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In this little book I have attempted to deal with a difficult branch of
psychology in a way that shall make it intelligible and interesting to any
cultivated reader, and that shall imply no previous familiarity with psy-
chological treatises on his part; for I hope that the book may be of ser-
vice to students of all the social sciences, by providing them with the
minimum of psychological doctrine that is an indispensable part of the
equipment for work in any of these sciences. I have not thought it neces-
sary to enter into a discussion of the exact scope of social psychology
and of its delimitation from sociology or the special social sciences; for
I believe that such questions may be left to solve themselves in the course
of time with the advance of the various branches of science concerned.
I would only say that I believe social psychology to offer for research a
vast and fertile field, which has been but little worked hitherto, and that
in this book I have attempted to deal only with its most fundamental
problems, those the solution of which is a presupposition of all profit-
able work in the various branches of the science.
If I have severely criticised some of the views from which I dissent,
and have connected these views with the names of writers who have
maintained them, it is because I believe such criticism to be a great aid
to clearness of exposition and also to be much needed in the present
state of psychology; the names thus made use of were chosen because
the bearers of them are authors well known for their valuable contribu-
tions to mental science. I hope that this brief acknowledgment may serve
as an apology to any of them under whose eyes my criticisms may fall.
I owe also some apology to my fellow-workers for the somewhat dog-
matic tone I have adopted. I would not be taken to believe that my utter-
ances upon any of the questions dealt with are infallible or incapable of6/William McDougall
being improved upon; but repeated expressions of deference and of the
sense of my own uncertainty would be out of place in a semi-popular
work of this character and would obscure the course of my exposition.
Although I have tried to make this book intelligible and useful to
those who are not professed students of psychology, it is by no means a
mere dishing up of current doctrines for popular consumption; and it
may add to its usefulness in the hands of professional psychologists if I
indicate here the principal points which, to the best of my belief, are
original contributions to psychological doctrine.
In Chapter II I have tried to render fuller and clearer the concep-
tions of instinct and of instinctive process, from both the psychical and
the nervous sides.
In Chapter III. I have elaborated a principle, briefly enunciated in a
previous work, which is, I believe, of the first importance for the under-
standing of the life of emotion and action—the principle, namely, that
all emotion is the affective aspect of instinctive process. The adoption
of this principle leads me to define emotion more strictly and narrowly
than has been done by other writers; and I have used it as a guide in
attempting to distinguish the more important of the primary emotions.
In Chapter IV. I have combated the current view that imitation is to
be ascribed to an instinct of imitation; and I have attempted to give
greater precision to the conception of suggestion, and to define the prin-
cipal conditions of suggestibility. I have adopted a view of the most
simple and primitive form of sympathy that has been previously enunci-
ated by Herbert Spencer and others, and have proposed what seems to
be the only possible theory of the way in which sympathetic induction of
emotion takes place. I have then suggested a modification of Professor
Groos’s theory of play, and in this connection have indulged in a specu-
lation as to the peculiar nature and origin of the emulative impulse.
In Chapter V. I have elaborated the conception of a “sentiment”
which is a relatively novel one. Since this is the key to all the construc-
tive, as contrasted with the more purely analytical, part of the book, I
desire to state as clearly as possible its relations to kindred conceptions
of other authors. In the preface to the first edition of this book I attrib-
uted the conception of the sentiments which was expounded in the text
to Mr. A. F. Shand. But on the publication of his important work on
“The Foundations of Character” in the year 1914, I found that the con-
ception I had developed differed very importantly from his as expounded
at length in that work. I had to some extent misinterpreted the very briefAn Introduction to Social Psychology/7
statements: of his earlier publications, and had read into them my own
meaning. Although I still recognise that Mr. Shand has the merit of
having first clearly shown the need of psychology for some such con-
ception, I must in the interests of truth point out that my conception of
the sentiment and its relation to the emotion is so different from his as to
be in reality a rival doctrine rather than a development of it. Looking
back, I can now see that the germ of my conception was contained in
and derived by me from Professor Stout’s chapter on “Emotions” in his
“Manual of Psychology.” At the time of writing the book I was not
acquainted with the work of Freud and Jung and the other psycho-ana-
lysts. And I have been gratified to find that the workers of this important
school, approaching psychological problems from the point of view of
mental pathology, have independently arrived at a conception which is
almost identical with my notion of the sentiment. This is the conception
of the “complex” which now occupies a position of great importance in
psycho-analytic literature. Arrived at and still used mainly in the at-
tempt to understand the processes at work in the minds of neurotic pa-
tients, it has been recognised by some recent writers on mental pathol-
ogy (notably Dr. Bernard Hart) that the “complex,” or something very
like it, is not a feature of mental structure confined to the minds of
neurotic patients, and they are beginning to use the term in this wider
sense as denoting those structural features of the normal mind which I
have called sentiments. It would, I venture to suggest, contribute to the
development of our psychological terminology, if it could be agreed to
restrict the term “complex” to those pathological or morbid sentiments
in connexion with which it was first used, and to use “sentiment” as the
wider more general term to denote all those acquired conjunctions of
ideas with emotional-conative tendencies or dispositions the acquisition
and operating of which play so great a part both in normal and morbid
mental development.
In Chapter V. I have analysed the principal complex emotions in the
light of the conception of the sentiment and of the principle laid down in
Chapter II, respecting the relation of emotion to instinct. The analyses
reached are in many respects novel; and I venture to think that, though
they may need much correction in detail, they have the merit of having
been achieved by a method very much superior to the one commonly
pursued, the latter being that of introspective analysis unaided by any
previous determination of the primary emotions by the comparative
method.8/William McDougall
In Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX. I have applied the doctrine of the
sentiments and the results reached in the earlier chapters to the descrip-
tion of the organisation of the life of emotion and impulse, and have
built upon these foundations an account which is more definite than any
other with which I am acquainted. Attention may be drawn to the ac-
count offered of the nature of active or developed sympathy; but the
principal novelty contained in these chapters is what may, perhaps, with-
out abuse of the phrase, be called a theory of volition, and a sketch of
the development of character conceived as consisting in the organisation
of the sentiments in one harmonious system.
Of the heterogeneous assortment of ideas presented in the second
section of the book I find it impossible to say what and how much is
original. No doubt almost all of them derive from a moderately exten-
sive reading of anthropological and sociological literature.
Since the original publication of this book I have added three supple-
mentary chapters, one on “Theories of Action” to the fifth edition in
1912, one “On the Sex Instinct “to the eighth edition in 1914, and the
third on “The Derived Emotions” to the present edition. These addi-
tional chapters give the work, I think, more the character of a complete
treatise on the active side of man’s nature, a character at which I had not
aimed in the first instance; for I aimed chiefly at setting out my own
views so far as they seemed to me to be novel and original. I feel now
that yet another chapter is required to complete the work, namely one on
habit, and I hope to attempt this as soon as I may achieve some degree
of clearness on the subject in my own mind. Since the first publication
of this book, there have appeared several books dealing in part with the
same topics and offering some criticism of my views. Of these I have
found three especially interesting, namely Mr. Shand’s “Foundations of
Character,” Professor Thorndike’s “Original Nature of Man,” and Dr.
J. Drever’s “Instinct in Man.” With Mr. Shand’s aims and with his ran-
sacking of the poets for psychological evidence I have much sympathy,
but I find myself at variance with him over many matters of fundamen-
tal importance for the understanding of character. He regards the emo-
tions as highly complex innate dispositions, within which the instincts
are organised as merely so many sensory-motor dispositions to particu-
lar bodily movements. A second important difference is that he regards
the sentiments as innately organised systems of emotional dispositions;
thus for him both love and hate are innate sentiments, and each of them
consists of the dispositions of four emotions, joy, sorrow, anger, andAn Introduction to Social Psychology/9
fear, linked together to form one system. In my view the sentiments are
acquired through individual experience, and where two or more emo-
tional dispositions become conjoined in the structure of one sentiment,
as when fear and anger are combined in the sentiment of hate, we have
to regard these two dispositions as connected, not directly with one an-
other, but only indirectly through the association of each with the par-
ticular object of this particular sentiment of hatred. Those are, I think,
the most deep-lying differences between his view and mine; but there
are many others which cannot be discussed here. Some of these differ-
ences have been set out and discussed in a symposium on “Instinct and
the Emotions,” published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
for 1914. Those readers who are interested in contrasting these views
may find some assistance there. Other differences are discussed at some
length in the new chapter which I have added to the present edition of
this book. Mr. Thorndike’s view of the constitution of man differs from
mine in the opposite way from Mr. Shand’s. While I postulate a few
great primary instincts, each capable, like those of the animals, of prompt-
ing and sustaining long trains of thought and action; and while Mr.
Shand postulate still more complex systems of innate dispositions, such
as preformed sentiments of love and hate, each comprising an array of
emotional dispositions and many instincts (in his sense of the word),
Mr. Thorndike, on the other hand, lays it down that our innate constitu-
tion consists of nothing more than a vast number of simple reflex ten-
dencies. How we are to conceive character and intellect as being built
up from such elements I utterly fail to grasp. This multitude of reflexes
correspond to Mr. Shand’s many instincts; these two authors, then, agree
in postulating a great number of very simple instinctive or reflex motor
tendencies as given in the innate constitution; they differ in that for Mr.
Thorndike they are a mere unorganised crowd of discrete unconnected
tendencies to movement; while for Mr. Shand they are somehow subor-
dinated to and organised within vast systems of emotional dispositions
and still more comprehensive systems of innate sentiments.
I am encouraged to find that my own position is midway between
these extreme views, that which postulates vastly complex innate
organisations comprising many emotional and conative dispositions, and
that which denies all but the most rudimentary conative reflexes to our
innate constitution. And I am further encouraged to believe that my
scheme of our innate conative endowment approximates to the truth by
Dr. Drever’s recent essay on “Instinct in Man.” For Dr. Drever has10/William McDougall
given us a careful historical survey of this question, and, after critically
considering the various views that have been put forward, comes to the
conclusion that the one set out in this book is the most acceptable. He is
not content with it in certain particulars; for example, he would prefer
to class as appetites certain of the tendencies which I have classed with
the instincts, such as the sex and the food-seeking tendencies; but I am
not convinced that it is possible to draw any clear line of separation, and
I would prefer to continue to regard instinct as the comprehensive class
or genus, of which the appetites are one species.
The distinction that Dr. Drever would have us sharply draw may
seem to be fairly clear in the human species; but it seems to me to break
down when we attempt to apply it at all rigidly to animal life. What
shall we say, for example, of the nest-building, the brooding, and the
migratory tendencies of birds? Are these instincts or appetites? I am
glad to note that Dr. Drever agrees with me also in respect of the other
most fundamental feature of this book, namely, he approves and accepts
the conception of the sentiment that I have attempted to develop. He,
however, makes in this connexion a suggestion which I am unable to
accept. I have proposed as the essential distinction between an instinct
and a sentiment the view that in the instinct the connexion between the
cognitive and the conative dispositions is innate, while in the sentiment
this connexion is acquired through individual experience.
Dr. Drever proposes to substitute for this the distinction that “the
instinct ‘disposition’ is perceptual, that is, involves only perceptual con-
sciousness, while the sentiment ‘ disposition ‘ is ideational, and is a
sentiment because it is ideational.” I cannot accept this for two good
reasons. First, I believe and have argued elsewhere that some instincts
(for example, some of the complex nest-building instincts of birds) are
ideational. Secondly, some animals which seem to be incapable of ide-
ation or representation seem nevertheless capable of acquiring through
experience connexions between particular perceptions and certain con-
ative-affective dispositions, as when they acquire a lasting fear of an
object towards which they are natively indifferent. Such an acquired
tendency is essentially of the nature of a sentiment, and I cannot see why
we should refuse to class it as a very simple perceptual sentiment.
Yet another of Dr. Drever’s suggestions I am unable to accept,
namely, that “the instinct- emotion is not an invariable accompaniment
of instinctive activity, but that the instinct interest is; that the instinct-
emotion is due to what we previously called ‘tension,’ that is, in theAn Introduction to Social Psychology/11
ordinary case, to arrest of the impulse, to the denying of immediate
satisfaction to the interest.” In maintaining this thesis Dr. Drever seems
to be putting forward independently a view which Professor Dewey has
long taught. But I have never felt that Dewey’s reasoning carried any
conviction to my mind, nor can I see that Drever has added anything to
it. If the instinctive disposition is so constituted as to be capable of
generating the appropriate emotion when its impulse is denied immedi-
ate satisfaction, it is difficult to see any theoretical ground for denying it
this capacity when its activity is unobstructed; nor does inspection of
the facts seem to me to yield any more evidence in support of this view
than the theoretical consideration of the possibilities. Surely, it is merely
a matter of degree of intensity of the emotional excitement! Some of Dr.
Drever’s criticisms I am happy to be able to accept. Especially I have to
admit that he has convicted me of injustice to some of the philosophers
of the Scottish school, notably Dugald Stewart and Hutcheson, who had
in many respects anticipated me in my view of the place of instinct in
human nature. In my defence I can only plead sheer ignorance, and I
may attempt to throw off the blame for this by saying that I had fallen a
victim to the recent English fashion of over-rating the German schools
of philosophy and psychology at the expense of our British predeces-
sors. I am grateful to Dr. Drever for having corrected me in this matter.
In this part of psychology it is only by the consensus of opinion of
competent psychologists that any view or hypothesis can be established
or raised to the status of a theory that may confidently be taught or used
as a basis for further constructive work. And the only method of verifi-
cation open to us is the application of our hypothesis to the control and
guidance of human conduct, especially in the two great fields of educa-
tion and medicine. I am therefore much encouraged by the fact that in
both these fields my sketch of the active side of human nature and its
development in the individual has been found useful. Several writers on
educational psychology have acknowledged its value, and some of them
have incorporated the essence of it in books written for students of edu-
cation. I have noticed above that the doctrines of the psycho-analytic
school contain much that coincides with my views. This school has re-
alized the fundamental importance of instincts in human nature; and
though it has devoted an excessive, and in some cases an almost exclu-
sive, attention to the sex instinct, it recognises the existence of other
human instincts and is realising more fully that they, as well as the sex
instinct, may play a part in the genesis of the psycho-neuroses. Other12/William McDougall
workers in this field have applied, and in Various degrees approved, my
sketch, notably Dr. Morton Prince, who in his important work, “The
Unconscious,” published in 1914, has made large use of it and fur-
nished new evidence in support of it. In spite of these encouraging indi-
cations that the substance of this book presents an approximation to-
wards the truth, it can by no means be claimed that it has secured gen-
eral acceptance. The greater number of the more influential of psycholo-
gists seem still to give a very small place to instinct in human nature,
admitting as instinct at most only some simple and rudimentary tenden-
cies to particular forms of movement, such as the crawling, sucking,
and lalling of the infant. I may perhaps be allowed to testify that during
five years of military service, devoted almost wholly to the care of cases
of psycho-neurosis among soldiers and their treatment by the various
methods of psycho-therapy, I have found no reason to make any radical
alterations in my view of the innate constitution of man.
Some critics have complained of this book that it hardly begins to
treat of social psychology. One writes: “He seems to do a great deal of
packing in preparation for a journey on which he never starts.” I confess
that the title of the book lays me open to this charge. It should rather
have been called “Propaedeutic to Social Psychology,” for it was de-
signed to prepare the way for a treatise on Social Psychology. When I
came to attempt the writing of such a treatise, I found that the psychol-
ogy of the active and emotional side of our nature was in so backward a
condition that it was impossible to go on without first attempting to
attain to some clear and generally acceptable account of the innate ten-
dencies of human nature and of their organization under the touch of
individual experience to form the characters of individual men. I hoped
that this book would provide such an agreed basis for Social Psychol-
ogy. In that I have been disappointed. Its substance was more remote
from contemporary opinion than I had supposed. However, in spite of
this, I have decided at last to start on the journey for which I have done
my packing as thoroughly as my powers permit, and I am glad to report
that I have now in the press a book entitled “The Group Mind,” which
does actually make some attempt to deal with a part of the large field of
Social Psychology,
W. McD. Oxford, September, 1919.Chapter I
Introduction
Among students of the social sciences there has always been a certain
number who have recognised the fact that some knowledge of the hu-
man mind and of its modes of operation is an essential part of their
equipment, and that the successful development of the social sciences
must be dependent upon the fulness and accuracy of such knowledge.
These propositions are so obviously true that any formal attempt to
demonstrate them is superfluous. Those who do not accept them as soon
as they are made will not be convinced of their truth by any chain of
formal reasoning. It is, then, a remarkable fact that psychology, the
science which claims to formulate the body of ascertained truths about
the constitution and working of the mind, and which endeavours to re-
fine and to add to this knowledge, has not been generally and practically
recognised as the essential common foundation on which all the social
sciences—ethics, economics, political science, philosophy of history,
sociology, and cultural anthropology, and the more special social sci-
ences, such as the sciences of religion, of law, of education, and of art—
must be built up. Of the workers in these sciences, some, like Carets,
and, at the present time, M. Durkheim, repudiate the claim of psychol-
ogy to such recognition. Some do lip service to psychology, but in prac-
tice ignore it, and will sit down to write a treatise on morals or econom-
ics, or any other of the social sciences, cheerfully confessing that they
know nothing of psychology. A certain number, perhaps the majority, of
recent writers on social topics recognise the true position of psychology,
but in practice are content to take as their psychological foundations the
vague and extremely misleading psychology embodied in common speech,
with the addition of a few hasty assumptions about the mind made to14/William McDougall
suit their particular purposes. There are signs, however, that this regret-
table state of affairs is about to pass away, that psychology will before
long be accorded in universal practice the position at the base of the
social sciences which the more clear-sighted have long seen that it ought
to occupy.
Since this volume is designed to promote this change of practice, it
is fitting that it should open with a brief inquiry into the causes of the
anomalous state of affairs at present obtaining and with some indication
of the way in which it is hoped that the change may be brought about.
For there can be no question that the lack of practical recognition of
psychology by the workers in the social sciences has been in the main
due to its deficiencies, and that the only way of establishing it in its true
place is to make good these deficiencies. What, then, are these deficien-
cies, and why have they so long persisted? We may attempt very briefly
to indicate the answers to these questions without presuming to appor-
tion any blame for the long continuance of these deficiencies between
the professed psychologists and the workers in the social sciences.
The department of psychology that is of primary importance for the
social sciences is that which deals with the springs of human action, the
impulses and motives that sustain mental and bodily activity and regu-
late conduct; and this, of all the departments of psychology, is the one
that has remained in the most backward state, in which the greatest
obscurity, vagueness, and confusion still reign. The answers to such
problems as the proper classification of conscious states, the analysis of
them into their elements, the nature of these elements and the laws of the
compounding of them, have but little bearing upon the social sciences;
the same may be said of the range of problems connected with the rela-
tions of soul and body, of psychical and physical process, of conscious-
ness and brain processes; and also of the discussion of the more purely
intellectual processes, of the way we arrive at the perception of relations
of time and place or of likeness and difference, of the classification and
description of the intellectual processes of ideation, conception, com-
parison, and abstraction, and of their relations to one another. Not these
processes themselves, but only the results or products of these pro-
cesses—the knowledge or system “of ideas and beliefs achieved by them,
and the way in which these ideas and beliefs regulate conduct and deter-
mine social institutions and the relations of men to one another in soci-
ety are of immediate importance for the social sciences. It is the mental
forces, the sources of energy, which set the ends and sustain the courseAn Introduction to Social Psychology/15
of all human activity—of which forces the intellectual processes are but
the servants, instruments, or means—that must be clearly defined, and
whose history in the race and in the individual must be made clear,
before the social sciences can build upon a firm psychological founda-
tion. Now, it is with the questions of the former classes that psycholo-
gists have chiefly concerned themselves and in regard to which they
have made the most progress towards a consistent and generally accept-
able body of doctrine: and they have unduly neglected these more so-
cially important problems. This has been the result of several condi-
tions, a result which we, looking back upon the history of the sciences,
can see to have been inevitable. It was inevitable that, when men began
to reflect upon the complex phenomena of social life, they should have
concentrated their attention upon the problems immediately presented,
and should have sought to explain them deductively from more or less
vaguely conceived principles that they entertained they knew not why or
how, principles that were the formulations of popular conceptions, slowly
grown up in the course of countless generations and rendered more ex-
plicit, but hardly less obscure, by the labours of theologians and meta-
physicians. And when, in the eighteenth century and the early part of the
nineteenth century, the modern principles of scientific method began to
be generally accepted and to be applied to all or most objects of human
speculation, and the various social sciences began to be marked off from
one another along the modern lines, it was inevitable that the workers in
each department of social science should have continued in the same
way, attempting to explain social phenomena from proximate principles
which they falsely conceived to be fundamental, rather than to obtain a
deeper knowledge of the fundamental constitution of the human mind. It
was not to be expected that generations of workers, whose primary in-
terest it was to lay down general rules for the guidance of human activ-
ity in the great fields of legislation, of government, of private and public
conduct, should have deliberately put aside the attempt to construct the
sciences of these departments of life, leaving them to the efforts of after-
coming generations, while they devoted themselves to the preparatory
work of investigating the individual mind, in order to secure the basis of
psychological truth on which the labours of their successors might rear
the social sciences. The problems confronting them were too urgent;
customs, laws, and institutions demanded theoretical justification, and
those who called out for social reform sought to strengthen their case
with theoretical demonstrations of its justice and of its conformity with16/William McDougall
the accepted principles of human nature.
And even if these early workers in the social sciences had made this
impossible self-denying ordinance, it would not have been possible for
them to achieve the psychology that was needed. For a science still more
fundamental, one whose connection with the social phenomena they
sought to explain or justify was still more remote and obscure, had yet
to be created— namely, the science of biology. It is only a comparative
and evolutionary psychology that can provide the needed basis; and this
could not be created before the work of Darwin had convinced men of
the continuity of human with animal evolution as regards all bodily
characters, and had prepared the way for the quickly following recogni-
tion of the similar continuity of man’s mental evolution with that of the
animal world.
Hence the workers in each of the social sciences, approaching their
social problems in the absence of any established body of psychological
truth and being compelled to make certain assumptions about the mind,
made them ad hoc; and in this way they provided the indispensable
minimum of psychological doctrine required by each of them. Many of
these assumptions contained sufficient truth to give them a certain plau-
sibility; but they were usually of such a sweeping character as to leave
no room for, and to disguise the need for, more accurate and detailed
psychological analysis. And not only were these assumptions made by
those who had not prepared themselves for the task by long years of
study of the mind in all its many aspects and by the many possible
avenues of approach, but they were not made with the single- hearted
aim of discovering the truth; rather they were commonly made under the
bias of an interest in establishing some normative doctrine; the search
for what is was clogged and misled at every step by the desire to estab-
lish some preconceived view as to what ought to be. When, then, psy-
chology began very slowly and gradually to assert its status as an inde-
pendent science, it found all that part of its province which has the most
immediate and important bearing on the social sciences already occu-
pied by the fragmentary and misleading psychological assumptions of
the workers in these sciences; and these workers naturally resented all
attempts of psychology to encroach upon the territory they had learned
to look upon as their own; for such attempts would have endangered
their systems.
The psychologists, endeavouring to define their science and to mark
it off from other sciences, were thus led to accept a too narrow view ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/17
its scope and methods and applications. They were content for the most
part to define it as the science of consciousness, and to regard introspec-
tion as its only method; for the introspective analysis and description of
conscious states was a part of the proper work of psychology that had
not been undertaken by any other of the sciences. The insistence upon
introspection as the one method of the science tended to prolong the
predominance of this narrow and paralysing view of the scope of the
science; for the life of emotion and the play of motives is the part of our
mental life which offers the least advantageous field for introspective
observation and description. The cognitive or intellectual processes, on
the other hand, present a rich and varied content of consciousness which
lends itself well to introspective discrimination, analysis, and descrip-
tion; in comparison with it, the emotional and conative consciousness
has but little variety of content, and that little is extremely obscure and
elusive of introspection.
Then, shortly after the Darwinian ideas had revolutionised the bio-
logical sciences, and when it might have been hoped that psychologists
would have been led to take a wider view of their science and to assert
its rights to its whole field, the introduction of the experimental methods
of introspection absorbed the energies of a large proportion of the work-
ers in the re-survey, by the new and more accurate methods, of the ground
already worked by the method of simple introspection.
Let us note some instances of the unfortunate results of this prema-
ture annexation of the most important and obscure region of psychology
by the sciences which should, in the logical order of things, have found
the fundamental psychological truths ready to their hands as a firm ba-
sis for their constructions.
Ethics affords perhaps the most striking example; for any writer on
this subject necessarily encounters psychological problems on every hand,
and treatises on ethics are apt to consist very largely of amateur
psychologising. Among the earlier moralists the lack of psychological
insight led to such doctrines as that of certain Stoics, to the effect that
the wise and good man should seek to eradicate the emotions from his
bosom; or that of Kant, to the effect that the wise and good man should
be free from desire. Putting aside, however, these quaint notions of the
earlier writers, we may note that in modern times three false and hasty
assumptions of the kind stigmatised above have played leading roles
and have furnished a large part of the matter with which ethical contro-
versy has been busied during the nineteenth century. First in importance18/William McDougall
perhaps as a topic for controversy was the doctrine known as psycho-
logical hedonism, the doctrine that the motives of all human activity are
the desire of pleasure and the aversion to pain. Hand in hand with this
went the false assumption that happiness and pleasure are synonymous
terms. These two false assumptions were adopted as the psychological
foundation of utilitarianism; they rendered that doctrine repugnant to
many of the best minds and drove them to fall back upon vague and
mystical conceptions. Of these the old conception of a special faculty of
moral intuition, a conscience, a moral sense or instinct, was the most
important; and this was the third of the trio of false psychological as-
sumptions on which ethical systems were based. Many of those who
adopted some form of this last assumption were in the habit of supple-
menting it by similar assumptions hastily made to afford explanations
of any tendencies they noted in human conduct which their master prin-
ciple was inadequate to meet; they postulated strange instincts of all
kinds as lightly and easily as a conjurer produces eggs from a hat or a
phrenologist discovers bumps on a head.
It is instructive to note that as recently as the year 1893 the late
Professor H. Sidgwick, one of the leaders of the ethical thought of his
time, still inverted the problem; like his predecessors he assumed that
moral or reasonable action is normal and natural to man in virtue of
some vaguely conceived principle, and in all seriousness wrote an ar-
ticle1 to prove that “unreasonable action” is possible and is actually
achieved occasionally, and to explain if possible this strange anomalous
fact. He quotes Bentham’s dictum that “on the occasion of every act he
exercises every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which,
according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in
the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness.” He points
out that, although J. S. Mill admitted certain exceptions to this prin-
ciple, his general view was that “to desire anything, except in propor-
tion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical impossibility.” So that,
according to this school, any action of an individual that does not tend
to produce for him the maximum of pleasure can only arise from an
error of judgment as to the relative quantities of pleasure that will be
secured by different lines of action. And, since, according to this school,
all actions ought to be directed to securing a maximum of pleasure,
action of any other kind is not only unreasonable action, but also im-
moral action; for it is action in a way other than the way in which the
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doctrine that unreasonable action (or wilful action not in accordance
with what the individual knows that he ought to do) is exceptional, para-
doxical, or abnormal is not peculiar to the utilitarians, but is common
also to theft opponents; he takes as an example T. H. Green, who “still
lays down as broadly as Bentham that every person in every moral ac-
tion, virtuous or vicious, presents to himself some possible state or
achievement of his own as for the time his greatest good, and acts for
the sake of that good, and that this is how he ought to act.” So that
Green only differs from Bentham and Mill in putting good in the place
of pleasure, and for the rest makes the same grotesquely false assump-
tion as they do. Sidgwick then, instead of attacking and rejecting as
radically false the conception of human motives common to both classes
of his predecessors, goes on in all seriousness to offer a psychological
explanation of the paradox that men do sometimes act unreasonably
and otherwise than they ought to act. That is to say, Sidgwick, like those
whom he criticises, accepts the doctrine that men normally and in the
vast majority of cases act reasonably and as they ought to act, in virtue
of some unexplained principle of their constitution, and defines as a
problem for solution the fact that they sometimes act otherwise. But the
truth is that men are moved by a variety of impulses whose nature has
been determined through long ages of the evolutionary process without
reference to the life of men in civilised societies; and the psychological
problem we have to solve, and with which this book is mainly con-
cerned, is—How can we account for the fact that men so moved ever
come to act as they ought, or morally and reasonably?
One is driven to suppose that the minds of the moral philosophers
who maintain these curious views as to the sources and nature of human
conduct are either constitutionally devoid of the powerful impulses that
so often move ordinary men to actions which they know to be morally
wrong and against their true interests and destructive of their happiness,
or so completely moralised by strict self-discipline that these powerful
impulses are completely subordinated and hardly make themselves felt
But, if either alternative is true, it is unfortunate that their peculiar con-
stitutions should have led these philosophers to base the social sciences
on profoundly fallacious psychological doctrines.
Political economy suffered hardly less from the crude nature of the
psychological assumptions from which it professed to deduce the expla-
nations of its facts and its prescriptions for economic legislation. It would
be a libel, not altogether devoid of truth, to say that the classical politi-20/William McDougall
cal economy was a tissue of false conclusions drawn from false psycho-
logical assumptions. And certainly the recent progress in economic doc-
trine has largely consisted in, or resulted from, the recognition of the
need for a less inadequate psychological basis. An example illustrating
these two facts will be not out of place. The great assumption of the
classical political economy was that man is a reasonable being who
always intelligently seeks his own good or is guided in all his activities
by enlightened self-interest; and this was usually combined with the
psychological hedonism which played so large a part in degrading utili-
tarian ethics; that is to say, good was identified with pleasure. From
these assumptions, which contained sufficient truth to be plausible, it
was deduced, logically enough, that free competition in an open market
will secure a supply of goods at the lowest possible rate. But mankind is
only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently
moved in quite unreasonable ways. The economists had neglected to
take account of the suggestibility of men which renders the arts of the
advertiser, of the “pushing” of goods generally, so profitable and effec-
tive. Only on taking this character of men into account can we under-
stand such facts as that sewing machines, which might be sold at a fair
profit for £5, find a large sale at £12, while equally good ones are sold
in the same market at less than half the price. The same deduction as to
competition and prices has been signally falsified by those cases in which
the establishment by trusts or corporations of virtual monopolies in ar-
ticles of universal consumption has led to a reduction of the market
prices of those commodities; or again, by the fact that so enormous a
proportion of the price paid for goods goes into the pockets of small
shopkeepers and other economically pernicious middlemen.
As an example of the happy effect of the recent introduction of less
crude psychology into economic discussions, it will suffice to mention
Mrs. Bosanquet’s work on “The Standard of Life.”
In political science no less striking illustrations may be found. What
other than an error due to false psychological assumptions was the cos-
mopolitanism of the Manchester school, with its confident prophecy of
the universal brotherhood of man brought about by enlightened self-
interest assigning to each region and people the work for which it was
best suited? This prophecy has been notoriously falsified by a great
outburst of national spirit, which has played the chief part in shaping
European history during the last half-century.
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deduction from hasty, incomplete, and misleading, if not absolutely false,
assumptions as to the human mind. We may take as a fair example the
assumptions that V. Cousin made the foundation of his philosophy of
history. Cousin, after insisting strongly upon the fundamental impor-
tance of psychological analysis for the interpretation of history, pro-
ceeds as follows:2 “The various manifestations and phases of social life
are all traced back to tendencies of human nature from which they spring,
from five fundamental wants each of which has corresponding to it a
general idea. The idea of the useful gives rise to mathematical and physical
science, industry, and political economy; the idea of the just to civil
society, the State, and jurisprudence; the idea of the beautiful to art; the
idea of God to religion and worship; and the idea of truth in itself, in its
highest degree and under its purest form, to philosophy. These ideas are
argued to be simple and indecomposable, to coexist in every mind, to
constitute the whole foundation of humanity, and to follow in the order
mentioned.” No better illustration of the truth of the foregoing remarks
could be found. We have here the spectacle of a philosopher, who ex-
erted a great influence on the thought of his own country, and who rightly
conceived the relation of psychology to the social sciences, but who, in
the absence of any adequate psychology, contents himself with concoct-
ing on the spur of the moment the most flimsy substitute for it in the
form of these five assumptions.
As for the philosophies of history that make no pretence of a psy-
chological foundation, they are sufficiently characterised by M. Fouillée
who, when writing of the development of sociology, says: “Elle est née
en effet d’une étude en grande partie mythique ou poetique: je veux
parler de la philosophie de l’histoire telle que les metaphysiciens ou les
théologiens l’ont d’abord conçue, et qui est à la sociologie positive ce
que l’alchimie fut à la chimie, l’astrologie a l’astronomie.”3
From the science of jurisprudence we may take, as a last illustra-
tion, the retributive doctrine of punishment, which is still held by a con-
siderable number of writers. This barbarous conception of the grounds
on which punishment is justified arises naturally from the doctrine of
free-will; to any one who holds this doctrine in any thorough-going form
there can be no other rational view of punishment than the retributive;
for since, according to this assumption, where human action la con-
cerned, the future course of events is not determined by the present,
punishment cannot be administered in the forward-looking attitude with
a view to deterrence or to moral improvement, but only in the backward22/William McDougall
looking vengeful attitude of retribution. The fuller becomes our insight
into the springs of human conduct, the more impossible does it become
to maintain this antiquated doctrine; so that here, too, progress depends
upon the improvement of psychology.
One might take each of the social sciences in turn and illustrate in
each case the great need for a true doctrine of human motives. But,
instead of doing that, I will merely sum up on the issue of the work of
the nineteenth century as follows:—During the last century most of the
workers in the social sciences were of two parties—those on the one
hand who with the utilitarians reduced all motives to the search for
pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and those on the other hand who,
recoiling from this hedonistic doctrine, sought the mainspring of con-
duct in some vaguely conceived intuitive faculty variously named the
conscience, the moral faculty, instinct, or sense; Before the close of the
century the doctrines of both of these parties were generally seen to be
fallacious; but no satisfactory substitute for them was generally accepted,
and by the majority of psychologists nothing better was offered to fill
the gap than a mere word, “the will,” or some such phrase as “the ten-
dency of ideas to self-realisation.” On the other hand, Darwin, in the
“Descent of Man “ (1871) first enunciated the true doctrine of human
motives, and showed how we must proceed, relying chiefly upon the
comparative and natural history method, if we would arrive at a fuller
understanding of them. But Darwin’s own account suffered from the
deference he paid, under protest, to the doctrine of psychological hedo-
nism, still dominant at that time; and his lead has been followed by
comparatively few psychologists, and but little has yet been done to
carry forward the work he began and to refine upon his first rough
sketch of the history of human motives.
Enough has been said to illustrate the point of view from which this
volume has been written, and to enforce the theme of this introductory
chapter, namely, that psychologists must cease to be content with the
sterile and narrow conception of their science as the science of con-
sciousness, and must boldly assert its claim to be the positive science of
the mind in all its aspects and modes of functioning, or, as I would
prefer to say, the positive science of conduct or behaviour.4 Psychology
must not regard the introspective description of the stream of conscious-
ness as its whole task, but only as a preliminary part of its work. Such
introspective description, such “pure psychology,” can never constitute
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ence; and it can never in itself be of any great value to the social sci-
ences. The basis required by all of them is a comparative and physi-
ological psychology relying largely on objective methods, the observa-
tion of the behaviour of men and of animals of all varieties under all
possible conditions of health and disease. It must take the largest pos-
sible view of its scope and functions, and must be an evolutionary natu-
ral history of mind. Above all, it must aim at providing a full and accu-
rate account of those most fundamental elements of our constitution, the
innate tendencies to thought and action that constitute the native basis
of the mind.
Happily this more generous conception of psychology is beginning
to prevail. The mind is no longer regarded as a mere tabula rasa or
magic mirror whose function it is passively to receive impressions from
the outer world or to throw imperfect reflections of its objects—“a row
of moving shadow-shapes that come and go.” Nor are we any longer
content to supplement this Lockian conception of mind with only two
principles of intrinsic activity, that of the association and reproduction
of ideas, and that of the tendency to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. The
discovery is being made that the old psychologising was like the playing
of “Hamlet” with the Prince of Denmark left out, or like describing
steam-engines while ignoring the fact of the presence and fundamental
role of the fire or other source of heat. On every hand we hear it said that
the static, descriptive, purely analytic psychology must give place to a
dynamic, functional, voluntaristic view of mind.
A second very important advance of psychology towards useful-
ness is due to the increasing recognition of the extent to which the adult
human mind is the product of the moulding influence exerted by the
social environment, and of the fact that the strictly individual human
mind, with which alone the older introspective and descriptive psychol-
ogy concerned itself, is an abstraction merely and has no real existence.
It is needless to attempt to describe the many and complex influ-
ences through which these changes are being effected. It suffices to note
the happy fact and briefly to indicate the way in which this book aims to
contribute its mite towards the building up of a psychology that will at
last furnish the much needed basis of the social sciences and of the
comprehensive science of sociology. The first section begins with the
elucidation of that part of the native basis of the mind which is the
source of all our bodily and mental activity. In Chapter II I have at-
tempted to render as clear and definite as possible the conception of an24/William McDougall
instinct, and to make clear the relation of instinct to mental process and
the fundamental importance of the instincts; in the third chapter I have
sought to enumerate and briefly to define the principal human instincts;
and in the fourth I have defined certain general functional tendencies
which, though they are sometimes classed with the instincts, are of a
different nature. I have not thought it necessary to make any elaborate
criticism of psychological hedonism, as that doctrine is now sufficiently
exploded. In the following chapters of this section I have attempted to
describe in general terms the way in which these native tendencies of
our constitution co-operate to determine the course of the life of emotion
and action; to show how, under the influence of the social environment,
they become gradually organised in systems of increasing complexity,
while they remain unchanged as regards their most essential attributes;
to show that, although it is no longer easy to trace to their source the
complex manifestations of human character and will, it is nevertheless
possible to sketch in rough outline the course of this development and to
exhibit human volition of the highest moral type as but a more complex
conjunction of the mental forces which we may trace in the evolutionary
scale far back into the animal kingdom.
This first section of the book deals, then, with the characters of the
individual mind that are of prime importance for the social life of man.
Of this section it might be said that it is not properly a part of a social
psychology. Nevertheless it is an indispensable preliminary of all social
psychology, and, since no consistent and generally acceptable scheme
of this kind has hitherto been furnished, it was necessary to attempt it. It
may even be contended that it deals with the fundamental problem of
social psychology. For social psychology has to show how, given the
native propensities and capacities of the individual human mind, all the
complex mental life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts
upon the course of their development and operation in the individual.
And of this task the primary and most essential part is the showing how
the life of highly organised societies, involving as it does high moral
qualities of character and conduct on the part of the great mass of men,
is at all possible to creatures that have been evolved from the animal
world, whose nature bears so many of the marks of this animal origin,
and whose principal springs of activity are essentially similar to those
of the higher animals. For, as Dr. Rashdall well says, “the raw material,
so to speak, of Virtue and Vice is the same— i.e., desires which in
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ther moral or immoral but simply non-moral.”5 That is to say, the fun-
damental problem of social psychology is the moralisation of the indi-
vidual by the society into which he is born as a creature in which the
non-moral and purely egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any
altruistic tendencies. This moralisation or socialisation of the individual
is, then, the essential theme of this section.
In Section II. I have briefly indicated some of the ways in which the
principal instincts and primary tendencies of the human mind play their
parts in the lives of human societies; my object being to bring home to
the reader the truth that the understanding of the life of society in any or
all of its phases presupposes a knowledge of the constitution of the hu-
man mind, a truth which, though occasionally acknowledged in prin-
ciple, is in practice so frequently ignored.Section I
The Mental Characters of Man of Primary
Importance for His Life in Society
Chapter II
The Nature of Instincts and Their Place in the
Constitution of the Human Mind
The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the
essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, whether
individual or collective, and are the bases from which the character and
will of individuals and of nations are gradually developed under the
guidance of the intellectual faculties. These primary innate tendencies
have different relative strengths in the native constitutions of the indi-
viduals of different races, and they are favoured or checked in very
different degrees by the very different social circumstances of men in
different stages of culture; but they are probably common to the men of
every race and of every age. If this view, that human nature has every-
where and at all times this common native foundation, can be estab-
lished, it will afford a much-needed basis for speculation on the history
of the development of human societies and human institutions. For so
long as it is possible to assume, as has often been done, that these innate
tendencies of the human mind have varied greatly from age to age and
from race to race, all such speculation is founded on quicksand and we
cannot hope to reach views of a reasonable degree of certainty.
The evidence that the native basis of the human mind, constituted
by the sum of these innate tendencies, has this stable unchanging char-
acter is afforded by comparative psychology. For we find, not only that
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races now living on the earth, but that we may find all of them, or at
least the germs of them, in most of the higher animals. Hence there can
be little doubt that they played the same essential part in the minds of
the primitive human stock, or stocks, and in the pre-human ancestors
that bridged the great gap in the evolutionary series between man and
the animal world.
These all-important and relatively unchanging tendencies, which
form the basis of human character and will, are of two main classes—
(1) The specific tendencies or instincts;
(2) The general or non-specific tendencies arising out of the consti-
tution of mind and the nature of mental process in general, when mind
and mental process attain a certain degree of complexity in the course of
evolution.
In the present and seven following chapters I propose to define the
more important of these specific and general tendencies, and to sketch
very briefly the way in which they become systematised in the course of
character-formation; and in the second section of this volume some at-
tempt will be made to illustrate the special importance of each one for
the social life of man.
Contemporary writers of all classes make frequent use of the words
“instinct” and “instinctive,” but, with very few exceptions, they use them
so loosely that they have almost spoilt them for scientific purposes. On
the one hand, the adjective “instinctive” is commonly applied to every
human action that is performed without deliberate reflexion; on the other
hand, the actions of animals are popularly attributed to instinct, and in
this connexion instinct is vaguely conceived as a mysterious faculty,
utterly different in nature from any human faculty, which Providence
has given to the brutes because the higher faculty of reason has been
denied them. Hundreds of passages might be quoted from contemporary
authors, even some of considerable philosophical culture, to illustrate
how these two words are used with a minimum of meaning, generally
with the effect of disguising from the writer the obscurity and incoher-
ence of his thought. The following examples will serve to illustrate at
once this abuse and the hopeless laxity with which even cultured au-
thors habitually make use of psychological terms. One philosophical
writer on social topics tells us that the power of the State “is dependent
on the instinct of subordination, which is the outcome of the desire of
the people, more or less distinctly conceived, for certain social ends”:
another asserts that ancestor-worship has survived amongst the West-28/William McDougall
ern peoples as a “mere tradition and instinct”: a medical writer has re-
cently asserted that if a drunkard is fed on fruit he will “become instinc-
tively a teetotaler”: a political writer tells us that “the Russian people is
rapidly acquiring a political instinct”: from a recent treatise on morals
by a distinguished philosopher two passages, fair samples of a large
number, may be taken; one describes the “notion that blood demands
blood” as an “inveterate instinct of primitive humanity”; the other af-
firms that “punishment originates in the instinct of vengeance”: another
of our most distinguished philosophers asserts that “popular instinct
maintains” that “there is a theory and a justification of social coercion
latent in the term ‘self-government.’” As our last illustration we may
take the following passage from an avowedly psychological article in a
recent number of the Spectator: “The instinct of contradiction, like the
instinct of acquiescence, is inborn.... These instincts are very deep-rooted
and absolutely incorrigible, either from within or from without. Both
springing as they do from a radical defect, from a want of original inde-
pendence, they affect the whole mind and character.” These are favourable
examples of current usage, and they justify the statement that these words
“instinct” and “instinctive” are commonly used as a cloak for ignorance
when a writer attempts to explain any individual or collective action
that he fails, or has not tried, to under, stand. Yet there can be no under-
standing of the development of individual character or of individual and
collective conduct unless the nature of instinct and its scope and func-
tion in the human mind are clearly and firmly grasped.
It would be difficult to find any adequate mention of instincts in
treatises on human psychology written before the middle of last century.
But the work of Darwin and of Herbert Spencer has lifted to some ex-
tent the veil of mystery from the instincts of animals, and has made the
problem of the relation of instinct to human intelligence and conduct
one of the most widely discussed in recent years.
Among professed psychologists there is now fair agreement as to
the usage of the terms “instinct” and “instinctive.” By the great majority
they are used only to denote certain innate specific tendencies of the
mind that are common to all members of any one species, racial charac-
ters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of spe-
cies to their environment and that can be neither eradicated from the
mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired by
individuals in the course of their lifetime. A few writers, of whom Pro-
fessor Wundt is the most prominent, apply the terms to the very stronglyAn Introduction to Social Psychology/29
fixed, acquired habits of action that are more commonly and properly
described as secondarily automatic actions, as well as to the innate spe-
cific tendencies. The former usage seems in every way preferable and is
adopted in these pages.
But, even among those psychologists who use the terms in this stricter
sense, there are still great differences of opinion as to the place of in-
stinct in the human mind. All agree that man has been evolved from pre-
human ancestors whose lives were dominated by instincts; but some
hold that, as man’s intelligence and reasoning powers developed, his
instincts atrophied, until now in civilised man instincts persist only as
troublesome vestiges of his pre-human state, vestiges that are compa-
rable to the vermiform appendix and which, like the latter, might with
advantage be removed by the surgeon’s knife, if that were at all pos-
sible. Others assign them a more prominent place in the constitution of
the human mind; for they see that intelligence, as it increased with the
evolution of the higher animals and of man, did not supplant and so lead
to the atrophy of the instincts, but rather controlled and modified their
operation; and some, like G. H. Schneider6 and William James,7 main-
tain that man has at least as many instincts as any of the animals, and
assign them a leading part in the determination of human conduct and
mental process. This last view is now rapidly gaining ground; and this
volume, I hope, may contribute in some slight degree to promote the
recognition of the full scope and function of the human instincts; for this
recognition will, I feel sure, appear to those who come after us as the
most important advance made by psychology in our time.
Instinctive actions are displayed in their purest form by animals not
very high in the scale of intelligence. In the higher vertebrate animals
few instinctive modes of behaviour remain purely instinctive—i.e., un-
modified by intelligence and by habits acquired under the guidance of
intelligence or by imitation. And even the human infant, whose intelli-
gence remains but little developed for so many months after birth, per-
forms few purely instinctive actions; because in the human being the
instincts, although innate, are, with few exceptions, undeveloped in the
first months of life, and only ripen, or become capable of functioning, at
various periods throughout the years from infancy to puberty.
Insect life affords perhaps the most striking examples of purely in-
stinctive action. There are many instances of insects that invariably lay
their eggs in the only places where the grubs, when hatched, will find the
food they need and can eat, or where the larvae will be able to attach30/William McDougall
themselves as parasites to some host in a way that is necessary to their
survival. In such cases it is clear that the behaviour of the parent is
determined by the impressions made on its senses by the appropriate
objects or places: e.g., the smell of decaying flesh leads the carrion-fly
to deposit its eggs upon it; the sight or odour of some particular flower
leads another to lay its eggs among the ovules of the flower, which serve
as food to the grubs. Others go through more elaborate trains of action,
as when the mason-wasp lays its eggs in a mud-nest, fills up the space
with caterpillars, which it paralyses by means of well-directed stings,
and seals it up; so that the caterpillars remain as a supply of fresh ani-
mal food for the young which the parent will never see and of whose
needs it can have no knowledge or idea.
Among the lower vertebrate animals also instinctive actions, hardly
at all modified by intelligent control, are common. The young chick
runs to his mother in response to a call of peculiar quality and nestles
beneath her; the young squirrel brought up in lonely captivity, when
nuts are given him for the first time, opens and eats some and buries
others with all the movements characteristic of his species; the kitten in
the presence of a dog or a mouse assumes the characteristic feline atti-
tudes and behaves as all his fellows of countless generations have be-
haved. Even so intelligent an animal as the domesticated dog behaves on
some occasions in a purely instinctive fashion; when, for example, a
terrier comes across the trail of a rabbit, his hunting instinct is immedi-
ately aroused by the scent; he becomes blind and deaf to all other im-
pressions as he follows the trail, and then, when he sights his quarry,
breaks out into the yapping which is peculiar to occasions of this kind.
His wild ancestors hunted in packs, and, under those conditions, the
characteristic bark emitted on sighting the quarry served to bring his
fellows to his aid; but when the domesticated terrier hunts alone, his
excited yapping can but facilitate the escape of his quarry; yet the old
social instinct operates too powerfully to be controlled by his moderate
intelligence.
These few instances of purely instinctive behaviour illustrate clearly
its nature. In the typical case some sense-impression, or combination of
sense-impressions, excites some perfectly definite behaviour, some move-
ment or train of movements which is the same in all individuals of the
species and on all similar occasions; and in general the behaviour so
occasioned is of a kind either to promote the welfare of the individual
animal or of the community to which he belongs, or to secure the per-An Introduction to Social Psychology/31
petuation of the species.8
In treating of the instincts of animals, writers have usually described
them as innate tendencies to certain kinds of action, and Herbert Spencer’s
widely accepted definition of instinctive action as compound reflex ac-
tion takes account only of the behaviour or movements to which in-
stincts give rise. But instincts are more than innate tendencies or dis-
positions to certain kinds of movement. There is every reason to believe
that even the most purely instinctive action is the outcome of a distinctly
mental process, one which is incapable of being described in purely
mechanical terms, because it is a psycho-physical process, involving
psychical as well as physical changes, and one which, like every other
mental process, has, and can only be fully described in terms of, the
three aspects of all mental process—the cognitive, the affective, and the
conative aspects; that is to say, every instance of instinctive behaviour
involves a knowing of some thing or object, a feeling in regard to it, and
a striving towards or away from that object.
We cannot, of course, directly observe the threefold psychical as-
pect of the psycho-physical process that issues in instinctive behaviour;
but we are amply justified in assuming that it invariably accompanies
the process in the nervous system of which the instinctive movements
are the immediate result, a process which, being initiated on stimulation
of some sense organ by the physical impressions received from the ob-
ject, travels up the sensory nerves, traverses the brain, and descends as
an orderly or co-ordinated stream of nervous impulses along efferent
nerves to the appropriate groups of muscles and other executive organs.
We are justified in assuming the cognitive aspect of the psychical pro-
cess, because the nervous excitation seems to traverse those parts of the
brain whose excitement involves the production of sensations or changes
in the sensory content of consciousness; we are justified in assuming the
affective aspect of the psychical process, because the creature exhibits
unmistakable symptoms of feeling and emotional excitement; and, espe-
cially, we are justified in assuming the conative aspect of the psychical
process, because all instinctive behaviour exhibits that unique mark of
mental process, a persistent striving towards the natural end of the pro-
cess. That is to say, the process, unlike any merely mechanical process,
is not to be arrested by any sufficient mechanical obstacle, but is rather
intensified by any such obstacle and only comes to an end either when
its appropriate goal is achieved, or when some stronger incompatible
tendency is excited, or when the creature is exhausted by its persistent32/William McDougall
efforts.
Now, the psycho-physical process that issues in an instinctive ac-
tion is initiated by a sense- impression which, usually, is but one of
many sense-impressions received at the same time; and the fact that this
one impression plays an altogether dominant part in determining the
animal’s behaviour shows that its effects are peculiarly favoured, that
the nervous system is peculiarly fitted to receive and to respond to just
that kind of impression. The impression must be supposed to excite, not
merely detailed changes in the animal’s field of sensation, but a sensa-
tion or complex of sensations that has significance or meaning for the
animal; hence we must regard the instinctive process in its cognitive
aspect as distinctly of the nature of perception, however rudimentary. In
the animals most nearly allied to ourselves we can, in many instances of
instinctive behaviour, clearly recognise the symptoms of some particu-
lar kind of emotion such as fear, anger, or tender feeling; and the same
symptoms always accompany any one kind of instinctive behaviour, as
when the cat assumes the defensive attitude, the dog resents the intru-
sion of a strange dog, or the hen tenderly gathers her brood beneath her
wings. We seem justified in believing that each kind of instinctive
behaviour is always attended by some such emotional excitement, how-
ever faint, which in each case is specific or peculiar to that kind of
behaviour. Analogy with our own experience justifies us, also, in as-
suming that the persistent striving towards its end, which characterises
mental process and distinguishes instinctive behaviour most clearly from
mere reflex action, implies some such mode of experience as we call
conative, the kind of experience which in its more developed forms is
properly called desire or aversion, but which, in the blind form in which
we sometimes have it and which is its usual form among the animals, is
a mere impulse, or craving, or uneasy sense of want Further, we seem
justified in believing that the continued obstruction of instinctive striv-
ing is always accompanied by painful feeling, its successful progress
towards its end by pleasurable feeling, and the achievement of its end by
a pleasurable sense of satisfaction.
An instinctive action, then, must not be regarded as simple or com-
pound reflex action if by reflex action we mean, as is usually meant, a
movement caused by a sense-stimulus and resulting from a sequence of
merely physical processes in some nervous arc. Nevertheless, just as a
reflex action implies the presence in the nervous system of the reflex
nervous arc, so the instinctive action also implies some enduring ner-An Introduction to Social Psychology/33
vous basis whose organisation is inherited, an innate or inherited psycho-
physical disposition, which, anatomically regarded, probably has the
form of a compound system of sensori-motor arcs.
We may, then; define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-
physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to
pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional
excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and
to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an
impulse to such action.
It must further be noted that some instincts remain inexcitable ex-
cept during the prevalence of some temporary bodily state, such as hun-
ger. In these cases we must suppose that the bodily process or state
determines the stimulation of sense-organs within the body, and that
nervous currents ascending from these to the psycho-physical disposi-
tion maintain it in an excitable condition.9
The behaviour of some of the lower animals seems to be almost
completely determined throughout their lives by instincts modified but
very little by experience; they perceive, feel, and act in a perfectly defi-
nite and invariable manner whenever a given instinct is excited— i.e.,
whenever the presence of the appropriate object coincides with the ap-
propriate organic state of the creature. The highest degree of complex-
ity of mental process attained by such creatures is a struggle between
two opposed Instinctive tendencies simultaneously excited. Such
behaviour is relatively easy to understand in the light of the conception
of instincts as innate psycho-physical dispositions.
While it is doubtful whether the behaviour of any animal is wholly
determined by instincts quite unmodified by experience, it is clear that
all the higher animals learn in various and often considerable degrees to
adapt their instinctive actions to peculiar circumstances; and in the long
course of the development of each human mind, immensely greater com-
plications of the instinctive processes are brought about, complications
so great that they have obscured until recent years the essential likeness
of the instinctive processes in men and animals. These complications of
instinctive processes are of four principal kinds, which we may distin-
guish as follows:—
(1) The instinctive reactions become capable of being initiated, not
only by the perception of objects of the kind which directly excite the
innate disposition, the natural or native excitants of the instinct, but also
by ideas of such objects, and by perceptions and by ideas of objects of34/William McDougall
other kinds:
(2) the bodily movements in which the instinct finds expression may
be modified and complicated to an indefinitely great degree:
(3) owing to the complexity of the ideas which can bring the human
instincts into play, it frequently happens that several instincts are simul-
taneously excited; when the several processes blend with various de-
grees of intimacy:
(4) the instinctive tendencies become more or less systematically
organised about certain objects or ideas.
The full consideration of the first two modes of complication of
instinctive behaviour would lead us too far into the psychology of the
intellectual processes, to which most of the textbooks of psychology are
mainly devoted. It must suffice merely to indicate in the present chapter
a few points of prime importance in this connection. The third and fourth
complications will be dealt with at greater length in the following chap-
ters, for they stand in much need of elucidation.
In order to understand these complications of instinctive behaviour
we must submit the conception of an instinct to a more minute analysis.
It was said above that every instinctive process has the three aspects of
all mental process, the cognitive, the affective, and the conative. Now,
the innate psycho-physical disposition, which is an instinct, may be re-
garded as consisting of three corresponding parts, an afferent, a central,
and a motor or efferent part, whose activities are the cognitive, the af-
fective, and the conative features respectively of the total instinctive
process. The afferent or receptive part of the total disposition is some
organised group of nervous elements or neurones that is specially adapted
to receive and to elaborate the impulses initiated in the sense-organ by
the native object of the instinct; its constitution and activities determine
the sensory content of the psycho-physical process. From the afferent
part the excitement spreads over to the central part of the disposition;
the constitution of this part determines in the main the distribution of the
nervous impulses, especially of the impulses that descend to modify the
working of the visceral organs, the heart, lungs, blood-vessels, glands,
and so forth, in the manner required for the most effective execution of
the instinctive action; the nervous activities of this central part are the
correlates of the affective or emotional aspect or feature of the total
psychical process.10 The excitement of the efferent or motor part reaches
it by way of the central part; its constitution determines the distribution
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tive action is effected, and its nervous activities are the correlates of the
conative element of the psychical process, of the felt impulse to action.
Now, the afferent or receptive part and the efferent or motor part
are capable of being greatly modified, independently of one another and
of the central part, in the course of the life history of the individual;
while the central part persists throughout life as the essential unchang-
ing nucleus of the disposition. Hence in man, whose intelligence and
adaptability are so great, the afferent and efferent parts of each instinc-
tive disposition are liable to many modifications, while the central part
alone remains unmodified: that is to say, the cognitive processes through
which any instinctive process may be initiated exhibit a great complica-
tion and variety; and the actual bodily movements by which the instinc-
tive process achieves its end may be complicated to an indefinitely great
extent; while the emotional excitement, with the accompanying nervous
activities of the central part of the disposition, is the only part of the
total instinctive process that retains its specific character and remains
common to all individuals and all situations in which the instinct is
excited. It is for this reason that authors have commonly treated of the
instinctive actions of animals on the one hand, and of the emotions of
men on the other hand, as distinct types of mental process, failing to see
that each kind of emotional excitement is always an indication of, and
the most constant feature of, some instinctive process.
Let us now consider very briefly the principal ways in which the
instinctive disposition may be modified on its afferent or receptive side;
and let us take, for the sake of clearness of exposition, the case of a
particular instinct, namely the instinct of fear or flight, which is one of
the strongest and most widely distributed instincts throughout the ani-
mal kingdom. In man and in most animals this instinct is capable of
being excited by any sudden loud noise, independently of all experience
of danger or harm associated with such noises. We must suppose, then,
that the afferent inlet, or one of the afferent inlets, of this innate disposi-
tion consists in a system of auditory neurones connected by sensory
nerves with the ear This afferent inlet to this innate disposition is but
little specialised, since it may be excited by any loud noise. One change
it may undergo through experience is specialisation; on repeated experi-
ence of noises of certain kinds that are never accompanied or followed
by hurtful effects, most creatures will learn to neglect them;11 their in-
stinct of flight is no longer excited by them; they learn, that is to say, to
discriminate between these and other noises; this implies that the per-36/William McDougall
ceptual disposition, the afferent inlet of the instinct, has become further
specialised.
More important is the other principal mode in which the instinct
may be modified on its afferent or cognitive side. Consider the case of
the birds on an uninhabited island, which show no fear of men on their
first appearance on the island. The absence of fear at the sight of man
implies, not that the birds have no instinct of fear, but that the instinct
has no afferent inlet specialised for the reception of the retinal impres-
sion made by the human form. But the men employ themselves in shoot-
ing, and very soon the sight of a man excites the instinct of fear in the
birds, and they take to flight at his approach. How are we to interpret
this change of instinctive behaviour brought about by experience? Shall
we say that the birds observe on one occasion, or on several or many
occasions, that on the approach of a man one of their number falls to the
ground, uttering cries of pain; that they infer that the man has wounded
it, and that he may wound and hurt them, and that he is therefore to be
avoided in the future? No psychologist would now accept this anthropo-
morphic interpretation of the facts. If the behaviour we are considering
were that of savage men, or even of a community of philosophers and
logicians, such an account would err in ascribing the change of behaviour
to a purely intellectual process. Shall we, then, say that the sudden loud
sound of the gun excites the instinct of fear, and that, because the per-
ception of this sound is constantly accompanied by the visual percep-
tion of the human form, the idea of the latter becomes associated with
the idea of the sound, so that thereafter the sight of a man reproduces the
idea of the sound of the gun, and hence leads to the excitement of the
instinct by way of its innately organised afferent inlet, the system of
auditory neurones? This would be much nearer the truth than the former
account; some such interpretation of facts of this order has been offered
by many psychologists and very generally accepted.12 Its acceptance
involves the attribution of free ideas, of the power of representation of
objects independently of sense- presentation, to whatever animals dis-
play this kind of modification of instinctive behaviour by experience—
that is to say, to all the animals save the lowest; and there are good
reasons for believing that only man and the higher animals have this
power. We are therefore driven to look for a still simpler interpretation
of the facts, and such a one is not far to seek. We may suppose that,
since the visual presentation of the human form repeatedly accompanies
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the power of exciting directly the reactions characteristic of this in-
stinct, rather than indirectly by way of the reproduction of the idea of
the sound; i.e., we may suppose that, after repetition of the experience,
the sight of a man directly excites the instinctive process in its affective
and conative aspects only; or we may say, in physiological terms, that
the visual disposition concerned in the elaboration of the retinal impres-
sion of the human form becomes directly connected or associated with
the central and efferent parts of the instinctive disposition, which thus
acquires, through the repetition of this experience, a new afferent inlet
through which it may henceforth be excited independently of its innate
afferent inlet.
There is, I think, good reason to believe that this third interpretation
is much nearer the truth than the other two considered above. In the first
place, the assumption of such relative independence of the afferent part
of an instinctive disposition as is implied by this interpretation is justi-
fied by the fact that many instincts may be excited by very different
objects affecting different senses, prior to all experience of such objects.
The instinct of fear is the most notable in this respect, for in many ani-
mals it may be excited by certain special impressions of sight, of smell,
and of hearing, as well as by all loud noises (perhaps also by any pain-
ful sense-impression), all of which impressions evoke the emotional ex-
pressions and the bodily movements characteristic of the instinct. Hence,
we may infer that such an instinct has several innately organised affer-
ent inlets, through each of which its central and efferent parts may be
excited without its other afferent inlets being involved in the excitement.
But the best evidence in favour of the third interpretation is that
which we may obtain by introspective observation of our own emo-
tional states. Through injuries received we may learn to fear, or to be
angered by, the presence of a person or animal or thing towards which
we were at first indifferent; and we may then experience the emotional
excitement and the impulse to the appropriate movements of flight or
aggression, without recalling the nature and occasion of the injuries we
have formerly suffered; i.e., although the idea of the former injury may
be reproduced by the perception, or by the idea, of the person, animal,
or thing from which it was received, yet the reproduction of this idea is
not an essential step in the process of re-excitement of the instinctive
reaction in its affective and conative aspects; for the visual impression
made by the person or thing leads directly to the excitement of the cen-
tral and efferent parts of the innate disposition. In this way our emo-38/William McDougall
tional and conative tendencies become directly associated by experience
with many objects to which we are natively indifferent; and not only do
we not necessarily recall the experience through which the association
was set up, but in many such cases we cannot do so by any effort of
recollection.13
Such acquisition of new perceptual inlets by instinctive disposi-
tions, in accordance with the principle of association in virtue of tempo-
ral contiguity, seems to occur abundantly among all the higher animals
and to be the principal mode in which they profit by experience and
learn to adapt their behaviour to a greater variety of the objects of their
environment than is provided for by their purely innate dispositions. In
man it occurs still more abundantly, and in his case the further compli-
cation ensues that each sense-presentation that thus becomes capable of
arousing some emotional and conative disposition may be represented,
or reproduced in idea; and, since the representation, having in the main
the same neural basis as the sense-presentation, induces equally well the
same emotional and conative excitement, and since it may be brought to
mind by any one of the intellectual processes, ranging from simple asso-
ciative reproduction to the most subtle processes of judgment and infer-
ence, the ways in which any one instinctive disposition of a developed
human mind may be excited are indefinitely various.
There is a second principal mode in which objects other than the
native objects of an instinct may lead to the excitement of its central and
efferent parts. This is similar to the mode of reproduction of ideas known
as the reproduction by similars; a thing, or sense-impression, more or
less like the specific excitant of an instinct, but really of a different
class, excites the instinct in virtue of those features in which it resembles
the specific object. As a very simple instance of this, we may take the
case of a horse shying at an old coat left lying by the roadside. The
shying is, no doubt, due to the excitement of an instinct whose function
is to secure a quick retreat from any crouching beast of prey, and the
coat sufficiently resembles such a crouching form to excite the instinct.
This example illustrates the operation of this principle in the crudest
fashion. In the human mind it works in a much more subtle and wide-
reaching fashion. Very delicate resemblances of form and relation be-
tween two objects may suffice to render one of them capable of exciting
the emotion and the impulse which are the appropriate instinctive re-
sponse to the presentation of the other object; and, in order that this
shall occur, it is not necessary that the individual shall become explic-An Introduction to Social Psychology/39
itly aware of the resemblance between the two objects, nor even that the
idea of the second object shall be brought to his consciousness; though
this, no doubt, occurs in many cases. The wide scope of this principle in
the human mind is due, not merely to the subtler operation of resem-
blances, but also to the fact that through the working of the principle of
temporal contiguity, discussed on the foregoing page, the number of
objects capable of directly exciting any instinct becomes very consider-
able, and each such object then serves as a basis for the operation of the
principle of resemblance; that is to say, each object that in virtue of
temporal contiguity acquires the power of exciting the central and effer-
ent parts of an instinct renders possible the production of the same ef-
fect by a number of objects more or less resembling it. The conjoint
operation of the two principles may be illustrated by a simple example:
a child is terrified upon one occasion by the violent behaviour of a man
of a peculiar cast of countenance or of some special fashion of dress;
thereafter not only does the perception or idea of this man excite fear,
but any man resembling him in face or costume may do so without the
idea of the original occasion of fear, or of the terrifying individual, re-
curring to consciousness.
As regards the modification of the bodily movements by means of
which an instinctive mental process achieves,14 or strives to achieve, its
end, man excels the animals even to a greater degree than as regards the
modification of the cognitive part of the process. For the animals ac-
quire and use hardly any movement-complexes that are not natively
given in their instinctive dispositions and in the reflex co-ordinations of
their spinal cords. This is true of even so intelligent an animal as the
domestic dog. Many of the higher animals may by long training be taught
to acquire a few movement-complexes—a dog to walk on its hind legs,
or a cat to sit up; but the wonder with which we gaze at a circus-horse
standing on a tub, or at a dog dancing on hind legs, shows how strictly
limited to the natively given combinations of movements all the animals
normally are.
In the human being, on the other hand, a few only of the simpler
instincts that ripen soon after birth are displayed in movements deter-
mined purely by the innate dispositions; such are the instincts of suck-
ing, of wailing, of crawling, of winking and shrinking before a coming
blow. Most of the human instincts ripen at relatively late periods in the
course of individual development, when considerable power of intelli-
gent control and imitation of movement has been acquired; hence the40/William McDougall
motor tendencies of these instincts are seldom manifested in their purely
native forms, but are from the first modified, controlled, and suppressed
in various degrees. This is the case more especially with the large move-
ments of trunk and limbs; while the subsidiary movements, those which
Darwin called serviceable associated movements, such as those due to
contractions of the facial muscles, are less habitually controlled, save
by men of certain races and countries among whom control of facial
movement is prescribed by custom. An illustration may indicate the
main principle involved: One may have learnt to suppress more or less
completely the bodily movements in which the excitement of the instinct
of pugnacity naturally finds vent; or by a study of pugilism one may
have learnt to render these movements more finely adapted to secure the
end of the instinct; or one may have learnt to replace them by the ha-
bitual use of weapons, so that the hand flies to the sword-hilt or to the
hip-pocket, instead of being raised to strike, whenever this instinct is
excited. But one exercises but little, if any, control over the violent beat-
ing of the heart, the flushing of the face, the deepened respiration, and
the general redistribution of blood-supply and nervous tension which
constitute the visceral expression of the excitement of this instinct and
which are determined by the constitution of its central affective part.
Hence in the human adult, while this instinct may be excited by objects
and situations that are not provided for in the innate disposition, and
may express itself in bodily movements which also are not natively de-
termined, or may fail to find expression in any such movements owing
to strong volitional control, its unmodified central part will produce
visceral changes, with the accompanying emotional state of conscious-
ness, in accordance with its unmodified native constitution; and these
visceral changes will usually be accompanied by the innately determined
facial expression in however slight a degree; hence result the character-
istic expressions or symptoms of the emotion of anger which, as regards
their main features, are common to all men of all times and all races.
All the principal instincts of man are liable to similar modifications
of their afferent and motor parts, while their central parts remain un-
changed and determine the emotional tone of consciousness and the vis-
ceral changes characteristic of the excitement of the instinct.
It must be added that the conative aspect of the psychical process
always retains the unique quality of an impulse to activity, even though
the instinctive activity has been modified by habitual control; and this
felt impulse, when it becomes conscious of its end, assumes the charac-An Introduction to Social Psychology/41
ter of an explicit desire or aversion.
Are, then, these instinctive impulses the only motive powers of the
human mind to thought and action? What of pleasure and pain, which
by so many of the older psychologists were held to be the only motives
of human activity, the only objects or sources of desire and aversion?
In answer to the former question, it must be said that in the devel-
oped human mind there are springs of action of another class, namely,
acquired habits of thought and action. An acquired mode of activity
becomes by repetition habitual, and the more frequently it is repeated
the more powerful becomes the habit as a source of impulse or motive
power. Few habits can equal in this respect the principal instincts; and
habits are in a sense derived from, and secondary to, instincts; for, in the
absence of instincts, no thought and no action could ever be achieved or
repeated, and so no habits of thought or action could be formed. Habits
are formed only in the service of the instincts.
The answer to the second question is that pleasure and pain are not
in themselves springs of action, but at the most of undirected move-
ments; they serve rather to modify instinctive processes, pleasure tend-
ing to sustain and prolong any mode of action, pain to cut it short; under
their prompting and guidance are effected those modifications and ad-
aptations of the instinctive bodily movements which we have briefly
considered above.15
We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the
prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force
of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct), every train
of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along
towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The
instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the
driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the
complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but
a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these im-
pulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to
guide them in their choice of the means.
Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful im-
pulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any
kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose
mainspring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been
drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all
the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with42/William McDougall
the central mystery of life and mind and will.
The following chapters, I hope, will render clearer, and will give
some support to, the views briefly and somewhat dogmatically stated in
the present chapter.16
Chapter III
The Principal Instincts and the Primary Emotions
of Man
Before we can make any solid progress in the understanding of the com-
plex emotions and impulses that are the forces underlying the thoughts
and actions of men and of societies, we must be able to distinguish and
describe each of the principal human instincts and the emotional and
conative tendencies characteristic of each one of them. This task will be
attempted in the present chapter; in Chapter V. we shall seek to analyse
some of the principal complex emotions and impulses, to display them
as compounded from the limited number of primary or simple instinc-
tive tendencies;17 and in the succeeding chapters of this section we shall
consider the way in which these tendencies become organised within the
complex dispositions that constitute the sentiments.
In the foregoing chapter it was said that the instinctive mental pro-
cess that results from the excitement of any instinct has always an affec-
tive aspect, the nature of which depends upon the constitution of that
most stable and unchanging of the three parts of the instinctive disposi-
tion, namely the central part. In the case of the simpler instincts, this
affective aspect of the instinctive process is not prominent; and though,
no doubt, the quality of it is peculiar in each case, yet we cannot readily
distinguish these qualities and we have no special names for them. But,
in the case of the principal powerful instincts, the affective quality of
each instinctive process and the sum of visceral and bodily changes in
which it expresses itself are peculiar and distinct; hence language pro-
vides special names for such modes of affective experience, names such
as anger, fear, curiosity; and the generic name for them is “emotion.”
The word “emotion” is used of course in popular speech loosely and
somewhat vaguely, and psychologists are not yet completely consistent
in their use of it. But all psychological terms that are taken from com-
mon speech have to undergo a certain specialisation and more rigid defi-
nition before they are fit for scientific use; and in using the word “emo-An Introduction to Social Psychology/43
tion” in the restricted sense which is indicated above, and which will be
rigidly adhered to throughout these pages, I am but carrying to its logi-
cal conclusion a tendency displayed by the majority of recent English
writers on psychology.
Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of
emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it; and the
emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of
the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a pri-
mary emotion. This principle, which was enunciated in my little work
on physiological psychology, proves to be of very great value when we
seek to analyse the complex emotions into their primary constituents.
Several writers have come very near to the recognition of this principle,
but few or none of them have stated it clearly and explicitly, and, what
is more important, they have not systematically applied it in any thor-
oughgoing manner as the guiding principle on which we must chiefly
rely in seeking to define the primary emotions and to unravel the com-
plexities of our concrete emotional experiences.18
In adapting to scientific use a word from popular speech, it is inevi-
table that some violence should be done to common usage; and, in adopt-
ing this rigid definition of emotion, we shall have to do such violence in
refusing to admit joy, sorrow, and surprise (which are often regarded,
even by writers on psychology, as the very types of emotions) to our list
whether of simple and primary or of complex emotions. Some argu-
ments in justification of this exclusion will be adduced later. At this
stage I will only point out that joy and sorrow are not emotional states
that can be experienced independently of the true emotions, that in every
case they are qualifications of the emotions they accompany, and that in
strictness we ought rather to speak always of a joyful or sorrowful emo-
tion—e.g.t a joyful wonder or gratitude, a sorrowful anger or pity.
In considering the claim of any human emotion or impulse to rank
as a primary emotion or simple instinctive impulse, we shall find two
principles of great assistance. First, if a similar emotion and impulse are
clearly displayed in the instinctive activities of the higher animals, that
fact will afford a strong presumption that the emotion and impulse in
question are primary and simple; on the other hand, if no such instinc-
tive activity occurs among the higher animals, we must suspect the af-
fective state in question of being either a complex composite emotion or
no true emotion. Secondly, we must inquire in each case whether the
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with morbidly exaggerated intensity, apart from such general hyper-
excitability as is displayed in mania. For it would seem that each in-
stinctive disposition, being a relatively independent functional unit in
the constitution of the mind, is capable of morbid hypertrophy or of
becoming abnormally excitable, independently of the rest of the mental
dispositions and functions. That is to say, we must look to comparative
psychology and to mental pathology for confirmation of the primary
character of those of our emotions that appear to be simple and
unanalysable.19
The Instinct of Flight and the Emotion of Fear
The instinct to flee from danger is necessary for the survival of almost
all species of animals, and in most of the higher animals the instinct is
one of the most powerful. Upon its excitement the locomotory appara-
tus is impelled to its utmost exertions, and sometimes the intensity and
long duration of these exertions is more than the visceral organs can
support, so that they are terminated by utter exhaustion or death. Men
also have been known to achieve extraordinary feats of running and
leaping under this impulse; there is a well-known story of a great athlete
who, when pursued as a boy by a savage animal, leaped over a wall
which he could not again “clear” until he attained his full stature and
strength. These locomotory activities are accompanied by a characteris-
tic complex of symptoms, which in its main features is common to man
and to many of the higher animals, and which, in conjunction with the
violent efforts to escape, constitutes so unmistakable an expression of
the emotion of fear that no one hesitates to interpret it as such; hence
popular speech recognises the connection of the emotion with the in-
stinct that determines the movements of flight in giving them the one
name fear. Terror, die most intense degree of this emotion, may involve
so great a nervous disturbance, both in men and animals, as to defeat
the ends of the instinct by inducing general convulsions or even death.
In certain cases of mental disease the patient’s disorder seems to consist
essentially in an abnormal excitability of this instinct and a consequent
undue frequency and intensity of its operation; the patient lives perpetu-
ally in fear, shrinking in terror from the most harmless animal or at the
least unusual sound, and surrounds himself with safeguards against
impossible dangers.
In most animals this instinct may be excited by a variety of objects
and sense-impressions prior to all experience of hurt or danger; that isAn Introduction to Social Psychology/45
to say, the innate disposition has several afferent inlets. In some of the
more timid creatures it would seem that every unfamiliar sound or sight
is capable of exciting it.20 In civilised man, whose life for so many
generations has been more or less sheltered from the dangers peculiar to
the natural state, the instinct exhibits (like all complex organs and func-
tions that are not kept true to the specific type by rigid selection) consid-
erable individual differences, especially on its receptive side. Hence it is
difficult to discover what objects and impressions were its natural exci-
tants in primitive man. The wail of the very young infant has but little
variety; but mothers claim to be able to distinguish the cries of fear, of
anger, and of bodily discomfort, at a very early age, and it is probable
that these three modes of reaction become gradually differentiated from
a single instinctive impulse, that of the cry, whose function is merely to
signal to the mother the need for her ministrations. In most young chil-
dren unmistakable fear is provoked by any sudden loud noise (some
being especially sensitive to harsh deep-pitched noises even though of
low intensity), and all through life such noise remains for many of us the
surest and most frequent excitant of the instinct. Other children, while
still in arms, show fear if held too loosely when carried downstairs, or if
the arms that hold them are suddenly lowered. In some, intense fear is
excited on their first introduction at close quarters to a dog or cat, no
matter how quiet and well- behaved the animal may be; and some of us
continue all through life to experience a little thrill of fear whenever a
dog runs out and barks at our heels, though we may never have received
any hurt from an animal and may have perfect confidence that no hurt is
likely to be done us.21
In other persons, again, fear is excited by the noise of a high wind,
and though they may be in a solidly built house that has weathered a
hundred storms, they will walk restlessly to and fro throughout every
stormy night.
In most animals instinctive flight is followed by equally instinctive
concealment as soon as cover is reached, and there can be little doubt
that in primitive man the instinct had this double tendency. As soon as
the little child can run, his fear expresses itself in concealment following
on flight; and the many adult persons who seek refuge from the strange
noises of dark nights, or from a thunderstorm, by covering their heads
with the bed-clothes, and who find a quite irrational comfort in so do-
ing, illustrate the persistence of this tendency. It is, perhaps, in the op-
posed characters of these two tendencies, both of which are bound up46/William McDougall
with the emotion of fear, that we may find an explanation of the great
variety of, and variability of, the symptoms of fear. The sudden stop-
ping of heart-beat and respiration, and the paralysis of movement in
which it sometimes finds expression, are due to the impulse to conceal-
ment; the hurried respiration and pulse, and the frantic bodily efforts,
by which it is more commonly expressed, are due to the impulse to
flight.22
That the excitement of fear is not necessarily, or indeed usually, the
effect of an intelligent appreciation or anticipation of danger, is espe-
cially well shown by children of four or five years of age, in whom it
may be induced by the facial contortions or playful roarings of a famil-
iar friend. Under these circumstances, a child may exhibit every symp-
tom of fear even while he sits upon his tormentor’s lap and, with arms
about his neck, beseeches him to cease or to promise not to do it again.
And many a child has been thrown into a paroxysm of terror by the
approach of some hideous figure that he knew to be but one of his
playfellows in disguise.
Of all the excitants of this instinct the most interesting, and the most
difficult to understand as regards its mode of operation, is the unfamil-
iar or strange as such. Whatever is totally strange, whatever is violently
opposed to the accustomed and familiar, is apt to excite fear both in men
and animals, if only it is capable of attracting their attention. It is, I
think, doubtful whether an eclipse of the moon has ever excited the fear
of animals, for the moon is not an object of their attention; but for sav-
age men it has always been an occasion of fear. The well-known case of
the dog described by Romanes, that was terrified by the movements of
an object jerked forward by an invisible thread, illustrates the fear-ex-
citing powers of the unfamiliar in the animal world. The following inci-
dent is instructive in this respect: A courageous child of five years, sit-
ting alone in a sunlit room, suddenly screams in terror, and, on her
father hastening to her, can only explain that she saw something move.
The discovery of a mouse in the corner of the room at once explains and
banishes her fear, for she is on friendly terms with mice. The mouse
must have darted across the peripheral part of her field of vision, and
this unexpected and unfamiliar appearance of movement sufficed to excite
the instinct. This avenue to the instinct, the unfamiliar, becomes in man
highly diversified and intellectualised, and it is owing to this that he
feels fear before the mysterious, the uncanny, and the supernatural, and
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reverence, plays its part in all religions.
Fear, whether its impulse be to flight or to concealment, is
characterised by the fact that its excitement, more than that of any other
instinct, tends to bring to an end at once all other mental activity, rivet-
ing the attention upon its object to the exclusion of all others; owing,
probably, to this extreme concentration of attention, as well as to the
violence of the emotion, the excitement of this instinct makes a deep and
lasting impression on the mind. A gust of anger, a wave of pity or of
tender emotion, an impulse of curiosity, may co-operate in supporting
and re-enforcing mental activities of the most varied kinds, or may domi-
nate the mind for a time and then pass away, leaving but little trace. But
fear, once roused, haunts the mind; it comes back alike in dreams and in
waking life, bringing with it vivid memories of the terrifying impres-
sion. It is thus the great inhibitor of action, both present action and
future action, and becomes in primitive human societies the great agent
of social discipline through which men are led to the habit of control of
the egoistic impulses.
The Instinct of Repulsion and the Emotion of Disgust
The impulse of this instinct is, like that of fear, one of aversion, and
these two instincts together account probably for all aversions, except
those acquired under the influence of pain. The impulse differs from
that of fear in that, while the latter prompts to bodily retreat from its
object, the former prompts to actions that remove or reject the offending
object This instinct resembles fear in that under the one name we, per-
haps, commonly confuse two very closely allied instincts whose affec-
tive aspects are so similar that they are not easily distinguishable, though
their impulses are of different tendencies. The one impulse of repulsion
is to reject from the mouth substances that excite the instinct in virtue of
their odour or taste, substances which in the main are noxious and evil-
tasting; its biological utility is obvious. The other impulse of repulsion
seems to be excited by the contact of slimy and slippery substances with
the skin, and to express itself as a shrinking of the whole body, accom-
panied by a throwing forward of the hands. The common shrinking from
slimy creatures with a “creepy” shudder seems to be the expression of
this impulse. It is difficult to assign any high biological value to it (un-
less we connect it with the necessity of avoiding noxious reptiles), but it
is clearly displayed by some children before the end of their first year;
thus in some infants furry things excite shrinking and tears at their first48/William McDougall
contact. In others the instinct seems to ripen later, and the child that has
handled worms, frogs, and slugs with delight suddenly evinces an un-
conquerable aversion to contact with them.
These two forms of disgust illustrate in the clearest and most inter-
esting manner the intellectualisation of the instincts and primary emo-
tions through extension of the range of their objects by association, re-
semblance, and analogy. The manners or speech of an otherwise pre-
sentable person may excite the impulse of shrinking in virtue of some
subtle suggestion of sliminess. Or what we know of a man’s charac-
ter—that it is noxious or, as we significantly say, is of evil odour—may
render the mere thought of him an occasion of disgust; we say, “It makes
we sick to think of him”; and at the same time the face exhibits in some
degree, however slight, the expression produced by the act of rejection
of some evil-tasting substance from the mouth. In these cases we may
see very clearly that this extension by resemblance or analogy does not
take place in any roundabout fashion; it is not that the thought of the
noxious or “slippery” character necessarily reproduces the idea of some
evil-tasting substance or of some slimy creature. Rather, the apprehen-
sion of these peculiarities of character excites disgust directly, and then,
when we seek to account for, and to justify, our disgust, we cast about
for some simile and say, “He is like a snake,” or “He is rotten to the
core!” The common form of emotion serves as the link between the two
ideas.
The Instinct of Curiosity and the Emotion of Wonder
The instinct of curiosity is displayed by many of the higher animals,
although its impulse remains relatively feeble in most of them. And, in
fact, it is obvious that it could not easily attain any considerable strength
in any animal species, because the individuals that displayed a too strong
curiosity would be peculiarly liable to meet an untimely end. For its
impulse is to approach and to examine more closely the object that ex-
cites it—a fact well known to hunters in the wilds, who sometimes by
exciting this instinct bring the curious animal within the reach of their
weapons. The native excitant of the instinct would seem to be any object
similar to, yet perceptibly different from, familiar objects habitually
noticed. It is therefore not easy to distinguish in general terms between
the excitants of curiosity and those of fear; for we have seen that one of
the most general excitants of fear is whatever is strange or unfamiliar.
The difference seems to be mainly one of degree, a smaller element ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/49
the strange or unusual exciting curiosity, while a larger and more pro-
nounced degree of it excites fear. Hence the two instincts, with their
opposed impulses of approach and retreat, are apt to be excited in ani-
mals and very young children in rapid alternation, and simultaneously
in ourselves. Who has not seen a horse, or other animal, alternately
approach in curiosity, and flee in fear from, some such object as an old
coat upon the ground? And who has not experienced a fearful curiosity
in penetrating some dark cave or some secret chamber of an ancient
castle? The behaviour of animals under the impulse of curiosity may be
well observed by any one who will lie down in a field where sheep or
cattle are grazing and repeat at short intervals some peculiar cry. In this
way one may draw every member of a large flock nearer and nearer,
until one finds oneself the centre of a circle of them, drawn up at a
respectful distance, of which every pair of eyes and ears is intently fixed
upon the strange object of their curiosity.
In the animals nearest to ourselves, namely, the monkeys, curiosity
is notoriously strong, and them it impels not merely to approach its
object and to direct the senses attentively upon it, but also to active
manipulation of it. That a similar impulse is strong in children, no one
will deny Exception may perhaps be taken to the use of wonder as the
name for the primary emotion that accompanies this impulse; for this
word is commonly applied to a complex emotion of which this primary
emotion is the chief but not the sole constituent.23 But, as was said
above, some specialisation for technical purposes of words in common
use is inevitable in psychology, and in this instance it is, I think, desir-
able and justifiable, owing to the lack of any more appropriate word.
This instinct, being one whose exercise is not of prime importance
to the individual, exhibits great individual differences as regards its in-
nate strength; and these differences are apt to be increased during the
course of life, the impulse growing weaker for lack of use in those in
whom it is innately weak, stronger through exercise in those in whom it
is innately strong. In men of the latter type it may become the main
source of intellectual energy and effort; to its impulse we certainly owe
most of the purely disinterested labours of the highest types of intellect.
It must be regarded as one of the principal roots of both science and
religion.50/William McDougall
The Instinct of Pugnacity and the Emotion of Anger
This instinct, though not so nearly universal as fear, being apparently
lacking in the constitution of the females of some species, ranks with
fear as regards the great strength of its impulse and the high intensity of
the emotion it generates. It occupies a peculiar position in relation to the
other instincts, and cannot strictly be brought under the definition of
instinct proposed in the first chapter. For it has no specific object or
objects the perception of which constitutes the initial stage of the in-
stinctive process. The condition of its excitement is rather any opposi-
tion to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to
which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts.24
And its impulse is to break down any such obstruction and to de-
stroy whatever offers this opposition. This instinct thus presupposes the
others; its excitement is dependent upon, or secondary to, the excite-
ment of the others, and is apt to be intense in proportion to the strength
of the obstructed impulse. The most mean-spirited cur will angrily re-
sent any attempt to take away its bone, if it is hungry; a healthy infant
very early displays anger, if his meal is interrupted; and all through life
most men find it difficult to suppress irritation on similar occasions. In
the animal world the most furious excitement of this instinct is pro-
voked in the male of many species by any interference with the satisfac-
tion of the sexual impulse; since such interference is the most frequent
occasion of its excitement, and since it commonly comes from other
male members of his own species, the actions innately organised for
securing the ends of this instinct are such actions as are most effective in
combat with his fellows. Hence, also, the defensive apparatus of the
male is usually, like the lion’s or the stallion’s mane, especially adapted
for defence against the attacks of his fellows. But the obstruction of
every other instinctive impulse may in its turn become the occasion of
anger. We see how among the animals even the fear- impulse, the most
opposed in tendency to the pugnacious, may on obstruction give place
to it; for the hunted creature when brought to bay—i.e., when its im-
pulse to flight is obstructed—is apt to turn upon its pursuers and to
fight furiously, until an opportunity for escape presents itself.
Darwin has shown the significance of the facial expression of an-
ger, of the contracted brow and raised upper lip; and man shares with
many of the animals the tendency to frighten his opponent by loud roars
or bellowings. As with most of the other human instincts, the excitement
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has, without any example or suggestion, suddenly taken to running with
open mouth to bite the person who has angered him, much to the distress
of his parents. As the child grows up, as self-control becomes stronger,
the life of ideas richer, and the means we take to overcome obstructions
to our efforts more refined and complex, this instinct ceases to express
itself in its crude natural manner, save when most intensely excited, and
becomes rather a source of increased energy of action towards the end
set by any other instinct; the energy of its impulse adds itself to and
reinforces that of other impulses and so helps us to overcome our diffi-
culties. In this lies its great value for civilised man. A man devoid of the
pugnacious instinct would not only be incapable of anger, but would
lack this great source of reserve energy which is called into play in most
of us by any difficulty in our path. In this respect also it is the opposite
of fear, which tends to inhibit all other impulses than its own.
The Instincts of Self-abasement (or Subjection) and of Self-assertion
(or Self-display), and the Emotions of Subjection and Elation (or Nega-
tive and Positive Self-feeling)
These two instincts have attracted little attention, and the two corre-
sponding emotions have, so far as I know, been adequately recognised
by M. Ribot alone,25 whom I follow in placing them among the primary
emotions. Ribot names the two emotions negative and positive self-feel-
ing respectively, but since these names are awkward in English, I pro-
pose, in the interests of a consistent terminology, to call them the emo-
tions of subjection and elation. The clear recognition and understanding
of these instincts, more especially of the instinct of self-display, is of the
first importance for the psychology of character and volition, as I hope
to show in a later chapter. At present I am only concerned to prove that
they have a place in the native constitution of the human mind.
The instinct of self-display is manifested by many of the higher
social or gregarious animals, especially, perhaps, though not only, at the
time of mating. Perhaps among mammals the horse displays it most
clearly. The muscles of all parts are strongly innervated, the creature
holds himself erect, his neck is arched, his tail lifted, his motions be-
come superfluously vigorous and extensive, he lifts his hoofs high in air,
as he parades before the eyes of his fellows. Many animals, especially
the birds, but also some of the monkeys, are provided with organs of
display that are specially disposed on these occasions. Such are the tail
of the peacock and the beautiful breast of the pigeon. The instinct is52/William McDougall
essentially a social one, and is only brought into play by the presence of
spectators. Such self-display is popularly recognised as implying pride;
we say “How proud he looks!” and the peacock has become the symbol
of pride. By psychologists pride is usually denied the animals, because
it is held to imply self-consciousness, and that, save of the most rudi-
mentary kind, they probably have not. But this denial arises from the
current confusion of the emotions and the sentiments. The word “pride”
is no doubt most properly to be used as the name of one form of the self-
regarding sentiment, and such sentiment does imply a developed self-
consciousness such as no animal can be credited with. Nevertheless,
popular opinion is, I think, in the right in attributing to the animals in
their moments of self-display the germ of the emotion that is the most
essential constituent of pride. It is this primary emotion which may be
called positive self-feeling or elation, and which might well be called
pride, if that word were not required to denote the sentiment of pride. In
the simple form, in which it is expressed by the self-display of animals,
it does not necessarily imply self-consciousness.
Many children clearly exhibit this instinct of self-display; before
they can walk or talk the impulse finds its satisfaction in the admiring
gaze and plaudits of the family circle as each new acquirement is prac-
tised;26 a little later it is still more clearly expressed by the frequently
repeated command, “See me do this,” or “See how well I can do so-and-
so”; and for many a child more than half the delight of riding on a pony,
or of wearing a new coat, consists in the satisfaction of this instinct, and
vanishes if there be no spectators. A little later, with the growth of self-
consciousness the instinct may find expression in the boasting and swag-
gering of boys, the vanity of girls; while, with almost all of us, it be-
comes the most important constituent of the self-regarding sentiment
and plays an all-important part in the volitional control of conduct, in
the way to be discussed in a later chapter.
The situation that more particularly excites this instinct is the pres-
ence of spectators to whom one feels oneself for any reason, or in any
way, superior, and this is perhaps true in a modified sense of the ani-
mals; the “dignified” behaviour of a big dog in the presence of small
ones, the stately strutting of a hen among her chicks, seem to be in-
stances in point. We have, then, good reason to believe that the germ of
this emotion is present in the animal world, and, if we make use of our
second criterion of the primary character of an emotion, it answers well
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that most terrible disorder, general paralysis of the insane, exaggeration
of this emotion and of its impulse of display is the leading symptom.
The unfortunate patient is perpetually in a state of elated self-feeling,
and his behaviour corresponds to his emotional state; he struts before
the world, boasts of his strength, his immense wealth, his good looks,
his luck, his family, when, perhaps, there is not the least foundation for
his boastings.
As regards the emotion of subjection or negative self-feeling, we
have the same grounds for regarding it as a primary emotion that ac-
companies the excitement of an instinctive disposition. The impulse of
this instinct expresses itself in a slinking, crestfallen behaviour, a gen-
eral diminution of muscular tone, slow restricted movements, a hanging
down of the head, and sidelong glances. In the dog the picture is com-
pleted by the sinking of the tail between the legs. All these features
express submissiveness, and are calculated to avoid attracting attention
or to mollify the spectator. The nature of the instinct is sometimes very
completely expressed in the behaviour of a young dog on the approach
of a larger, older dog; he crouches or crawls with legs so bent that his
belly scrapes the ground, his back hollowed, his tail tucked away, his
head sunk and turned a little on one side, and so approaches the impos-
ing stranger with every mark of submission.
The recognition of this behaviour as the expression of a special
instinct of self-abasement and of a corresponding primary emotion en-
ables us to escape from a much-discussed difficulty. It has been asked,
“Can animals and young children that have not attained to self-con-
sciousness feel shame?” And the answer usually given is, “No; shame
implies self-consciousness.” Yet some animals, notably the dog, some-
times behave in a way which the popular mind interprets as expressing
shame. The truth seems to be that, while fully developed shame, shame
in the full sense of the word, does imply self-consciousness and a self-
regarding sentiment, yet in the emotion that accompanies this impulse to
slink submissively we may see the rudiment of shame; and, if we do not
recognise this instinct, it is impossible to account for the genesis of
shame or of bashfulness.
In children the expression of this emotion is often mistaken for that
of fear; but the young child sitting on his mother’s lap in perfect silence
and with face averted, casting sidelong glances at a stranger, presents a
picture very different from that of fear.
Applying, again, our pathological test, we find that it is satisfied by54/William McDougall
this instinct of self- abasement In many cases of mental disorder the
exaggerated influence of this instinct seems to determine the leading
symptoms. The patient shrinks from the observation of his fellows, thinks
himself a most wretched, useless, sinful creature, and, in many cases, he
develops delusions of having performed various unworthy or even crimi-
nal actions; many such patients declare they are guilty of the unpardon-
able sin, although they attach no definite meaning to the phrase—that is
to say, the patient’s intellect endeavours to justify the persistent emo-
tional state, which has no adequate cause in his relations to his fellow-
men.
The Parental Instinct and the Tender Emotion
As regards the parental instinct and tender emotion, there are wide dif-
ferences of opinion. Some of the authors who have paid most attention
to the psychology of the emotions, notably Mr. A. F. Shand, do not
recognise tender emotion as primary;27 others, especially Mr. Alex.
Sutherland28 and M. Ribot,29recognise it as a true primary and see in its
impulse the root of all altruism; Mr. Sutherland, however, like Adam
Smith and many other writers, has confused tender emotion with sym-
pathy, a serious error of incomplete analysis, which Ribot has avoided.
The maternal instinct, which impels the mother to protect and cher-
ish her young, is common to almost all the higher species of animals.
Among the lower animals the perpetuation of the species is generally
provided for by the production of an immense number of eggs or young
(in some species of fish a single adult produces more than a million
eggs), which are left entirely unprotected, and are so preyed upon by
other creatures that on the average but one or two attain maturity. As we
pass higher up the animal scale, we find the number of eggs or young
more and more reduced, and the diminution of their number compen-
sated for by parental protection. At the lowest stage this protection may
consist in the provision of some merely physical shelter, as in the case of
those animals that carry their eggs attached in some way to their bodies.
But, except at this lowest stage, the protection afforded to the young
always involves some instinctive adaptation of the parent’s behaviour.
We may see this even among the fishes, some of which deposit their
eggs in rude nests and watch over them, driving away creatures that
might prey upon them. From this stage onwards protection of offspring
becomes increasingly psychical in character, involves more profound
modification of the parent’s behaviour and a more prolonged period ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/55
more effective guardianship. The highest stage is reached by those spe-
cies in which each female produces at a birth but one or two young and
protects them so efficiently that most of the young born reach maturity;
the maintenance of the. species thus becomes in the main the work of the
parental instinct. In such species the protection and cherishing of the
young is the constant and all-absorbing occupation of the mother, to
which she devotes all her energies, and in the course of which she will at
any time undergo privation, pain, and death. The instinct becomes more
powerful than any other, and can override any other, even fear itself; for
it works directly in the service of the species, while the other instincts
work primarily in the service of the individual life, for which Nature
cares little. All this has been well set out by Sutherland, with a wealth of
illustrative detail, in his work on “The Origin and Growth of the Moral
Instinct.”
When we follow up the evolution of this instinct to the highest ani-
mal level, we find among the apes the most remarkable examples of its
operation. Thus in one species the mother is said to carry her young one
clasped in one arm uninterruptedly for several months, never letting go
of it in all her wanderings. This instinct is no less strong in many human
mothers, in whom, of course, it becomes more or less intellectualised
and organised as the most essential constituent of the sentiment of pa-
rental love. Like other species, the human species is dependent upon this
instinct for its continued existence and welfare. It is true that reason,
working in the service of the egoistic impulses and sentiments, often
circumvents the ends of this instinct and sets up habits which are incom-
patible with it. When that occurs on a large scale in any society, that
society is doomed to rapid decay. But the instinct itself can never die
out, save with the disappearance of the human species itself; it is kept
strong and effective just because those families and races and nations in
which it weakens become rapidly supplanted by those in which it is
strong.
It is impossible to believe that the operation of this, the most power-
ful of the instincts, is not accompanied by a strong and definite emotion;
one may see the emotion expressed unmistakably by almost any mother
among the higher animals, especially the birds and the mammals—by
the cat, for example, and by most of the domestic animals; and it is
impossible to doubt that this emotion has in all cases the peculiar qual-
ity of the tender emotion provoked in the human parent by the spectacle
of her helpless offspring. This primary emotion has been very generally56/William McDougall
ignored by the philosophers and psychologists; that is, perhaps, to be
explained by the fact that this instinct and its emotion are in the main
decidedly weaker in men than in women, and in some men, perhaps,
altogether lacking. We may even surmise that the philosophers as a class
are men among whom this defect of native endowment is relatively com-
mon.
It may be asked, ‘How can we account for the fact that men are at
all capable of this emotion and of this disinterested protective impulse?
For in its racial origin the instinct was undoubtedly primarily maternal.
The answer is that it is very common to see a character, acquired by one
sex to meet its special needs, transmitted, generally imperfectly and with
large individual variations, to the members of the other sex. Familiar
examples of such transmission of sexual characters are afforded by the
horns and antlers of some species of sheep and deer. That the parental
instinct is by no means altogether lacking in men is probably due in the
main to such transference of a primarily maternal instinct, though it is
probable that in the human species natural selection has confirmed and
increased its inheritance by the male sex.
To this view, that the parental tenderness of human beings depends
upon an instinct phylogenetically continuous with the parental instinct
of the higher animals, it might be objected that the very widespread
prevalence of infanticide among existing savages implies that primitive
man lacked this instinct and its tender emotion. But that would be a
most mistaken objection. There is no feature of savage life more nearly
universal than the kindness and tenderness of savages, even of savage
fathers, for their little children. All observers are agreed upon this point.
I have many a time watched with interest a bloodthirsty head-hunter of
Borneo spending a day at home tenderly nursing his infant in his arms.
And it is a rule, to which there are few exceptions among savage peoples,
that an infant is only killed during the first hours of its life. If the child is
allowed to survive but a few days, then its life is safe; the tender emo-
tion has been called out in fuller strength and has begun to be organised
into a sentiment of parental love that is too strong to be overcome by
prudential or purely selfish considerations.30
The view of the origin of parental tenderness here adopted com-
pares, I think, very favourably with other accounts of its genesis. Bain
taught that it is generated in the individual by the frequent repetition of
the intense pleasure of contact with the young; though why this contact
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uted it to the expectation by the parent of filial care in his or her old age.
This is one form of the absurd and constantly renewed attempt to reveal
all altruism as arising essentially out of a more or less subtle regard for
one’s own welfare or pleasure. If tender emotion and the sentiment of
love really arose from a disguised selfishness of this sort, how much
stronger should be the love of the child for the parent than that of the
parent for the child! For the child is for many years utterly dependent on
the parent for his every pleasure and the satisfaction of his every need;
whereas the mother’s part—if she were not endowed with this powerful
instinct—would be one long succession of sacrifices and painful efforts
on behalf of her child. Parental love must always appear an insoluble
riddle and paradox if we do not recognise this primary emotion, deeply
rooted in an ancient instinct of vital importance to the race. Long ago
the Roman moralists were perplexed by it. They noticed that in the Sullan
prosecutions, while many sons denounced their fathers, no father was
ever known to denounce his son; and they recognised that this fact was
inexplicable by their theories of conduct. For their doctrine was like that
of Bain, who said explicitly: “Tender feeling is as purely self-seeking as
any other pleasure, and makes no inquiry as to the feelings of the be-
loved personality. It is by nature pleasurable, but does not necessarily
cause us to seek the good of the object farther than is needful to gratify
ourselves in the indulgence of the feeling.” And again, in express refer-
ence to maternal tenderness, he wrote: “The superficial observer has to
be told that the feeling in itself is as purely self-regarding as the pleasure
of wine or of music. Under it we are induced to seek the presence of the
beloved objects and to make the requisite sacrifices to gain the end,
looking all the while at our own pleasure and to nothing beyond.”32 This
doctrine is a gross libel on human nature, which is not so far inferior to
animal nature in this respect as Bain’s words imply. If Bain, and those
who agree with his doctrine, were in the right, everything the cynics
have said of human nature would be justified; for from this emotion and
its impulse to cherish and protect spring generosity, gratitude, love, pity,
true benevolence, and altruistic conduct of every kind; in it they have
their main and absolutely essential root, without which they would not
be.33
Like the other primary emotions, the tender emotion cannot be de-
scribed; a person who had not experienced it could no more be made to
understand its quality than a totally colour-blind person can be made to
understand the experience of colour-sensation. Its impulse is primarily58/William McDougall
to afford physical protection to the child, especially by throwing the
arms about it; and that fundamental impulse persists in spite of the im-
mense extension of the range of application of the impulse and its incor-
poration in many ideal sentiments.34
Like all the other instinctive impulses, this one, when its operation
meets with obstruction or opposition, gives place to, or is complicated
by, the pugnacious or combative impulse directed against the source of
the obstruction; and, the impulse being essentially protective, its ob-
struction provokes anger perhaps more readily than the obstruction of
any other. In almost all animals that display it, even in those which in all
other situations are very timid, any attempt to remove the young from
the protecting parent, or in any way to hurt them, provokes a fierce and
desperate display of all their combative resources. By the human mother
the same prompt yielding of the one impulse to the other is displayed on
the same plane of physical protection, but also on the higher plane of
ideal protection; the least threat, the smallest slight or aspersion (e.g.,
the mere speaking of the baby as “it,” instead of as “he” or “she”), the
mere suggestion that it is not the most beautiful object in the world, will
suffice to provoke a quick resentment.
This intimate alliance between tender emotion and anger is of great
importance for the social life of man, and the right understanding of it is
fundamental for a true theory of the moral sentiments; for the anger
evoked in this way is the germ of all moral indignation, and on moral
indignation justice and the greater part of public law are in the main
founded. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, beneficence and punish-
ment alike have their firmest and most essential root in the parental
instinct. For the understanding of the relation of this instinct to moral
indignation, it is important to note that the object which is the primary
provocative of tender emotion is, not the child itself, but the child’s
expression of pain, fear, or distress of any kind, especially the child’s
cry of distress; further, that this instinctive response is provoked by the
cry, not only of one’s own offspring, but of any child. Tender emotion
and the protective impulse are, no doubt, evoked more readily and in-
tensely by one’s own offspring, because about them a strongly organised
and complex sentiment grows up. But the distress of any child will evoke
this response in a very intense degree in those in whom the instinct is
strong. There are women—and men also, though fewer—who cannot
sit still, or pursue any occupation, within sound of the distressed cry of
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its relief, they yet cannot withdraw their attention from the sound, but
continue to listen in painful agitation.
In the human being, just as is the case in some degree with all the
instinctive responses, and as we noticed especially in the case of dis-
gust, there takes place a vast extension of the field of application of the
maternal instinct. The similarity of various objects to the primary or
natively given object, similarities which in many cases can only be op-
erative for a highly developed mind, enables them to evoke tender emo-
tion and its protective impulse directly—i.e., not merely by way of as-
sociative reproduction of the natively given object. In this way the emo-
tion is liable to be evoked, not only by the distress of a child, but by the
mere sight or thought of a perfectly happy child; for its feebleness, its
delicacy, its obvious incapacity to supply its own needs, its liability to a
thousand different ills, suggest to the mind its need of protection. By a
further extension of the same kind the emotion may be evoked by the
sight of any very young animal, especially if in distress; Wordsworth’s
poem on the pet lamb is the celebration of this emotion in its purest
form; and indeed it would be easy to wax enthusiastic in the cause of an
instinct that is the source of the only entirely admirable, satisfying, and
perfect human relationship, as well as of every kind of purely disinter-
ested conduct.
In a similar direct fashion the distress of any adult (towards whom
we harbour no hostile sentiment) evokes the emotion; but in this case it
is more apt to be complicated by sympathetic pain, when it becomes the
painful, tender emotion we call pity; whereas the child, or any other
helpless and delicate thing, may call it out in the pure form without alloy
of sympathetic pain. It is amusing to observe how, in those women in
whom the instinct is strong, it is apt to be excited, owing to the subtle
working of similarity, by any and every object that is small and delicate
of its kind—a very small cup, or chair, or book, or what not.
Extension takes place also through association in virtue of contigu-
ity; the objects intimately connected with the prime object of the emo-
tion—such objects as the clothes, the toys, the bed, of the beloved child—
become capable of exciting the emotion directly.
But the former mode of direct extension of the field of application is
in this case the more important. It is in virtue of such extension to similars
that, when we see or hear of, the ill- treatment of any weak, defenceless
creature (especially, of course, if the creature be a child) tender emotion
and the protective impulse are aroused on its behalf, but are apt to give60/William McDougall
place at once to the anger we call moral indignation against the perpe-
trator of the cruelty; and in bad cases we are quite prepared to tear the
offender limb from limb, the tardy process of the law with its mild pun-
ishments seeming utterly inadequate to afford vicarious satisfaction to
our anger.35
How is this great fact of wholly disinterested anger or indignation
to be accounted for, if not in the way here suggested? The question is an
important one; it supplies a touchstone for all theories of the moral emo-
tions and sentiments. For, as was said above, this disinterested indigna-
tion is the ultimate root of justice and of public law; without its support
law and its machinery would be most inadequate safeguards of personal
rights and liberties; and, in opposition to the moral indignation of a
majority of members of any society, laws can only be very imperfectly
enforced by the strongest despotism, as we see in Russia at the present
time. Those who deny any truly altruistic motive to man and seek to
reduce apparent altruism to subtle and far-sighted egoism, must simply
deny the obvious facts, and must seek some far-fetched unreal explana-
tions of such phenomena as the anti-slavery and Congo-reform move-
ments, the anti-vivisection crusade, and the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children. Let us examine briefly the way in which Bain
sought to account for ostensibly disinterested emotion and action. As
we have seen above, he regarded tender emotion as wholly self-seeking,
and, like many other authors, he attributed such actions as we are con-
sidering to sympathy. He wrote: “From a region of the mind quite apart
from the tender emotion arises the principle of sympathy, or the prompt-
ing to take on the pleasures and pains of other beings, and act on them
as if they were our own. Instead of being a source of pleasure to us, the
primary operation of sympathy is to make us surrender pleasures and to
incur pains. This is a paradox of our constitution to be again more fully
considered.”36
Here he has clearly committed himself to a position that needs much
explanation. But, when we seek his fuller consideration of this paradox,
all we find is a passage of a few lines in his section on moral disappro-
bation. This passage tells us that, when another’s conduct inspires a
feeling of disapprobation as violating the maxims recognised to be bind-
ing. “It is to be supposed that the same sense of duty that operates upon
one’s own self, and stings with remorse and fear in case of disobedience,
should come into play when some other person is the guilty agent. The
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sure or dislike, proportioned to the strength of our regard to the violated
duty. There arises a moral resentment, or a disposition to inflict punish-
ment upon the offender.”37 That is to say, according to Bain, the source
of all disinterested moral indignation is the reflection, “If I had done
that, I should have been punished; therefore he must be punished.” Now,
this attitude is not uncommon, especially in the nursery, and it plays
some small part, no doubt, in securing equal distribution of punish-
ments; but it is surely wholly inadequate to account for that paradox of
our constitution previously recognised by Bain. In order to realise how
far from the truth this doctrine is, we have only to consider what kinds
of conduct provoke our moral indignation most strongly. If we hear of a
man robbing a bank, holding up a mail train, or killing another in fair
fight, we may agree that he should be punished; for we recognise intel-
lectually that the interests of society demand that such things shall not
be done too frequently, and we ourselves might shrink from similar con-
duct; but our feeling towards the criminal may be one of pity, or perhaps
merely one of amusement dashed with admiration for his audacity and
skill. But let the act be one inflicting pain on a helpless creature—an act
of cruelty to a horse, a dog, or, above all, to a child—and our moral
indignation blazes out, even though the act be one for which the law
prescribes no punishment. Bain’s explanation of his “paradox” of sym-
pathy is then utterly inadequate, and a closer examination of his state-
ment of the principle of sympathy shows that it is false, and that any
plausibility it may seem to possess depends upon the vague and rhetori-
cal language in which it is made, His statement is that sympathy is the
prompting to take on the pains and pleasures of another being, and to
endeavour to abolish that other’s pain and to prolong his pleasure. But,
if we use more accurate language, we shall have to say that the sympa-
thetic pain or pleasure we experience is immediately evoked in us by the
spectacle of pain or of pleasure, and that we then act on it because it is
our own pain or pleasure; and the action we take (so long as no other
principle is at work) is directed to cut short our own pain and to prolong
our own pleasure, quite regardless of the feelings of the other person.
Now, the easiest and quickest way of cutting short sympathetically in-
duced pain is to turn our eyes and our thoughts away from the suffering
creature; and this is the way invariably followed by all sensitive natures
in which the tender emotion and its protective impulse are weak. They
pass by the sick and suffering with averted gaze, and resolutely banish
all thoughts of them, surrounding themselves as far as possible with gay62/William McDougall
and cheerful faces. No doubt the spectacle of the poor man who fell
among thieves was just as distressing to the priest and the Levite, who
passed by on the other side, as to the good Samaritan who tenderly
cared for him. They may well have been exquisitely sensitive souls, who
would have fainted away if they had been compelled to gaze upon his
wounds. The great difference between them and the Samaritan was that
in him the tender emotion and its impulse were evoked, and that this
impulse overcame, or prevented, the aversion naturally induced by the
painful and, perhaps, disgusting spectacle.38
Our susceptibility to sympathetically induced pain or pleasure, op-
erating alone, simply inclines us, then, to avoid the neighbourhood of
the distressed and to seek the company of the cheerful; but tender emo-
tion draws us near to the suffering and the sad, seeking to alleviate their
distress. It is to be noted also that the intensity of the emotion and the
strength of its impulse to cherish and protect, and also the violence of
the anger we feel against him who inflicts pain on any weak and
defenceless creature—all these bear no constant relation to the intensity
of our sympathetically induced pain. There are natures so strong and so
happily constituted that they hardly know pain; yet they may be very
tender- hearted and easily roused to anger by the spectacle of cruelty.
Again, the mere threat of injury to a feeble creature may provoke an
instantaneous anger; and it would be absurd to suppose that in such a
case one first pictures the suffering of the creature that would result if
the threat were executed, then sympathetically experiences the pain, and
then, putting oneself in the place of the prospectively injured, goes on to
feel anger against him who threatens. The response is as direct and
instantaneous as the mother’s emotion at the cry of her child or her
impulse to fly to its defence; and it is essentially the same process.
In no other way than that here proposed is it possible to account for
disinterested beneficence and moral indignation. If this view is rejected,
they remain a paradox and a miracle—tendencies, mysteriously implanted
in the human breast, that have no history in the evolutionary process, no
analogy and no intelligible connection with, no resemblance to, any of
the other features of our mental constitution.
The importance of establishing the place of tender emotion among
the primary emotions necessitates in this place a brief criticism of Mr.
Shand’s treatment of it, although this criticism may be more easily un-
derstood after reading Chapters V and VI, in which the organisation of
the sentiments is discussed.An Introduction to Social Psychology/63
According to Mr. Shand,39 tender emotion is always complex, and
into its composition there enter always both joy and sorrow. He arrives
at this view in the following way: Accepting the traditional view that joy
and sorrow are primary emotions, he says that joy is a diffusive emotion
that has no specific tendency (for he has not accepted the guiding prin-
ciple followed in these pages, namely, that each primary emotion ac-
companies the excitement of an instinctive disposition of specific ten-
dency); and sorrow, he says, has two impulses, namely, to cling to its
object and to restore it, to repair the injury done to it that is the cause of
the sorrow. He then takes pity as the simplest type of tender emotion,
and finds that it has the fundamental impulses of sorrow, to restore and
to cling to its object; but pity is not pure sorrow, because it has an
element of sweetness; which element he identifies with joy. Hence pity,
the simplest variety of tender emotion, is, he says, a fusion of joy and
sorrow.
Mr. Shand does not attempt to account for sorrow, or to trace its
history in the race, or to show how it gets its disinterested impulse to
restore and do good to its object. And this is the all- important question,
for this impulse of tender emotion is, as has been said, the source of all
altruistic conduct. He simply begs the question in assuming sorrow to
be a primary emotion having this impulse. Further, in the course of his
discussion Shand recognises the existence of a kind of sorrow or grief
that has no impulse to restore its object— the hard, bitter variety of
grief; and in doing that he implicitly admits that sorrow is complex and
derived from simpler elements. He makes also this significant admis-
sion: “The tenderness of pity seems to come from the ideas and impulses
that go out to relieve suffering.” Now, that is just the point I wish to
insist upon—that there is in pity as one element this impulse to cherish
and protect, with its accompanying tender emotion; and that this is present
also in sorrow proper, but that it is not in itself painful—as sorrow is—
and therefore is not sorrow, but is one of the primary elements of which
sorrowful emotion is compounded.
According to the view here adopted, the element of pain in pity is
sympathetically induced pain,40 and the element of sweetness is the plea-
sure that attends the satisfaction of the impulse of the tender emotion.
That this view is truer than the other is, I think, shown by the fact that
pity may be wholly devoid of this element of sweetness without losing
its essential character— namely, in the case of pity evoked by some
terrible suffering that we are powerless to relieve; in this case the pain64/William McDougall
of the obstructed tender impulse is added to the sympathetic pain, and
our pity is wholly painful.
Another good reason for refusing to regard sorrow as one of the
primary emotions is the fact that sorrowful emotion of every kind pre-
supposes the existence of an organised sentiment, and is, in fact, the
tender emotion developed within the sentiment of love and rendered pain-
ful either by sympathetically induced pain—as in the case of injury to
the beloved object, or by the baffling of its impulse—as in the case of
the loss of that object. If, as seems to me indisputable, sorrow presup-
poses the organised sentiment of love, it clearly cannot be regarded as a
primary emotion.
Some other Instincts of less well-defined Emotional Tendency
The seven instincts we have now reviewed are those whose excitement
yields the most definite of the primary emotions; from these seven pri-
mary emotions together with feelings of pleasure and pain (and perhaps
also feelings of excitement and of depression) are compounded all, or
almost all, the affective states that are popularly recognised as emo-
tions, and for which common speech has definite names. But there are
other human instincts which, though some of them play but a minor part
in the genesis of the emotions, have impulses that are of great impor-
tance for social life; they must therefore be mentioned.
Of these by far the most important is the sexual instinct or instinct
of reproduction. It is unnecessary to say anything of the great strength
of its impulse or of the violence of the emotional excitement that accom-
panies its exercise. One point of interest is its intimate connection with
the parental instinct. There can, I think, be little doubt that this connec-
tion is an innate one, and that in all (save debased) natures it secures
that the object of the sexual impulse shall become also the object in
some degree of tender emotion.41 The biological utility of an innate
connection of this kind is obvious. It would prepare the way for that co-
operation between the male and female in which, even among the ani-
mals, a lifelong fidelity and mutual tenderness is often touchingly dis-
played.
This instinct, more than any other, is apt in mankind to lend the
immense energy of its impulse to the sentiments and complex impulses
into which it enters, while its specific character remains submerged and
unconscious. It is unnecessary to dwell on this feature, since it has been
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of view of this section the chief importance of this instinct is that it
illustrates, in a manner that must convince the most obtuse, the continu-
ity and the essential similarity of nature and function between the hu-
man and the animal instincts.
In connection with the instinct of reproduction a few words must be
said about sexual jealousy and female coyness. These are regarded by
some authors as special instincts, but perhaps without sufficiently good
grounds. Jealousy in the full sense of the word is a complex emotion
that presupposes an organised sentiment, and there is no reason to re-
gard the hostile behaviour of the male animal in the presence of rivals as
necessarily implying any such complex emotion or sentiment. The as-
sumption of a specially intimate innate connection between the instincts
of reproduction and of pugnacity will account for the fact that the anger
of the male, both in the human and in most animal species, is so readily
aroused in an intense degree by any threat of opposition to the operation
of the sexual impulse; and perhaps the great strength of the sexual im-
pulse sufficiently accounts for it.
The coyness of the female in the presence of the male may be ac-
counted for in similar fashion by the assumption that in the female the
instinct of reproduction has specially intimate innate relations to the
instincts of self-display and self-abasement, so that the presence of the
male excites these as well as the former instinct
The desire for food that we experience when hungry, with the im-
pulse to seize it, to carry it to the mouth, to chew it and swallow it, must,
I think, be regarded as rooted in a true instinct. In many of the animals
the movements of feeding exhibit all the marks of truly instinctive
behaviour. But in ourselves the instinct becomes at an early age so greatly
modified through experience, on both its receptive and its executive sides,
that little, save the strong impulse, remains to mark the instinctive na-
ture of the process of feeding.
The gregarious instinct is one of the human instincts of greatest
social importance, for it has played a great part in moulding societary
forms. The affective aspect of the operation of this instinct is not suffi-
ciently intense or specific to have been given a name. The instinct is
displayed by many species of animals, even by some very low in the
scale of mental capacity. Its operation in its simplest form implies none
of the higher qualities of mind, neither sympathy nor capacity for mu-
tual aid. Mr. Francis Galton has given the classical description of the
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Damaraland,43 he says he displays no affection for his fellows, and
hardly seems to notice their existence, so long as he is among them; but,
if he becomes separated from the herd, he displays an extreme distress
that will not let him rest until he succeeds in rejoining it, when he has-
tens to bury himself in the midst of it, seeking the closest possible con-
tact with the bodies of his fellows. There we see the working of the
gregarious instinct in all its simplicity, a mere uneasiness in isolation
and satisfaction in being one of a herd. Its utility to animals liable to the
attacks of beasts of prey is obvious.
The instinct is commonly strongly confirmed by habit; the individual
is born into a society of some sort and grows up in it, and the being with
others and doing as they do becomes a habit deeply rooted in the instinct
It would seem to be a general rule, the explanation of which is to be
found in the principle of sympathetic emotion to be considered later,
that the more numerous the herd or crowd or society in which the indi-
vidual finds himself the more complete is the satisfaction of this im-
pulse. It is probably owing to this peculiarity of the instinct that gregari-
ous animals of so many species are found at times in aggregations far
larger than are necessary for mutual protection or for the securing of
any other advantage. Travellers on the prairies of North America in the
early days of exploration have told how the bison might sometimes be
seen in an immense herd that blackened the surface of the plain for
many miles in all directions. In a similar way some kinds of deer and of
birds gather together and move from place to place in vast aggregations.
Although opinions differ widely as to the form of primitive human
society, some inclining to the view that it was a large promiscuous horde,
others, with more probability, regarding it as a comparatively small
group of near blood relatives, almost all anthropologists agree that primi-
tive man was to some extent gregarious in his habits; and the strength of
the instinct as it still exists in civilised men lends support to this view.
The gregarious instinct is no exception to the rule that the human
instincts are liable to a morbid hypertrophy under which their emotions
and impulses are revealed with exaggerated intensity. The condition
known to alienists as agoraphobia seems to result from the morbidly
intense working of this instinct—the patient will not remain alone, will
not cross a wide empty space, and seeks alwavs to be surrounded by
other human beings. But of the normal man also it is true that, as Pro-
fessor James says: “To be alone is one of the greatest of evils for him.
Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruelAn Introduction to Social Psychology/67
and unnatural for civilised countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a
desert island the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the
distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences.”44
In civilised communities we may see evidence of the operation of
this instinct on every hand. For all but a few exceptional, and generally
highly cultivated, persons the one essential condition of recreation is the
being one of a crowd. The normal daily recreation of the population of
our towns is to go out in the evening and to walk up and down the streets
in which the throng is densest—the Strand, Oxford Street, or the Old
Kent Road; and the smallest occasion—a foreign prince driving to a
railway-station or a Lord Mayor’s Show— will line the streets for hours
with many thousands whose interest in the prince or the show alone
would hardly lead them to take a dozen steps out of their way. On their
few short holidays the working classes rush together from town and
country alike to those resorts in which they are assured of the presence
of a large mass of their fellows. It is the same instinct working on a
slightly higher plane that brings tens of thousands to the cricket and
football grounds on half-holidays. Crowds of this sort exert a greater
fascination and afford a more complete satisfaction to the gregarious
instinct than the mere aimless aggregations of the streets, because all
their members are simultaneously concerned with the same objects, all
are moved by the same emotions, all shout and applaud together. It
would be absurd to suppose that it is merely the individuals’ interest in
the game that brings these huge crowds together. What proportion of the
ten thousand witnesses of a football match would stand for an hour or
more in the wind and rain, if each man were isolated from the rest of the
crowd and saw only the players?
Even cultured minds are not immune to the fascination of the herd.
Who has not felt it as he has stood at the Mansion House crossing or
walked down Cheapside? How few prefer at nightfall the lonely Thames
Embankment, full of mysterious poetry as the barges sweep slowly on-
ward with the flood-tide, to the garish crowded Strand a hundred yards
away! We cultivated persons usually say to ourselves, when we yield to
this fascination, that we are taking an intelligent interest in the life of the
people. But such intellectual interest plays but a small part, and beneath
works the powerful impulse of this ancient instinct The possession of
this instinct, even in great strength, does not necessarily imply sociabil-
ity of temperament. Many a man leads in London a most solitary, unso-
ciable life, who yet would find it hard to live far away from the thronged68/William McDougall
city. Such men are like Mr. Galton’s oxen, unsociable but gregarious;
and they illustrate the fact that sociability, although it has the gregari-
ous instinct at its foundation, is a more complex, more highly devel-
oped, tendency. As an element of this more complex tendency to socia-
bility, the instinct largely determines the forms of the recreations of even
the cultured classes, and is the root of no small part of the pleasure we
find in attendance at the theatre, at concerts, lectures, and all such enter-
tainments. How much more satisfying is a good play if one sits in a
well-filled theatre than if half the seats are empty; especially if the house
is unanimous and loud in the expression of its feelings! But this instinct
has in all ages produced more important social effects that must be
considered in a later chapter.
Two other instincts of considerable social importance demand a brief
mention. The impulse to collect and hoard various objects is displayed
in one way or another by almost all human beings, and seems to be due
to a true instinct; it is manifested by many animals in the blind, unintel-
ligent manner that is characteristic of crude instinct. And, like other
instinctive impulses of man, it is liable to become morbidly exagger-
ated, when it appears, in a mild form, as the collecting mania and, in
greater excess, as miserliness and kleptomania. Like other instincts, it
ripens naturally and comes into play independently of all training. Sta-
tistical inquiry among large numbers of children has shown that very
few attain adult life without having made a collection of objects of one
kind or another, usually without any definite purpose; such collecting is
no doubt primarily due to the ripening of an instinct of acquisition.
We seem to be justified in assuming in man an instinct of construc-
tion. The playful activities of children seem to be in part determined by
its impulse; and in most civilised adults it still survives, though but little
scope is allowed it by the circumstances of the majority. For most of us
the satisfaction of having actually made something is very real, quite
apart from the value or usefulness of the thing made. And the simple
desire to make something, rooted in this instinct, is probably a contrib-
uting motive to all human constructions from a mud-pie to a metaphysi-
cal system or a code of laws.
The instincts enumerated above, together with a number of minor
instincts, such as those that prompt to crawling and walking, are, I think,
all that we can recognise with certainty in the constitution of the human
mind. Lightly to postulate an indefinite number and variety of human
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is an error hardly less serious and less common than the opposite error
of ignoring all the instincts. How often do we not hear of the religious
instinct! Renan asserted that the religious instinct is as natural to man as
the nest-building instinct is to birds, and many authors have written of it
as one of the fundamental attributes of the human mind.45 But, if we
accept the doctrine of the evolution of man from animal forms, we are
compelled to seek the origin of religious emotions and impulses in in-
stincts that are not specifically religious. And consideration of the con-
ditions, manifestations, and tendencies of religious emotions must lead
to the same search. For it is clear that religious emotion is not a simple
and specific variety, such as could be conditioned by any one instinct; it
is rather a very complex and diversified product of the co-operation of
several instincts, which bring forth very heterogeneous manifestations,
differing from one another as widely as light from darkness, according
to the degree and kind of guidance afforded by imagination and reason.
Much has been written in recent years of instincts of imitation, of
sympathy, and of play, and the postulation of these instincts seems to
have been allowed to pass without challenge. Yet, as I shall show in the
following section, there is no sufficient justification for it; for all the
behaviour attributed to these three supposed instincts may be otherwise
accounted for.
Professor James admits an instinct of emulation or rivalry, but the
propriety of this admission is to my mind questionable. It is possible
that all the behaviour which is attributed to this instinct may be ac-
counted for as proceeding from the instincts of pugnacity and of self-
display or self- assertion. It would, I think, be difficult to make out any
good case for the existence of such an instinct in the animal world. But
a suggestion as to the peculiar position and origin of a human instinct of
emulation will be made in the next chapter.
Chapter IV
Some General or Non-Specific Innate Tendencies
In this chapter we have to consider certain innate tendencies of the hu-
man mind of great importance for social life which are sometimes as-
cribed to special instincts, but which are more properly classed apart
from the instinctive tendencies. For we have seen that an instinct, no
matter how profoundly modified it may be in the developed human mind
as regards the conditions of its excitement and the actions in which it
manifests itself, always retains unchanged its essential and permanent70/William McDougall
nucleus; this nucleus is the central part of the innate disposition, the
excitement of which determines an affective state or emotion of specific
quality and a native impulse towards some specific end. And the tenden-
cies to be considered in this chapter have no such specific characters,
but are rather of a many-sided and general nature. Consider, for ex-
ample, the tendency to imitate—the modes of action in which this ten-
dency expresses itself and the accompanying subjective states are as
various as the things or actions that can be imitated.
Sympathy or the Sympathetic Induction of the Emotions
The three most important of these pseudo-instincts, as they might be
called, are suggestion, imitation, and sympathy. They are closely allied
as regards their effects, for in each case the process in which the ten-
dency manifests itself involves an interaction between at least two indi-
viduals, one of whom is the agent, while the other is the person acted
upon or patient; and in each case the result of the process is some degree
of assimilation of the actions and mental state of the patient to those of
the agent They are three forms of mental interaction of fundamental
importance for all social life, both of men and animals. These processes
of mental interaction, of impression and reception, may involve chiefly
the cognitive aspect of mental process, or its affective or its conative
aspect. In the first case, when some presentation, idea, or belief of the
agent directly induces a similar presentation, idea, or belief in the pa-
tient, the process is called one of suggestion; when an affective or emo-
tional excitement of the agent induces a similar affective excitement in
the patient, the process is one of sympathy or sympathetic induction of
emotion or feeling; when the most prominent result of the process of
interaction is the assimilation of the bodily movements of the patient to
those of the agent, we speak of imitation.
Now, M. Tarde46 and Professor Baldwin47 have singled out imita-
tion as the all-important social process, and Baldwin, like most contem-
porary writers, attributes it to an instinct of imitation. But careful con-
sideration of the nature of imitative actions shows that they are of many
kinds, that they issue from mental processes of a number of different
types, and that none are attributable to a specific instinct of imitation,
while many are due to sympathy and others to suggestion. We must
therefore first consider sympathy and suggestion, and, after defining
them as precisely as possible, go on to consider the varieties of imitative
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Sympathy is by some authors ascribed to a special instinct of sym-
pathy, and even Professor James has been misled by the confused usage
of common speech and has said “sympathy is an emotion.”48 But the
principles maintained in the foregoing chapter will not allow us to ac-
cept either of these views. The word “sympathy,” as popularly used,
generally implies a tender regard for the person with whom we are said
to sympathise. But such sympathy is only one special and complex form
of sympathetic emotion, in the strict and more general sense of the words.
The fundamental and primitive form of sympathy is exactly what the
word implies, a suffering with, the experiencing of any feeling or emo-
tion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the
expression of that feeling or emotion.49
Sympathetic induction of emotion is displayed in the simplest and
most unmistakable fashion by many, probably by all, of the gregarious
animals; and it is easy to understand how greatly it aids them in their
struggle for existence. One of the clearest and commonest examples is
the spread of fear and its flight-impulse among the members of a flock
or herd. Many gregarious animals utter when startled a characteristic
cry of fear; when this cry is emitted by one member of a flock or herd, it
immediately excites the flight-impulse in all of its fellows who are within
hearing of it; the whole herd, flock, or covey takes to flight like one
individual. Or again, one of a pack of gregarious hunting animals, dogs
or wolves, comes upon a fresh trail, sights the prey, and pursues it,
uttering a characteristic yelp that excites the instinct of pursuit in all his
fellows and brings them yelping behind him. Or two dogs begin to growl
or fight, and at once all the dogs within sound and sight stiffen them-
selves and show every symptom of anger. Or one beast in a herd stands
arrested, gazing in curiosity on some unfamiliar object, and presently
his fellows also, to whom the object may be invisible, display curiosity
and come up to join in the examination of the object. In all these cases
we observe only that the behaviour of one animal, upon the excitement
of an instinct, immediately evokes similar behaviour in those of his fel-
lows who perceive his expressions of excitement. But we can hardly
doubt that in each case the instinctive behaviour is accompanied by the
appropriate emotion and felt impulse.
Sympathy of this crude kind is the cement that binds animal societ-
ies together, renders the actions of all members of a group harmonious,
and allows them to reap some of the prime advantages of social life in
spite of lack of intelligence.72/William McDougall
How comes it that the instinctive behaviour of one animal directly
excites similar behaviour on the part of his fellows? No satisfactory
answer to this question seems to have been hitherto proposed, although
this kind of behaviour has been described and discussed often enough.
Not many years ago it would have seemed sufficient to answer, It is due
to instinct. But that answer will hardly satisfy us to-day. I think the facts
compel us to assume that in the gregarious animals each of the principal
instincts has a special perceptual inlet (or recipient afferent part) that is
adapted to receive and to elaborate the sense-impressions made by the
expressions of the same instinct in other animals of the same species—
that, e.g., the fear-instinct has, besides others, a special perceptual inlet
that renders it excitable by the sound of the cry of fear, the instinct of
pugnacity a perceptual inlet that renders it excitable by the sound of the
roar of anger.
Human sympathy has its roots in similar specialisations of the in-
stinctive dispositions on their afferent sides. In early childhood sympa-
thetic emotion is almost wholly of this simple kind; and all through life
most of us continue to respond in this direct fashion to the expressions
of the feelings and emotions of our fellow-men. This sympathetic induc-
tion of emotion and feeling may be observed in children at an age at
which they cannot be credited with understanding of the significance of
the expressions that provoke their reactions. Perhaps the expression to
which they respond earliest is the sound of the wailing of other children.
A little later the sight of a smiling face, the expression of pleasure,
provokes a smile. Later still fear, curiosity, and, I think, anger, are com-
municated readily in this direct fashion from one child to another. Laugh-
ter is notoriously infectious all through life, and this, though not a truly
instinctive expression, affords the most familiar example of sympathetic
induction of an affective state. This immediate and unrestrained respon-
siveness to the emotional expressions of others is one of the great charms
of childhood. One may see it particularly well displayed by the children
of some savage races (especially perhaps of the negro race), whom it
renders wonderfully attractive.
Adults vary much in the degree to which they display these sympa-
thetic reactions, but in few or none are they wholly lacking. A merry
face makes us feel brighter; a melancholy face may cast a gloom over a
cheerful company; when we witness the painful emotion of others, we
experience sympathetic pain; when we see others terror-stricken or hear
their scream of terror, we suffer a pang of fear though we know nothingAn Introduction to Social Psychology/73
of the cause of their emotion or are indifferent to it; anger provokes
anger; the curious gaze of the passer-by stirs our curiosity; and a dis-
play of tender emotion touches, as we say, a tender chord in our hearts.50
In short, each of the great primary emotions that has its characteristic
and unmistakable bodily expression seems to be capable of being ex-
cited by way of this immediate sympathetic response. If, then, the view
here urged is true, we must not say, as many authors have done, that
sympathy is due to an instinct, but rather that sympathy is founded upon
a special adaptation of the receptive side of each of the principal instinc-
tive dispositions, an adaptation that renders each instinct capable of
being excited on the perception of the bodily expressions of the excite-
ment of the same instinct in other persons.
It has been pointed out on a previous page that this primitive sym-
pathy implies none of the higher moral qualities. There are persons who
are exquisitively sympathetic in this sense of feeling with another, expe-
riencing distress at the sight of pain and grief, pleasure at the sight of
joy, who yet are utterly selfish and are not moved in the least degree to
relieve the distress they observe in others or to promote the pleasure that
is reflected in themselves. Their sympathetic sensibility merely leads
them to avoid all contact with distressful persons, books, or scenes, and
to seek the company of the careless and the gay. And a too great sensi-
bility of this kind is even adverse to the higher kind of conduct that seeks
to relieve pain and to promote happiness; for the sufferer’s expressions
of pain may induce so lively a distress in the onlooker as to incapacitate
him for giving help. Thus in any case of personal accident, or where
surgical procedure is necessary, many a woman is rendered quite use-
less by her sympathetic distress.51
Suggestion and Suggestibility
“Suggestion” is a word that has been taken over from popular speech
and been specialised for psychological use. But even among psycholo-
gists it has been used in two rather different senses. A generation ago it
was used in a sense very similar to that which it has in common speech;
one idea was said to suggest another. But this purpose is adequately
served by the word “reproduction,” and there is a growing tendency to
use “suggestion” only in a still more technical and strict manner, and it
is in this stricter sense that it is used in these pages. Psychologists have
only in recent years begun to realise the vast scope and importance of
suggestion and suggestibility in social life. Their attention was directed74/William McDougall
to the study of suggestion by the recognition that the phenomena of
hypnotism, so long disputed and derided, are genuine expressions of a
peculiar abnormal condition of the mind, and that the leading symptom
of this condition of hypnosis is the patient’s extreme liability to accept
with conviction any proposition submitted to him. This peculiar condi-
tion was called one of suggestibility, and the process of communication
between agent and patient which leads to the latter’s acceptance of any
proposition was called suggestion. There was for some time a tendency
to regard suggestibility as necessarily an abnormal condition and sug-
gestion as a psychological curiosity. But very quickly it was seen that
there are many degrees of suggestibility, ranging from the slight degree
of the normal educated adult to the extreme degree of the deeply hypno-
tised subject, and that suggestion is a process constantly at work among
us, the understanding of which is of extreme importance for the social
sciences.
It is difficult to find a definition of suggestion which will include all
varieties and will yet mark it off clearly from other processes of com-
munication; and there is no sharp line to be drawn, for in many pro-
cesses by which conviction is produced there is a more or less strong
element of suggestion co-operating with logical processes. The follow-
ing definition will, I think, cover all varieties: Suggestion is a process of
communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the com-
municated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds
for its acceptance. The measure of the suggestibility of any subject is,
then, the readiness with which he thus accepts propositions. Of course,
the proposition is not necessarily communicated in formal language, it
may be implied by a mere gesture or interjection. The suggestibility of
any subject is not of the same degree at all times; it varies not only
according to the topic and according to the source from which the propo-
sition is communicated, but also with the condition of the subject’s brain
from hour to hour. The least degree of suggestibility is that of a wide-
awake, self-reliant man of settled convictions, possessing a large store
of systematically organised knowledge which he habitually brings to
bear in criticism of all statements made to him. Greater degrees of sug-
gestibility are due in the main to conditions of four kinds—(1) abnormal
states of the brain, of which the relative dissociation obtaining in hyste-
ria, hypnosis, normal sleep, and fatigue, is the most important; (2) defi-
ciency of knowledge or convictions relating to the topic in regard to
which the suggestion is made, and imperfect organisation of knowledge;An Introduction to Social Psychology/75
(3) the impressive character of the source from which the suggested
proposition is communicated; (4) peculiarities of the character and na-
tive disposition of the subject
Of these the first need not engage our attention, as it has but little
part in normal social life. The operation of the other three conditions
may be illustrated by an example. Suppose a man of wide scientific
culture to be confronted with the proposition that the bodies of the dead
will one day rise from their graves to live a new life. He does not accept
it, because he knows that dead bodies buried in graves undergo a rapid
and complete decomposition, and because the acceptance of the propo-
sition would involve a shattering of the whole of his strongly and sys-
tematically organised knowledge of natural processes. But the same
proposition may be readily accepted by a child or a savage for lack of
any system of critical belief and knowledge that would conflict with it
Such persons may accept almost any extravagant proposition with primi-
tive credulity. But, for the great majority of civilised adults of little
scientific culture, the acceptance or rejection of the proposition will de-
pend upon the third and fourth of the conditions enumerated above.
Even a young child or a savage may reject such a proposition with scorn
if it is made to him by one of his fellows; but, if the statement is sol-
emnly affirmed by a recognised and honoured teacher, supported by all
the prestige and authority of an ancient and powerful Church, not only
children and savages, but most civilised adults, will accept it, in spite of
a certain opposition offered by other beliefs and knowledge that they
possess. Suggestion mainly dependent for its success on this condition
may be called prestige suggestion.
But not all persons of equal knowledge and culture are equally open
to prestige suggestion. Here the fourth factor comes into play, namely,
character and native disposition. As regards the latter the most impor-
tant condition determining individual suggestibility seems to be the rela-
tive strengths of the two instincts that were discussed in Chapter III.
under the names “instincts of self-assertion” and “subjection.” Personal
contact with any of our fellows seems regularly to bring one or other, or
both, of these two instincts into play. The presence of persons whom we
regard as our inferiors in the particular situation of the moment evokes
the impulse of self- assertion; towards such persons we are but little or
not at all suggestible. But, in the presence of persons who make upon us
an impression of power or of superiority of any kind, whether merely of
size or physical strength, or of social standing, or of intellectual reputa-76/William McDougall
tion, or, perhaps, even of tailoring, the impulse of submission is brought
into play, and we are thrown into a submissive, receptive attitude to-
wards them; or, if the two impulses are simultaneously evoked, there
takes place a painful struggle between them and we suffer the complex
emotional disturbance known as bashful feeling. In so far as the impulse
of submission predominates we are suggestible towards the person whose
presence evokes it. Persons in whom this instinct is relatively strong
will, other things being the same, be much subject to prestige sugges-
tion; while, on the other hand, persons in whom this impulse is weak and
the opposed instinct of self-assertion is strong will be apt to be self-
confident, “cocksure” persons, and to be but little subject to prestige
suggestion. In the course of character-formation by social intercourse,
excessive strength of either of these impulses may be rectified or com-
pensated to some extent; the able, but innately submissive, man may
gain a reasonable confidence; the man of self-assertive disposition may,
if not stupid, learn to recognise his own weaknesses; and in so far as
these compensations are effected liability to prestige suggestion will be
diminished or increased.
Children are, then, inevitably suggestible, firstly, because of their
lack of knowledge and lack of systematic organisation of such knowl-
edge as they have; secondly, because the superior size, strength, knowl-
edge, and reputation of their elders tend to evoke the impulse of submis-
sion and to throw them into the receptive attitude. And it is in virtue
largely of their suggestibility that they so rapidly absorb the knowledge,
beliefs, and especially the sentiments, of their social environment. But
most adults also remain suggestible, especially towards mass-sugges-
tion and towards the propositions which they know to be supported by
the whole weight of society or by a long tradition. To the consideration
of the social importance of suggestion we must return in a later chapter,
This brief discussion may be concluded by the repudiation of a cer-
tain peculiar implication attached to the word “suggestion” by some
writers. They speak of “suggestive ideas” and of ideas working sugges-
tively in the mind, implying that such ideas and such working have some
peculiar potency, a potency that would seem to be almost of a magical
character; but they do not succeed in making clear in what way these
ideas and their operations differ from others. The potency of the idea
conveyed by suggestion seems to be nothing but the potency of convic-
tion; and convictions produced by logical methods seem to have no less
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processes, than those produced by suggestion; the principal difference
is that by suggestion conviction may be produced in regard to proposi-
tions that are insusceptible of logical demonstration, or even are op-
posed to the evidence of perception and inference.
A few words must be said about contra-suggestion. By this word it
is usual to denote the mode of action of one individual on another which
results in the second accepting, in the absence of adequate logical grounds,
the contrary of the proposition asserted or implied by the agent. There
are persons with whom this result is very liable to be produced by any
attempt to exert suggestive influence, or even by the most ordinary and
casual utterance. One remarks to such a person that it is a fine day, and,
though, up to that moment, he may have formulated no opinion about
the weather, and have been quite indifferent to it, he at once replies,
“Well, I don’t agree with you. I think it is perfectly horrid weather.” Or
one says to him, “I think you ought to take a holiday,” and, though he
had himself contemplated this course, he replies, “No, I don’t need one,”
and becomes more immovably fixed in this opinion and the correspond-
ing course of action the more he is urged to adopt their opposites. Some
children display this contra-suggestibility very strongly for a period and
afterwards return to a normal degree of suggestibility But in some per-
sons it becomes habitual or chronic; they take a pride in doing and say-
ing nothing like other people, in dressing and eating differently, in defy-
ing all the minor social conventions. Commonly, I believe, such persons
regard themselves as displaying great strength of character and cherish
their peculiarity. In such cases the permanence of the attitude may have
very complex mental causes; but in its simpler instances, and probably
at its inception in all instances, centra-suggestion seems to be deter-
mined by the undue dominance of the impulse of self- assertion over
that of submission, owing to the formation of some rudimentary senti-
ment of dislike for personal influence resulting from an unwise exercise
of it—a sentiment which may have for its object the influence of some
one person or personal influence in general.
Imitation
This word has been used by M. Tarde in his well-known sociological
treatises to cover processes of sympathy and suggestion as well as the
processes to which the name is more usually applied, and, since the verb
“to suggest” can be applied only to the part of the agent in the process of
suggestion, and since we need some verb to describe the part of the78/William McDougall
patient, it is perhaps legitimate to extend the meaning of the word “imi-
tate” in this way, so as to make it cover the process of accepting a
suggestion.
But in the more strict sense of the word “imitation,” it is applicable
only to the imitation or copying by one individual of the actions, the
bodily movements, of another. Imitation and imitativeness in this nar-
rower sense of the words are usually ascribed to an instinct. Thus James
writes: “This sort of imitativeness is possessed by man in common with
other gregarious animals, and is an instinct in the fullest sense of the
term.”52 Baldwin also uses the phrase “instinct of imitation” and its
equivalents,53 but applies the word “imitation” to so great a variety of
processes that it can hardly be supposed he means to attribute all of
them to the operation of this assumed instinct
The reasons for refusing to recognise an instinct of imitation may
be stated as follows:—Imitative actions are extremely varied, for every
kind of action may be imitated; there is therefore nothing specific in the
nature of the imitative movements and in the nature of the sense-impres-
sions by which the movements are excited or guided. And this variety of
movement and of sense-impression is not due to complication of a con-
genital disposition, such as takes place in the case of all the true in-
stincts; for this variety characterises imitative movements from the out-
set. More important is the fact that, underlying the varieties of imitative
action, there is no common affective state and no common impulse seek-
ing satisfaction in some particular change of state. And we have seen
reason to regard such a specific impulse, prompting to continued action
until its satisfaction is secured, as the most essential feature of every
truly instinctive process. Further, if we consider the principal varieties
of imitative action, we find that all are explicable without the assump-
tion of a special instinct of imitation. Imitative actions of at least three
perhaps of five, distinct classes may be distinguished according to the
kind of mental process of which they are the outcome.
1. The expressive actions that are sympathetically excited in the
way discussed under the head of “sympathy” form one class of imitative
actions. Thus, when a child responds to a smile with a smile, when he
cries on hearing another child cry, or when he runs to hide himself on
seeing other children running frightened to shelter, he may be said to be
imitating the actions of others. If we were right in our conclusions re-
garding the responses of primitive sympathy, these outwardly imitative
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special adaptations of the principal instinctive dispositions on their sen-
sory sides, and they are secondary to the sympathetic induction of the
emotions and feelings they express. Imitative actions of this sort are
displayed by all the gregarious animals, and they are the only kind of
which most of the animals seem capable. They are displayed on a great
scale by crowds of human beings and are the principal source of the
wild excesses of which crowds are so often guilty.
2. Imitative actions of a second class are simple ideo-motor actions.
The clearest examples are afforded by subjects in hypnosis and in cer-
tain other abnormal conditions. Many hypnotised subjects will, if their
attention is forcibly drawn to the movements of the hypnotiser, imitate
his every action. A certain proportion of the people of the Malay race
are afflicted with a disorder known as Iâtah,54 which renders them li-
able to behave like the hypnotic subject in this respect. And all of us, if
our attention is keenly concentrated on the movements of another per-
son, are apt to make, at least in a partial incipient fashion, every move-
ment we observe—e.g., on watching a difficult stroke in billiards, the
balancing of a tight-rope walker, the rhythmic swaying of a dancer. In
all these cases the imitative movement seems to be due to the fact that
the visual presentation of the movement of another is apt to evoke the
representation of a similar movement of one’s own body, which, like all
motor representations, tends to realise itself immediately in movement
Many of the imitative movements of children are of this class. Some
person attracts a child’s curious attention, by reason perhaps of some
unfamiliar trait; the child becomes absorbed in watching him and pres-
ently imitates his movements. It seems to be in virtue of this simple
ideo-motor imitation that a child so easily picks up, as we say, the pecu-
liarities of gesture, and the facial expressions and deportment generally,
of those among whom he lives. This kind of imitation may be in part
voluntary and so merges into a third kind— deliberate, voluntary, or
self-conscious imitation.
3. Some person, or some kind of skilled action, excites our admira-
tion, and we take the admired person for our model in all things or
deliberately set ourselves to imitate the action.
Between the second and third kinds is a fourth kind of imitation
allied to both, and affording for the child a transition from the one to the
other. In cases of this fourth type the imitator, a child say, observes a
certain action, and his attention is concentrated, not on the movements,
but on the effects produced by the movements. When the child again80/William McDougall
finds himself in a situation similar to that of the person he has observed,
the idea of the effect observed comes back to mind and perhaps leads
directly to action. For example, a child observes an elder person throw
a piece of paper on the fire; then, when on a later occasion the child
finds himself in the presence of fire and paper, he is very apt to imitate
the action; he produces a similar effect, though he may do so by means
of a very different combination of movements. This kind of imitation is
perhaps in many cases to be regarded as simple ideo-motor action due
to the tendency of the idea to realise itself in action; but in other cases
various impulses may be operative.
For the sake of completeness a fifth kind of imitation may be men-
tioned. It is the imitation by very young children of movements that are
not expressive of feeling or emotion; it is manifested at an age when the
child cannot be credited with ideas of movement or with deliberate self-
conscious imitation. A few instances of this sort have been reported by
reliable observers; e.g., Preyer55 stated that his child imitated the pro-
trusion of his lips when in the fourth month of life. These cases have
been regarded, by those who have not themselves witnessed similar ac-
tions, as chance coincidences, because it is impossible to bring them
under any recognised type of imitation. I have, however, carefully veri-
fied the occurrence of this sort of imitation in two of my own children;
one of them on several occasions during his fourth month repeatedly put
out his tongue when the person whose face he was watching made this
movement For the explanation of any such simple imitation of a par-
ticular movement at this early age, we have to assume the existence of a
very simple perceptual disposition having this specific motor tendency,
and, since we cannot suppose such a disposition to have been acquired
at this age, we are compelled to suppose it to be innately organised.
Such an innate disposition would be an extremely simple rudimentary
instinct. It may be that every child inherits a considerable number of
such rudimentary instincts, and that they play a considerable part In
facilitating the acquisition of new movements, especially perhaps of
speech-movements.
We shall have to consider in later chapters the ways in which these
three forms of mental interaction, sympathy, suggestion, and imitation,
play their all-important parts in the moulding of the individual by his
social environment, and in the life of societies generally.An Introduction to Social Psychology/81
Play
Another tendency, one that the human mind has in common with many
of the animals, demands brief notice, namely, the tendency to play. Play
also is sometimes ascribed to an instinct; but no one of the many variet-
ies of playful activity can properly be ascribed to an instinct of play.
Nevertheless play must be reckoned among the native tendencies of the
mind of high social value. Children and the young of many species of
animal take to play spontaneously without any teaching or example.
Several theories of play have been put forward, each claiming to sum up
the phenomena in one brief formula. The oldest of the modern theories
was proposed by the poet Schiller, and was developed by Herbert Spen-
cer. According to this view, play is always the expression of a surplus of
nervous energy. The young creature, being tended and fed by its par-
ents, does not expend its energy upon the quest of food, in earning its
daily bread, and therefore has a surplus store of energy which overflows
along the most open nervous channels, producing purposeless move-
ments of the kind that are most frequent in real life. There is, no doubt,
an element of truth in the theory, but it is clearly inadequate to account
for the facts, even in the case of the simple play of animals. It does not
sufficiently account for the forms the play activities take; still less is it
compatible with the fact that young animals, as well as young children,
will often play till they are exhausted. The element of truth is that the
creature is most disposed to play when it is so well nourished and rested
that it has a surplus of stored energy. But this is true also of work.
Others, looking chiefly at the play of children, have regarded their
play as a special instance of the operation of the law of recapitulation;
and they have sought to show that the child retraverses in his play the
successive culture periods of human history, owing to the successive
development or ripening of native tendencies to the forms of activity
supposed to have been characteristic of these periods. This recapitulatory
theory of play and the educational practice based on it are founded on
the fallacious belief that, as the human race traversed the various cul-
ture periods, its native mental constitution acquired very special tenden-
cies, and that each period of culture was, as it were, the expression of a
certain well-marked stage in the evolution of the human mind. This view
can hardly be accepted, for we have little reason to suppose that human
nature has undergone any such profound modifications in the course of
the development of civilisation out of barbarism and savagery.
Professor Karl Groos56 has recently propounded a new theory of82/William McDougall
play. He sets out from the consideration of the play of young animals,
and he points out the obvious utility to them of play as a preparation for
the serious business of life, as a perfecting by practice of the more
specialised and difficult kinds of activity on the successful exercise of
which their survival in the struggle for existence must depend. Consider
the case of the kitten playing with a ball on the floor. It is clear that, in
the course of such playing, the kitten improves its skill in movements of
the kind that will be needed for the catching of its prey when it is thrown
upon its own resources. Or take the case of puppies playfully fighting
with one another. It seems clear that the practice they get in quick attack
and avoidance must make them better fighters than they would become
if they never played in this way.
Starting out from considerations of this sort, Professor Groos ar-
gues that the occurrence of youthful play among almost all animals that
in mature life have to rely upon rapid and varied skilled movements
justifies us in believing that the period of immaturity, with its tendency
to playful activities, is a special adaptation of the course of individual
development, an adaptation that enables the creature to become better
fitted to cope with its environment than it could be if it enjoyed no such
period of play. Groos therefore reverses the Schiller-Spencer dictum,
and says—it is not that young animals play because they are young and
have surplus nervous energy: we must believe rather that the higher
animals have this period of youthful immaturity in order that they may
play. The youthful play-tendencies are, then, according to this view,
special racial endowments of high biological utility, the products, no
doubt, of the operation of natural selection. If we ask—In what does
this special adaptation consist? the answer is—it consists in the ten-
dency for the various instincts (on the skilled exercise of which adult
efficiency depends) to ripen and to come into action in each individual
of the species before they are needed for serious use. We have other and
better grounds for believing that the time of ripening of any instinct in
the individuals of any species is liable to be shifted forwards or back-
wards in the age- scale during the course of racial evolution, so that the
order of their ripening and of the appearance of the various instinctive
activities in the individual does not conform to the law of recapitulation.
There is, therefore, nothing improbable in this view that play is deter-
mined by the premature ripening of instincts. But it will not fully ac-
count for all the facts of animal play, and still less for all forms of
children’s play. There remains a difficulty of a very interesting kind.An Introduction to Social Psychology/83
Consider the case of young dogs playfully fighting together. If we
simply assume that this is the expression of the prematurely ripened
pugnacious instinct, we ought to expect to find the young dogs really
fighting and doing their best to hurt one another; and, since anger is the
affective state that normally accompanies the exercise of this instinct,
we should expect to observe every symptom of anger as the dogs roll
about together. But it is perfectly clear that, although the dogs are ca-
pable of anger on other occasions, they make all the movements of com-
bat without anger and in a peculiarly modified manner; one seizes the
other by the throat and pins him to the ground, and so forth; but all this
is done in such a way as not to hurt his opponent; the teeth are never
driven home, and no blood is drawn. That they do no hurt to one another
is by no means due to lack of muscular power or of sharp teeth; nor is
there any lack of energy in the movements in general; in merely chasing
one another the utmost exertions are made. This peculiar modification
of the combative movements seems to be an essential character of the
playful fighting of many young animals, and boys are no exception to
the rule. How is it to be accounted for and reconciled with Professor
Groos’s theory of play? Mr. F. H. Bradley has made a suggestion in
answer to this question.57 He takes the case of the playful biting of
young dogs as typical of play, and points out that, not only in this case
but in many others also, a certain restraint of action is manifested in
play; and he proposes to regard a certain degree of self- restraint as the
psychological characteristic of play. He takes the view that, when the
dog bites your hand in play, he knows he must not exert so much force
as to hurt you; “there is restraint, a restraint which later may be formu-
lated as the rule of the game.” Mr. Bradley here seems to ascribe to the
playfully biting dog a certain deliberate self-restraint I think that in do-
ing so he greatly overestimates the complexity of the creature’s mental
process, and ascribes to it a degree of self-consciousness and a power of
intelligent control of conduct of which it is really quite incapable. We
might find a parallel to the psychological situation in which Bradley
supposes the dog to be, in the case of a boy who, fighting with another
in real earnest, is aware that, if he should do the other more than a slight
hurt, he will bring punishment upon himself, and who therefore exerts a
strong control over his actions and hits his opponent only in places where
no great harm can be done. To suppose that the mental process of the
young dog at all approaches this degree of complexity is, I think, quite
impossible. And that this view is untenable is shown also by the fact84/William McDougall
that young dogs display this playful fighting and its characteristic re-
straint of movement at a very early age, when they can hardly have
learnt self- restraint from experience of the ill consequences of biting
too hard. It is not that the young dog, when playfully fighting, has the
impulse to bite with all his force and that he keeps a strong volitional
control over his movements; we must rather suppose, since the move-
ments he makes are in all other respects like those of real combat, that
the instinct of which they are the expression is a peculiarly modified
form of the combative instinct.
The movements, with their characteristic differences from those of
actual combat, must be regarded as instinctive, but as due to the excite-
ment of some modified form of the combative instinct, an instinct differ-
entiated from, and having an independent existence alongside, the origi-
nal instinct. And that the movements are not the expression of the true
combative instinct is shown also by the fact that the specific affective
state, namely anger, which normally accompanies its excitement, is lack-
ing in playful activity. Professor Groos’s theory that play is due to the
premature ripening of instincts needs, then, to be modified by the recog-
nition of some special differentiation of the instincts which find expres-
sion in playful activity.
It is obvious that Groos’s theory is applicable to some of the plays
of children, especially the warlike and hunting games of boys and the
doll-playing of girls. But there are other forms of childish play which
cannot be accounted for in this way and which are not the direct expres-
sions of instincts. The motives of play are various and often complex,
and they cannot be characterised in any brief formula; nor can any hard-
and-fast line be drawn between work and play. Beside the class of plays
to which Professor Groos’s formula is applicable we may recognise
several principal classes of play motives—such are the desire of in-
creased skill, the pleasure of make- believe, the pleasure in being a cause.
But a motive that may co-operate with others in almost all games, and
which among ourselves is seldom altogether lacking, is the desire to get
the better of others, to emulate, to excel. This motive plays an important
part, not only in games, but in many of the most serious activities of life,
to which it gives an additional zest. For many a politician it is a princi-
pal motive, and many a professional and many a commercial man con-
tinues bis exertions, under the driving power of this motive, long after
the immediate practical ends of his professional activity have been
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wherever it enters in, it is recognised that it imparts something of a
playful character to the activity; a recognition which often finds expres-
sion in the phrase “playing the game” applied to activities of the most
diverse and serious kinds.
Whence comes this strong desire and impulse to surpass our rivals?
We saw reason for refusing to accept a specific instinct of rivalry or
emulation in the animals, for rivalry and emulation imply self-conscious-
ness. It is a defensible view that the impulse of rivalry derives from the
instinct of self-assertion; but, though it is probably complicated and
reinforced in many cases by the co-operation of this impulse, it can
hardly be wholly identified with it. Nor can it be identified with the
combative impulse; for this too seems to persist in the most highly civilised
peoples with all its fierce strength and its specific brutal tendency to
destroy the opponent. The obscurity of the subject and the importance
of this impulse of rivalry in the life of societies tempt me to offer a
speculation as to its nature and origin that is suggested by the issue of
our discussion of the playful fighting of young animals.
The impulse of rivalry is to get the better of an opponent in some
sort of struggle; but it differs from the combative impulse in that it does
not prompt to, and does not find satisfaction in, the destruction of the
opponent. Rather, the continued existence of the rival, as such, but as a
conquered rival, seems necessary for its full satisfaction; and a benevo-
lent condescension towards the conquered rival is not incompatible with
the activity of the impulse, as it is with that of the combative impulse.
Now, these peculiarities of the impulse of rivalry, when stripped of all
intellectual complications, seem to be just those of the modified form of
the combative impulse that seems to underlie the playful fighting of
young animals. May it not be, then, that the impulse of rivalry is essen-
tially this impulse to playful fighting, the impulse of an instinct differen-
tiated from the combative instinct in the first instance in the animal
world to secure practice in the movements of combat? In favour of this
view it may be pointed out that in the human race the native strength of
the impulse of rivalry seems on the whole to run parallel with, or to be
closely correlated with, the strength of the pugnacious instinct. The im-
pulse of rivalry is very strong in the peoples of Europe, especially, per-
haps, in the English people; it constitutes the principal motive to almost
all our many games, and it lends its strength to the support of almost
every form of activity. It cannot be denied that we are a highly pugna-
cious people or that our Anglo- Saxon and Danish and Norman ances-86/William McDougall
tors were probably the most terrible fighting-men the world has ever
seen. On the other hand, men of the unwarlike races, e.g., the mild Hindoo
or the Burman, seem relatively free from the impulse of rivalry. To men
of these races such games as football seem utterly absurd and irrational,
and, in fact, they are absurd and irrational for all men born without the
impulse of rivalry; whereas men of warlike races, e.g., the Maoris, who,
like our ancestors, found for many generations their chief occupation
and delight in warfare, take up such games keenly and even learn very
quickly to beat us at them.
I think we may even observe in young boys the recapitulation of the
process of differentiation of the impulse of rivalry from the combative
instinct The latter usually comes into play at a very early age, but the
former does not usually manifest itself until the age of four or five years.
Up to this time the more active playing of boys is apt to be formless and
vague, a mere running about and shouting, a form of play sufficiently
accounted for by the Schiller-Spencer theory. But then the impulse of
rivalry begins to work, and from that time it may dominate the boy’s life
more and more, in so far as his activities are spontaneous. In this con-
nection it is important to note that the growth of self-consciousness must
favour and strengthen the operation of this impulse, whereas it is rather
adverse to the display of most of the other instinctive activities in their
crude forms.58
A universal tendency of the mind, which is so familiar as to run
some risk of being neglected, must be briefly mentioned; namely, the
tendency for every process to be repeated more readily in virtue of its
previous occurrence and in proportion to the frequency of its previous
repetitions. The formulation of this tendency may be named the law of
habit, if the word “habit” is understood in the widest possible sense. In
virtue of this tendency the familiar as such is preferred to the less famil-
iar, the habitual and routine mode of action and reaction, in all depart-
ments of mental life, to any mode of action necessitating any degree of
novel adjustment. And the more familiar and habitual is any mental
process or mode of action in a situation of a given type, the more diffi-
cult is it to make any change or improvement in it and the more painful
is any change of the character of the situation that necessitates an effort
of readjustment. This is the great principle by which all acquisitions of
the individual mind are preserved and in virtue of which the making of
further acquisitions is rendered more difficult, through which the indefi-
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of the mature mind.
Temperament
In order to complete this brief sketch of the more important features of
the native mental constitution, a few words must be said about tempera-
ment. This is a very difficult subject which most psychologists are glad
to leave alone. Yet temperament is the source of many of the most strik-
ing mental differences between individuals and peoples.
Under the head of temperamental factors we group a number of
natively given constitutional conditions of our mental life that exert a
constant influence on our mental processes. This influence may be slight
at any one time, but since its effects are cumulative—i.e., since it oper-
ates as a constant bias in one direction during mental development and
the formation of habits—it is responsible for much in the mental make-
up of the adult Temperament is, as the ancients clearly saw, largely a
matter of bodily constitution; that is to say that among the temperamen-
tal factors the influences on the mental life exerted by the great bodily
organs occupy a prominent place. But there are other factors also, and it
is impossible to bring them all under one brief formula; and, since tem-
perament is the resultant of these many relatively independent factors, it
is impossible to distinguish any clearly defined classes of temperaments,
as the ancients, as well as many modern authors, have attempted to do.
Some of the best modern psychologists have been led into absurdities by
attempting this impossible task. The truth is that we are only just begin-
ning to gain some slight insight into the conditions of temperament, and
progress in this respect must depend chiefly upon the progress of physi-
ology. In one respect only can we make a decided advance upon the
ancients—we can realise the great complexity of the problem and can
frankly admit our ignorance.
The temperamental factors may conveniently be grouped in two
principal classes—on the one hand, the influences exerted on the ner-
vous system and, through it, on mental process by the functioning of the
bodily organs; on the other hand, general functional peculiarities of the
nervous tissues. We may best grasp something of the nature of the former
class by the observation of cases in which their influence is abnormally
great. Of recent years some light has been thrown upon temperament by
the discovery of the great influence exerted on mental life by certain
organs whose functions had been, and in many respects still are, ob-
scure. The most notable example is perhaps the thyroid body, a small88/William McDougall
mass of soft cellular tissue in the neck. We know now that defect of the
functions of this organ may reduce any one of us to a state of mental
apathy bordering on idiocy, and that its excessive activity produces the
opposite effect and may throw the mind into an over-excitable condition
verging on maniacal excitement. Again, we know that certain diseases
tend to produce specific changes of temperament, that phthisis often
gives it a bright and hopeful turn, diabetes a dissatisfied and cantanker-
ous turn. It is clear that, in some such cases of profound alteration of
temperament by bodily disorder, the effects are produced by means of
the chemical products of metabolism, which, being thrown out of the
disordered tissues into the blood and reaching the nervous system by
way of the blood-stream, chemically modify its processes. It is probable
that every organ in the body exerts in this indirect way some influence
upon our mental life, and that temperament is in large measure the bal-
ance or resultant of all these many contributory chemical influences.
Most of the bodily organs probably co-operate in determining tem-
perament in another way hardly less important. All of them are supplied
with afferent nerves, nerves that constantly carry impulses up from the
organs to the central nervous system. And all these impulses probably
modify in some degree the general working of the nervous system and
play some part in determining the “coenaesthesia,” the obscure back-
ground of consciousness on which the general tone of our mental life
chiefly depends. The organs of reproduction afford the most striking
example of this kind of temperamental influence. The skeletal system of
muscles also probably exerts a great influence of this kind—a well-
developed and active muscular system tends to maintain a certain tone
of the nervous system that favours an alert and confident habit of mind.
Perfect functioning of all the bodily organs not only favours in this way
mental activity in general, but tends to an objective habit of mind; whereas
imperfection of organic functions tends to produce an undue promi-
nence in consciousness of the bodily self and, therefore, an introspective
and brooding habit of mind.
As regards the part played by the general constitution of the ner-
vous system itself in determining temperament, we are still more igno-
rant than in regard to the influence of the bodily organs. A few charac-
ters of the nervous tissues we can point to with confidence as determin-
ing differences of temperament Such are native differences of excitabil-
ity, of rapidity of response and transmission of the nervous impulse, and
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there are probably other subtle differences of which we know nothing.
Temperament, then, is a complex resultant of many factors each of
which is in the main natively determined, and, though they are alterable
perhaps by disease and the influence of the physical environment, espe-
cially by temperature and food, they are but little capable of being modi-
fied by voluntary effort; and the mental development of individuals is,
as it were, constantly biassed in this or that direction by peculiarities of
temperament, the selective activity of the mind is given this or that trend;
e.g., the child natively endowed with a cheerful temperament will be
receptive to bright influences, his thoughts will tend to dwell on the
future in pleased anticipation, optimistic ideas will readily find a foot-
hold in his mind, while gloomy, pessimistic ideas will gain no perma-
nent influence over him in spite of being intellectually grasped. And
with the child of gloomy temperament all this will be reversed. In this
way temperament largely determines our outlook on life, our cast of
thought and lines of action.
Temperament must be carefully distinguished from disposition and
from character, though these distinctions are not always observed by
popular speech and thought The disposition of a person is the sum of all
the innate dispositions or instincts with their specific impulses or ten-
dencies of the kind discussed in Chapter II. Differences of disposition
are due to native differences in the strengths of the impulses of the in-
stincts, or to differences in their strengths induced by use and disuse in
the course of individual development, or more rarely to absence of one
or other of the instincts. Thus we properly speak of an irascible, or
tender, or timid disposition; not of irascible, tender, or timid tempera-
ment. Character, on the other hand, is the sum of acquired tendencies
built up on the native basis of disposition and temperament; it includes
our sentiments and our habits in the widest sense of the term, and is the
product of the interaction of disposition and temperament with the physi-
cal and social environment under the guidance of intelligence. Thus a
man’s temperament and disposition are in the main born with him and
are but little alterable by any effort he may make, whereas character is
made largely by his own efforts.90/William McDougall
Chapter V
The Nature of the Sentiments and the
Constitution of Some of the Complex Emotions.
We seldom experience the primary emotions discussed in Chapter III in
the pure or unmixed forms in which they are commonly manifested by
the animals. Our emotional states commonly arise from the simulta-
neous excitement of two or more of the instinctive dispositions; and the
majority of the names currently used to denote our various emotions are
the names of such mixed, secondary, or complex emotions. That the
great variety of our emotional states may be properly regarded as the
result of the compounding of a relatively small number of primary or
simple emotions is no new discovery. Descartes, for example, recognised
only six primary emotions, or passions as he termed them, namely—
admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness, and he wrote, “All the
others are composed of some out of these six and derived from them.”
He does not seem to have formulated any principles for the determina-
tion of the primaries and the distinction of them from the secondaries.
The compounding of the primary emotions is largely, though not
wholly, due to the existence of sentiments, and some of the complex
emotional processes can only be generated from sentiments. Before go-
ing on to discuss the complex emotions, we must therefore try to under-
stand as clearly as possible the nature of a sentiment.
The word “sentiment” is still used in several different senses. M.
Ribot and other French authors use its French equivalent as covering all
the feelings and emotions, as the most general name for the affective
aspect of mental processes. We owe to Mr. A. F. Shand59 the recogni-
tion of features of our mental constitution of a most important kind that
have been strangely overlooked by other psychologists, and the applica-
tion of the word “sentiments” to denote features of this kind. Mr. Shand
points out that our emotions, or, more strictly speaking, our emotional
dispositions, tend to become organised in systems about the various
objects and classes of objects that excite them. Such an organised sys-
tem of emotional tendencies is not a fact or mode of experience, but is a
feature of the complexly organised structure of the mind that underlies
all our mental activity. To such an organised system of emotional ten-
dencies centred about some object Mr. Shand proposes to apply the
name “sentiment.” This application of the word is in fair accordance
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rapidly be adopted by psychologists.
The conception of a sentiment, as defined by Mr. Shand, enables us
at once to reduce to order many of the facts of the life of impulse and
emotion, a province of psychology which hitherto has been chaotic and
obscure. That, in spite of the great amount of discussion of the affective
life in recent centuries, it should have been reserved for a contemporary
writer to make this very important discovery is an astonishing fact, so
obvious and so necessary does the conception seem when once it has
been grasped. The failure of earlier writers to arrive at the conception
must be attributed to the long prevalence of the narrow and paralysing
doctrine according to which the task of the psychologist is merely to
observe, analyse, and describe the content of his own consciousness.
The typical sentiments are love and hate, and it will suffice for our
present purpose if we briefly consider the nature and mode of formation
of these two. Now, it is a source of great confusion that, sentiments
never having been clearly distinguished from the emotions until Mr.
Shand performed this great service to psychology, the words love and
hate have been used to denote both emotions and sentiments. Thus the
disposition of the primary emotion we have discussed under the name of
“tender emotion “is an essential constituent of the system of emotional
dispositions that constitutes the sentiment of love; and the name “love”
is often applied both to this emotion and to the sentiment In a similar
way the word “hate” is commonly applied to a complex emotion com-
pounded of anger and fear and disgust, as well as to the sentiment which
comprises the dispositions to these emotions as its most essential con-
stituents. But it is clear that one may properly be said to love or to hate
a man at the times when he is not at all present to one’s thought and
when one is experiencing no emotion of any kind. What is meant by
saying that a man loves or hates another is that he is liable to experience
any one of a number of emotions and feelings on contemplating that
other, the nature of the emotion depending upon the situation of the
other; that is to say, common speech recognises that love and hate are,
not merely emotions, but enduring tendencies to experience certain emo-
tions whenever the loved or hated object comes to mind; therefore, in
refusing to apply the names “love” and “hate” to any of the emotions
and in restricting them to these enduring complex dispositions which
are the sentiments, no more violence is done to language than is abso-
lutely necessary for the avoidance of the confusion that has hitherto
prevailed. It must be noted that the sentiments of love and hate comprise92/William McDougall
many of the same emotional dispositions; but the situations of the object
of the sentiment that evoke the same emotions are very different and in
the main of opposite character in the two cases. Thus, as Shand points
out, when a man has acquired the sentiment of love for a person or other
object, he is apt to experience tender emotion in its presence, fear or
anxiety when it is in danger, anger when it is threatened, sorrow when it
is lost, joy when the object prospers or is restored to him, gratitude
towards him who does good to it, and so on; and, when he hates a per-
son, he experiences fear or anger or both on his approach, joy when that
other is injured, anger when he receives favours.
It is going too far to say, as Shand does, that with inversion of the
circumstances of the object all the emotions called forth by the loved
object are repeated in relation to the hated object; for the characteristic
and most essential emotion of the sentiment of love is tender emotion,
and this is not evoked by any situation of the hated object; its disposi-
tion has no place in the sentiment of hate. It is clear, nevertheless, that
the objects of these two very different sentiments may arouse many of
the same emotions, and that the two sentiments comprise emotional dis-
positions that are in part identical, or, in other words, that some of the
emotional dispositions, or central nuclei of the instincts, are members of
sentiments of both kinds. It is, I think, helpful, at least to those who
make use of visual imagery, to attempt to picture a sentiment as a ner-
vous disposition and to schematise it crudely by the aid of a diagram.
Let us draw a number of circles lying in a row, and let each circle stand
for one of the primary emotional dispositions. We are to suppose that
the excitement of each one of these is accompanied by the correspond-
ing emotion with its specific impulse. These dispositions must be re-
garded as natively independent of one another, or unconnected. Let A be
the object of a sentiment of hate and B be the object of a sentiment of
love; and let a in our diagram stand for the complex neural disposition
whose excitement underlies the idea or presentation of A, and let ß be
the corresponding disposition concerned in the presentation of B. Then
we must suppose that a becomes intimately connected with R, F, and P,
the central nuclei of the instincts of repulsion, fear, and pugnacity, and
less intimately with C and S, those of curiosity and of submission, but
not at all with T, the central nucleus
of the tender or parental instinct. Whenever, then, a. comes into
play (i.e., whenever the idea of A rises to consciousness) its excitement
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that they are thrown into a condition of sub-excitement which very eas-
ily rises to discharging point in any one of them, or in several together—
e.g., in P and R, when the emotional state of the subject becomes one of
mingled anger and disgust, and the impulses of these two emotions de-
termine his actions, attitudes, and expressions. Similarly ß must be sup-
posed to be connected most intimately with T, the disposition of the
tender emotion, and less intimately with A, S, C, P, and F, and not at all
with R. If this diagram represents the facts, however crudely and inad-
equately, we may say that the structural basis of the sentiment is a sys-
tem of nerve-paths by means of which the disposition of the idea of the
object of the sentiment is functionally connected with several emotional
dispositions. The idea, taken in the usual sense of the word as something
that is stored in the mind, may therefore be said to be the essential nucleus
of the sentiment, without which it cannot exist, and through the medium
of which several emotional dispositions are connected together to form
a functional system. The emotional dispositions comprised within the
system of any sentiment are, then, not directly connected together; and,
in accordance with the law of forward conduction, the excitement of
any one of them will not spread backwards to the cognitive dispositions,
but only in the efferent direction, as indicated by the arrows in the dia-
gram. Hence any one such disposition may become an organic constitu-
ent of an indefinitely large number of sentiments.
The process by which such a complex psycho-physical disposition
or system of dispositions is built up may be supposed to be essentially
that process (discussed in Chapter II) by which an instinctive disposi-
tion becomes capable of being directly excited by other objects than its
natively given objects, working in conjunction with the law of habit.
The oftener the object of the sentiment becomes the object of any one of
the emotions comprised in the system of the sentiment, the more readily
will it evoke that emotion again, because, in accordance with the law of
habit, the connexions of the psycho-physical dispositions become more
intimate the more frequently they are brought into operation.
After this brief exposition, and this attempt at a physiological inter-
pretation, of Mr. Shand’s doctrine of the sentiment, we may pass on to
consider some of the complex emotions, and to attempt to exhibit them
as fusions of the primary emotions we have distinguished. If we find
that most of the complex emotions can be satisfactorily displayed as
fusions of some two, or more, of the primary emotions we have distin-
guished, together with feelings of pleasure and pain, excitement and94/William McDougall
relaxation, this will be good evidence that the emotions we have desig-
nated as the primaries are truly primary, and it will confirm the prin-
ciple by which we were guided in the choice of these primaries, the
principle, namely, that each primary emotion accompanies the excite-
ment of one of the instincts, and is the affective aspect of a simple in-
stinctive mental process.
Since the primary emotions may be combined in a large number of
different ways, and since the primaries that enter into the composition
of a secondary emotion may be present in many different degrees of
intensity, the whole range of complex emotions presents an indefinitely
large number of qualities that shade imperceptibly into one another with-
out sharp dividing lines. The names provided by common speech desig-
nate merely a certain limited number of the most prominent of these
complexes.
In seeking to analyse the complex emotions we must rely largely on
the method recommended by Mr. Shand—we must, that is to say, ob-
serve the conative tendencies of the emotions, the nature of the actions
to which they impel us. For every emotion, no matter how complex it
may be, has its characteristic conjunction of motor tendencies, which
together give rise to the characteristic attitudes and expressions of the
emotion. How true this is we may realise by considering how success-
fully a skilful actor can portray even the more complex emotions.
And in attempting to analyse any emotion we must consider it as
experienced and displayed at a high pitch of intensity; for we cannot
hope to recognise the elementary qualities and impulses of the primary
emotions in complexes of low intensity.
We may roughly divide the complex emotional states into two
groups—on the one hand those which do not necessarily imply the ex-
istence of any organised sentiment, and on the other hand those which
can be experienced only in virtue of the existence of some sentiment
within the system of which they may be said to be excited. We will
consider first some of the more important emotions of the former class.
Some of the Complex Emotions that do not necessarily imply the Exist-
ence of Sentiments
Admiration.—This is certainly a true emotion, and is as certainly not
primary. It is distinctly a complex affective state and implies a consider-
able degree of mental development. We can hardly suppose any of the
animals to be capable of admiration in the proper sense of the word, norAn Introduction to Social Psychology/95
is it displayed by very young children. It is not merely a pleasurable
perception or contemplation. One may get a certain pleasure from the
perception or contemplation of an object without feeling any admiration
for it; e.g., a popular ditty played on a barrel-organ may give one plea-
sure, though one admires neither the ditty nor the mode of its produc-
tion, and though one may a little despise oneself on account of the plea-
sure one feels. Nor is it merely intellectual and pleasurable appreciation
of the greatness or excellence of the object. There seem to be two pri-
mary emotions essentially involved in the complex state provoked by
the contemplation of the admired object, namely, wonder and negative
self-feeling or the emotion of submission. Wonder is revealed by the
impulse to approach and to continue to contemplate the admired object,
for, as we saw, this is the characteristic impulse of the instinct of curios-
ity; and wonder is clearly expressed on the face in intense admiration. In
children one may observe the element of wonder very clearly expressed
and dominant. “Oh, how wonderful!” or—“Oh, how clever!” or—“How
did you do it?” are phrases in which a child naturally expresses its ad-
miration and by which the element of wonder and the impulse of curios-
ity are clearly revealed. And as soon as we feel that we completely
understand the object we have admired, and can wholly account for it,
our wonder ceases and the emotion evoked by it is no longer admiration.
But admiration is more than wonder.60 We do not simply proceed to
examine the admired object as we should one that provokes merely our
curiosity or wonder. We approach it slowly, with a certain hesitation;
we are humbled by its presence, and, in the case of a person whom we
intensely admire, we become shy, like a child in the presence of an adult
stranger; we have the impulse to shrink together, to be still, and to avoid
attracting his attention; that is to say, the instinct of submission, of self-
abasement, is excited, with its corresponding emotion of negative self-
feeling, by the perception that we are in the presence of a superior power,
something greater than ourselves. Now, this instinct and this emotion
are primarily and essentially social. The primary condition of their ex-
citement is the presence of a person bigger and more powerful than
oneself; and, when we admire such an object as a picture or a machine,
or other work of art, the emotion still has this social character and per-
sonal reference; the creator of the work of art is more or less clearly
present to our minds as the object of our emotion, and often we say,
“What a wonderful man he is!”
Is, then, the emotion of admiration capable of being evoked in us96/William McDougall
only by other persons and their works? It is obviously true that we ad-
mire natural objects, a beautiful flower or landscape, or a shell, or the
perfect structure of an animal and its nice adaptation to its mode of life.
In these cases no known person is called to mind as the object of our
admiration; but, just because admiration implies and refers to another
person, is essentially, in so far as it involves negative self-feeling, an
attitude towards a person, it leads us to postulate a person or personal
power as the creator of the object that calls it forth. Hence in all ages the
admiration of men for natural objects has led them to personify the
power, or powers, that have brought those objects into being, either as
superhuman beings who have created, and who preside over, particular
classes of objects, or as a supreme Creator of all things; and, if the
intellect rejects all such conceptions as anthropomorphic survivals from
a ruder age, the admiration of natural objects still leads men to per-
sonify, under the name of Nature, the power that has produced them. It
is, I think, true that, if this sense of a personal power is not suggested by
any object that we contemplate, the emotion we experience is merely
wonder, or at least is not admiration. It is because negative self-feeling
is an essential element in admiration that the extremely confident, self-
satisfied, and thoroughly conceited person is incapable of admiration,
and that genuine admiration implies a certain humility and generosity. It
may be added that much admiration—all aesthetic admiration, in fact—
includes also an element of pleasure, the conditions of which may be
very complex.
As an example of the further complication of an emotion, let us
consider the nature of our emotion if the object that excites our admira-
tion is also of a threatening or mysterious nature and, therefore, capable
of exciting fear—a tremendous force in action such as the Victoria Falls,
or a display of the aurora borealis, or a magnificent thunderstorm. The
impulse of admiration to draw near humbly and to contemplate the ob-
ject is more or less neutralised by an impulse to withdraw, to run away,
the impulse of fear. We are kept suspended in the middle distance, nei-
ther approaching very near nor going quite away; admiration is blended
with fear, and we experience the emotion we call awe.
Awe is of many shades, ranging from that in which admiration is
but slightly tinged with fear to that in which fear is but slightly tinged
with admiration. Admiration is, then, a binary compound, awe a ter-
tiary compound. And awe may be further blended to form a still more
complex emotion. Suppose that the power that excites awe is also oneAn Introduction to Social Psychology/97
that we have reason to regard as beneficent, one that, while capable of
annihilating us in a moment, yet works for our good, sustains and pro-
tects us, one that evokes our gratitude. Awe then becomes compounded
with gratitude and we experience the highly compound emotion of rev-
erence. Reverence is the religious emotion par excellence; few merely
human powers are capable of exciting reverence, this blend of wonder,
fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling. Those human beings who in-
spire reverence, or who are by custom and convention considered to be
entitled to inspire it, usually owe their reverend character to their being
regarded as the ministers and dispensers of Divine power.
What, then, is gratitude, which enters into the emotion of reverence
for the Divine power? Gratitude is itself complex. It is a binary com-
pound of tender emotion and negative self-feeling. To this view it may
be objected—If tender emotion is the emotion of the parental instinct
whose impulse is to protect, how can this emotion be evoked by the
Divine power? The answer to this question is—In the same way as the
child’s tender emotion towards the parent is evoked, namely, by sympa-
thy. Tender emotion occupies a peculiar position among the primary
emotions, in that, being directed towards some other person and its im-
pulse directly making for the good of that other, it is peculiarly apt to
evoke by sympathetic reaction, of the kind we studied in Chapter IV, the
same emotion in its object; and this sympathetically evoked tender emo-
tion then finds its object most readily in the person to whom it owes its
rise. But gratitude is not simply tender emotion sympathetically excited;
a child or even an animal may excite our tender emotion in this way;
e.g., it may give us something that is utterly useless or embarrassing to
us, and by doing so may touch our hearts, as we say; but I do not think
that we then feel gratitude, even if the gift involves self-sacrifice on the
part of the giver. Mr. Shand maintains that into gratitude there enters
some sympathetic sorrow for the person who excites it, on account of
the loss or sacrifice sustained by him in giving us that for which we are
grateful. It is in this way he would account for the tender element in
gratitude; for, according to his view, all tenderness is a blending of joy
and sorrow, which are for him primary emotions. But surely we may
experience gratitude for a kindness done to us that involves no loss or
sacrifice for the giver, but is for him an act of purely pleasurable benefi-
cence. I submit, then, that the other element in gratitude, the element
that renders it different from, and more complex than, simple tender-
ness, is that negative self-feeling which is evoked by the sense of the98/William McDougall
superior power of another. The act that is to inspire gratitude must make
us aware, not only of the kindly feeling, the tender emotion, of the other
towards us; it must also make us aware of his power, we must see that
he is able to do for us something that we cannot do for ourselves. This
element of negative self-feeling, then, is blended with tenderness in true
gratitude, and its impulse, the impulse to withdraw from the attention
of, or to humble oneself in the presence of, its object, more or less
neutralises the impulse of the tender emotion to approach its object; the
attitude typical and symbolical of gratitude is that of kneeling to kiss the
hand that gives. This element of negative self-feeling renders gratitude
an emotion that is not purely pleasurable to many natures, makes it one
that a proud man does not easily experience, and one that does less to
develop a sentiment of affection than the giver of good things is apt to
expect And, if the seemingly beneficent act is done, not from pure kind-
liness or tenderness, but with condescension, if positive self-feeling and
a gratified sense of power accompany or enter into the motive of the act,
it is apt to evoke negative self-feeling without tenderness, a negative
self-feeling painful in quality that may lead to the growth of a sentiment
of dislike rather than of love.
Into reverence of the kind we have considered negative self-feeling
enters from two sources, as an element of admiration and again as an
element of gratitude. But there is a different kind of reverence into which
tenderness enters directly, and not merely as an element of gratitude. Let
us imagine ourselves standing before a great Gothic cathedral whose
delicate and beautiful stonework is crumbling to dust. We shall prob-
ably feel admiration for it, and the spectacle of its decay, or of its deli-
cate and perishable nature, awakens directly our tender emotion and
protective impulse; i.e., we experience a tender admiration, a complex
emotion for which we have no special name. Now let us imagine our-
selves entering the cathedral, passing between vast columns of stone
where the dim mysterious light is lost in dark recesses and where reign a
stillness and a gloom like that of a great forest; an element of fear is
added to our emotion of tender admiration, and this converts it to rever-
ence (or, if our tender emotion does not persist, to awe). This is a rever-
ence that has less of the personal note, because less of negative self-
feeling, than that of which gratitude is a component.61
The history of religion seems to show us the gradual genesis of this
highly complex emotion. Primitive religion seems to have kept separate
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inspiring powers on the one hand, the kindly beneficent powers that
inspired gratitude on the other. And it was not until religious doctrine
had undergone a long evolution that, by a process of syncretism or fu-
sion, it achieved the conception of a Deity whose attributes were ca-
pable of evoking all the elements of the complex emotion of reverence.
There is another group of complex emotions of which anger and
fear are the most prominent constituents. When an object excites our
disgust, and at the same time our anger, the emotion we experience is
scorn. The two impulses are apt to be very clearly expressed, the shrink-
ing and aversion of disgust, and the impulse of anger to attack, to strike,
and to destroy its object. This emotion is most commonly evoked by the
actions of other men, by mean cruelty or underhand opposition to our
efforts; it is therefore one from which original moral judgments often
spring. It is, I think, very apt to be complicated by positive self-feel-
ing—we feel ourselves magnified by the presence of the moral weak-
ness or littleness of the other, just as on a lower plane the physical weak-
ness or smallness of those about one excites this positive self-feeling,
with its tendency to expand the chest, throw up the head, and strut in
easy confidence. The name “scorn” is often applied to an affective state
of which this emotion is an element; but, if this element is dominant, the
emotion is that we experience when we are said to despise another, and
its name is contempt, the substantive corresponding to the verb despise;
scorn, then, is a binary compound of anger and disgust, or a tertiary
compound if positive self-feeling is added to these; while contempt is a
binary compound of disgust and positive self-feeling, differing from scorn
in the absence of the element of anger.
Fear and disgust are very apt to be combined, as on the near view of
a snake or an alligator, and in some persons this binary emotion is pro-
voked by a large number of animals, rats, moths, worms, spiders, and
so on, and also by the mere appearance of some men, though more often
by their characters. It is the emotion we call loathing, and, in its most
intense form, horror. Loathing is apt to be complicated by wonder, which
then, in spite of the combined impulses of fear and disgust, keeps us
hovering in the neighbourhood of the loathsome object, fascinated, as
we say, or in horrible fascination.
Again, anger, fear, and disgust may be blended to form a tertiary
compound, to which, if to any emotion, the name “hate” can be most
properly applied, although it is better to reserve this name for the senti-
ment of intense dislike or hate, within the system of which this complex100/William McDougall
emotion is most commonly excited.
Envy is allied to this group of emotions. Without feeling confident
as to its analysis, I would suggest that it is a binary compound of nega-
tive self-feeling and of anger; the former emotion being evoked by the
superior power or position of the object, the latter by the sense that the
envied person is excluding us from the enjoyment of the goods or the
position that he has or occupies. I do not think that true envy arises
except when this sense of deprivation by, or opposition on the part of,
the object is present; as when, for example, another takes the prize we
aimed at, or achieves the position we hoped to occupy, and therefore
appears as an obstacle to the realisation of our ends.
Complex Emotions that imply the Existence of Sentiments
We may now consider some of the complex emotional states that we
only experience in virtue of having previously acquired some sentiment
for the object of the emotion.
Within the sentiment of love several well-defined compounds arise.
Reproach, seems to be a fusion of anger and of tender emotion. “Oh,
how could you do it!” is the natural expression of reproach. The person
who is the object of the sentiment of love performs some action which,
if performed by an indifferent person, would provoke our anger simply;
but tender emotion, which is habitually evoked by the mere thought of
the object of our love, prevents the full development of our anger, fuses
with it and softens it to reproach. This is the simplest form, as when a
mother chides her little son for cruelty to an animal. A more complex
form arises when the sentiment is reciprocated, or supposed to be recip-
rocated, and its object acts in a way that seems to show indifference to
us. In this case the pain of the wound given to our self-regarding senti-
ment and of the check to our tender emotion is the prominent feature of
the affective state and overshadows anger; perhaps the name “reproach”
is most properly given to this more complex state.
The threat of injury or destruction against the object of the senti-
ment of love excites in us anticipatory pain of its loss and perhaps also
some anticipation of the sympathetic pain we should feel if the threat
were realised; and this pain, mingling with tender emotion and perhaps
with a little anger against the source of the threatened harm, gives rise to
the state we call anxiety or solicitude. la popular language we are said
to fear the loss of, or injury to, the object; but that fear enters into this
emotion seems to be very questionable.An Introduction to Social Psychology/101
Jealousy presents a difficult problem. Animals and very young chil-
dren are commonly said to exhibit jealousy. A favourite dog will be
emotionally moved by the sight of his master fondling a kitten or an-
other dog; he will sometimes slink away and hide himself and sulk, or he
will keep pushing himself forward to be caressed, with sidelong glances
at the kitten. Some very young children behave in a similar way, when
their mother nurses another child. And in both cases the jealous creature
is apt to exhibit anger towards the intruder. These facts do not necessi-
tate the assumption that jealousy is a primary emotion, although, possi-
bly, in order fully to account for them, we should have to admit an
instinct of possession or ownership.62 But even in these cases the exist-
ence of a sentiment of affection, however rudimentary, seems to be im-
plied by this conduct. Certainly full-blown jealousy is only developed
where some sentiment of love or attachment exists; and the conditions
of its excitement, which constitute the object of the emotion, are com-
plex, being, not a single person and his situation or actions, but the
relations between three persons. The presence of a third person who
attempts to draw to himself the regard of the object of the sentiment
does not of itself excite jealousy, though it may excite anger. Jealousy
involves anger of this sort towards the third person, but also some pain-
ful check to one’s own tender emotion and sentiment. It is, perhaps,
possible to imagine a love so wholly disinterested that it would demand
no reciprocation of its tender feeling. Such a sentiment would be inca-
pable of jealousy, and, perhaps, a mother’s love sometimes approxi-
mates to this type, though seldom. The sentiment of love commonly
feeds upon, is sustained by, and demands reciprocation, which, being
given, excites in turn a positive self-feeling or elation that fuses with the
tender emotion, adding greatly to its pleasurable character. And the sen-
timent is apt to demand for its complete satisfaction the maximum of
such reciprocation; so long as we feel that this maximum is not attained
we are uneasy, we lack the complete satisfaction of the self- expansive
impulse, the impulse of positive self-feeling. And jealousy arises when
the object of the sentiment gives to another, or merely is thought to give
to another, any part of the regard thus claimed for the self. It is thus an
unstable state of emotion, of which the most constant element is the
painfully checked positive self-feeling, and which tends to oscillate be-
tween two poles, revenge and reproach, according as one or the other
person is more prominently before consciousness. In some cases the
tender emotion may be at a minimum or even perhaps lacking, and the102/William McDougall
sentiment within which this kind of jealousy arises is a purely egoistic
sentiment: the object of it is regarded merely as a part of one’s property,
a part of one’s larger self, as one of the props on which one’s pride is
built up; and the marks of affection, or of subjection, of the object to-
wards oneself are valued merely as contributing to feed one’s positive
self-feeling and self- regarding sentiment In this case any expression of
regard for a third person on the part of the object of the sentiment pro-
vokes a jealousy of which the anger turns mainly upon that object it-
self.63
There is an emotion that is properly called vengeful emotion; it is
not merely anger, though anger may be a large element in it. It is of
especial interest to the moralist, because it has been one of the principal
sources of the institution of public justice, more especially of the branch
dealing with personal injuries; for the pursuit and punishment of mur-
derers by the State, or by officers of the law, has only gradually re-
placed the system of private vengeance and the blood- feud. One respect
in which the impulse of revenge differs from that of simple anger is its
long persistence owing to its being developed in connection with a sen-
timent, generally the self- regarding sentiment. The act that, more cer-
tainly than any other, provokes vengeful emotion is the public insult,
which, if not immediately resented, lowers one in the eyes of one’s fel-
lows. Such an insult calls out one’s positive self-feeling, with its im-
pulse to assert oneself and to make good one’s value and power in the
public eye. If the insult is at once avenged, the emotion is perhaps prop-
erly called resentment. It is when immediate satisfaction of the impulse
of angry self-assertion is impossible that it gives rise to a painful desire;
it is then the insult rankles in one’s breast; and this desire can only be
satisfied by an assertion of one’s power, by returning an equally great or
greater insult or injury to the offender—by “getting even with him.”
This painful struggle of positive self-feeling, maintaining one’s anger
against the offender, is vengeful emotion or the emotion of revenge.
Though the emotion is most easily evoked, perhaps, by public in-
sult, it may arise also from injury deliberately done to any part of the
larger self, any part of that large sphere of objects to which one’s self-
regarding sentiment extends—e.g., injury or insult to one’s family or
tribe, or to any larger society with which a man identifies himself; this
we see in the case of the blood- feuds, where the killing of one member
of a family or tribe excites this emotion in all its other members, who
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slayer by killing him or another of its members. On a still greater scale
it may be provoked as a collective emotion throughout a nation by de-
feat in war. In this case the painful conation or desire that arises from
the checked impulse of positive self- feeling is apt to predominate greatly
over the element of anger. The attitude of the French nation towards
Germany for many years after the Franco-Prussian War, and of a large
part of the British nation towards the Boers after Majuba, was deter-
mined by this emotion excited within the system of that most widely
extended form of the self-regarding sentiment which we call the patri-
otic sentiment.
The view that vengeful emotion is essentially a fusion of anger and
wounded self-feeling is not generally accepted. The question has been a
good deal discussed in connection with the history of punishment. Dr.
Steinmetz, a German authority,64 takes the view that “revenge is essen-
tially rooted in the feeling of power and authority, its aim is to enhance
the ‘self-feeling’ which has been lowered or degraded by the injury suf-
fered.”... And he supports this view by showing that primitively revenge
is undirected, i.e., seeks satisfaction in any violent assertion of one’s
power. The best illustration of such undirected revenge is, perhaps, the
running amok of the Malay.65 In these cases the man who has suffered
injury or insult does not deliberately plan out and execute his vengeance
on those who have injured him. He broods for a time, no doubt filled
with the painful desire arising from his instinct of self-assertion, and
then suddenly takes his kris and runs through his village, cutting down
every living being he encounters, until he himself is slain. This brooding
and fierce dejection produced by insult is sometimes very intense among
other savages. We know how Achilles sulked in his tent, and cases have
been described of savages who have lain prone on the ground for days
together and have even died when this emotion and its impulse could
find no satisfaction.
Professor Westermarck,66 on the other hand, maintains against
Steinmetz that self-feeling is not an essential element in vengeful emo-
tion. He writes: “Resentment may be described as an aggressive attitude
of mind towards a cause of pain. Anger is sudden resentment, in which
the hostile reaction against the cause of pain is unrestrained by delibera-
tion. Revenge, on the other hand, is a more deliberate form of non-moral
resentment, in which the hostile reaction is more or less restrained by
reason and calculation. It is impossible, however, to draw any distinct
limit between these two types of resentment, as also to discern where an104/William McDougall
actual desire to inflict pain comes in.”67
This view of anger and revenge and of the relations between them is
very different to the one proposed in the preceding pages. Westermarck
makes resentment the fundamental type of this kind of emotional reac-
tion, and distinguishes two varieties of it, anger and revenge, which, he
holds, differ merely in that while anger is sudden and impulsive resent-
ment, revenge is deliberate and controlled resentment. This, I venture to
think, is a failure of analysis due to non-recognition of the guiding prin-
ciple we have followed, the principle that the primary emotions are the
affective aspects of the fundamental instinctive mental processes and
that all the other emotions are derived from them by fusion or blending.
Westermarck seeks to support his view by saying that, if one has written
a book and it has been adversely criticised, though our self-feeling re-
ceives a painful check we do not seek vengeance on the critic but rather
set out to write a better book. Now, it is dangerous to trust to the consid-
eration of the emotions of the most cultivated and intellectual class of
men in seeking light on the origin of the emotions, but I think that most
authors would avenge themselves on the unjust and damaging critic, if
they could find an easy opportunity; and our literary disputes frequently
are but the most refined expression of this emotion.
Our account of these emotions is nearer to that of Steinmetz, but
differs from it in recognising that vengeful emotion is essentially a bi-
nary compound of anger and positive self-feeling. These two elements
may be fused in all proportions, so that revenge ranges from the hot,
blind fury of the Malay running amok, or from the emotion of the child
furiously striking out at all about him, to the comparatively cold, plot-
ting revenge that can postpone and pursue its satisfaction for years.
And the distinction we make between resentment and revenge is that
resentment is the fusion of anger and positive self-feeling immediately
evoked by an act of aggression and does not necessarily imply the exist-
ence of a developed self-regarding sentiment, whereas revenge is the
same emotion developed within the system of the self-regarding senti-
ment—to which circumstance it owes its persistent character—with the
addition of painful feeling arising from the continued thwarting of the
two impulses.
The vengeful emotion has been regarded by some authors, e.g., by
Dr. Mercier,68 as the root of moral indignation, and Westermarck gives
this position to his “resentment.” He divides resentments into two great
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anger and revenge, the moral class of moral indignation and disapproval.
This classification seems to involve a cross-division and a confusion,
not only because he fails to seize the difference between anger and re-
venge, but also because he has no criterion by which to distinguish his
moral from his non-moral resentments. Whether revenge is ever a moral
emotion, and whether the disinterested anger against the cruel oppressor
that we have called moral indignation (the anger that arises, in the way
we have studied in Chapter III, out of the parental instinct exercised on
behalf of the defenceless creature) is ever non-moral— these are ques-
tions that may be left to the moralists for decision; but that these two
emotions, revenge and moral indignation, are not only intrinsically dif-
ferent, but that they are evoked by very different situations, seems as
indisputable as that while one is essentially egoistic the other is essen-
tially altruistic. These two emotions together are the main roots of all
justice; neither alone would have sufficed to engender a system of law
and custom that would secure personal rights and liberties, and neither
alone would suffice to secure the efficient administration of justice.
Approval and disapproval have been treated of by Westermarck
and other writers as emotions. But to describe them as emotions is to
perpetuate the chaos of psychological terminology.69 They are not emo-
tions but judgments, and though, like other judgments, they are often
directly determined by emotions, that is not always the case; for even
moral approval and disapproval may be unemotional intellectual judg-
ments made in logical accordance with previously adopted principles.
Shame is an emotion second to none in the extent of its influence
upon social behaviour. There are several words closely connected with
shame, the loose usage of which is a source of great confusion, e.g.,
shyness, bashfulness, and modesty; these are sometimes said to be the
names of emotions, sometimes of instincts. But shyness and modesty,
like courage, generosity, and meanness, are qualities of character and of
conduct arising out of the possession of instincts and sentiments, while
shame is a true secondary emotion, and bashfulness, if not an emotion
in the strict sense of the word, is an emotional state.
Shame has given much trouble to psychologists, because it seems to
imply and to depend upon self-consciousness, while yet the behaviour
of animals and of very young children, whom we can credit only with
the merest rudiments of self-consciousness, sometimes seems to express
shame. Professor Baldwin70 has dealt with these emotions in children
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periods in the development of what he calls the bashfulness of the child;
an earlier period, during which what he calls organic bashfulness is
evoked by the presence of strangers—this organic bashfulness, which is
shown by most children in their first year, he identifies with fear; a later
period in which the child makes efforts to draw attention to himself—
this he calls the period of true bashfulness. Baldwin’s description of the
facts seems to be accurate, but he fails to show the origin of the bashful-
ness he describes and fails also to show its relation to shame.
The way has been prepared for the solution of these and other diffi-
culties connected with shame by our recognition of positive and nega-
tive self-feeling as primary emotions, and by our acceptance of the im-
portant distinction between emotions and sentiments that Shand has so
clearly pointed out. The earliest reactions of a child towards strangers
are, no doubt, symptoms of fear, as Baldwin says. But truly bashful
behaviour, which is not usually displayed until the third year, has noth-
ing to do with fear, and is, I submit, symptomatic of a struggle between
the two opposed impulses of the instincts of self-display and self-abase-
ment, with their emotions of positive and negative self-feeling: a struggle
rather than a fusion, for the impulses and emotions of the two instincts
are so directly opposed that fusion is hardly possible. Consider the little
boy of three who, in the presence of a stranger, hides quietly behind his
mother’s skirt with head hung low, averted face, and sidelong glances,
until suddenly he emerges, saying “Can you do this?” and turns a som-
ersault at the feet of the stranger. In adults the slightly painful agitation
that most of us feel when we have to figure before an audience seems to
be of the same nature as this childish bashfulness, and to be due to a
similar struggle between these two impulses and emotions. Our nega-
tive self-feeling is evoked by the presence of persons whom we regard
as our superiors, or who, by reason of their number and of their forming
a collective whole, are able to make on us an impression of power; but
it is not until our positive self-feeling is also excited, until we feel our-
selves called upon to make a display of ourselves or our powers, to
address the audience, to play a part as an equal among the superior
beings, or even merely to walk across the room before the eyes of a
crowd, that we experience the slightly painful, slightly pleasurable, but
often very intense, emotional agitation which is properly called bashful-
ness. Whether this state is at all possible in the absence of self-con-
sciousness it is difficult to say. For although either instinct may be ex-
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it would seem that the idea of the self and some development of the self-
regarding sentiment are necessary conditions of the conjunction of the
two opposed emotions; in their absence one of the opposed emotions
would simply preclude or drive out the other. In situations that evoke
bashfulness the negative self-feeling is, perhaps, as a rule, more directly
induced by the presence of the other person or persons, while the posi-
tive self-feeling is more dependent on the idea of the self and on the
egoistic sentiment.
But the state of bashfulness we have considered is not shame. Shame,
in the full sense of the word, is only possible when the self-regarding
sentiment has become well developed about the idea of the self, its at-
tributes and powers. Then any exhibition of the self to others as defi-
cient in these powers and attributes, which constitute the self in so far as
it is the object of the self- regarding sentiment, provokes shame. The
self may appear defective or inferior to others in all other respects and
no shame, though perhaps bashfulness, will be induced. Thus a man
whose self, as object of his self-respect, includes courage or athletic
prowess will feel shame if he appears cowardly or bodily incapable;
whereas most women, whose selves as objects of their self-regarding
sentiments have not the attribute of physical courage or athletic capac-
ity, will run away from a mouse or show themselves incapable of jump-
ing over a fence without the least pang of shame.
Shame, then, is not merely negative self-feeling, nor is it merely
negative and positive self- feeling struggling together; it is bashfulness
qualified by the pain of baffled positive self-feeling, whose impulse is
strong and persistent owing to the fact that the emotion is excited within
the system of the self-regarding sentiment The conduct that excites our
shame is that which lowers us in the eyes of our fellows, so that we feel
it to be impossible for our positive self-feeling to attain satisfaction.
Shame thus differs from vengeful emotion, which also is provoked by a
blow to our self-esteem, in that the blow comes, not from another, but
from ourselves; or rather, though it comes from others, it is occasioned
by our own conduct, and therefore, though the check to our impulse of
self-assertion may provoke our anger, this anger, unlike that of vengeful
emotion, is directed against ourselves, and is therefore incapable of find-
ing satisfaction. Hence the pain of the check to our positive self-feeling,
which, when it comes from another, may find some relief in the active
pursuit of vengeance, can in this case find no relief but is augmented by
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vengeful emotion and, especially in brutal natures, is apt to be accom-
panied by it; but it differs from vengeful emotion in two respects—first,
the check to positive self-feeling not only gives rise to a painful and
angry desire for self-assertion, but there is no possibility of satisfaction
for this desire, of “getting even” with the person from whom the check
comes, because that person is oneself; secondly, there is an element of
negative self-feeling, with its impulse to withdraw oneself from the no-
tice of others, evoked by the recognition of one’s own shortcoming. In
revenge in its purest form this element of negative self-feeling has no
part; but, if in the face of insult or injury one has behaved in a cowardly
manner, it may complicate the emotional state, which then becomes an
imperfect blend of revenge and shame.
Mere bashfulness very readily passes into shame; for, when in that
state, one is acutely aware of one’s self in relation to others, and there-
fore one notices at once any slight defect of one’s conduct, and any
censure or disapproval passed upon it occasions a painful check to posi-
tive self-feeling that converts bashfulness to shame. The full understand-
ing of shame implies a study of the self-regarding sentiment, which,
however, we must postpone to a later page.
We are now in a position to inquire into the nature of sorrow and
joy, which we have rejected from our list of primary emotions, because,
as was said, they are algedonic or pleasure-pain qualifications of emo-
tional states rather than emotions capable of standing alone.
First, a remark must be made upon one feature of emotions that has
been too much neglected. Apart from the pleasure that attends the suc-
cessful, and the pain that attends the unsuccessful, conation or striving
towards an end involved in every emotional state, each primary emotion
seems to have a certain intrinsic feeling-tone, just as the sensations that
are synthesised in perception have their feeling-tone independently of
the success or lack of success of the perceptual conation. And the intrin-
sic feeling-tone of the emotions seems to follow the same rule as that of
sensations, namely, that with increase of intensity of the emotion pleas-
ant tends to give way to unpleasant feeling-tone; so that, while at mod-
erate intensities some are pleasant and others unpleasant, at the highest
intensity all alike become unpleasant or painful; and, perhaps, at the
lowest intensity all are pleasant, if that is the case, then, like the sensa-
tions, the emotions differ greatly from one another in regard to the posi-
tion of the neutral point of feeling-tone in the scales of their intensities.
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suit, as we see especially clearly in children, sportsmen, and adventur-
ous spirits generally; whereas at high intensity it is the most horrible of
all experiences. On the other hand, tender- emotion is pleasantly toned,
save, perhaps, at its highest intensity; and positive self-feeling is even
more highly pleasurable and remains so, probably, even at its highest
intensity.
How, then, are we to regard joy and sorrow? Is joy mere pleasure,
and are the two words synonymous? Obviously not; joy is universally
recognised as something more than, and higher than, mere pleasure.
Whenever did poet write of pleasure in the lofty strain of the beautiful
lines that Coleridge wrote of joy?
“O pure of heart, thou needst not ask of me
What this strong music in the soul may be!
What, and wherein it doth exist,
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist,
This beautiful and beauty-making power,
Joy, virtuous lady! Joy that ne’er was given
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour.
Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud—
We in ourselves rejoice !
And thence flows all that charms or ear or sight,
All melodies the echoes of that voice,
All colours a suffusion from that light.”
Clearly joy is more than pleasure, however intense. Let us examine
what is by common consent the purest type of joy—the joy of a loving
mother as she tends her beautiful and healthy child. In this case many
factors contribute to produce the joyful emotion: (1) There is aesthetic
pleasure in the contemplation of the beauty of the object, a pleasure that
any onlooker may share; (2) sympathetic pleasure reflected by, or in-
duced in, the mother from her smiling child; (3) tender- emotion, in
itself pleasantly toned and progressively attaining satisfaction; (4) posi-
tive self- feeling, also intrinsically pleasant and also attaining an ideal
satisfaction; for the mother is proud of her child as an evidence of her
own worth; (5) each of these two primary emotions of the mother is
developed within the system of a strong sentiment, the one within the
system of her love for her child, the other within the system of her re-
gard for herself, the two strongest sentiments of her nature, which, in so110/William McDougall
far as the child is identified with herself, become welded together to
constitute a master sentiment or passion; this renders the emotions more
intense and more enduring; (6) the fact that the emotions are not aroused
as merely isolated experiences by some casually presented object, but
are developed within strongly organised and enduring sentiments gives
them a prospective reference; they project themselves into an indefi-
nitely prolonged future, and so hope or pleasant anticipation is added to
the complex.
Joy is always, as in this instance, a complex emotional state, in
which one or more of the primary emotions, developed within the sys-
tem of a strong sentiment, plays an essential part. We ought, then, prop-
erly to speak, not of joy, but of joyous emotion. And if, by an illegiti-
mate effort of abstraction, we should seek to separate joy from the emo-
tions with which it forms an inseparable whole, we should have to say
that it is pleasure, but pleasure of a high type, pleasure of complex
origin, arising from the harmonious operation of one or more sentiments
that constitute a considerable feature of the total mental organisation.
Reflexion upon sorrow yields similar results. Take the parallel case
of the mother sorrowing for the loss of her child. There is tender emo-
tion, which, though intrinsically of pleasant feeling- tone, is in this case
painful because its impulse is baffled and cannot attain more than the
most scanty and imperfect satisfaction in little acts, such as the laying
of flowers on the grave; and this emotion, being developed within a
strong sentiment, is persistent, and the pain of its ineffectual impulse
constantly recurs: again, pride and hope have been dashed down and
few can avoid some negative self-feeling under such conditions, for a
part of the larger self has been torn away, and some thought of some
effort that might have been made but was not is very apt to increase the
intensity of this painful negative self-feeling.
In this case, then, we should properly speak of a sorrowful emotion,
which emotion is a painfully toned binary compound of tender emotion
and negative self-feeling, And as in this case, so in every other, sorrow
implies one or more of the primary emotions excited within a sentiment
Perhaps in every case tender emotion must be an element; for, take away
the tender emotion and only painful negative self-feeling or humiliation
remains; take away that emotion also and nothing remains but some
painful depressed feeling that cannot properly be called sorrow, though
it might perhaps be called grief. Some such state as this last might be
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same time that it removed its object; e.g., a friend, the object of a strong
sentiment, suddenly by some cruel act shows us that he has renounced
our friendship and, at the same time, that he is unworthy of it. Under
these conditions might be realised a state of intolerable pain, a state
almost devoid of impulse or desire, that might be called grief, but not
sorrow. But it is hard to imagine even under such conditions a state
without some anger, some resentment or disgust, and the corresponding
impulse. In so far as grief is properly distinguishable from sorrow, it
differs in having less of tender emotion and more of anger, as when the
bereaved and grief-stricken father curses God, or the Fates, or the Uni-
verse.
In this connection we may consider the difference between pity and
sorrow. Pity in its simplest form is tender emotion tinged with sympa-
thetically induced pain. It differs from sorrow, which also is essentially
a painful tender emotion, in the sympathetic character of the pain, and
in that it does not imply the existence of any sentiment of affection or
love, as sorrow does, and is therefore a more transient experience, and
one with less tendency to look before and after. There is also, of course,
a sorrowful pity, as when one watches the painful and mortal illness of
a dear friend. In this case there is tender emotion and there is sympa-
thetically induced pain which makes the state one of pity; but there is
also pain arising from the prospect of the loss of the object of our senti-
ment of love, which makes the emotion a sorrowful one. That sorrow
does not necessarily include an element of sympathetic pain is clearly
shown by the sorrow of those who have lost a loved one whom they
sincerely believe to have entered on a happier life. The pain of sorrow
is, then, a self-regarding pain, whereas the pain of pity is not; hence pity
is rightly regarded as the nobler emotion.
Before passing on from this subject, it seems worth while to in-
quire, What is happiness? Is happiness merely pleasure or a sum of
pleasures, and if not, what is it? If only moralists had condescended to
ask this question earnestly and had found the answer to it, how much of
the energy devoted to ethical discussion during the last century might
profitably have been turned into other channels! The utilitarians con-
stantly assumed that happiness and pleasure are to be identified, and
used happiness and sum of pleasures as synonymous terms, generally
without pausing to consider, or to seek to justify, this identification. The
principle that the ultimate test of the relative worth of different kinds of
conduct and character must be the estimation of the degree in which112/William McDougall
they contribute to bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, this principle, which if the phrase “greatest number” is taken as
referring to the remoter, as well as to the immediate, future cannot eas-
ily be rejected, was treated as identical with the maxim that the aim of
all conduct should be to increase the sum of pleasures to the greatest
possible extent; and this maxim, illuminated by Bentham’s dictum that
“pushpin is as good as poetry provided the pleasure be as great,” was
naturally repulsive to many of the finer natures; it provoked in them a
reaction and drove them to grope among obscure and mystical ideas for
their ethical foundations, and so has greatly delayed the general accep-
tance of the great truth embodied in the utilitarian doctrines. J. S. Mill,
like the rest, identified happiness with sum of pleasures, and attempted
to improve the position by recognising higher and lower qualities of
pleasure, and by regarding the higher as indefinitely more desirable than
the lower. This was an effort in the right direction, but so long as happi-
ness is regarded as merely a sum of pleasures, whether higher or lower,
and pleasure and pain as the only motives to action, the utilitarian posi-
tion is untenable.71
It is, I think, indisputable that a man may be unhappy while he
actually experiences pleasure, and that he might experience one plea-
sure after another throughout a considerable period without ceasing to
be unhappy. Consider the case of a man whose lifelong ambition and
hopes have recently been dashed to the ground. If he were fond of mu-
sic, he might, when the first shock of disappointment had passed away,
attend a concert and derive pleasure from the music, or indulge in other
pleasures, and yet be continuously unhappy. No doubt his unhappiness
would make it more difficult to find pleasure and might make his plea-
sure thin in quality; but the two modes of experience are, though an-
tagonistic, not absolutely incompatible and mutually exclusive.
In a similar way, a man may be happy while experiencing pain, not
merely physical pain, but pain in the proper sense of the word—i.e.,
painful feeling. Imagine the case of a man of fine nature who in the past
in a moment of weakness has done a mean thing, but who by his efforts
has completely repaired the injury done, has set his relations to others
on an entirely satisfactory footing, and has become thoroughly happy. If
his mind goes back to that act of meanness, he will have a painful feel-
ing and yet he may continue to be happy without intermission. Or imag-
ine another, perhaps a clearer, case—that of a person who finds an ex-
alted happiness in seeking to relieve the lot of the sick and distressed.An Introduction to Social Psychology/113
Such a person will often feel sympathetic pain, but, so long as he knows
he is doing good to others, he is happy and does not cease to be happy in
those moments of pitiful emotion. We may even believe that the cause of
such sympathetic pain may increase the happiness of him who feels it.
Suppose that to a tender-hearted, sympathetic person, who finds his
happiness in doing good to others, a friend pours out his troubles in a
moment of confidence; the recipient feels sympathetic pain, but his hap-
piness is at the same time increased because he sees that his friend con-
fides in him and finds relief in doing so. Do not facts of this order show
clearly that happiness is no mere sum of pleasures? What, then, is it? It
may, I think, be indirectly defined by saying that happiness is related to
joy in the same way that joy is related to pleasure.72 Pleasure is a quali-
fication of consciousness of momentary duration or, at most, of a fleet-
ing character, and it arises from some mental process that involves but
a mere fragment of one’s whole being. Joy arises from the harmonious
operation of an organised system or sentiment that constitutes a consid-
erable feature or part of one’s whole being; it has, therefore, potentially
at least, a greater persistence and continuity and a deeper resonance; it
is, as it were, more massive than pleasure; it is more intimately and
essentially a part of oneself, so that one cannot stand aside and contem-
plate it in philosophic or depreciatory detachment, as one may contem-
plate one’s pleasures. Happiness arises from the harmonious operation
of all the sentiments of a well-organised and unified personality, one in
which the principal sentiments support one another in a succession of
actions all of which tend towards the same or closely allied and harmo-
nious ends. Hence the richer, the more highly developed, the more com-
pletely unified or integrated is the personality, the more capable is it of
sustained happiness in spite of inter-current pains of all sorts. In the
child or in the adult of imperfectly developed and unified personality,
the pleasure or pain of the moment is apt to fill or dominate the whole of
consciousness as a simple wave of feeling, whereas in the perfected
personality it appears as a mere ripple on the surface of a strong tide
that sets steadily in one direction.
If this account of happiness is correct, it follows that to add to the
sum of happiness is not merely to add to the sum of pleasures, but is
rather to contribute to the, development of higher forms of personality,
personalities capable, not merely of pleasure, as the animals are, but, of
happiness. If this conclusion is sound, it is of no small importance to the
social sciences; it goes far to reconcile the doctrine of such moralists as114/William McDougall
T. H. Green with that of the more enlightened utilitarians; for the one
party insists that the proper end of moral effort is the development of
personalities, the other that it is the increase of happiness, and these we
now see to be identical ends.
In Chapter III. it was said that the definition of emotion there adopted
necessitates the exclusion of surprise, as well as of joy and sorrow,
from the list of true and primary emotions. This is because surprise is
an affective state that implies no corresponding instinct and has no spe-
cific conative tendency. It is merely a condition of general excitement
which supervenes upon any totally unexpected and violent mental im-
pression; or perhaps it is more accurate to say that it is produced by an
impression which is contrary to anticipation, and to which, therefore,
we cannot immediately adjust ourselves, which does not evoke at once
an appropriate emotional and conative response. It is the momentary
state of confused excitement which intervenes between the reception of
the impression and the assumption of the appropriate attitude towards
it, a moment of conflict and confusion between the habitual anticipatory
attitude determined by the course of previous experience and the new
attitude provoked by the unusual course of events.
Appendix to Chapter V
In the previous editions no attempt was made to deal with the emotion of
remorse. The following note is added to make good this serious omis-
sion.
Remorse is an emotion which has been commonly regarded by mor-
alists as the most intense of the effects produced by the activity of that
peculiar entity “the conscience.” It is a complex emotional state imply-
ing the existence of a well-developed self-regarding sentiment and, gen-
erally, of moral sentiments. It arises upon the recollection of some past
action that one deeply regrets; like all regret it is painful owing to the
fact that the impulse or desire, which is the root of it and which may be
the impulse of any one of several instincts, is directed towards the past
rather than towards the future, and is therefore seen to be necessarily
and for ever baffled. But it differs from other forms of regret in that the
regretted event is one brought about by one’s own action Hence the
anger which arises from the baffled desire is directed against oneself,
and can find no satisfaction in the utterance of reproaches or curses; for
these, being directed against oneself, do but add to the painfulness of the
whole complex state; and even the doing of penance (i.e., the inflictionAn Introduction to Social Psychology/115
of punishment upon oneself), though it yields some satisfaction to the
baffled impulse, does not heal the wound to one’s self-regard caused by
the recognition of the irrevocable failure to realise one’s ideal of self.
Through this last factor remorse is closely allied with shame, and it
might perhaps be adequately defined as shameful and angry regret.
Chapter VI
The Development of the Sentiments.
We have seen that a sentiment is an organised system of emotional dis-
positions centred about the idea of some object. The organisation of the
sentiments in the developing mind is determined by the course of expe-
rience; that is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the structure of the
mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution. This is cer-
tainly true in the main, though the maternal sentiment might almost
seem to be innate; but we have to remember that in the human mother
this sentiment may, and generally does, begin to grow up about the idea
of its object, before the child is born.73
The growth of the sentiments is of the utmost importance for the
character and conduct of individuals and of societies; it is the organisation
of the affective and conative life. In the absence of sentiments our emo-
tional life would be a mere chaos, without order, consistency, or conti-
nuity of any kind; and all our social relations and conduct, being based
on the emotions and their impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic,
unpredictable, and unstable. It is only through the systematic organisation
of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the volitional control of
the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible. Again,
our judgments of value and of merit are rooted in our sentiments; and
our moral principles have the same source, for they are formed by our
judgments of moral value.
In dealing with the emotions, we named and classed them according
to their nature as states of affective consciousness and as tendencies to
action; and we may attempt to name and classify the sentiments also
according to the nature of the emotional dispositions that enter into the
composition of each one. But since, as we have seen, the same emo-
tional dispositions may enter into the composition of very different sen-
timents, we can carry the naming and classification of them but a little
way on this principle, and we have accordingly but very general names
for the sentiments. We have the names love, liking, affection, attach-
ment, denoting those sentiments that draw one towards their objects,116/William McDougall
generally in virtue of the tender emotion with its protective impulse which
is their principal constituent; and we have the names hate, dislike, and
aversion, for those that lead us to shrink from their objects, those whose
attitude or tendency is one of aversion, owing to the fear or disgust that
is the dominant element in their composition. The two names love and
hate, and the weaker but otherwise synonymous terms liking and dis-
like, affection and aversion, are very general; each stands for a large
class of sentiments of varied, though similar, composition; the character
common to the one class being the fundamental tendency to seek the
object and to find pleasure in its presence, while that of the other class is
the tendency to avoid the object and to be pained by its presence.
We must, I think, recognise a third principal variety of sentiment
which is primarily the self- regarding sentiment, and is, perhaps, best
called respect. Respect differs from love in that, while tender emotion
occupies the principal place in love, it is lacking, or occupies an alto-
gether subordinate position, in the sentiment of respect. The principal
constituents of respect are the dispositions of positive and negative self-
feeling; and respect is clearly marked off from love by the fact that
shame is one of its strongest emotions.
It may be asked—If respect is thus a sentiment that has for its most
essential constituents these self-regarding emotions, how can we prop-
erly be said to entertain respect for others? The answer is, I think, that
we respect those who respect themselves, that our respect for another is
a sympathetic reflexion of his self-respect; for unless a man shows self-
respect we never have respect for him, even though we may admire
some of his qualities, or like, or even love, him in a certain degree. The
generally recognised fact that we may like without respecting, and may
respect without liking, shows very clearly the essentially different na-
tures of these two sentiments, love and respect
The older moralists frequently made use of the expression “self-
love,” and in doing so generally confounded under this term two differ-
ent sentiments, self-love and self-respect Self-love is fortunately a com-
paratively rare sentiment; it is the self-regarding sentiment of the thor-
oughly selfish man, the meaner sort of egoist Such a man feels a tender
emotion for himself, he indulges in self-pity; he may have little positive
self-feeling and may be incapable of shame.74
Besides the sentiments of these three main types, love, hate, and
respect, which may be called complete or full-grown sentiments, we
must recognise the existence of sentiments of all degrees of developmentAn Introduction to Social Psychology/117
from the most rudimentary upward; these may be regarded as stages in
the formation of fully-grown sentiments, although many of them never
attain any great degree of complexity or strength. These we have to
name according to the principal emotional disposition entering into their
composition.
The sentiments may also be classified according to the nature of
their objects; they then fall into three main classes, the concrete particu-
lar, the concrete general, and the abstract sentiments—e.g., the senti-
ment of love for a child, of love for children in general, of love for
justice or virtue. Their development in the individual follows this order,
the concrete particular sentiments being, of course, the earliest and most
easily acquired. The number of sentiments a man may acquire, reck-
oned according to the number of objects in which they are centred, may,
of course, be very large; but almost every man has a small number of
sentiments—perhaps one only—that greatly surpass all the rest in
strength and as regards the proportion of his conduct that springs from
them.
Each sentiment has a life-history, like every other vital organisation.
It is gradually built up, increasing in complexity and strength, and may
continue to grow indefinitely, or may enter upon a period of decline, and
may decay slowly or rapidly, partially or completely.
When any one of the emotions is strongly or repeatedly excited by a
particular object, there is formed the rudiment of a sentiment. Suppose
that a child is thrown into the company of some person given to frequent
outbursts of violent anger, say, a violent-tempered father who is other-
wise indifferent to the child and takes no further notice of him than to
threaten, scold, and, perhaps, beat him. At first the child experiences
fear at each exhibition of violence; but repetition of these incidents very
soon creates the habit of fear, and in the presence of his father, even in
his mildest moods, the child is timorous; that is to say, the mere pres-
ence of the father throws the child’s fear-disposition into a condition of
sub-excitement, which increases on the slightest occasion until it pro-
duces all the subjective and objective manifestations of fear. As a fur-
ther stage, the mere idea of the father becomes capable of producing the
same effects as his presence; this idea has become associated with the
emotion; or, in stricter language, the psycho-physical disposition, whose
excitement involves the rise to consciousness of this idea, has become
associated or intimately connected with the psycho-physical disposition
whose excitement produces the bodily and mental symptoms of fear.118/William McDougall
Such an association constitutes a rudimentary sentiment that we can
only call a sentiment of fear.
In a similar way, a single act of kindness done by A to B may evoke
in B the emotion of gratitude; and if A repeats his kindly acts, confer-
ring benefits on B, the gratitude of B may become habitual, may be-
come an enduring emotional attitude of B towards A—a sentiment of
gratitude. Or, in either case, a single act—one evoking very intense fear
or gratitude—may suffice to render the association more or less durable
and the attitude of fear, or gratitude, of B towards A more or less per-
manent.
The same is true of most, perhaps of all, of the emotions of the class
that do not presuppose sentiments already formed for the object of the
emotion—e.g., of admiration, of anger, of disgust, of pity. We must,
then, recognise, as limiting cases on the side of simplicity, sentiments
formed by the association of a single emotional disposition with the idea
of some object But it can seldom happen that a sentiment persists in this
rudimentary condition for any long period of time. Any such sentiment
is liable to die away for lack of stimulus, or, if further relations are
maintained with its object, to develop into a more complex organisation.
Thus the simple sentiment of fear, created in the way we have imagined,
will tend to develop, and will most readily become hate by the incorpo-
ration of other emotional dispositions; anger may be frequently aroused
by the harsh punishments and restrictions imposed by the violent-tem-
pered father, perhaps also revenge, disgust, and shame; and after each
occasion on which the father becomes the object of these emotions, they
remain more ready to be stirred by him or by the mere thought of him;
they all, in virtue of their repeated excitement by this one object, be-
come associated with the object more and more intimately, until the
mere idea of him may suffice to throw them all at once into a condition
of sub-excitement, or to arouse all of them in turn or in conjunction to
full activity. So the rudimentary sentiment, whose only emotional con-
stituent is fear, develops into a full-blown hatred.
Now let us take parental love as the type of a strong and highly
complex sentiment, and let us consider its development. By reason of its
helplessness, its delicacy, its distresses, the young child evokes sooner
or later the tender emotion of the parent, if he is at all capable of this
emotion; and if the parent does not, through laziness or under the influ-
ence of a bad tradition, restrain the protective impulse, it finds its satis-
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are brought into operation by this particular object, they are rendered
more easily excitable in the same way, until the mere idea of this object
is constantly accompanied by some degree of the emotion, however feeble.
This gives the object a special power of attracting and holding the atten-
tion of the parent, who therefore constantly notices the child’s expres-
sions; and these evoke by sympathetic reaction the corresponding feel-
ings and emotions in the parent. Thus all the tender and attracting emo-
tions are repeatedly aroused by this one object, either singly or in com-
bination—pity, wonder, admiration, gratitude, solicitude, as well as sym-
pathetic pain and pleasure, and quick anger at neglect or injury of the
child by others. This, perhaps, is as far as the sentiment normally devel-
ops while the child is very young. But there comes in the ordinary course
of things a time when the child learns to reciprocate the parent’s senti-
ment and, by its expressions of tenderness or gratitude, intensifies the
satisfaction of the parental emotions; in so doing it welds the father’s
sentiment still more strongly than before, and also establishes the rela-
tion presently to be discussed under the head of active sympathy. But
this is not all; the parent is apt to identify the child with himself in a
peculiarly intimate way, for he knows that the world in general regards
its qualities and its defects as, in a sense, his own; and so his self-re-
garding sentiment of respect or of pride becomes directly extended to
the child; whatever is admirable about it brings satisfaction to his posi-
tive self- feeling; whatever is defective humbles him, excites his nega-
tive self-feeling; its shame or disgrace is his shame, its triumphs are his
triumphs. It is the fusion of these two sentiments, the altruistic and the
egoistic, in the parental sentiment that gives it its incomparable hold
upon our natures, and makes it a sentiment from which proceed our
most intense joys and sorrows. And not only are the various emotions,
such as tender emotion and positive self-feeling, excited in complex con-
junctions, but it would seem that each emotion excited within the system
of any complex sentiment acquires an increased intensity and its im-
pulse an additional energy from its membership in the system, an incre-
ment of energy which is greater the larger the number of dispositions
comprised within the system.75 To all this must be added yet another
factor—every effort and every sacrifice made on the child’s behalf, ev-
ery pain suffered through it, adds to the strength of the sentiment; for
with each such incident we feel that we put something of ourselves into
the object of the sentiment; and this sense of the accumulation of our
efforts and sacrifices gives it an additional value; we come to regard it120/William McDougall
as an investment in which we have sunk our capital bit by bit, to lose
which would be to lose that which embodies our past efforts. In this way
also the child becomes identified with ourselves, so that, as with any
other thing, such as a work of art or science, to the shaping of which our
best powers have been devoted, approval of it gives us pleasure and
disapproval pain, equally with approval or disapproval of ourselves.
Though the parental sentiment in its completest form arises from
the fusion of the purely altruistic with the extended self-regarding senti-
ment, it may be wholly of one or other type. The mother of a child that
is mentally and physically defective can find little occasion for extend-
ing to it her self-respect or pride; it does not minister to her positive self-
feeling, but rather, in so far as it is identified with herself, is a cause of
shame and pain. Yet the maternal instinct often rises superior to these
influences, which would make for hate rather than for love; the greater
needs of the child do but call out more intensely and frequently her
tender emotion, and she cherishes it with a sentiment that is almost purely
tender.
On the other hand, many a father’s sentiment for his children is very
little, or not at all, tender, is not properly love, but is a mere extension of
his self-regarding sentiment. He is gratified—i.e., his positive self-feel-
ing attains satisfaction—when they are admired or when they achieve
success of any kind; he feels shame when they appear bad-mannered or
ill-dressed or stupid; and he labours to fit them to take a good place in
the world, or is ambitious for them, just as he labours for, and is ambi-
tious for, himself; all, perhaps, without once experiencing the least touch
of tender emotion for them.
The sentiment of affection for an equal generally takes its rise, not
in simple tender emotion, but in admiration, or gratitude, or pity, and is
especially developed by active sympathy. By active sympathy I mean
sympathy in the fuller, more usual, sense of the word; we must carefully
distinguish it from the simple, primitive, or passive sympathy discussed
in Chapter IV. Active sympathy plays, or may play, a minor part in the
genesis of the parental sentiment, but it is of prime importance for the
development of the sentiment of affection between equals; for while the
former may be wholly one-sided, the latter can hardly become fully
formed and permanent without some degree of reciprocation and of sym-
pathy in this fuller sense.
Active sympathy presents a difficult problem, which we may con-
sider in this connexion. It involves a reciprocal relation between at leastAn Introduction to Social Psychology/121
two persons; either party to the relation not only is apt to experience the
emotions displayed by the other, but he desires also that the other shall
share his own emotions; he actively seeks the sympathy of the other,
and, when he has communicated his emotion to the other, he attains a
peculiar satisfaction which greatly enhances his pleasure and his joy, or,
in the case of painful emotion, diminishes his pain.
This relation of active sympathy is apt to grow up between any two
persons who are thrown much together, if they are commonly stirred to
similar emotions by similar objects; and that can only be the case if they
have similar sentiments. Two persons may live together for years, and,
if their sentiments are very different, if one of them likes and dislikes the
things that are for the most part indifferent to the other, there will be no
habitual sympathy established between them. There may be a reciprocal
sentiment of love without active sympathy, as in some cases of mother
and child;76 and in such cases there will be reciprocation of tender emo-
tion, and when one party to the relation is in distress the other will pity
and succour him. But such a sentiment of love without active sympathy
brings little joy and is likely to be troubled by frequent jars, irritations,
and regrets. Instances of this kind of relation are common enough; they
show clearly that tender emotion and pity, though often in popular speech
and by many psychologists confused with sympathy, do not constitute
sympathy; and they show also that sympathy is not essential to love,
that, in short, sympathy (both the simple or passive and the complex
active variety) and tender emotion are radically distinct
If, however, the relation of active sympathy is established between
any two persons, some sentiment of affection is pretty sure to grow up
in both parties, if they are at all capable of tender emotion; and, except
in the case of parental love, active sympathy is the most sure foundation
of love and is an essential feature of any completely satisfying affection.
We have, then, to ask, Why do we seek and find this peculiar satis-
faction in the mere fact of another person’s sharing our emotion? In the
case of the pleasurable emotions we may see a partial explanation in the
fact that the sharing of our emotion by another intensifies our own emo-
tion by way of the fundamental reaction of primitive sympathy,77 and
therefore intensifies our pleasure or our joy. But the sharing of our emo-
tion intensifies also the painful emotions, anger, revenge, fear, pity, and
sorrowful emotion; yet in these cases also we desire that others shall
share our emotion and find a certain satisfaction when they do so.
Some further explanation of active sympathy is therefore required,122/William McDougall
and in order to find it we must, I think, fall back on the gregarious
instinct. The excitement of this, the pre-eminently social instinct, is ac-
companied, as we have seen, by no specific emotion of well-marked
quality. In the simplest cases it operates merely to produce an uneasy
restlessness in any member of a herd or other animal society that has
become separated from its fellows, impelling him to wander to and fro
until he finds and rejoins the herd. In the present connection it is impor-
tant that this gregarious impulse seems generally to be called into play
in conjunction with some other instinct; that is to say, the excitement of
any other instinct seems to predispose to the excitement of this one. This
is, perhaps, most obvious in the case of fear. The gregarious animal
may graze in comfort at some distance from his fellows, but at the slightest
alarm will run first to join them, before making off in headlong flight.
But it is true also of anger and curiosity, of the migratory instinct, of the
food-seeking impulse when sharpened by hunger, and of the mating in-
stinct Animals of many species live for the most part more or less scat-
tered, or in family groups only, but come together in vast collections
when these special instincts are excited.
It seems, then, that the gregarious instinct supplements, as it were,
each of the special instincts, rendering complete satisfaction of their
impulses impossible, until each animal is surrounded by others of the
same species’ in a similar state of excitement. Since man certainly in-
herits this instinct, we may see in this instinct the principle that we need
for the explanation of the development of active sympathy from the
crude sympathetic reaction or mere sympathetic induction of emotion
that we studied in Chapter IV. The blind impulse of the gregarious ani-
mal to seek the company of his fellows, whenever one of his other in-
stincts is excited, becomes in us the desire of seeing ourselves surrounded
by others who share our emotion; and it is apt to become directed to
seeking the sympathetic response of some one person in whom we are
sure of evoking it; and then, having become habitually directed to that
person, it finds a more certain and complete and detailed satisfaction
than is possible if it remains unspecialised.
That we are right in thus finding the root of active sympathy in an
ancient and deep-seated instinct, and that the impulse of this instinct is
distinct from the tender or protective impulse, is shown by the great
differences between us in regard to this impulse in spite of similar con-
ditions of life, differences that do not run parallel with our differences in
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almost devoid of active sympathy; they are content to admire, or to be
indignant, or vengeful, or tender, or curious, or grateful, alone, and they
derive little or no satisfaction from finding that others are sharing their
emotions. Such a man is not necessarily incapable of the tender emotion
and the sentiment of love; he may be tenderly devoted to his family and
be capable of the most truly disinterested conduct, but he is by nature a
solitary, his gregarious instinct is abnormally weak, and therefore he is
content to bury his joys and his sorrows in his own bosom.
On the other hand, the person in whom this impulse is strong can
find, when alone, no enjoyment in the things that give him, when in
sympathetic company, the keenest delight He may, for example, be an
enthusiastic admirer of natural beauty; but if, by some strange chance,
he takes a walk alone through the most beautiful scenes, his emotional
stirrings, which, if shared by others, would be a pure delight, are ac-
companied by a vague though painful desire, whose nature he may or
may not clearly recognise. And the chances are that he occupies himself
in making mental notes of the scenes before him and hurries home to
give a glowing description of them to some friend who, he knows, will
be stirred in some degree to share his emotions. Some persons, in whom
this impulse is but little specialised though strong and whose emotions
are quick and vivid, are not satisfied until all about them share their
emotions; they are pained and even made angry by the spectacle of any
one remaining unmoved by the objects of their own emotions.
Many children manifest very clearly this tendency of active sympa-
thy; they demand that their every emotion shall be shared at once. “Oh,
come and look!” is their constant cry when out for a walk, and every
object that excites their curiosity or admiration is brought at once, or
pointed out, to their companion. And if that companion is unsympa-
thetic, or is wearied by their too frequent demands upon his emotional
capacities, the urgency of this impulse gives rise to pain and anger and,
perhaps, a storm of tears. On the other hand, another child, brought up,
perhaps, under identical conditions, but in whom this impulse is rela-
tively weak, will explore a garden, interested and excited for hours to-
gether, without once feeling the need for sympathy, without once calling
on others to share his emotion.
Active sympathy is, then, egoistic, it is a seeking of one’s own sat-
isfaction. There are selfish men in whom this tendency is very strong;
such men wear out their wives, or others about them, by their constant
demands for sympathetic emotion, regardless of the strain they put upon124/William McDougall
their companions, who cannot always be in the mood to sympathise.
Such men constantly demand sympathy and give but little. Sympathy
then, whether in the active or the passive form, is not the root of altru-
ism, as Bain and others would have it Nor is it, as Mr. Sutherland main-
tains, to be identified with the maternal impulse. But, although it is not
in itself an altruistic impulse and is not in any sense the root of altruism,
it is a most valuable adjunct to the tender emotion in the formation of
altruistic sentiments and in stimulating social co-operation for social
ends. The man that has it not at all, or in whom it has become com-
pletely specialised (i.e., directed to some one or few persons only), will
hardly become a leader and inspirer of others in the reform of social
abuses, in the public recognition of merit, in public expression of moral
indignation, or in any other of those collective expressions of emotion
which do so much to bind societies together, even if they fail of achiev-
ing their immediate ends.
It is only when this active sympathy is specialised and is combined
in both parties with a reciprocal sentiment of affection, and when each,
knowing that the other desires his sympathy and derives from it increase
of joy and diminution of pain, desires to procure these results for the
other and in turn derives satisfaction from the knowledge that he can
and does produce these results—it is only then that sympathy, in the
fullest sense of the word, is achieved.
Chapter VII
The Growth of Self-consciousness and of the
Self-Regarding Sentiment
If we would understand the life of societies, we must first learn to un-
derstand the way in which individuals become moulded by the society
into which they are born and in which they grow up, how by this moul-
ding they become fitted to play their part in it as social beings—how, in
short, they become capable of moral conduct. Moral conduct is essen-
tially social conduct, and there could be no serious objection to the use
of the two expressions as synonymous; but it is more in conformity with
common usage to restrict the term “moral” to the higher forms of social
conduct of which man alone is capable.
While the lower forms of social conduct are the direct issue of the
prompting of instinct—as when the animal-mother suffers privation,
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maternal instinct —the higher forms of social conduct, which alone are
usually regarded as moral, involve the voluntary control and regulation
of the instinctive impulses. Now, volition or voluntary control proceeds
from the idea of the self and from the sentiment, or organised system of
emotions and impulses, centred about that idea. Hence the study of the
development of self-consciousness and of the self-regarding sentiment
is an important part of the preparation for the understanding of social
phenomena. And these two things, the idea of the self and the self-re-
garding sentiment, develop in such intimate relations with each other
that they must be studied together. This development is, as we shall see,
essentially a social process, one which is dependent throughout upon
the complex interactions between the individual and the organised soci-
ety to which he belongs.
Almost all animals are capable in some degree of learning to modify
their instinctive behaviour in the light of experience, under the guidance
of pleasure and pain; and in the young child also this kind of learning
leads to the first steps beyond purely instinctive behaviour. At first, all
efforts and movements of the young infant or young animal, in so far as
they are not mere reflexes, are directly and wholly due to the instinctive
impulses. When any such movement directly attains its end, the plea-
sure of satisfaction confirms the tendency to that particular kind of ac-
tion in relation to that kind of object or situation. If, on the other hand,
movements of the kind first made are not successful, the pain of failure
brings them to an end; but the impulse persists and some variation of the
movements is made, again and again, until success is achieved; then the
pleasure of satisfaction confirms this last and successful kind of move-
ment, so that, whenever the same impulse is again excited, it will work
towards its end by means of this kind of action rather than by means of
any other. Few of the animals rise to higher modes of learning or acqui-
sition. But in the infant, as his powers of representation develop, as he
becomes capable of free ideas, the end towards which any instinct im-
pels him becomes more or less clearly represented in his mind as an
object of desire. The first result of this transformation of blind appetite
or impulse into desire is greater continuity of effort; for, when the power
of representation of the object has been attained, the attention is not so
readily drawn off from it by irrelevant sensory impressions of all sorts.
Then, as the child’s intellectual powers develop further, the train of
activity through which the end of any impulse is attained becomes longer;
a succession of actions is performed, each of which is only a means to126/William McDougall
the end prescribed by the instinctive impulse; objects that are in them-
selves uninteresting are made use of as means to the end. In all such
mediate activities the original impulse persists as the motive power of
the whole sequence. In so far as the actions and objects made use of do
not bring him nearer to his end, they are discarded; he turns to others,
until he finds those by means of which success is attainable. When,
thereafter, a similar situation recurs, this last sequence of actions and
objects is the one brought into play.
The principle that the original impulse or conation supplies the motive
power to all the activities that are but means to the attainment of the
desired end—this principle is of supreme importance for the understand-
ing of the mental life and conduct of men. The train of activity, sup-
ported by any one of the instinctive impulses, may become in this way
indefinitely prolonged and incessantly renewed; it may take the pre-
dominantly intellectual form of thinking out means for the attainment of
the end.
This complication of purely instinctive behaviour in the developing
child may be illustrated by a concrete example. Suppose that a hungry
young child has by chance found something good to eat in a certain
cupboard that has been left open. On the next occasion that he comes
hungry within sight of the cupboard, he may at once turn to and help
himself to food. So much profiting by experience any of the higher ani-
mals may display. Next suppose that the child finds himself hungry
while in another part of the house. The idea of the cupboard and of the
food in it rises to consciousness, and he goes off to find it and to repeat
his successful raid. Again, suppose that on another similar occasion he
finds on reaching the cupboard that it is latched and that the latch is out
of his reach. He goes and fetches a footstool, but still he cannot reach
the latch. Perhaps then the obstruction to his conation excites his anger
and leads to a violent assault upon the door; the assault may be main-
tained until his baffled anger gives way to despair, his efforts relax, and
he weeps. But, if he is an intelligent child, he may turn away from the
footstool and drag up a chair and then, reaching the latch, secure the
desired food. All this train of varied activity is maintained by the one
original hunger-impulse; the means necessary for the attainment of the
end are sought as eagerly as the food, the object capable of directly
satisfying the impulse; the energy of the original hunger-impulse im-
parts itself to all the mediating actions found necessary for its satisfac-
tion. And, on the recurrence of a similar situation, the child will go atAn Introduction to Social Psychology/127
once to seek the necessary chair, neglecting the footstool; for the plea-
sure of success has confirmed this tendency, and the pain of failure has
destroyed the tendency to seek the ineffectual footstool.
Now imagine a further complication. Suppose that, just as the child
is about to seize the food he desires, some harsh elder discovers him and
severely punishes him by shutting him up in a dark room where he suf-
fers an agony of fear. On the next recurrence of the situation, the hun-
ger- impulse drives him on as before until, perhaps, he hears in the
distance the voice of the person who punished him. This brings to his
mind the idea of that person and this idea re-excites the fear induced by
the punishment; or, more probably, the sound of the voice directly ex-
cites the fear-impulse in the way we considered in Chapter II. There
then takes place a conflict between the impulse to withdraw and the
hunger-impulse; the former proving stronger and overcoming the latter,
he runs away and conceals himself; presently the fear dies away, the
idea of the desired object recurs and restores the original impulse, which
then attains its end.
Such a brute conflict of impulses is characteristic of conation on the
purely perceptual level of mental life. A rather higher stage is reached
when the two impulses persist side by side, and in spite of fear, which
keeps him ready to flee at the least noise, the boy steals towards his
object, taking every precaution against being seen or heard. In this case
the two impulses co-operate in determining each step in the sequence of
actions, the one, the desire for food, predominating, the other merely
modifying the way in which its end is attained. The state of affective
consciousness accompanying the actions that proceed from the co-op-
eration of the two impulses is complex; it is not simply desire of food,
and it is not simply fear, nor is it merely a rapid alternation of these two
states, but rather an imperfect fusion of the two for which we have no
name.
Behaviour of this kind may imply but a minimum of self-conscious-
ness. It does not necessarily imply that the child has any idea or repre-
sentation of himself suffering punishment or of the punishment itself.
There are, no doubt, even in civilised communities, individuals of low
type, brought up under unfavourable circumstances, whose behaviour
hardly rises above this level. Whatever power of conceptual thought
such a being attains is exercised merely in the immediate service of
desire springing directly from some one or other of the primary instinc-
tive impulses; he may display a certain cunning in the pursuit of his128/William McDougall
ends and may form certain habits in the service of these impulses, per-
haps an habitual caution in the presence of strangers, an habitual bru-
tality towards those of whom he has no fear. He has no sense of respon-
sibility or duty or obligation, no ideal of self; he has but rudimentary
sentiments in regard to himself or others, has no character, whether
good or bad, in the proper sense of the word, and, therefore, is incapable
of true volition. In the case of behaviour on this comparatively low
level, it is easy to understand that the instinctive impulses are the pri-
mary springs of all activities, and that the pains and pleasures experi-
enced in the course of these activities merely serve to modify the actions
motived by these impulses and thereby to shape the habits acquired in
the service of them. Such behaviour may be called non-moral; it can no
more be made the subject of moral judgments than the behaviour of
animals.
At the other end of the scale of conduct is the man all of whose
actions are either the direct issue of volitions or the outcome of habits
that are the secondary results of volitions or at least have been deliber-
ately shaped, restrained here, encouraged there, by volitional control.
Instead of acting at once upon each impulse, instead of striving to realise
each desired end, such a man often resists, if he cannot altogether sup-
press, his strongest desires, and acts in direct opposition to them; his
conduct does not seem to be the issue of a mere conflict of desires, the
stronger one prevailing; he often seems to act, not in the line of least
resistance, but in the line of greatest resistance; the motives from which
he acts may be, as facts of immediate experience, as feelings, emotions,
conations, much less intense than the strong feelings, emotions, and de-
sires whose promptings he resists.
How does it become possible for a man thus to act in the line of
greatest resistance, to make the feebler prevail over the stronger desire?
It is the capacity for this kind of action that gives the highest moral
conduct the appearance of being uncaused, the outcome of a free will, in
the sense of a will not proceeding from antecedent conditions in the
constitution of the individual. Such conduct raises the problem of the
will in its most difficult form.
The child has to pass gradually in the course of its development
from that lowest stage of behaviour to this highest stage; and we must
gain some understanding of this genesis of the higher conduct out of the
lower, before we can hope to understand the nature of volition and its
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the development of self-consciousness, of the sentiments, and of charac-
ter. And it is only when we trace the growth of self-consciousness that
we can understand how it comes to play its part in determining conduct
of the kind that alone renders possible the complex life of highly organised
societies. For we find that the idea of the self and the self-regarding
sentiment are essentially social products; that their development is ef-
fected by constant interplay between personalities, between the self and
society; that, for this reason, the complex conception of self thus at-
tained implies constant reference to others and to society in general, and
is, in fact, not merely a conception of self, but always of one’s self in
relation to other selves. This social genesis of the idea of self lies at the
root of morality, and it was largely because this social origin and char-
acter of the idea of self was ignored by so many of the older moralists
that they were driven to postulate a special moral faculty, the conscience
or moral instinct.
We may roughly distinguish four levels of conduct, successive stages,
each of which must be traversed by every individual before he can attain
the next higher stage. These are (1) the stage of instinctive behaviour
modified only by the influence of the pains and pleasures that are inci-
dentally experienced in the course of instinctive activities; (2) the stage
in which the operation of the instinctive impulses is modified by the
influence of rewards and punishments administered more or less sys-
tematically by the social environment; (3) the stage in which conduct is
controlled in the main by the anticipation of social praise and blame; (4)
the highest stage, in which conduct is regulated by an ideal of conduct
that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right regardless of
the praise or blame of his immediate social environment.
The word “self” or “ego” is used in several different senses in philo-
sophical discourse, the clearest and most important of these being the
self as logical subject and the empirical self. In considering the genesis
of moral conduct and character, we need concern ourselves with the
empirical self only. We may have a conception of the self as a substan-
tial or enduring psychical entity or soul whose states are our states of
consciousness. Or we may hold that, by the very nature of our thought
and language, we are logically compelled to conceive, and to speak of,
the self as one pole of the subject-object relation in terms of which alone
we are able to describe our cognitive experience, the knowing or being
aware of anything. But such conceptions are products of reflexion ar-
rived at comparatively late, if at all, in the process of individual mental130/William McDougall
development, long after the complex conception of the empirical self
has been formed through a multitude of experiences of a less reflective
character. Those other conceptions of the self are of importance from
our present point of view only in so far as they are taken up into, and
become part of, the empirical conception of the self. Thus if a man
believes that he has, or is, a substantial soul that can continue to enjoy
consciousness after the death of the body, that belief is a feature of his
total conception of his self which may, and of course often does, pro-
foundly influence his conduct. But it is a feature of the empirical self of
a certain number of persons only, and is not a part of the empirical self
of others; nor is it a part essential to moral conduct of the highest order,
as we know from many instances. We have briefly to trace the genesis of
the idea of the empirical self in so far as it is common to all normally
constituted men; and in doing so we shall follow in the main the descrip-
tion of the process recently worked out by several writers, notably by
Professors Baldwin and Royce.
The child’s first step in this direction is to learn to distinguish the
objects of the external world as things existing independently of him-
self. How this step is achieved we need not stop to inquire. But we must
note that all those features of the child’s experience that are not thus
extruded or referred to a world of external reality remain to constitute
the nucleus of his idea of himself. The parts of his body, especially his
limbs, play a very peculiar and important part in this process, because
they are presented in consciousness sometimes as things of the outer
world, as parts of the not-self, sometimes—when they are the seats of
pain, discomfort, heat or cold, or muscular sensations—as parts of the
self. Thus the conception of the bodily self is in large part dependent on
the development of the conception of things as persistent realities of the
external world; and the conception of those things is in turn completed
by the projection into it of the idea of the self as a centre of effort, a
cause of movement and of resistance to pressure. It is helpful to try to
imagine how far the idea of the self could develop in a human being of
normal native endowment, if it were possible for him to grow up from
birth onward in a purely physical environment, deprived, that is to say,
of both human and animal companionship. It would seem that under
these conditions he could achieve at best but a very rudimentary and
crude idea of the self. It would be little more than a bodily self, which
would be distinguished from other physical objects chiefly by its con-
stant presence and by reason of the special interest that would attach toAn Introduction to Social Psychology/131
it as the seat of various pains. There would be a thread of continuity or
sameness supplied by the mass of organic sensations arising from the
internal organs and constituting what is called the coenassthesia; and
still more intimate and fundamental constituents of the empirical self
would be the primary emotions, the conations, pleasures, and pains.
The solitary individual’s idea of self could hardly surpass this degree of
complexity; for the further development of self- consciousness is wholly
a social process.
At first the child fails to make a distinction between the two classes
of objects that make up his external world, his not-self, namely, persons
and inanimate objects. In the first months of life his attention is pre-
dominantly drawn to persons, at first merely because they are the ob-
jects that most frequently move and emit sounds, later because they
bring him relief from hunger and other discomforts. He therefore learns
to take interest in these moving objects, he watches them, he is soothed
by their presence and distressed by their absence; and very early the
mere sound of the mother’s voice may still his crying, bringing anticipa-
tory satisfaction of his needs. Very early also the expressions, especially
the smile, on the faces of other persons and the cries of other children
excite in him as purely instinctive reactions similar expressions, which
are doubtless accompanied in some degree by the appropriate feelings
and emotions; in this way he learns to understand in terms of his own
experience the expressions of others, learns to attribute to them the feel-
ings and emotions he himself experiences. He finds also that things re-
sist his efforts at movement in very various degrees and that they forc-
ibly impress movements on his limbs. So he comes to assume implicitly
in his behaviour towards things of the external world the capacities of
feeling and effort, of emotion and sympathetic response, that he himself
repeatedly experiences. Inanimate objects are at first conceived after the
same pattern as persons, and only in the course of some years does he
gradually learn to distinguish clearly between persons and things, di-
vesting his idea of inanimate things little by little, but never, perhaps,
completely, of the personal attributes, the capacities for feeling and ef-
fort, which he recognises in himself. His treatment of inert things as
beings possessed of personal attributes shows clearly that his ideas of
things in general are bound up with, and coloured by, his rudimentary
idea of his self as a being capable of feeling and effort, and that his idea
of his self is not at first the idea of a merely bodily self fashioned after
ideas of inert objects.132/William McDougall
As the differentiation of persons and inert objects proceeds, persons
continue to be the more interesting to the young child, for they continue
to be the main sources of his pains and pleasures and satisfactions. His
attention is constantly directed towards them, and he begins to imitate
their behaviour. He finds that they do many things he cannot do, but
would like to do; and often he tends to do as they do simply because
their actions arrest his attention and so give direction to the outflow of
his abundant motor energies. But much more important than the actions
of the people about him are the feelings and emotions that prompt them.
The child soon learns that he can play upon these to a certain extent and
so acquires an interest in understanding the attitudes of others towards
himself. He widens his experience and his understanding of the emo-
tional attitudes and motives of others by copying them in his imitative
play; he puts himself into some personal relation he has observed, as-
sumes the part of parent or teacher or elder sister, makes some smaller
child, a dog, a cat, or a doll, stand for himself, and acts out his part, so
realising more fully the meaning of the behaviour of other persons. In
this way the content of his idea of his self and of its capacities for action
and feeling grows hand in hand with his ideas of other selves; features
of other selves, whether capacities for bodily action or emotional ex-
pression, having first been observed without understanding of their in-
ner significance, are translated into personal experience, which is then
read back into the other selves, giving richer meaning to their actions
and expressions.
And it is not only in play that this imitation of, and consequent
fuller realisation of the meaning of, the behaviour of others goes on. It is
carried out also in the serious relations of daily life, as when the little
girl of five or six years talks to, plays with, comforts, or reproves a
younger child in almost exact imitation of her mother.
In this way the child’s idea of his self early comes to be the idea, not
merely of his body and of certain bodily and mental capacities, but also
of a system of relations between his self and other selves. Now, the
attitudes of other persons towards him are more or less freely expressed
by them in praise, reproof, gratitude, reproach, anger, pleasure or dis-
pleasure, and so forth. Hence, as he rapidly acquires insight into the
meaning of these attitudes, he constantly sees himself in the reflected
light of their ideas and feelings about him, a light that colours all his
idea of his self and plays a great part in building up and shaping that
idea; that is to say, he gets his idea of his self in large part by acceptingAn Introduction to Social Psychology/133
the ideas of himself that he finds expressed by those about him. The
process is well illustrated by the case of the unfortunate child who is
constantly scolded and told that he is a naughty boy.78 Under these con-
ditions the normal child very soon accepts these oft- repeated sugges-
tions, learns to regard himself as a naughty boy, and plays the part thus
assigned to him. Similarly, if he finds himself constantly regarded as
clever, or irresistibly charming, or in any other light, he can hardly fail
to regard himself in the same way, and the idea of his self moulded in
this way by his social environment affects his conduct accordingly.
The child’s self-consciousness is, then, nourished and moulded by
the reflection of himself that he finds in the minds of his fellows. It is
hardly necessary to point out that this is true, not only of the mental but
also of the bodily self; each of us gets some idea, more or less accurate,
of his bodily appearance to others, a process in which civilised folk are
greatly aided by the use of the mirror. The vain person is one who is
constantly preoccupied with this idea of his bodily or total appearance
in the eyes of others, and who never achieves so stable an estimate of
himself, his powers, and appearance as to be indifferent to the regards
of casual acquaintances.
We are now in a position to consider the transition from the second
to the third stage of conduct, from that in which conduct is regulated
chiefly by the expectation of rewards and punishments, and in which the
subject’s attitude in controlling any impulse is expressed by the phrase,
I must or must not do this, to that in which the mere expectation of
social praise or blame suffices to regulate conduct.
The oppositions and prohibitions that a child encounters in his so-
cial relations are not less important for the development of his personal-
ity than his sympathetic apprehension of the mental states of others.
They serve especially to define and consolidate his ideas of his self and
of other selves. When, for example, his desire to perform some particu-
lar action meets some personal opposition that his best efforts fail to
break down, and especially if such insuperable opposition is consis-
tently and unfailingly forthcoming, he gets both a more vivid idea of the
personality of his opponent and a fuller sense of the social import of his
own actions. And with his earliest experience of law, in the form of
general prohibitions upheld by all members of his social environment,
the child makes a further step in each of these directions. It is generally
necessary that law shall be enforced at first by physical strength, and
that his regard for it shall be encouraged by physical punishment; for134/William McDougall
the first step towards moral conduct is the control of the immediate
impulse, and fear of punishment can secure this control of the Immedi-
ate impulse by a more remote motive at an earlier age than it can other-
wise be effected, fear being the great inhibitor of action. Law takes at
first the form of specific prohibition of some particular kind of action,
and by punishment the child is taught to hold himself accountable for
any action of that kind. By the extension of rules in number and gener-
ality his sense of accountability to others is extended, and he is taught to
conceive himself more and more clearly as an agent in fixed relations to
other agents, as a member of a social system in which he has a defined
position; and the habit of control, and of reflection before action, is thus
initiated. In all this a child is in all probability recapitulating the history
of social evolution, which, it would seem, must have begun by the en-
forcement by the community, or by the strongest member of it, of rules
of conduct upon each member, rules which in primitive societies were
probably prescribed by rigid customs of unknown origin rather than by
the will or caprice of individuals.
But social conduct founded only upon the fear of punishment, on
the sense of accountability, and on the habits formed under their influ-
ence, is the conduct of a slave. It can hardly be called moral, even if
laws are never broken and all prohibitions and injunctions are observed.
And, though the sense of accountability founded on fear of punishment
may effectively prevent breaches of the law, it is of but little effect in
promoting positive well-doing.
Why is our conduct so profoundly influenced by public opinion?
How do we come to care so much for the praise and blame, the approval
and disapproval, of our fellow-men? This is the principal problem that
we have to solve if we would understand how men are led to control
their impulses in a way that renders possible the life of complexly
organised societies. For the praise and blame of our fellows, especially
as expressed by the voice of public opinion, are the principal and most
effective sanctions of moral conduct for the great mass of men; without
them few of us would rise above the level of mere law-abidingness, the
mere avoidance of acts on which legal punishment surely follows; and
the strong regard for social approval and disapproval constitutes an
essential stage of the progress to the higher plane of morality, the plane
of obligation to an ideal of conduct
The strength of the regard men pay to public opinion, the strength
of their desire to secure the approval and avoid the disapproval of theirAn Introduction to Social Psychology/135
fellow-men, goes beyond all rational grounds; it cannot be wholly ex-
plained as due to regard for their own actual welfare or material pros-
perity, or to the anticipation of the pain or the pleasure that would be felt
on hearing men’s blame or praise. For, as we know, some men, other-
wise rational and sane enough, are prepared to sacrifice ease and enjoy-
ments of every kind—in fact, all the good things of life—if only they
may achieve posthumous fame; that is to say, their conduct is domi-
nated by the desire that men shall admire or praise them long after they
themselves shall have become incapable of being affected pleasurably
or painfully by any expression of the opinions of others. The great strength
in so many men of this regard for the opinions of others and the almost
universal distribution of it in some degree may, then, fairly be said to
present the most important and difficult of the psychological problems
that underlie the theory of morals. Some of the moralists have simply
ignored this problem, with the result that their moralising is largely viti-
ated and made unreal. It is perhaps worth while to consider an example
of procedure of this kind, provided by a very respectable writer on mor-
als; the late Dr. T. Fowler79 wrote:  “Human nature, in its normal con-
ditions, is so constituted that the remorse felt, when we look back upon
a wrong action, far outweighs any pleasure we may have derived from
it, just as the satisfaction with which we look back upon a right action
far more than compensates for any pain with which it may have been
attended.” The author went on to say that these pains and pleasures of
reflection on our past actions are more intense than any other pains and
pleasures, and he proposed to regard them as the moral sanction. Ac-
cording to this author’s view all moral conduct arises, then, from an
enlightened and nicely calculating hedonism; for he represents the stron-
gest motives to right conduct as being the desire of this greatest pleasure
and the aversion from this greatest pain.
This is a fair example of the procedure of a moralist who has got
beyond the old-fashioned popular doctrine of the conscience as a myste-
rious faculty that tells us what is right and what is wrong and impels us
to pursue the right, but who lacks psychological insight. Of course, if
the statement quoted above were true, the moralist would be justified in
simply recognising the fact and in leaving it to the psychologist to ex-
plain, if he could, how human nature had acquired this remarkable consti-
tution. But the statement is in direct opposition to notorious facts, and in
reducing all morality to hedonism it grossly libels human nature. The
finest moral acts do not proceed from this desire of the pleasure of self-136/William McDougall
satisfied retrospection, nor from the aversion from the pain of remorse.
When the patriot volunteers for the forlorn hope and goes to certain
death, he cannot be seeking the pleasures of retrospective self-approval,
and it would be absurd to suppose that he is driven on only by fear of
remorse. Strong and fine characters, when forming their decisions pay
little or no regard to the prospect of these pleasures and pains of retro-
spection; while in the mass of men the pain of remorse for undetected
lapses from morality is easily avoided or got rid of, and the pleasure of
self-approval for virtues unknown to others is comparatively slight The
most that can be admitted is that in certain morbidly conscientious per-
sons the prospect of these retrospective pleasures and pains may play
some part in regulating conduct; and it may be added that, if we were
called upon to advise in the designing of a new type of human nature, we
might be tempted to recommend that it should be constituted in this way,
if only for the reason that justice would be so admirably served; for each
right or wrong act would then inevitably bring its own internal reward
of pleasure or punishment of pain, as the nursery moralists, regardless
of truth, have so often asserted that it does. Such a constitution of hu-
man nature would then obviate the irreparable injustices of this life which,
human nature being what it is, constitute its darkest feature, and for
which in every age men have sought to provide a remedy in some system
of external rewards and punishments that shall be distributed in this life
or another.
We cannot, then, consent to escape the difficulty of this problem by
accepting any such false assumption as to the normal constitution of
human nature, but must seek its solution in the development of the self-
regarding sentiment
There are two principal varieties of the self-regarding sentiment,
which we may distinguish by the names “pride” and “self-respect” No
sharp line can be drawn between them, unless we restrict the name “pride”
to one extreme type of the sentiment that is but rarely met with; in popu-
lar speech the forms of self-respect that approximate to this type are
commonly called pride. Pride, taking the word in the narrow and strict
sense, is a simpler sentiment than self-respect, and we may with advan-
tage consider it first.
Imagine the son of a powerful and foolish prince to be endowed
with great capacities and to have in great strength the instinct of self-
display with its emotion of positive self-feeling. Suppose that he is never
checked, or corrected, or criticised, but is allowed to lord it over all hisAn Introduction to Social Psychology/137
fellow- creatures without restraint The self-regarding sentiment of such
a child would almost necessarily take the form of an unshakable pride,
a pride constantly gratified by the attitudes of deference, gratitude, and
admiration, of his social environment; the only dispositions that would
become organised in this sentiment of pride would be those of positive
self-feeling or elation and of anger (for his anger would be invariably
excited when any one failed to assume towards him the attitude of sub-
jection or deference). His self-consciousness might be intense and very
prominent, but it would remain poor in content; for he could make little
progress in self-knowledge; he would have little occasion to hear, or to
be interested in, the judgments of others upon himself; and he would
seldom be led to reflect upon his own character and conduct. The only
influences that could moralise a man so endowed and so brought up
would be either religious teaching, which might give him the sense of a
power greater than himself to whom he was accountable, or a very strong
natural endowment of the tender emotion and its altruistic impulse, or a
conjunction of these two influences.
A man in whom the self-regarding sentiment had assumed this form
would be incapable of being humbled —his pride could only be morti-
fied; that is to say, any display of his own shortcomings or any demon-
stration of the superiority of another to himself could cause a painful
check to his positive self-feeling and a consequent anger, but could give
rise neither to shame nor to humiliation, nor to any affective state, such
as admiration, gratitude, or reverence, in which negative self-feeling
plays a part. And he would be indifferent to moral praise or blame; for
the disposition of negative self-feeling would have no place in his self-
regarding sentiment; and negative self-feeling, which renders us obser-
vant of the attitudes of others towards ourselves and receptive towards
their opinions, is one of the essential conditions of the influence of praise
and blame upon us.
In many men whose moral training has been grossly defective the
self-regarding sentiment approximates to this type of pure pride; such
men may revel in the admiration, flattery, and gratitude of others, but
they remain indifferent to moral approval; they may be painfully af-
fected by scorn or ridicule, and but little by moral censure. And for most
of us the admiration and the scorn or ridicule of others remain stronger
spurs to our self feeling than praise or blame, and still more so than
mere approval and disapproval.
But the self-regarding sentiment of the man of normally developed138/William McDougall
moral nature differs from pride in that it comprises the disposition of
negative self-feeling as well as that of positive self- feeling; it is the
presence of this disposition within the sentiment that distinguishes self-
respect from pride. We have seen that negative self-feeling is normally
evoked by the presence of any person who makes upon us an impression
of power greater than our own, and that its impulse is to assume an
attitude of submission towards that person, an attitude which becomes
in the child, as his intellectual powers develop, an attitude of receptivity,
of imitativeness and suggestibility. The main condition of the incorpo-
ration of this disposition in the self-regarding sentiment is the exercise
of authority over the child by his elders. At first this authority necessar-
ily demonstrates its superior power by means of physical force, later by
means of rewards and punishments. On each occasion that the exercise
of personal authority over the child makes him aware of a superior and
inflexible power to which he must submit, his negative self- feeling is
evoked; then his idea of self in relation to that person becomes habitu-
ally accompanied and suffused by this emotion in however slight a de-
gree, and he habitually assumes towards that person the attitude of sub-
mission. Thus the disposition of this emotion becomes incorporated in
the self-regarding sentiment. Thereafter all persons fall for the child
into one or other of two classes; in the one class are those who impress
him as beings of superior power, who evoke his negative self-feeling,
and towards whom he is submissive and receptive; in the other class are
those whose presence evokes his positive self-feeling and towards whom
he is self-assertive and masterful, just because they fail to impress him
as beings superior to himself. As his powers develop and his knowledge
increases, persons who at first belonged to the former class are trans-
ferred to the latter; he learns, or thinks he learns, the limits of their
powers; he no longer shrinks from a contest with them, and, every time
he gains the advantage in any such contest, their power of evoking his
negative self-feeling diminishes, until it fails completely. When that stage
is reached his attitude towards them is reversed, it becomes self-asser-
tive; for their presence evokes his positive self-feeling. In this way a
child of good capacities, in whom the instinct of self-assertion is strong,
works his way up the social ladder. Each of the wider social circles that
he successively enters—the circle of his playmates, of his school- fel-
lows, of his college, of his profession—impresses him at first with a
sense of a superior power, not only because each circle comprises indi-
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each is in some degree an organised whole that disposes of a collective
power whose nature and limits are at first unknown to the newly- admit-
ted member. But within each such circle he rapidly finds his level, finds
out those to whom he must submit and those towards whom he may be
self- assertive. Thus, when he enters a great school, the sixth-form boys
may seem to him god-like beings whose lightest word is law; and even
the boys who have been but a little while in the school will at first im-
press him and evoke his negative self-feeling by reason of their familiar-
ity with many things strange to him and in virtue of their assured share
in the collective power of the whole society. But, when he himself has
reached the sixth form, or perhaps is captain of the school, how com-
pletely reversed is this attitude of submissive receptivity! When he en-
ters college, the process begins again; the fourth- year men, with their
caps and their colours and academic distinctions, are now his gods, and
even the dons may dominate his imagination. But at the end of his fourth
year, after a successful career in the schools and the playing fields, how
changed again is his attitude towards his college society! The dons he
regards with kindly tolerance, the freshmen with hardly disguised dis-
dain; and very few remain capable of evoking his negative self-feel-
ing— perhaps a “blue,” or a “rugger-international,” or a don of world-
wide reputation; for the rest—he has comprehended them, grasped their
limits, labelled them, and dismissed them to the class that ministers to
his positive self-feeling. And so he goes out into the great world to re-
peat the process and to carry it as far as his capacities will enable him to
do.80
But if once authority, wielding punishment and reward, has awak-
ened negative self-feeling and caused its incorporation in the self-re-
garding sentiment, that emotion may be readily evoked; and there is
always one power81 that looms up vaguely and largely behind all indi-
viduals—the power of society as a whole—which, by reason of its inde-
finable vastness, is better suited than all others to evoke this emotion
and this attitude. The child comes gradually to understand his position
as a member of a society indefinitely larger and more powerful than any
circle of his acquaintances, a society which with a collective voice and
irresistible power distributes rewards and punishments, praise and blame,
and formulates its approval and disapproval in universally accepted
maxims. This collective voice appeals to the self-regarding sentiment,
humbles or elates us, calls out our shame or self-satisfaction, with even
greater effect than the personal authorities of early childhood, and gradu-140/William McDougall
ally supplants them more and more. And, when any individual passes
upon us a well-founded judgment of moral approval or disapproval, he
wields this power; and, though he maybe personally our inferior, his
expressions may influence us profoundly, because we realise that his
moral judgment voices the collective judgment of all- powerful society.
The exercise of inflexible authority over the child prevents, then,
his self-regarding sentiment taking the form of pride in the strict sense,
pride that acknowledges no superior, that knows no shame, and is indif-
ferent to moral approval and disapproval; it gives the sentiment the form
of a self-respect that is capable of humility, of the receptive imitative
attitude of negative self-feeling; and, by so doing, it renders the develop-
ing individual capable of profiting by example and precept, by advice
and exhortation, by moral approval and disapproval.
Does, then, the incorporation of negative self-feeling in the self-
regarding sentiment suffice to explain the strength of our regard for
public opinion, for the praise and blame of our fellows? Some further
explanation is, I think, required. For we can hardly assume that the two
instincts of self-display and self-subjection, which respectively impel us
to seek and to avoid the notice of our fellows, impel us also directly to
seek approval and avoid disapproval. It might well be contended that
positive self-feeling seeks merely to draw the attention of others to the
self, no matter what be the nature of the regards attracted; that it finds
its satisfaction simply in the fact of the self being noticed by others.
There is much in the behaviour of human beings to justify this view—
for example, the large number of men who seek, and who are gratified
by, mere notoriety, some of whom will even commit criminal acts in
order to secure notoriety; or again, the large number of people whose
dress is clearly designed to attract attention, but which, even by the
most disordered imagination, can hardly be supposed to excite admira-
tion or approval; or again, the curiously great satisfaction most of us
find in seeing our names in a newspaper or in print of any kind. We have
to ask, Do the many facts of this order imply perversion of instinct, or
are they the outcome of its primitive and natural mode of operation? It is
not easy to decide; but it is at any rate clear that the satisfaction of the
impulse is greater when the regards of others are admiring regards, or
such as to express in any way the recognition of our superiority in any
respect. We shall probably be nearest the truth if we say that the im-
pulse of positive self-feeling primitively finds its satisfaction when the
attitude of others towards us is that of negative self- feeling, the normalAn Introduction to Social Psychology/141
attitude of men in the presence of one whom they recognise as superior
to themselves. But even if this be granted, something more is needed to
account for our great regard for praise and approval. Now, the effect
upon us of praise and of approval is complex; they do not, like admira-
tion, simply bring satisfaction to our positive self- feeling; in so far as
praise is accepted as praise, it implies our recognition of the superiority
of him who praises and an attitude of submission towards him. It is for
this reason that all may admire a great man without impertinence, and
that he may derive pleasure from their admiration; whereas it is rightly
felt to be an impertinence for any one to praise his superior in any art or
department of activity; and the superior is apt to resent praise coming
from such a quarter, rather than to be pleased by it. It is for him to
praise if he so chooses. That is to say, since our acceptance of praise
involves the recognition of the superiority of him who praises, praise
evokes our negative self-feeling; but since it is an acknowledgment by
our superior of our merit, it also elates us; in other words, it evokes that
state of bashfulness in which the impulses and emotions of the two in-
stincts are imperfectly combined, but a bashfulness that is highly pleas-
ant because both impulses are in process of attaining satisfaction. And
moral approval, embodying as it does the verdict of society upon us,
provokes a like complex satisfaction.
Blame and disapproval also are apt to produce a similarly complex
effect. They check the impulse of self-assertion and evoke the impulse
of submission; and the resulting state ranges, according as one or other
of these effects predominates, from an angry resentment, in which nega-
tive self- feeling is lacking, through shame and bashfulness of many
shades, to a state of repentance in which the principal element is nega-
tive self-feeling, and which may derive a certain sweetness from the
completeness of submission to the power that rebukes us, a sweetness
which is due to the satisfaction of the impulse of submission.
The organisation of these two dispositions within the self-regarding
sentiment renders us capable of this range of moral emotions; but still
something more is needed to explain the full magnitude of the effects of
praise and blame, or of the mere anticipation of them. We may imagine,
and, I think, we may also observe, persons in whom the sentiment is
strong and whom it renders very sensitive to the opinions of others, yet
whose conduct is not effectually controlled by the sentiment; for these
persons are content to oscillate between the luxury of the elation in-
duced by praise and the lesser luxury of repentance induced by blame.142/William McDougall
In order that blame and disapproval shall exert their full deterrent
effects, it would seem that some other factor or factors must co-operate,
that the sentiment must undergo a process of moralisation. We may find
one such factor in the influence of punishment during the early days of
childhood. Punishment and the fear of punishment are needed by most
of us, we said, to initiate the control of the instinctive impulses and the
habit of reflection before action. In the normal course of things punish-
ment is gradually replaced by the threat of punishment in the succes-
sively milder forms of the frown and angry word, the severe rebuke,
blame combined perhaps with reproach, and moral disapproval; but all
of these owe something of their effectiveness to the fact that they retain
the nature of, because they continue to produce the effects of, the early
punishments; that is to say, they evoke some degree of fear; for in virtue
of the early punishments the disposition of fear has become incorpo-
rated in the self-regarding sentiment, and fear, as we know, is the great
inhibitor of action. Fear, then, once incorporated in the sentiment, readily
enters into and colours our emotional attitude towards authority in what-
ever form we meet it, renders us capable of awe and reverence in our
personal relations, and is one of the principal conditions of the effective-
ness of moral disapproval as a regulator of conduct.82
It is possible also that praise and approval owe some part of their
power over us to their early association with the grosser forms of re-
ward, which they gradually replace as the moral education of the child
progresses.
There is yet another factor that operates in very various degrees in
different persons to develop their regard for praise and blame, their sen-
sitiveness towards moral approval and disapproval. It is what we have
called active sympathy, that tendency to seek to share our emotions and
feelings with others which, as we found, is rooted in primitive or passive
sympathy and in the gregarious instinct. The person in whom this ten-
dency is strong cannot bear to suffer his various affective experiences in
isolation; his joys are no joys, his pains are doubly painful, so long as
they are not shared by others; his anger or his moral indignation, his
vengeful emotion, his pity, his elation, his admiration, if they are con-
fined to his own bosom, cannot long endure without giving rise to a
painful desire for sympathy. Active sympathy impels him, then, not only
to seek to bring the feelings and emotions of his fellows into harmony
with his own, but also, since that is often impossible, to bring his own
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is displeasing to those about him, but finds it in conduct that pleases
them, even though it be such as would otherwise be distasteful, repug-
nant, or painful to himself. He finds in the praise of his fellows evidence
that his emotions are shared by them, and their blame or disapproval
makes him experience the pain of isolation. To many children this sense
of isolation, of being cut off from the habitual fellowship of feeling and
emotion, is, no doubt, the source of the severest pain of punishment; and
moral disapproval, even though not formally expressed, soon begins to
give them this painful sense of isolation; while approval gratifies the
impulse of active sympathy and makes them feel at one with their fel-
lows. And, as their social circle widens more and more, so the approval
and disapproval of each wider circle give greater zest to their elation
and a deeper pain to their shame, and are therefore more eagerly sought
after or shunned in virtue of this impulse of active sympathy.
The two principles we have now considered—on the one hand the
influence of authority or power, exercised primarily in bringing rewards
and punishments, on the other hand the impulse of active sympathy
towards harmony of feeling and emotion with our fellows—these two
principles may sufficiently account, I think, for the moralisation of the
self-regarding sentiment, for that regard for the praise and blame of our
fellow-men and for moral approval and disapproval in general, which is
so strong in most of us and which plays so large a part in shaping our
sentiments, our character, and our conduct. This regard leads on some
men to the higher plane of conduct, conduct regulated by an ideal that
may render them capable of acting in the way they believe to be right,
regardless of the approval or disapproval of the social environment in
which their lives are passed.
There are, of course, great differences between men as regards the
delicacy with which they apprehend the attitudes of others towards them.
These differences are due in part to differences of intellectual power,
but in greater part to differences in the degree of development of the
self- regarding sentiment. Any man in whom this sentiment is well de-
veloped will be constantly observant of the signs of others’ feelings in
regard to him, and so will develop his powers of perceiving and inter-
preting the signs of the more delicate shades of feeling that do not com-
monly find deliberate expression. On the other hand, one whose percep-
tions are dull and whose self-regarding sentiment is not strong will be
moved only by the coarser expressions of general approval and disap-
proval, by open praise and blame. Of two such men, the one will be said144/William McDougall
in common speech to have a sensitive conscience, and the other to have
a less delicate, or a relatively defective, conscience.
Before going on to consider the higher kind of conduct, we may
note some of the ways in which conduct, while remaining upon the plane
of regulation by the impulses and emotions evoked by our social circle,
may be complicated by altruistic motives. For, just as upon the purely
instinctive plane of animal life the parental instinct may impel to
behaviour from which we cannot withhold our admiration, so it may do
upon this higher or middle plane also, working, of course, in more subtle
fashion.
This occurs when the approval and the disapproval of others move
us not merely through their appeal to the self-regarding sentiment, but
also because we see that the act of approval is pleasing, and the act of
disapproval painful, to him who approves or disapproves, and we desire
to give him pleasure and to avoid giving him pain. This kind of motive
implies the previous growth of a reciprocal sentiment of affection be-
tween the parties concerned. Therefore it can never efficiently supply
the place of the coarser egoistic motives arising out of the self-regarding
sentiment. Nevertheless, within the family circle or other intimate com-
munity it constitutes a very effective supplement to the egoistic motives.
The conduct of affectionate children is in many cases very largely regu-
lated by this motive from an early age. When they do what they have
been taught to believe is right, it is not so much from the motive of
securing praise or avoiding blame, as from that of giving pleasure, or
avoiding the giving of pain, to those they love.
This is a kind of conduct that has its own peculiar charm, and it
tends to the development of a very delicate and sympathetic character,
though a narrow one; it cannot lead on to the stronger forms of charac-
ter and to conduct based on broad moral principles; and it renders the
person in whom this kind of motive predominates peculiarly dependent
upon the natures of those to whom he is attached. Little girls act from
this motive far more commonly, I think, than do boys; the tendency to its
predominance seems to be one of the distinguishing features of their
sex, as we might expect if it is true that, as we argued in Chapter III, all
altruistic conduct has its root and origin in the maternal instinct.
The motive constituted by the co-operation of this altruistic impulse
with the egoistic motive of securing praise or avoiding blame, is apt to
reach a third degree of complication by the addition of an egoistic mo-
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secures the approval of his mother and pleases her, then, apart from the
satisfaction of his tender impulse towards her, the pleasure that he de-
rives from her approval is heightened by his perception of her pleasure
in his conduct; and this increase of his own pleasure may have one, or
both, of two sources—a simpler and a more complex. It may come by
way of that primitive sympathetic reaction in virtue of which another’s
expression of a feeling or emotion generates the same feeling or emotion
in the observer.83 There are persons, in whom this primitive sympa-
thetic tendency is very strong, whose kindly conduct to those about them
proceeds largely from this motive; they cannot bear to see dull, unhappy
faces about them, for to do so depresses them; they desire to see those
about them bright and joyous, because that renders themselves bright
and joyous. If such a person is in a position to influence markedly the
welfare of those by whom he is constantly surrounded—if, for example,
he is the head of a family or the master of many servants who live in
close contact with him—his conduct towards them will be rendered kindly
and beneficent up to a certain point by the desire to secure this sympa-
thetic pleasure and to avoid sympathetic pain.
The more complex source of the pleasure that constitutes this ter-
tiary motive to kindly conduct is the sense of being the source of the
pleasure the expressions of which we observe in those round about us.
The impulse of positive self-feeling finds satisfaction in the recognition
by the recipients of our bounty of the fact that our actions have ben-
efited them, especially if those recipients exhibit gratitude and defer-
ence, or even merely a lively sense of favours to come. George Meredith’s
“Egoist” is a fine study of conduct founded predominantly on the com-
bination of the desire for reflex sympathetic pleasure with that for this
kind of satisfaction of the impulse of positive self-feeling; and many
another rich man’s beneficence derives in the main from this last source.
Such conduct is, of course, thoroughly egoistic, though it implies a dis-
position in which the primitive sympathetic tendency and the altruistic
impulse are present in moderate strength. In many respects such con-
duct will closely resemble altruistic conduct; but it will differ in one
very important respect, namely, that the beneficence arising from the
truly altruistic motive, the impulse of the tender emotion, knows no
limits and may go the length of absolute sacrifice, even of life and of all
that is most valued in life; whereas this pseudo-altruistic motive will
never impel a man to sacrifice things the pain of the loss of which will
counterbalance the pleasure he derives from contemplating the effects146/William McDougall
of his beneficent actions.
Again, this pseudo-altruistic motive can impel a man to act kindly
to those only with whom he is in personal contact—those whose plea-
sure in, and whose gratitude for, his gifts and kindly attentions he can
observe. To a man predominantly swayed by this motive the happiness
or misery of all who are outside his circle and are not obtruded upon his
attention will be a matter of indifference; and even within his circle such
a man will be unjust, and, like King Lear, will shower benefits upon
those who respond most readily with expressions of pleasure and grati-
tude, and will feel resentment against those who remain unmoved. And
his conduct will exert a deleterious influence upon those about him, will
encourage flattery and toadying in some; but it will provoke the scorn of
men of sterner fibre, if they are able to understand his motives.
Upon this middle plane of conduct, and alongside the pseudo-altru-
istic conduct just now considered, must be ranged also the conduct pro-
ceeding from certain quasi-altruistic motives which arise from the ex-
tension of the self-regarding sentiment and are of the greatest impor-
tance for the life of societies.
We have already touched upon this subject in describing the full-
blown parental sentiment. The parental sentiment, we said, is apt to be
not only a tender sentiment of love for the child, but to be complicated
by an extension of the self-regarding sentiment to him and to all that
pertains to him, owing to the parent’s intellectual identification of the
child with himself.
But the child is by no means the only object to which the self-re-
garding sentiment may be, and very commonly is, extended, especially
in men in whom the sympathetic tendency and the gregarious instinct
are strong. After the child the family as a whole, both in the past and in
the future as well as in the present, is the object to which this extension
is most readily effected. A man realises, more especially perhaps in
societies less complex than our own, that the family of which he is a
part has a capacity for collective suffering and collective prosperity,
that it is held collectively responsible and is the collective object of the
judgments, emotions, and sentiments of other men; he recognises that
he, being a member of the whole, is in part the object of all these re-
gards. In so far as he does this, all these attitudes of other men appeal to
his self- regarding sentiment, evoke within it his anger, his gratitude, his
revenge, his positive self- feeling, his shame. Therefore he desires that
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desire may become a motive hardly less strong than the care for his own
welfare and position. The mere community of name of all the members
of the family goes a long way to bring about this identification of the
self with the family and the consequent extension of the self-regarding
sentiment, results which are described by the popular phrase, “Blood is
thicker than water.”
And this extension should not, and usually does not, stop short at
the family; in primitive societies the tribe and the clan, which are the
collective objects of the regards of other tribes and clans, become also
the objects of this sentiment; and among ourselves the growing child is
led on in the same way to identify himself with, and to extend his self-
regarding sentiment to, his school, his college, his town, his profession
as a class or collective unit, and finally to his country or nation as a
whole. It should be noted that, in each case, the extension of the senti-
ment depends upon the existence of the object, the school, the profes-
sion, the country, as one object among other similar objects, having to
those others relations similar to the relations between persons, and be-
ing made by those other collective units and by men in general the object
of judgments, emotions, sentiments, and actions, that are capable of
evoking our resentment, our elation, our gratitude, and all the specifi-
cally personal emotions. So long as any such collective unit has no such
“personal” relations, the extension of the self-regarding sentiment to it
can hardly take place; for example, it is not extended to the nation or
people that is isolated from all others; and the extended sentiment tends
to become stronger and more widely distributed the more abundant and
intense are the interactions of the nation with others, the more free and
vigorous become international rivalry and criticism; that is to say, our
patriotic self- knowledge and sentiment, just like individual self-knowl-
edge and sentiment, are developed by constant interplay with other similar
collective selves; they grow in the light of our advancing knowledge of
those other selves and in the light of the judgments passed by them upon
our collective self and upon one another.
From this kind of extended self-regarding sentiment, then, there may
spring motives to conduct that may involve individual self-sacrifice;
and, if the sentiment is strong, these motives may be powerful enough to
overcome the more narrowly self-regarding motives; but in the main
they work in harmony with these, as when the patriot soldier in giving
his life in battle brings glory upon himself as well as upon his country.84
These quasi-altruistic extensions of the egoistic sentiment consti-148/William McDougall
tute a very important part of the moral equipment of the individual; for
they lead to the subjection of immediate personal ends in the service of
social co-operation undertaken to secure the collective ends that indi-
vidual action is powerless to achieve. They enrich our emotional life
and raise our emotions and conduct to an over-individual plane.
Chapter VIII
The Advance to the Higher Plane of Social
Conduct.
The regulation of conduct by regard for the approval and disapproval of
our fellow-men in the way discussed in the preceding chapter has cer-
tain limitations and drawbacks in spite of its supreme importance for
the great mass of mankind.
In the first place the motives involved are fundamentally egoistic,
although, as we saw, they may in certain cases be leavened with the
altruistic impulse. Secondly, the approval and disapproval of our social
circle cease to be effective sanctions of right conduct, as soon as we can
be quite sure that our lapse from the standard demanded of us will never
be known to those in whose minds we habitually see ourselves reflected
and to whose approval and disapproval we attach importance; or, in
other words, the man whose right conduct rests on no higher basis than
this sanction will not conform to the accepted code, in spite of opposing
desires, when he is in no danger of being “found out.” In order to rem-
edy this defect of the sanction of public opinion, many peoples have
supplemented it with the doctrine of an all-seeing eye, of a power that
can observe all men’s deeds, however carefully concealed, and will dis-
tribute rewards and punishments either in this life or another, according
as these deeds conform to, or transgress, the current code of society.
This supplementary sanction has, no doubt, proved very effective at a
certain stage of the moral evolution of societies. But it must be recognised
that the motives to which this sanction appeals are lower than the mo-
tives through which public opinion affects conduct; for it commonly
relies upon rewards and punishments of a lower type than public ap-
proval and disapproval. Further, since the rewards offered and the pun-
ishments threatened are generally extremely remote in time and of un-
certain character, and since some uncertainty as to their advent is apt to
prevail, they have to be described as of very great magnitude if they are
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ately large rewards or punishments is in itself demoralising.
A third limitation of public opinion as the principal sanction of right
conduct is that the conduct based upon it is entirely dependent on the
nature of the moral tradition and custom of the society in which the
individual grows up. Every society has its own code, and regards as
absurd or even wicked those features of other codes in which they differ
from its own. Illustrations of this fact abound in modern works on mor-
als. Consider the case of the Fijian who regards it as his duty to slay his
parents, when they attain a certain age, and gives them a tender and
dutiful embrace before despatching them to the grave; or of certain tribes
of Borneo, among whom the taking of a head of man, woman, or child,
even by methods involving perfidious treachery, is the surest road to
popular esteem;85 or, again, the case of men of the same region who feel
shame if seen by a stranger without the narrow bands that they com-
monly wear just below the knee, although no other garment is consid-
ered absolutely indispensable.
The sanction of public opinion, then, provides no guarantee against
gross defects and absurdities of conduct; and—what is of more impor-
tance—it contains within itself no principle of progress, but tends rather
to produce rigid customs whose only changes are apt to be degenerative
distortions of elements once valuable.
We have now to consider the ways in which some men advance to a
plane of conduct higher than that regulated by the approval and disap-
proval of their social circle.
As the young child’s sphere of social relations widens, he finds that
certain of the rules of the family circle are everywhere upheld, that the
breaking of them brings universal disapproval. In primitive societies, in
which custom is usually extremely rigid and well defined and is unques-
tioned by any member of the society, this is true of all the current rules
of conduct; the breach of any one brings universal disapproval. If the
development of the self-regarding sentiment has been initiated in normal
fashion by the exercise of authority over the child within the family
circle, no boy or man can bear up against universal disapproval, unless
he has found some higher source of moral guidance; hence we find that
in many primitive or savage societies the rules of conduct, positive and
negative, prescribed by custom are scrupulously observed by all mem-
bers.
In modern civilised societies, on the other hand, the child is gener-
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enforced rules than the savage child ever knows. But, when he emerges
from his home into a wider social sphere, he finds that some only of
these rules, such as those against theft and murder, are maintained by
the general voice of society, and are embodied in public law; these ac-
cordingly he continues to accept and observe. Others of his nursery
rules, he finds, are not at all enforced by the opinion and feeling of the
social circles in which he moves; while as regards others, again, he
discovers that they are maintained by some persons and ignored by oth-
ers—some of them being accepted in one social circle, others in another.
And unless and until the average boy or man has risen to the higher
plane of conduct, he will almost inevitably accept the peculiarities of
the code of conduct of any circle, so long as he acts as a member of that
circle.
The boy’s discovery of the diversities of the codes of different mem-
bers and circles of his society necessarily weakens the influence upon
him of the rules in regard to which such diversities obtain; he is led by
them to question the sanction of public opinion as applied to these de-
partments of conduct; and, if he conforms to the diverse codes of his
various social circles, his habits of moral conduct will not become so
firm as they would if he were acquainted with one code only. These
diversities of opinion in our complex civilised societies weaken, then,
the force with which public opinion bears upon each individual’s con-
duct, and they render the conduct of the mass of civilised men very
much less consistent with the standards they profess than is that of most
savages and barbarians. This, however, does not imply any innate moral
inferiority of the civilised man; and, though it results in many grave
social evils of kinds that are hardly known in well-organised savage
societies, it brings one great advantage, which more than compensates
civilised societies for the uncertainty of conduct and for the appearance
of inferior morality on the part of the mass of their members; namely, it
gives scope and occasion for the development of higher types of conduct
and character than can be found in primitive communities, and hence it
renders possible the progress of the moral tradition through the influ-
ence of these higher types.
For in primitive societies the precision of the customary code and
the exact coincidence of public opinion with the code, allow of no occa-
sion for deliberation upon conduct, no scope for individual moral judg-
ment and choice; they provide no sphere of action for, and no stimulus
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not only resist the promptings of his strongest instinctive impulses, but
is capable also of standing up against public opinion and of doing what
he judges to be right in defiance of it.
Let the reader try to imagine himself a member of a society whose
code prescribes that he shall fall flat on his face whenever he meets his
mother-in-law, or that he shall never mention certain of his relatives by
name; and let him imagine that these and almost all other details of
conduct are prescribed by rules the breach of which is visited with the
reprobation of the whole community and often with the severest punish-
ments; he will then understand how little scope is afforded by such a
rigid code for the development of character and will.
The exercise of moral judgment is essential to the progress of indi-
viduals to the higher plane of conduct, and at this point we must briefly
consider the conditions of such judgment. We may take Dr. Fowler’s
statement of the relation of moral judgment to emotion as representing
the traditional and prevalent doctrine. He wrote: “When an action has
once been pronounced to be right or wrong, morally good or evil, or has
been referred to some well-known class of actions whose ethical charac-
ter is already determined, the emotion of approval or disapproval is
excited and follows as a matter of course”; and again: “No sooner is the
intellectual process completed, and the action duly labelled as a lie, or a
theft, or a fraud, or an act of cruelty or ingratitude, or the like, than the
appropriate ethical emotion is at once excited.”86 These and similar
passages expound the traditional doctrine that the intellectual process of
classing, of rightly naming, the conduct on which we pass moral judg-
ment is the primary and essential step in exerting moral judgment, and
that any emotion involved in the process is consequent on this intellec-
tual process. Others, on the other hand, totally reject this doctrine and
reverse the order of the process. Professor Westermarck, for example,
maintains that moral judgments are expressions of moral emotions; he
writes: “That the moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions ei-
ther of indignation or approval, is a fact which a certain school of think-
ers have in vain attempted to deny.”87
Here we seem to have two flatly opposed doctrines of moral judg-
ment. According to the one, judgment in every case produces the emo-
tion; according to the other, the emotion always determines the judg-
ment. We must recognise that both are partially true. We must admit
with Westermarck that the doctrine he opposes contains the intellectual-
ist fallacy (against which there has recently been so widespread a reac-152/William McDougall
tion), and that moral judgments are ultimately based on the emotions;
but then we must lay stress on the word “ultimately.” For the emotions
on which a man’s moral judgments are based may be not his own emo-
tions at the time of passing judgment, and not even his own earlier emo-
tions, but the emotions, especially that disinterested emotion we call
moral indignation, of those who in bygone ages have played their parts
in the shaping of the moral tradition.
No man, perhaps, ever has learnt to make moral judgments without
previously experiencing some emotions of the kind from which the moral
tradition ultimately sprang; but it is at least theoretically possible to do
so. For every moral tradition embodies a great number of ready-made
judgments formulated in words; and every well-organised society im-
poses its moral tradition upon each of its members with tremendous
force. The child learns to accept many of these current maxims simply
through suggestion, chiefly of the kind we have distinguished as pres-
tige-suggestion; his parents and teachers repeatedly assert various moral
propositions—it is wrong to tell a lie, to steal, to deceive, to be cruel; it
is right to be honest, kind, or generous; and the voice of society, with its
irresistible prestige, re-enforces these assertions. The child accepts these
and many other similar propositions, and will apply them to the conduct
of himself and others, before he can understand the ground of them, and
before actions of the kind to which they are applicable have evoked in
him any emotion that could determine the appropriate moral judgment.
For example, a child will accept on suggestion, and will appropriately
apply, the proposition that it is wrong to put your elbows on the table;
and, if he has acquired in some degree the sentiment for law or rule, he
may pass the judgment, “You are very naughty to put your elbows on
the table,” with some indignation, just as he might reprove another for
stealing or cruelty. It would be absurd to maintain that his condemna-
tion of the elbows is an original moral judgment arising out of moral
indignation. We must, in short, distinguish between original moral judg-
ment and imitative moral judgments. As regards the latter, the tradi-
tional doctrine is true—the act of classing precedes and determines the
moral emotion; as regards original moral judgments, Westermarck is in
the right—they proceed directly from emotions.
The acceptance by the normal child of the major part of the current
maxims is inevitable, if they are authoritatively asserted to him; and his
regard for them and conformity to them are secured by that process of
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and punishments, praise and blame, which we studied in the foregoing
chapter. As regards these imitative judgments, we may go even farther
than Dr. Fowler and the intellectualists, and may say that they may be
made, not only without antecedent emotion, but also without any conse-
quent moral emotion, that they may be purely intellectual, though this is
seldom the case. That is to say, we accept certain maxims of conduct,
either purely by suggestion or in part also in virtue of original judg-
ments springing from our emotions and sentiments; thereafter the ac-
cepted maxims or principles may give rise to moral judgment by way of
a purely intellectual process,88 the recognition of the agreement or dis-
agreement of conduct with those principles, a process that may be ex-
pressed in syllogistic form—all lies are wrong; that is a lie, therefore
that is wrong. And action also may follow in virtue of another previ-
ously accepted principle; e.g., I ought to punish your wrong conduct,
therefore I punish you. Of course, such purely intellectual judgments,
unsupported by emotion directly evoked by the conduct judged of, will
not lead to efforts, on behalf of the right and against the wrong, so
energetic as the efforts that may follow upon emotional judgments.
It is through original moral judgments of approval and disapproval
that a man rises to the higher plane of conduct; therefore it is in them
that we are chiefly interested in the present connection.
Judgments of approval and disapproval are of two great classes, the
aesthetic and the moral, which are differentiated from a common stock,
but never completely differentiated by most men. We continue to use the
same verbal expressions for judgments of both kinds; ought, should,
must, good, bad, wrong, and right are terms we use equally in moral and
in aesthetic judgment. Such judgments are commonly said to spring
from emotions of approval and disapproval, and, though there is much
looseness and vagueness in current accounts of these alleged emotions,
they are described, or referred to, by many authors as the specifically
moral emotions. This is only one more illustration of the chaotic condi-
tion in which the psychology of the emotions still remains.
We have already seen that judgments of approval and disapproval
may be purely intellectual processes, determined by previously accepted
principles, and that such judgments may or may not be followed by
appropriate emotions having as their objects the actions on which judg-
ment has been passed. The question remains, Are there any specific
emotions from which original moral judgments spring and which might
be described as emotions of approval and disapproval? The answer, I154/William McDougall
think, must be—Certainly not, there is no specific emotion of approval
or of disapproval. For it is impossible to point to any such emotions
distinct from those we have already recognised, and either form of judg-
ment may spring from any one of several of those primary emotions or
of the complex emotions. Judgment of approval may be prompted by
admiration, gratitude, positive self-feeling, or by any one of the emo-
tions when induced by way of the primitive sympathetic reaction; judg-
ment of disapproval springs most frequently from anger, either in its
primary uncomplicated form,89 or as an element in one of its secondary
combinations, such as shame, reproach, scorn, but also from fear and
disgust. And they may, perhaps, be prompted by feelings of pleasure
and pain respectively without emotion, though judgments having this
source are properly aesthetic rather than moral judgments. In the young
child these original moral judgments spring from the unorganised emo-
tions; but in the adult they are more commonly prompted by emotions
excited within some sentiment by actions affecting the object of the sen-
timent.
It is notorious that the sentiments determine our moral judgments.
A man’s concrete sentiments are apt to lead him to judgments that are
valid only for himself, that have little objective or supra-individual va-
lidity; or, as is commonly said, they pervert his judgment Thus it is
notoriously difficult to pass moral judgments of general or objective
validity upon the acts of those we love or hate. In the one case the emo-
tions that determine approval are apt to play too great a part— for the
principal emotions of the sentiment of love are of this order; in the other
case those which determine disapproval. The abstract sentiments, on
the other hand, such sentiments as the love of justice, truth, courage,
self-sacrifice, hatred of selfishness, of deception, of slothfulness—these
alone enable us to pass moral judgments of general validity. These sen-
timents for abstract objects, the various qualities of conduct and of char-
acter, are the specifically moral sentiments. It is, then, through the de-
velopment of such abstract sentiments that the individual’s moral devel-
opment and the refinement of his moral judgment, both of his own acts
and those of others, is effected, and that his moral principles are formed.
And it is as regards this development of the abstract moral sentiments
that the individual is most open to the influence of his social environ-
ment.
No man could acquire by means of his own unaided reflections and
unguided emotions any considerable array of moral sentiments; still lessAn Introduction to Social Psychology/155
could he acquire in that way any consistent and lofty system of them. In
the first place, the intellectual process of discriminating and naming the
abstract qualities of character and conduct is quite beyond the unaided
power of the individual; in this process he finds indispensable aid in the
language that he absorbs from his fellows. But he is helped not by lan-
guage only; every civilised society has a more or less highly developed
moral tradition, consisting of a system of traditional abstract sentiments.
This moral tradition has been slowly formed and improved by the influ-
ence of the great and good men, the moral leaders of the race, through
many generations; it has been handed on from generation to generation
in a living form in the sentiments of the élite, the superior individuals of
each generation, and has been embodied in literature, and, in partial
fashion, in a variety of institutions, such as the Church. And every great
and organised department of human activity, each profession and call-
ing of a civilised society, has its own specialised form of the moral
tradition, which in some respects may sink below, in other respects may
rise above, the moral level of the unspecialised or general tradition.
The moral tradition of any society lives, in its fullest completest
form, only in the strong moral sentiments of a comparatively few indi-
viduals, those who are expressively called “the salt of the earth.” The
great majority of men participate in it only in a very partial manner and
in very diverse degrees, as regards both the strength of their moral sen-
timents and the nature and number of such sentiments as they in any
degree acquire. And it is only by the absorption of the moral tradition
that any man can acquire a respectable array of moral sentiments; even
the great moral reformer begins by absorbing the moral tradition, be-
fore he can go on to add to it, or to reform it, in some respect. This is the
truth expressed by T. H. Green when he wrote: “No individual can make
a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him.”90
If an individual is to acquire abstract moral sentiments, he must not
grow up in a society that is completely bound by the laws of rigid and
uniform custom. Rigid custom is the cement of society in the ages pre-
ceding the formation of a moral tradition, and the breaking of the rigid
bonds of custom, bonds which were probably essential for the preserva-
tion of primitive societies, was the prime condition of the growth of the
moral tradition of the progressive nations. In the same way, it is a prime
condition of the moral progress of individuals; the individual also must
not be bound in absolute obedience to any system of rules of conduct
prescribed by custom or in any other manner. For in either case he has156/William McDougall
no occasion for reflection upon conduct, no scope for the free exercise
of moral judgment and choice, no opportunity of acquiring by absorp-
tion the traditional system of moral sentiments.
Suppose that, as is the case in many savage societies, the conduct of
each of us in every social relation were prescribed by a rigid custom;
suppose, as was suggested above, that you must never speak to, or look
at, your mother-in-law; that, if you meet her out of doors, you must fall
flat on your face until she has passed by; and that infringement of this
customary law is invariably punished by death or other severe penalty.
Suppose also that all the rest of your social behaviour were defined with
similar precision and rigidity. Or imagine the case of a member of one of
the mediaeval religious communities whose only duty, to which he was
trained from earliest youth, was unquestioning obedience to his supe-
rior. It is easy to understand that under such conditions we should hardly
be led to reflect on conduct, to acquire the moral sentiments, or to make
moral judgments of any kind; for our own conduct, we should merely
have to ascertain what behaviour custom prescribes for each situation
and to observe its prescription; and, as regards the conduct of other men
also, there would be no scope for moral judgment but only for the ascer-
tainment of fact. Did he, or did he not, neglect this observance? If he
did, he must be punished; if not, he is to go free. That is to say, under
such a system there is scope only for the merely legal attitude, but none
for that of moral judgment.
But the child growing up in the midst of a complex and cultured
society, coming in contact with various social circles in which diversi-
ties of code and opinion obtain, and reading history and romance, be-
comes acquainted with a great variety of opinions, of moral codes, and
of character and modes of conduct; while language leads him to the
formation of a certain number of abstract conceptions of qualities of
conduct and character, however vague and fluctuating. If, under these
conditions, the child were left entirely without moral guidance, he would
acquire some abstract moral sentiments, whose nature would be deter-
mined by the strongest emotional dispositions of his native disposition
and by the chance circumstances of his life; he would acquire some
sentiment of liking for all those qualities and types of conduct and char-
acter which brought him the most frequent and intense satisfactions,
both ideal and actual, and some sentiment of hate or dislike for those
which most often thwarted his efforts and brought him pain. That is to
say, he would build up certain abstract sentiments by means of a seriesAn Introduction to Social Psychology/157
of original moral judgments coming from his emotions and his concrete
sentiments.
But when the child is thus brought into contact with a variety of
characters, codes, and opinions, he normally comes also under strong
influences that mould his growing abstract sentiments. The moral senti-
ments that are most fully embodied in the moral tradition of his time and
country are impressed upon him on all hands by precept and example—
e.g., love of common honesty and of courage, dislike of meanness and
of cruelty; while of other moral sentiments belonging to the more re-
fined part of the moral tradition, he finds some entertained by some
persons, others by other persons. Among all these persons some will
impress their abstract sentiments upon him more than others; and, in the
main, those that so impress him will be those whose power, or achieve-
ments, or position, evoke his admiration. Of all the affective attitudes of
one man towards another, admiration is that which renders him most
susceptible to the other’s influence; and it is easy to see why this should
be so, if our analysis of admiration was correct. We said that admiration
is compounded of wonder and negative self-feeling. The impulse of
wonder, then, keeps his attention directed upon the admired person; the
impulse of negative self-feeling throws him into the submissive, recep-
tive, suggestible attitude towards the object of his admiration. Hence the
child accepts by suggestion the moral propositions of the persons he
admires, he imitates their actions and sympathetically shares their moral
emotions; and so his developing abstract sentiments are moulded in ac-
cordance with those of the admired persons. If these persons deliber-
ately aim at moulding his sentiments, the extent of their influence in this
direction is only limited by his intellectual capacity for forming abstract
conceptions of the various qualities of conduct and character.
The child, then, builds up his abstract sentiments by means of a
series of emotional judgments, judgments of approval and disapproval,
which are original in the sense that they spring from his emotions and
concrete sentiments; but they are not independently formed judgments,
but rather emotional judgments made under the very powerful directing
influence of personal suggestion and sympathy. In modern societies this
influence is exerted, not only through personal contact, but on a very
great scale by literature; for, in so far as we learn to grasp in some
degree the personality of an author and to admire him, the expressions
of his abstract sentiments exert this personal influence upon us, more
especially, of course, upon the young mind whose sentiments are not158/William McDougall
fully formed and crystallised. This, of course, is the principal reason
that literature read as such, as the expressions of great personalities that
evoke our admiration, is so superior, as food for the growing mind, to
the productions of the daily and weekly press; for, no matter how well
written these may be, nor how admirable the moral sentiments expressed
or implied, they fail to exert the great influence of an admired personal-
ity. Even if the author of acknowledged eminence is not intrinsically
superior to one less generally recognised, he will exert a greater mould-
ing influence upon the abstract sentiments of his readers, simply be-
cause their knowledge that so many others admire, and have admired,
this author, increases by mass-suggestion and sympathy their admira-
tion for him and so increases also their receptivity towards him and all
his opinions and expressions.
In all this absorption of the more refined parts of the moral tradi-
tion, the native disposition of the individual will make itself felt more or
less. If the training of the moral sentiments is most carefully and skil-
fully supervised from the first years of life, the native disposition will
make itself felt, not so much in the nature of the abstract objects for
which sentiments of liking and disliking are acquired, but rather in the
strength of the various sentiments and the force of the emotions awak-
ened within them. But if, as is more usually the case, a certain liberty of
choice is allowed to the young mind, its native disposition exerts a greater
selective influence, and, by determining the choice of admired models,
may lead to a vastly greater development of some of the moral senti-
ments than of others. And, no matter how strong the moulding influ-
ences may be, they must fail to develop any strong sentiment for an
abstract object, if that sentiment involves or implies an emotional ca-
pacity or instinct that is natively defective; if, for example, a man’s
native disposition comprises only a weak instinct of curiosity, he will
hardly acquire a strong sentiment for the life of learning and research; if
it is defective in the instinct of self-assertion and its emotion of positive
self-feeling, he will hardly acquire a strong sentiment for self- perfec-
tion; if it is defective in the protective instinct and its tender emotion, he
will hardly acquire a strong sentiment for altruism and self- sacrifice.
When the abstract sentiments have been acquired, they determine
our emotional responses to the conduct and character of ourselves and
others; the intellectual process of classing an act under its proper head-
ing, the apperception of it as an act of justice, of self-sacrifice, or of
cruelty, is apt to call out at once the appropriate emotion in some de-An Introduction to Social Psychology/159
gree, and secures our approval or disapproval, in accordance with the
nature of the sentiment we have acquired for that quality or class of
action. The objects of our sentiments of love and hate necessarily be-
come objects of desire and aversion. Thus, if we have acquired the sen-
timent of love of justice and we are credibly informed that any person is
in serious danger of suffering injustice, the desire of justice, arising
within the abstract sentiment, impels us to efforts to secure justice.91
The strength of the motive, the intensity of the desire or aversion awak-
ened within the system of the sentiment, depends in such cases upon the
strength of the sentiment. In most men the desires and aversions arising
from the abstract sentiments are apt to be much inferior in strength to
those excited within the concrete sentiments; hence, as motives of these
two classes are frequently opposed in tendency, the mere possession of
moral sentiments does not always suffice to determine a man to action
in accordance with them. A sentiment of love for an individual may, and
often does, give rise to a desire that conflicts with the desire for justice
arising from the sentiment for justice; and the self- regarding sentiment
with its strong emotions is especially apt to conflict with the moral sen-
timents. Hence it is possible for a man to have the most beautiful moral
sentiments and yet to act in ways that are not altogether admirable.
Even the purely altruistic sentiments, the love of beneficence or of
mankind in general, will not necessarily suffice to enable a man to reach
the highest plane of conduct—not even if they are strong. The habit of
self-criticism is required, and this implies, and arises from, a strong
self- regarding sentiment. The special moral sentiments must be brought
into connection with, and organised within, the system of a more com-
prehensive sentiment—what may be called the master sentiment among
all the moral sentiments, namely, the sentiment for a perfected or com-
pletely moral life. If a man acquires this sentiment, he will aim at the
realisation of such a life for all men as far as possible; but, since he has
more control over his own life than over the lives of others, he will
naturally aim at the perfection of his own life in the first place. In this
sentiment, then, the altruistic and egoistic emotions and sentiments may
find some sort of reconciliation; that is to say, they may become
synthesised in the larger sentiment of love for an ideal of conduct, the
realisation of which involves a due proportion of self-regarding and of
altruistic action; and the desire for the realisation of this ideal may be-
come the master motive to which all the abstract sentiments lend what-
ever force they have.160/William McDougall
It is worth noting in passing that in many persons aesthetic appre-
ciation of the beauty of fine character and conduct may play a large part
in the genesis of the ideal of conduct and of the sentiment of love for this
ideal. Not all admiration is aesthetic admiration, but, if the object that
we admire on account of its strength or excellence of any kind, presents
a complex of harmoniously organised and centralised relations and ac-
tivities, the mere contemplation of it pleases us, in so far as we are
capable of grasping the harmony of its complex features; that is to say,
it affords us an aesthetic satisfaction, and therefore has a certain value
for us and becomes an object of desire. A fine character, or a life finely
lived, has these aesthetic properties, and therefore our admiration of it
will be an aesthetic admiration, in so far as we appreciate its harmony
and unity; we are then disposed to desire all the more strongly that our
own character shall be of this nature, shall appear to the world, or all
that part of it whose opinion we most value, as having aesthetic proper-
ties that lend it a certain dignity and nobility; our self-regarding senti-
ment seeks this additional satisfaction, we desire and strive to realise
this aesthetic ideal.
The desire resulting in this way from aesthetic appreciation blends
in very various proportions with the purely moral desire for the realisation
of the ideal of conduct; and in some persons of the type of Marius the




We have now sketched the way in which an individual may acquire an
ideal of conduct and the way in which his primary instinctive disposi-
tions, becoming organised within the complex moral sentiments, may
impel him to strive to realise such an ideal. We have seen that both of
these achievements, the acquisition of the ideal and of the sentiment for
the ideal, are rendered possible only by the absorption of the more re-
fined parts of the moral tradition, under the influence of some of the
personalities in whom it is most strongly embodied. These persons, we
said, exert this influence upon us in virtue principally of the admiration
that they evoke in us. This admiration, which renders us receptive to
their opinions and examples, and responsive to their emotions, may be,
of course, and often is, blended with fear, yielding the tertiary com-
pound emotion which we call awe; and this may be further complicatedAn Introduction to Social Psychology/161
by an infusion of tender emotion, which renders the complex emotion
one of reverence; when the influence of the persons who excite these
complex emotions becomes the more powerful in proportion to the addi-
tional strength of the complex impulses evoked by them.
It was, I think, in the main because the older moralists neglected to
take sufficiently into account the moral tradition and the way in which it
becomes impressed upon us, and because they treated of the individual
in artificial abstraction from the social relations through which his moral
sentiments are formed, that they were led to maintain the hypothesis of
some special faculty, the conscience, or the moral sense or instinct, or
the moral consciousness,92 in seeking to account for moral conduct.
But, though we may have accounted for the desire to realise an ideal
of conduct, we have still to account for the fact that in some men this
motive acquires predominance over all others and actually regulates
their conduct in almost all relations and situations. For some men ac-
quire the ideal and the sentiment, but fail wholly or in part to realise the
ideal. We have to recognise that the desire that springs from the com-
pleted moral sentiment is usually of a thin and feeble sort in comparison
with the fiercer coarser desires that spring directly from our instincts
and from our concrete sentiments. It is therefore no matter for surprise
that, in so many cases, the acquirement of an ideal of conduct and of the
sentiment for it does not suffice to secure its realisation. How, then, are
we to account for the fact that the conduct of the good man is in the
main regulated according to the promptings of these weaker desires,
and against the stronger more urgent prompting of the more primitive
desires? It is this appearance of the overcoming of the stronger by the
weaker impulse or motive, in so many cases of right action following
upon a conflict of motives and the exercise of moral effort, that leads
Professor James to define moral action as “action in the line of the greatest
resistance.”93
It is in these cases of moral conflict that volition, or effort of the will
in the fullest sense of the word, comes in to determine the victory to the
side of the weaker impulse. Professor James puts the matter schemati-
cally in this way:—
I (ideal impulse) in itself weaker than P (the native propensity).
I + E (effort of will) stronger than P.
Professor James, like many others, finds here an ultimate and
irresolvable problem in face of which we can only say—The will exerts
itself on the side of the weaker motive and enables it to triumph over its162/William McDougall
stronger antagonists, while leaving the word “will” simply as the name
for this possibility of an influx of energy that works on the side of the
weaker motive, an influx of energy of whose source, causes, or anteced-
ents we can say nothing. That is to say, Professor James, failing to carry
the analysis of volition beyond the point of determining what the effects
of volition are, adopts the doctrine of indeterminism. I do not propose to
go at length into the world-old dispute between libertarians and deter-
minists. But the acceptance of the libertarian doctrine would be incom-
patible with any hope that a science of society, in any proper sense of
the word “science,” may be achieved; for in face of each of the most
important problems of such a science, we should have to content our-
selves with the admission of impotence.94
Some attempt must therefore be made to show that the effort of
volition is not the mysterious and utterly incomprehensible process the
libertarians would have it to be; but that it is to be accounted for by the
same principles as other modes of human activity; that it involves no
new principles of activity and energy, but only a more subtle and com-
plex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour and
in which the ultimate mystery of mind and life resides.
The dispute has been conducted upon two different grounds, the
moral and the psychological. On the former ground it has been urged,
again and again, that if we do not recognise freedom of the will, do not
recognise some degree of independence of antecedent conditions in the
making of moral choice, we cannot recognise any moral responsibility,
and that, therefore, to deny the freedom of the will is to undermine all
morality and to deprive our systems of rewards and punishments, of
praise and blame, of all logical justification. This argument implies a
false conception of responsibility and of the proper nature and purpose
of rewards and punishments, although it has been urged by many per-
sons who might have been expected to avoid this confusion of popular
thought.
Responsibility means accountability—to be responsible for a wrong
action means to be rightly liable to punishment. If to punish means sim-
ply to inflict pain from the motive of resentment or revenge, then it may
fairly be said that it is illogical for the determinist to hold any one liable
to punishment, i.e., responsible, that he ought rather to say: “Poor fel-
low, you could not help it; therefore I, recognising that you are merely a
piece of mechanism, will not vent my resentment upon you, you are not
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resentment is entirely a-moral or immoral. Punishment is only justifi-
able, is only moral punishment, when inflicted as a deterrent from fur-
ther wrong-doing, and as an influence capable of moulding character.
That is to say, men are only morally responsible, or rightly liable to
punishment, if the punishment may fairly be expected to deter them
from further wrong-doing, or to modify their natures for the better.95 It
is for this reason that, while we rightly punish children and animals, we
do not punish madmen. These last are not rightly liable to punishment,
they are not held responsible, because it has been found that punishment
will not exert on them its normal deterrent and improving effects.96 The
attitude of the judge, or father, who has to punish, is then: “I punish you
in order that you may be deterred from repetition of your bad conduct. I
know that you could not help it, but, if you are not punished, you will,
on the next occasion of temptation, still be unable to avoid misconduct;
whereas, if I now punish you, you will in all probability be deterred; and
the punishment may initiate or strengthen in you the habit of control of
your impulses, and, by inducing in you a greater regard for authority, it
may set the growth of your self-regarding sentiment upon the right lines.”
In other words, according to the determinist view, if a man is morally
punishable, i.e., responsible, it is because his wrong action was the out-
come of his own nature, was determined by conditions of which the
most important lie. In his mental constitution, and because it may rea-
sonably be hoped that punishment may modify his nature for the better.
If the opposed view is true, if a man’s voluntary actions are not in
the main determined by conditions comprised within the system of his
mental constitution, the only ground for punishing him must be the emo-
tion of resentment or revenge. For, if the issues of our moral conflicts
are decided, not by the conditions of our own natures, but by some new
beginning, some causal factor having no antecedents, or by some mys-
terious influence coming upon us from an unknown source, a prompting
from God or devil—or from any other source the libertarian likes to
assign it outside our own natures— then clearly we deserve neither praise
nor blame, neither reward nor punishment; and it is useless to attempt to
modify the issue of such conflicts by modifying our natures by means of
these influences.97 That is to say, if the libertarian doctrine is true, there
can be no moral punishment of a wrongdoer, but only vengeful harming
of him, and therefore there can be no moral responsibility. The argu-
ment from moral responsibility is therefore altogether on the side of the
determinist. It is the advocates of freewill who would undermine moral164/William McDougall
responsibility.
But there is another argument for freewill based on moral needs,
which is not to be set aside so easily. If, as the determinist asserts, each
of my actions is completely determined by antecedent conditions and
processes that are partly within my own nature, partly in my environ-
ment, why should I make any moral effort? My conduct will be what it
will be, the issue of conditions that existed and determined it in every
detail long before I was born; therefore it would be foolish of me to take
pains to choose the better course and to make efforts to realise it This is
the real crux of this dispute. This is the legitimate inference from deter-
minism. This is its moral difficulty, which has seldom been squarely
faced by its advocates, and never overcome by them. To say, as so many
of them say, that we are free to act in accordance with our own natures,
that the conditions of our actions are within us, and that this is all the
freedom that any reasonable man can desire—to say this does not re-
move, or in any degree lessen, this moral difficulty. Such reflections
may, no doubt, be satisfactory enough to those who believe that their
own natures are above serious reproach, but not to those who can point
to undesirable ancestry and unmistakable flaws in their native disposi-
tions. Nothing is more difficult than to give any helpful answer to one
who adopts this line of justification for moral slackness; we can only
hold him responsible and punish him. One may suspect that the deter-
minists, most of whom try to put aside this difficulty by some scornful
reference to Oriental fatalism, are in general really afraid of it, and have
entered into a conspiracy resolutely to ignore, since they cannot dispel,
this dark shadow on human life.
But psychology must not allow its investigations and theories to be
biased by moral needs; and it must not easily accept, as evidence in
favour of freewill, the difficulty of finding in our mental constitution the
source of that influx of energy which seems to play the decisive role in
volition.98
The psychological problem we have to face is, then, this: Can we
give any psychological account of the conditions of the effort of will,
which, being thrown on the side of the weaker, more ideal motive, may
cause it to prevail over the coarser, more primitive, and stronger mo-
tive?
We have recognised that all impulses, all desires and aversions, all
motives—in short, all conations—fall into two classes: (1) those that
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that arise on the excitement of dispositions acquired during the life of
the individual by differentiation from the innate dispositions, under the
guidance of pleasure and of pain. We may, then, restate our problem in
more general terms, as follows: Is volition only a specially complex
case of conation, implying some conjunction of conations of these two
origins rendered possible by the systematic organisation of the innate
and acquired dispositions? Or does it involve some motive power, some
source of energy, some power of striving, of an altogether different or-
der? Clearly we must attempt to account for it in terms of the former
alternative, and we may only adopt the latter if the attempt gives no
promise of success. It may fairly be claimed, I think, that we can vaguely
understand the way in which all volition may be accounted for as a
special case of conation, differing from other conations, not in kind, but
only in complexity. We may see this most clearly if we form a scale of
conations ranging from the simplest type to the most complex and ob-
scure type, namely, moral choice achieved by an effort which, in the
struggle of higher and lower motives, brings victory to the side of the
higher but weaker motive. If types of conation can be arranged in such
a scale, each type differing from its neighbours only very slightly, that
will afford a strong presumption of continuity of the scale; for if voli-
tion involves some peculiar factor, not operative in other conations, we
ought to be able to draw a sharp line between the volitional and the non-
volitional conations. That such a scale can be made is, I think, indisput-
able; and an attempt to illustrate it will be made on a later page.
But, though we cannot draw any sharp line between volitions and
conations of other types, it is convenient and justifiable to reserve the
name “volition,” or act of will, for a particular class of conations, and
we must first try to determine what are the marks of the conations of this
class.
Some authors do not recognise this distinction, but describe all
conations, every form of mental activity, as issuing from the will. For
Schopenhauer, for example, the blind appetitions displayed by lowly
organisms were acts of will, equally with our greatest moral efforts; for
Professor Bain there was no such distinction, because he regarded all
activities as alike prompted simply by pleasure or pain, as efforts to
secure pleasure or to escape from pain. And it was for many years a
common practice to class all bodily movements as either unconscious
reflex actions or voluntary actions. But of late years increase of insight
into the simpler modes of action and the better comprehension of the166/William McDougall
large part they play in our lives, have led to the general recognition of
the propriety of the distinction of volitional and non-volitional conations.
Herbert Spencer and others, confining their attention to the conations
expressed in bodily movements, have regarded as volitional all move-
ments that are immediately preceded by the idea of the movement.99 But
this precedence of the idea of movement is merely the mark of ideo-
motor action, and many such movements take place in an automatic or
machine-like fashion that is very different from unmistakable volition.
Others adopt as the criterion of volitional action its antecedence by
the idea or representation of the end to be achieved by it. But this is
common to all action prompted by desire, to all conation that is not mere
blind appetition. And a man may struggle against the prompting of a
desire whose end is clearly represented. We commonly and properly say
in such cases that the man’s will, or the man himself, struggles against
the desire and masters it, or is mastered by it. Clearly, then, volition is
something other, and more, than simple desire, and more than desire
issuing in action. Nor can we be content to regard as volitional every
action issuing from a conflict of desires; for such conflicts take place on
a plane of mental development lower than that at which volition proper
becomes possible.
Professor Stout,100 criticising Mr. Shand’s conclusion that a voli-
tion is a unique differentiation of conation, a special form of conation
that is incapable of being analysed or described,101 puts the problem in
this way: “How does a volition differ from a desire?” And the answer he
proposes is that a “volition is a desire qualified and defined by the judg-
ment that, so far as in us lies, we shall bring about the attainment of the
desired end.” That volition involves such a judgment is true, I think, of
the special class of volitions we call resolutions, but not of all volitions;
and, even if it were true of all, it certainly would not adequately describe
the difference between desire and volition. We have seen that in the
typical case of volition, that of hard moral choice, the effort of will
somehow supports or re-enforces the weaker motive, and enables it to
get the better of the stronger motive. Now, a mere judgment has no such
motive power; rather, the judgment, “I shall do this and not that” is
merely the mode in which the accomplished volition is explicitly ex-
pressed when the circumstances demanding the one, or the other, mode
of action lie still in the future; the judgment is an effect of, rather than
the essence of, the volitional process.
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simple desire, or simple conflict of desires—is that the personality as a
whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the personality, the man him-
self, or all that which is regarded by himself and others as the most
essential part of himself, is thrown upon the side of the weaker motive;
whereas a mere desire may be felt to be something that, in comparison
with this most intimate nucleus of the personality, is foreign to the self,
a force that we do not acknowledge as our own, and which we, or the
intimate self, may look upon with horror and detestation.
Before following up this clue and attempting to trace the source of
this energy with which the idea of the self seems to support one of the
conflicting motives, we must ask, What is the immediate effect of voli-
tion? According to a widely accepted view we can only will a movement
of some part of the body. This view is explicitly maintained by Bain,
and has received the endorsement of Professor Stout. Yet it is, I think,
quite indefensible. We may, and often do, effectively will the continu-
ance of a sensation or an idea in consciousness; by an effort of will one
can maintain at the focus of consciousness a presentation or idea, which,
but for the volition, would be driven out of the focus by other ideas or
sense-impressions. Those who accept the view that we can will only a
movement, or a motor adjustment of some kind, usually try to explain
away these cases of voluntary direction of attention to sense-impres-
sions or objects of any kind, by saying that in these cases the immediate
effect of volition is merely some appropriate muscular adjustment of a
sense-organ, which adjustment aids indirectly in maintaining the idea or
sense-impression at the focus of consciousness. Thus Dr. Stout writes:
“The volition to attend is strictly analogous to the volition to move the
arm, or perform any other bodily action. It follows from this that our
voluntary command of attention must depend on our voluntary com-
mand of the motor processes of fixation.”102 But, though the statement
of the former of these two sentences is unimpeachable, the conclusion
drawn in the second has no logical connection with it. It would seem
that this doctrine owes its prevalence to the fact that the sequence of
movement upon volition to move is an immediately observable and un-
deniable fact, one so familiar that we are apt to overlook the inexpli-
cable and mysterious nature of the sequence, and to accept it as a matter
of course; just as most of us accept as a matter of course the equally
mysterious, inexplicable, and familiar sequence of sensation upon stimu-
lation of a sense-organ.
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desire notoriously tends to maintain the idea of its object or end at the
focus of consciousness; our thought keeps flying back to dwell on that
which we strongly desire, in spite of our best efforts to banish the idea
of it from our minds. This power of desire to maintain the desired object
at the focus of consciousness, to keep our attention directed to such an
object, is, like the persistent bodily striving that characterises all cona-
tion and marks off such action most clearly from mechanical process,
the immediate expression of psychical work, and involves, as was said
above, the central mystery of life and mind and of their relation to mat-
ter. No one contends that desire maintains the presentation of its end
indirectly only by way of motor adjustments; such maintenance is rather
an essential and immediate effect of every impulse that rises above the
level of blind appetition and becomes conscious of its end. Why, then,
should we deny to volition, which is desire and more than desire, a
power that desire unmistakably possesses? Secondly, that volitional ef-
fort can directly maintain a presentation at the focus of consciousness
may easily be shown by appropriate experiment.103
We must, then, reverse the position; instead of saying that volitional
direction of attention is an indirect effect of volitional innervation of
some muscular apparatus, we must recognise that volitional innervation
of muscles is but a special case of volition, and that the essential and
immediate effect of all volition is the maintenance of a presentation at
the focus of consciousness. For, when we will a movement, we do but
re-enforce the idea of that movement so that it tends more strongly to
issue in movement. We may therefore follow Professor James when he
asserts that “the essential achievement of the will is to attend to a diffi-
cult object and hold it fast before the mind,” and, again, that “effort of
attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.” In the special case in
which the object to which we direct our attention by a volitional effort is
a bodily movement, the movement follows immediately upon the idea in
virtue of that mysterious connection between them of which we know
almost nothing beyond the fact that it obtains.
Effort of attention is, then, the essential form of all volition. And
this formulation of the volitional process, the holding of an idea at the
focus of consciousness by an effort of attention, covers every instance
of volition. Let us consider a few of the principal types of volitional
effect. In deliberation we have the ideas of two different lines of action
rising alternately to the focus of consciousness, either one being checked
or inhibited by the other before it can determine action; in the act ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/169
volitional choice we give permanence and dominance to the one idea,
and in so doing we exclude the other more or less completely from con-
sciousness. Again, in making a resolution to follow a certain line of
conduct, we form as clear an idea as possible of that line of conduct,
and we hold the idea steadily before the mind by an effort of attention. It
is true that we may formulate our resolution in the form of a judgment
—I am going to do this; but that is something additional, not an essen-
tial part of the volitional process. Once more, in volitional recollection
of some fact we have forgotten, e.g., the name of a man of whom we are
thinking, our volition merely holds the idea of this man before con-
sciousness, so that it has the opportunity to develop its various aspects,
its associative setting, the place and time and company in which we
have seen the man; all of which, of course, increases the chance that his
name will be reproduced or recollected.
We have now to go on to the more serious part of the problem of
volition, and to ask, Can we give any account of the process that results
in this holding of a presentation at the focus of consciousness to the
exclusion of rival presentations? The thorough-going libertarian should
reply: “No, this act of will, this holding of the attention, is not condi-
tioned by the mind or character, it has no antecedents in the mental
processes of the subject who is said to will, therefore we may not hope
to give any psychological account of its antecedents or conditions, if it
has any.” Professor James does not go quite so far as this; having cor-
rectly defined the essential effect of volition, he claims to be able to
trace one step backwards the process of which it is the issue. He tells us
that the holding fast of the one idea at the focus of consciousness is
effected by suppressing or inhibiting all rival ideas that tend to exclude
it; the favoured idea then persists in virtue of its own energy and works
its appropriate effects, whether in the production of bodily movement or
in the determination of the further course of mental process.
Professor Wundt teaches a very similar doctrine. For him volition is
one aspect of apperception, and apperception is essentially the inhibi-
tion of all presentations save the one that rises to the focus of conscious-
ness. According to these two great authorities, then, volition is essen-
tially a negative function, an inhibiting of irrelevant presentations. But
neither of them explains how the inhibition is effected, whence comes
the inhibiting force, or what are the conditions of its operation. Presum-
ably, according to Professor James, this is where every attempt to trace
the volitional process from its effects backwards comes against a dead170/William McDougall
wall of mystery, because the inhibiting stroke issues from some region
inaccessible to our intellects, or simply happens without antecedents.
But this doctrine of the primarily inhibitive character of the voli-
tional process is, I think, a false scent; and it is not to be expected that
we can successfully trace back the process, if we make this false start
What gives it a certain plausibility is the fact that volitional attention,
like all attention, involves inhibition of all presentations other than the
one held at the focus of consciousness; but this inhibition is a secondary
or collateral result of the essential process, which is primarily a re-
enforcement of the one idea, the idea of the end that we will. Throughout
the nervous system, with the exception possibly of those most primitive
parts directly concerned in the control of the visceral organs, inhibition
always has this character, appears always as the negative aspect, or
complementary result, of a positive process of innervation. There is no
good evidence of inhibiting impulses sent out to the muscles of the vol-
untary system; and we control involuntary tendencies either by inner-
vating antagonistic muscles, or by directing our attention elsewhere by
an effort of will; that is to say, by concentrating the energy of the mind
and nervous system in one direction we withdraw it from, or prevent its
flowing in, any other direction. We may see this most clearly when we
attempt to exert volitional control over the deep-seated sensation-re-
flexes, such as the tendency to sneeze or the tendency to flinch under a
sudden pain or threat. Most of us learn to suppress a sneeze by volitionally
accentuating the energy of the respiratory movements —we make regu-
lar, rapid and forced inspirations and expirations; and in order to avoid
flinching or winking we strongly innervate some group of muscles, per-
haps almost the whole muscular system, but most habitually and most
strongly the muscles of the jaw, brow, and hands. And all the other
instances of inhibitions that play so large a part in our mental and ner-
vous life appear to be of this type, the supplementary or negative as-
pects of positive excitations.104 We must not, then, reverse the order, as
Wundt and James do, in the case of volition and make inhibition the
primary and essential aspect of the process. We must conclude that vo-
lition essentially involves a positive increase of the energy with which
an idea maintains itself in consciousness and plays its part in determin-
ing bodily and mental processes.
So we come back from our brief discussion of the views of other
writers to the position that in the typical case of volition, when in the
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we make a volitional decision, we in some way add to the energy with
which the idea of the one desired end maintains itself in opposition to its
rival.
This conclusion constitutes an important step towards the answer
to the question with which we set out—Is volition merely a specially
complex conjunction of the conative tendencies of the two kinds that we
have recognised from the outset? For it shows us that the essential op-
eration of volition is the same as that of desire, namely, the holding the
idea of the end at the focus of consciousness so that it works strongly
towards the realisation of its end, prevailing over rival ideas and tenden-
cies.
We are now in a position to follow up the clue that we left on one
side some little way back. We recognised that in the typical case of
volition a man’s self, in some peculiarly intimate sense of the word “
self,” is thrown upon the side of the motive that is made to prevail.
That the empirical self, the idea of his self that each man entertains,
plays an essential part in volition has been widely recognised. The rec-
ognition seems to be implied by the obscure dictum, approved by Mr.
Bradley and several other writers, that in volition we identify the self
with the end of the action. It was expressed by Dr. Stout when he wrote
that the judgment, “I am going to do this” is the essential feature of
volition by which it is distinguished from desire; and it is more clearly
expressed in his latest volume,105 where he writes, “What is distinctive
of voluntary decision is the intervention of self-consciousness as a co-
operating factor.” But he does not, I think, make quite clear how self-
consciousness plays this role.106
No mere idea has a motive power that can for a moment withstand
the force of strong desire, except only the pathologically fixed ideas of
action, and the quasi-pathological ideas of action introduced to the mind
by hypnotic suggestion.107 And the idea of the self is no exception to
this rule. The idea of the self, or self-consciousness, is able to play its
great role in volition only in virtue of the self-regarding sentiment, the
system of emotional and conative dispositions that is organised about
the idea of the self and is always brought into play to some extent when
the idea of the self rises to the focus of consciousness. The conations,
the desires and aversions, arising within this self-regarding sentiment
are the motive forces which, adding themselves to the weaker ideal
motive in the case of moral effort, enable it to win the mastery over
some stronger, coarser desire of our primitive animal nature and to172/William McDougall
banish from consciousness the idea of the end of this desire.
In the absence of a strong self-regarding sentiment, the idea of the
self, no matter how rich and how accurate its content, can play but a
feeble part in the regulation of conduct, and can exert little or no influ-
ence in moral choice. We may see this clearly if we imagine the case of
a man who combines full and accurate self-knowledge with almost com-
plete lack of self-respect and pride. The case is hardly realised, because,
as we have seen, advance In self-knowledge depends upon the existence
of the self-regarding sentiment But it is approximately realised by men
who, having attained self-knowledge, afterwards, through a series of
moral misfortunes, lose their self-respect more or less completely. In
such a man accurate self-knowledge would simply enable him to foresee
more accurately than others what things would bring him the greatest
satisfactions and pains, and to foretell his own conduct under given
conditions. He might become a very paragon of prudence, but hardly of
virtue. Such a man might have acquired and might retain admirable
moral sentiments; he might even have formed an ideal of conduct and
character, and might entertain for this ideal a sentiment that led him to
desire its realisation both for himself and others. But, if he had lost his
self-respect, if his self-regarding sentiment had decayed, his conduct
might be that of a villain in spite of his accurate self-knowledge and his
moral sentiments. On each occasion on which a desire, springing from a
moral sentiment, came into conflict with one of the coarser and stronger
desires, it would be worsted; for there would be no support for it forth-
coming from the sentiment of self-respect. Something like this is, I take
it, the condition of the man who becomes an habitual drunkard after
acquiring admirable moral sentiments. He may still desire the realisation
of all that is good and moral, and may have a lofty ideal of conduct; but,
if he has become known to all the world as a sot and has become aware
of the fact, he can no longer find in his self- regarding sentiment a sup-
port for his better, more ideal, motives. Whereas, so long as his drinking
is secret and is preceded on each occasion by a struggle in which his
self-respect takes part with his moral sentiments against the desire for
drink, there is still room for hope that he may reform his habits.
We may, then, define volition as the supporting or re-enforcing of a
desire or conation by the co-operation of an impulse excited within the
system of the self-regarding sentiment.
Since, as we have seen, the growth of the self-regarding sentiment is
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conations that are volitional and those that are not. Between, on the one
hand, the simple desire conscious of its end but not complicated by self-
consciousness, and, on the other hand, the moral effort that gives the
victory to the ideal motive—which is volition in the fullest sense—there
is a large range of complex conations in which the self-regarding emo-
tions and conations play parts of all degrees of importance and refine-
ment. It is instructive and important for our purpose to devise cases
illustrating the principal stages in the transition from simple conflict of
impulses to volition in the fullest sense.
Let us take, as illustrating the stages in this scale:—
1. The case of a child who desires food that is in a dark room and
who is impelled in opposite directions by this desire and by his fear of
the dark place. If either impulse overcomes the other and action follows,
that is not a case of volition.
2. Suppose that the child has been punished on some previous occa-
sion because his fear has overcome him, and suppose that the memory
of this punishment and his aversion to it enable his desire for food to
overcome his fear. Is that a case of volition? In the simplest conceivable
case of behaviour of this sort, such as might be exhibited by a young
child or a dog, I should say no.
3. But, if the child has attained some degree of self-consciousness
and says, “I don’t want to be punished, so I will go and get it,” we might
perhaps call this volition of the lowest grade.
4. As illustrations of stages successively higher in the scale, sup-
pose the child to say, “I must go and get it, for mother will scold me if I
don’t”; or again—
5. “I will do it because, if I don’t, the other boys will call me a
coward.”
6. Or let him say, “I will do it, for one ought to be able to put aside
this absurd fear, and I should be ashamed if any one knew that I was
afraid of going in there.”
In an these cases, except the first, the influence of the social envi-
ronment is clearly the factor that leads to the mastery of the one impulse
by the other. And the last two cases, which dearly imply the existence of
the sentiment of self-respect and the co-operation of an impulse awak-
ened within it, would generally be admitted to be cases of volition.
7. But now consider a case in which, although social disapproval is
ranged on the side of the restraining impulse, the effort of will, being
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restraining impulse. Suppose that our imaginary agent is a man of great
attainments whose life and work are publicly recognised as of great
value to the community; and suppose that he suddenly finds himself
before a burning house in which a child remains in imminent danger. To
save the child seems impossible, and, though the man’s protective im-
pulse strongly prompts him to make the attempt, he is restrained by a
very real fear. We may suppose that the impulse of fear is more than
strong enough to overcome the rival impulse, if these two were left to
fight it out alone; and we may suppose that the influence of his friends
and of society in general is thrown upon the side of his fear—his com-
panion tells him that it would be wicked to sacrifice his valuable life in
this hopeless attempt, and he knows that this will be the general opinion
of his fellows and that he will be regarded by many as a vainglorious
fool. Nevertheless, our hero feels that to make the attempt is the higher
line of conduct, he deliberates a few moments and then, choosing to act,
throws himself into the forlorn hope with all his energy. Here is a case of
undeniable volition, of hard choice, and of action in the line of greatest
resistance. The appeal of social approval and disapproval to the self-
regarding sentiment seems to be all against the decision actually taken,
yet the will seems to triumph over that as well as over the restraining
impulse of fear.
Is it, then, impossible to bring this case under our definition of voli-
tion? Must we fall back on indeterminism and say: Here was an action
that was performed by sheer volition against all the motives arising
from the man’s mental constitution; all the factors of which we can give
any psychological account were against action, yet the will triumphed
over them? I do not think we need draw this conclusion; for the prin-
ciples of explanation we have hitherto relied upon will not fail us alto-
gether in this case.
We may imagine two rather different ways in which such volition
can be accounted for.
1. The man may be moved to his decision by the belief that his
conduct would be approved by persons whose approval he values more
highly, whose approval appeals more strongly to his self-regarding sen-
timent, than the approval of all his friends and contemporaries. He may
think of such men as Chinese Gordon and others for whom he may have
a profound admiration or reverence; or he may believe in a purely ideal
personality; and, though he may believe that these persons will never
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approve, awakens a motive within his self-regarding sentiment that over-
rides all others and determines his hard choice; just as on a lower plane,
in the type of volition illustrated by our sixth case, one says, “I will
overcome this fear, for what would my companions say if they knew I
was afraid.”
2. On the other hand, our hero may decide from principle. He may
long ago have decided after reflection that courageous self-sacrifice for
the good of others is a principle superior to all other considerations.
Whether his opinion is right may be for others a fair matter of dispute,
but not for him; he has made up his mind after mature and cool delibera-
tion; and now a case arises calling for the application of his principle,
and he acts in accordance with it and against what might seem over-
whelmingly strong motives. Such action is the type of resolution, of
resolute adherence to decisions once formed; and it is the highest type of
resolute action, because in this case the decision was not formed in face
of the special circumstances calling for its application, but was of a
general nature.
How, then, does the possession of this principle supply the motive
power that overcomes the other strong motives? The bare verbal for-
mula, “I will always prefer self-sacrifice to self- seeking,” has no mo-
tive power, or but a minimum. In the first place, this preference for self-
sacrifice is a moral sentiment acquired in the main by selective absorp-
tion from the higher moral tradition in the way we noticed in the preced-
ing chapter; and this moral sentiment has been incorporated in the sen-
timent for the ideal of conduct that our hero has set up for himself. His
self-regarding sentiment demands that he shall live up to this ideal; he
feels shame when he does not, elation and satisfaction when he does;
that is to say, the impulse of self-assertion organised within his senti-
ment of self-respect gives rise to a strong desire to realise his ideal under
all circumstances.
But, in order that his adopted principle may powerfully affect his
conduct, something more is needed. He must have a strong sentiment
for self-control. Of all the abstract moral sentiments, this is the master
sentiment for volition and especially for resolution. It is a special devel-
opment of the self-regarding sentiment. For the man in whom this senti-
ment has become strong the desire of realising his ideal of self-control is
a master-motive that enables him to apply his adopted principles of
action, the results of his deliberate decisions, in spite of the opposition
of all other motives. The operation of this sentiment, more than any-176/William McDougall
thing else, gives a man the appearance of independence of the appeal of
the voice of society, and of all other persons, to his self-regarding senti-
ment. It enables him to substitute himself, as it were, for his social envi-
ronment.
These two interpretations of this particular case seem to me to illus-
trate the two principal types of higher volition natural to men of differ-
ent dispositions. The former case, in which the determining motive is
the desire of the approval of the ideal spectator, illustrates, perhaps, the
more usual source of the moral volition of the man in whom active
sympathy is strongly developed. In principle it presents no difficulty, if
we have sufficiently accounted for the influence of approval and disap-
proval in general. It implies merely a greater refinement of discrimina-
tion between those whose approval we value or are indifferent to than is
exercised by the average man.
The other type is characteristic of the less social, less sympathetic,
man. In this case it is less easy to trace the energy of volition back to the
self-regarding sentiment. For we found that this sentiment has for its
object, not the self merely, but the self in its relations to others, the
emotional and conative dispositions of the sentiment being excited by
the regards and attitudes of others towards the self. And it is now sug-
gested that a man may achieve a hard moral choice in opposition to
social approval or disapproval by substituting himself, more or less
completely, for his fellow-men as the spectator whose regards evoke the
impulses of his self-regarding sentiment and in whose approval they
find their satisfaction. It is doubtful whether this substitution is ever
completely achieved; for, as we have seen, the idea of the self, the con-
sciousness of self, is in its very origin and essential nature a conscious-
ness of the self in its social relations; and probably some vague social
reference always persists. But, in any case, it is clear, I think, that this
kind of volition, which seems almost to render a man independent of his
social environment, can only be attained to by the development of the
self-regarding sentiment under social influences. Most of us make some
progress towards this substitution. At first our self-regarding sentiment
is sensitive to the regards of every one and of all social circles; and then,
as we find that different persons and circles regard the same conduct
and our same self very differently, we learn to set these off against one
another more or less, we learn to despise the opinions and regards of the
mass of men and to gain confidence in our own personal and moral
judgments; thus our own estimate of ourselves, which in early life is aptAn Introduction to Social Psychology/177
to fluctuate with every passing regard of our fellows, becomes stable
and relatively independent.
Most of us, perhaps, may be said to achieve a stage in this process
at which our self-regarding sentiment and emotions have for their object
the self in relation to the select group of persons who are of similar ways
of thinking with ourselves, those who share our moral sentiments and
from whom we have in the main absorbed them; and, when we make a
moral effort, it is with some more or less vague reference to this select
circle. All this applies to the self, not only in its strictly moral aspects,
but in all others also; and one of the great advantages of being fully
grown up is that we cease to suffer so acutely and so frequently the
elations and the humiliations which in early life we are so liable to expe-
rience in face of every attitude of approval or disapproval, whether ex-
pressed or merely implied.
There are two doctrines from which we must carefully distinguish
this of the self-approbative impulse:
1. There is Adam Smith’s fiction of the well-informed and impartial
spectator, the man within the breast, whose approval we seek; this may
be regarded as a first approximation to the truth.
2. There is the hedonistic doctrine, which we rejected in an earlier
chapter, to the effect that in making a moral effort we are always seek-
ing the pleasure of self-satisfaction or seeking to avoid the pain of re-
morse. The kind of volition we are considering may, and, I think, usu-
ally does, involve no anticipation of these pleasures and pains. The plea-
sure or pain may result, but the desire of, or aversion from, it is not
necessarily or commonly an important part of the motive; what we de-
sire, or are averse from, is not the pleasure of approval or the pain of
disapproval, but the approval or disapproval themselves; and, whether
the approval is our own or another’s, the source of the additional motive
power, which in the moral effort of volition is thrown upon the side of
the weaker, more ideal impulse, is ultimately to be found in that instinct
of self-display or self-assertion whose affective aspect is the emotion of
positive self-feeling. That this is true we may see clearly in such a simple
case of volition as that of a boy overcoming by effort of the will, owing
to the presence of spectators, an impulse of fear that restrains him from
some desired object. He makes his effort and overcomes his fear-im-
pulse, because, as we say, he knows his companions are looking at him;
the impulse of self-display is evoked on the side of the weaker motive.
And the same is true of those more refined efforts of the will in which178/William McDougall
the operation of this impulse is so deeply obscured that it has not hith-
erto been recognised,.
Moral advance and the development of volition consist, then, not in
the coming into play of factors of a new order, whether called the will or
the moral instinct or conscience, but in the development of the self-
regarding sentiment and in the improvement or refinement of the “gal-
lery” before which we display ourselves, the social circle that is capable
of evoking in us this impulse of self-display; and this refinement may be
continued until the “gallery” becomes an ideal spectator or group of
spectators or, in the last resort, one’s own critical self standing as the
representative of such spectators.
To this statement the objection may be raised that it seems to make
what we commonly call a prig of every man who makes any moral
effort. It may be said that the ordinarily good man simply does what
seems to be right as judged by its social effects, regardless of the figure
he cuts in his own or others’ eyes; that that is the only truly moral
conduct; and that to care about, and to be moved by the thought of, the
figure one will cut is the mark of a prig. But any one who raises this
objection and maintains that the outward-looking attitude is the only
truly moral one, proves the truth of the position maintained above by his
resentment and by his implied admission that the attitude of the agent is
of so much importance for the estimation of the moral worth of conduct;
for he shows that he desires that he himself and other good men should
be regarded as acting in the outward-looking attitude and not in that
inward-looking one which he characterises as priggish. There are two
important differences between the truly moral man and the prig. The
prig finds in the desire for an admirable and praiseworthy attitude his
only, or at least his predominant, motive to right doing; whereas the
moral agent desires the right for its own sake in virtue of his moral
sentiments, and habitually acts from this motive; and it is only when a
moral conflict arises with the necessity for moral choice and effort, that
the self and the self-regarding impulse play the decisive role. Again, the
truly moral man has an ideal of conduct so high that he can hardly attain
to it, and, realising this, he is moved by the desire not to fall short of it
and not to incur the disapproval of his ideal spectators; whereas the
prig’s ideal is so easily within his reach that he constantly attains it and
achieves the pleasure of self-approval—“he puts in his thumb and pulls
out a plum, and says—What a good boy am I.”
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the relation of will to what is called character. Character has been de-
fined as “that from which the will proceeds”; and will might equally
well be defined as “that which proceeds from character.” What, then, is
character? At the outset we said that character is something built up in
the course of life, and that it must therefore be distinguished from dispo-
sition and from temperament, which are in the main natively given. There
can be no doubt, I think, that the sentiments constitute a large part of
what is properly called character. But do they constitute the whole of
character? Or is there some other acquired feature of the adult mental
constitution that is an essential feature of character in the strict sense of
the word? That there is, beside the sentiments, some such additional
feature involved in character, seems to be proved by the existence of
persons who have many strong sentiments and who yet cannot be said to
have strong character. They are the sentimentalists.
One essential condition of strong character seems to be the
organisation of the sentiments in some harmonious system or hierarchy.
The most usual or readiest way in which such systematisation of the
sentiments can be brought about, is the predominance of some one sen-
timent that in all circumstances is capable of supplying a dominant
motive, that directs all conduct towards the realisation of one end to
which all other ends are subordinated. The dominant sentiment may be
a concrete or an abstract sentiment; it may be the love of money, of
home, of country, of justice. When any such sentiment acquires decided
predominance over all others, we call it a ruling passion; whenever other
motives conflict with the motives arising within the system of a ruling
passion, they go to the wall, they are powerless to oppose it
Take the case of a man whose ruling passion is the love of home,
say of a beautiful ancestral home that is dilapidated and encumbered
with debts when it first becomes his own. He sets out to restore its
ancient glories, perhaps entering upon the task with reluctance. As time
goes on his sentiment gains strength, he acquires the habit of working
for this one end, of valuing all things according to the degree in which
they contribute towards it. All other motives become not only relatively,
but absolutely, weaker for lack of exercise; that is to say, they are never
allowed to determine action and so tend to atrophy from disuse. The
man loses his other sentiments, or interests, as we say; he gives up sport,
art, horses, and what not, and may become indifferent to the opinions of
his fellow-men, may be content to appear miserly and to commit mean
actions in the service of his ruling passion.180/William McDougall
Can such a man be said to have acquired a strong character? In
contrast with the man whose sentiments are but little systematized, he
may seem to have strong character. This other man will be drawn this
way and that. If he is of sympathetic nature, he will be liable to be
dominated first by one, then by another, sentiment, according to the
nature of the social influences that bear upon him, the opinions and
sentiments of each social circle he enters. He will make no sustained
effort in any direction, except under the spur of necessity. And the man
of specifically weak character, or lacking in character, is the man whose
sentiments not only have not been organised in any system, but have not
been consolidated and confirmed by habitual action in accordance with
their prompting, because the man has constantly allowed himself to be
moved by the entirely unorganised and fleeting impulses evoked spo-
radically by each situation as it arises. Habitual action on the motives
supplied by the systematised sentiments is, then, an essential factor in
character, over and above the possession of the sentiments.
Does, then, the possession of a master-sentiment or ruling passion
of any kind, such as the passion for a home that we considered just now,
or one for money or for any other concrete or abstract object, in itself
constitute character, when confirmed, as a ruling passion always is, by
habitual action from the motives it supplies? It does not constitute strong
character in the full sense of the words. It seems to give the man a strong
will in relation to all that affects the object of his master-sentiment; but
he has not strong will and character in the full sense, but rather what
might be called specialised character. In relation to all objects and situ-
ations that are not in any way connected with bis ruling passion, or if
the object of it is irrevocably taken from him, such a man may display
deplorable weakness or lack of will and character. In fact, he cannot
properly be said to have a strong will or to exert volition; his ruling
passion supplies him with motives so strong that, in all situations in
which its object is concerned, conflict of motives and deliberation can
hardly occur and volition is not needed; while in all other situations he is
incapable of volition.
There is only one sentiment which by becoming the master-senti-
ment can generate strong character in the fullest sense, and that is the
self-regarding sentiment. There is a lower imperfect form of the senti-
ment, ambition or the love of fame, the ambition to become publicly
recognised as a man of this or that kind of ability or power. When this
sentiment becomes a ruling passion it may cover almost the whole ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/181
conduct, may supply a dominant motive for almost every situation, a
motive which arising within the self-regarding sentiment determines
volition in the strict sense in which we have defined it. But it is not
properly a moral sentiment, and, though it may generate character, the
character formed through its agency is not moral character.
For the generation of moral character in the fullest sense, the strong
self-regarding sentiment must be combined with one for some ideal of
conduct, and it must have risen above dependence on the regards of the
mass of men; and the motives supplied by this master-sentiment in the
service of the ideal must attain an habitual predominance. There are
men, so well described by Professor James, who have the sentiment and
the ideal of the right kind, but in whom, nevertheless, the fleeting,
unorganised desires repeatedly prove too strong for the will to overcome
them. They lack the second essential factor in character, the habit of
self-control, the habitual dominance of the self-regarding sentiment;
perhaps because the native disposition that is the main root of self-re-
spect is innately lacking in strength; perhaps because they have never
learnt to recognise the awful power of habit, and have been content to
say, “This time I will not trouble to resist this desire, to suppress this
impulse; I know that I can do so if I really exert my will.” Every time
this happens, the power of volition is weakened relatively to that of the
unorganised desires; every time the self-regarding sentiment masters an
impulse of some other source, it is rendered, according to the law of
habit, more competent to do so again—the will is strengthened as we
say. And, when the habitual dominance of this master- sentiment has
been established, perhaps after many conflicts, it becomes capable of
determining the issue of every conflict so certainly and easily that con-
flicts can hardly arise; it supplies a determining motive for every pos-
sible situation, namely, the desire that I, the self, shall do the right. So
this motive, in the individual for whom it has repeatedly won the day in
all conflicts of motives, acquires the irresistible strength of a fixed con-
solidated habit; and, in accordance with the law of habit, as it becomes
more and more fixed and invariable, it operates more and more auto-
matically, i.e., with diminishing intensity of its conscious aspect, with
less intensity of the emotion and desire from which the habit was gener-
ated, and with less explicit reference to the persons in whose eyes the
self seeks approval.
In this way the self comes to rule supreme over conduct, the indi-
vidual is raised above moral conflict; he attains character in the fullest182/William McDougall
sense and a completely generalised will, and exhibits to the world that
finest flower of moral growth, serenity. His struggles are no longer moral
conflicts, but are intellectual efforts to discover what is most worth do-
ing, what is most right for him to do.
It is important to note, especially in view of the analogy to be drawn
between the individual will and the national, or other form of collective
or general, will, that the development of self- consciousness and of the
self-regarding sentiment renders the behaviour of the individual pro-
gressively less dependent upon his environment; that it involves a con-
tinuous advance from action of the type of immediate response to the
impressions made on the sense-organs and an approximation towards
complete self-determination, towards conduct that is the issue of condi-
tions wholly comprised within the constitution of the mind. Like the
evolution of mind in the race, this advance involves also a progress
from predominantly mechanical to predominantly teleological determi-
nation, a continuous increase of the part played by final causes rela-
tively to that of purely mechanical causes in the determination of the
behaviour of the individual. No doubt the vague movements of the in-
fant are teleological or purposive in the lowliest sense of the word; but
actions do not become the expressions of conscious purpose until the
individual attains the capacity of representing the end towards which he
feels himself impelled. At the intermediate level of development of the
personality, the ends or final causes of his action are immediate, vari-
ous, and often inharmonious with one another; with the development of
a unified personality, (i.e., of clear self-consciousness, a consistent ideal
of conduct and a strong sentiment for the self and for that ideal), these
are more and more superseded and controlled by a single all- powerful
final cause, the ideal of the self.
The foregoing account of volition differs from those of other writ-
ers in the stress laid upon the systematic organisation of the conative
dispositions in the moral and self-regarding sentiments; and its princi-
pal claim to originality is the attempt made to exhibit the continuity of
the development of the highest types of human will and character from
the primary instinctive dispositions that we have in common with the
animals. Especial importance, as an essential factor in volition, has been
attached to the impulse of self-assertion or self-display and its concomi-
tant emotion of positive self-feeling. It may seem paradoxical and re-
pugnant to our sense of the nobility of moral conduct, that it should be
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and which in them plays a part that is of secondary importance and
utterly amoral. It should, however, be remembered that the humble na-
ture of the remote origins of any thing we justly admire or revere in
nowise detracts from its intrinsic worth or dignity, and that the ascer-
tainment of those origins need not, and should not, diminish by one jot
our admiration or reverence.Section II
The Operation of the Primary Tendencies of the
Human Mind in the Life of Societies
Chapter X
The Reproductive and the Parental Instincts
In the first section of this book certain primary or fundamental tenden-
cies of the human mind were distinguished and described, and it was
asserted that these are the prime movers, the great motive powers, of
human life and society, and that therefore a true understanding of the
nature and operation of these tendencies must form the essential basis of
all social psychology, and in fact of the social sciences in general. I
propose to devote this section to the illustration of the truth of this posi-
tion, and to consider very briefly some of the principal ways in which
each of these primary tendencies plays its part in shaping the social life
of man and in determining the forms of institutions and of social
organisation.
The processes to be dealt with are so complex, the operations of the
different factors are so intricately combined, their effects are so vari-
ously interwoven and fused in the forms of social organisations and
institutions, that it would be presumptuous to attempt to prove the truth
of most of the views advanced. I would therefore repeat and especially
emphasise in regard to this section the remark made in the introduction
to this volume to the effect that, in spite of the dogmatic form adopted
for the sake of brevity and clearness of exposition, my aim is to be
suggestive rather than dogmatic, to stimulate thought and promote dis-
cussion rather than to lay down conclusions for the acceptance of the
reader.An Introduction to Social Psychology/185
The reproductive instinct is in a sense antisocial rather than social.
Nevertheless its importance for society needs no demonstration; for it is
clear that, if it could be abolished in any people, that people would very
soon disappear from the face of the earth. In all animal species the strength
of this instinct is maintained at a very high level by natural selection; for
the production by each generation of offspring more numerous than
themselves—in some cases many thousand times more numerous—has
been an essential condition of the survival of the species, of the better
adaptation of species to their environment, and of the evolution of new
species. In the human species also it is one of the strongest of the in-
stincts; so strong is it that the control and regulation of its impulse is one
of the most difficult problems for the individual and for society. In every
age and country its operation is to some extent regulated by rigid social
customs, or by laws, which are commonly enforced by the severest pen-
alties.
In many animal species the reproductive instinct secures the per-
petuation of the species without the cooperation of any parental instinct,
whilst some animals, e.g., the working bee, have a parental but no re-
productive instinct; but all human beings, with rare exceptions, possess
both these instincts; and there is probably some degree of correlation
between the strengths of the two instincts, that is to say, in the individu-
als in whom one of them is strong the other will also be strong in the
majority of cases, and vice versa. The social operations and effects of
these two instincts are in certain respects so intimately interwoven and
blended that they cannot be clearly distinguished. This intimate associa-
tion of the two instincts, which is undoubtedly of great social advan-
tage, makes it necessary to discuss them conjointly.
The work of Malthus on “Population” was the first to attract gen-
eral attention to the social operation of these instincts. Malthus pointed
out that, if these instincts were given free play in any society of fairly
secure organisation, the rate of increase of the population would be
exceedingly rapid, and that the actual rate of increase in all civilised
societies, being much lower than the maximal rate, implies that the in-
stincts are commonly controlled in some degree. The population of most
European countries has increased during the historic period at a very
slow rate, except during part of the nineteenth century, when the inven-
tion of so many forms of machinery almost suddenly multiplied man’s
power of producing the necessaries of life. That of some European coun-
tries has passed through periods of great diminution; thus it is estimated186/William McDougall
that Spain enjoyed towards the close of the Roman occupation a popu-
lation of twenty millions, and that this sank as low as six millions in the
eighteenth century.108 Even when we remember the ravages made by
plague, famine, and war, and the large number of persons that through-
out the Middle Ages was condemned to celibacy through the influence
of the Church, this slow rate of increase, or actual decrease, of popula-
tion remains something of a mystery.109 But it is clear that in the present
age prudent control of these instincts plays a great part in keeping down
the birth- rate. The population of France is almost (or, but for immigra-
tion, quite) stationary, and it is notorious that this is due very largely to
prudent control. And statistics, showing that the numbers of marriages
and births in various countries vary with the cost of the prime neces-
saries of life and with the prosperity of trade and agriculture, prove that
such control plays its part in most of the civilised countries.
The parental instinct is the foundation of the family, and, with few
exceptions, all who have given serious attention to the question are agreed
that the stability of the family is the prime condition of a healthy state of
society and of the stability of every community.110  Although a contrary
opinion has been maintained by certain writers, it is in the highest de-
gree probable that the family was the earliest form of human society.111
We have no certain record of any tribe or community of human beings
in which the family in one form or another does not exist. It is reduced
perhaps to its lowest terms among some of the negrito peoples, where
the co-operation of the father with the mother in the care of the off-
spring—which is the essential feature of the family—continues only
until the child is weaned and can walk.112
It is probable that these two instincts in conjunction, the reproduc-
tive and the parental instincts, directly impel human beings to a greater
sum of activity, effort, and toil, than all the other motives of human
action taken together.
The parental instinct especially impels to actions that involve self-
sacrifice, in the forms of suppression of the narrower egoistic tenden-
cies and of heavy and unremitting toil on behalf of the offspring. Since
these sacrifices and exertions on behalf of the children are a necessary
condition of the continued existence and the flourishing of any society,
whether small or large, we find that among all peoples, save the very
lowest in the scale of culture, the institution of marriage and the duties
of parenthood are surrounded by the most solemn social sanctions, which
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laws, and in the rites and doctrines of religion. These sanctions are in
the main the more solemnly and rigidly maintained by any society, the
higher the degree of civilisation attained by it and the freer and more
nearly universal the play of the intellectual faculties among the mem-
bers of that society. This correlation is accounted for by the following
considerations. The use of reason and intelligent foresight modifies pro-
foundly the operation of all the instincts, and is especially apt to modify
and work against the play of the reproductive and parental instincts.
Among the higher animals these instincts suffice to secure the perpetu-
ation of the species by their blind workings. And we may suppose that
the same was true of primitive human societies.113 But, with the in-
crease of the power and of the habit of regulating instinctive action by
intelligent foresight, the egoistic impulses must have tended to suppress
the working of the parental instinct; hence the need for the support of
the instinct by strong social sanctions; hence also the almost universal
distribution of such sanctions. For those societies in which no such sanc-
tions became organised must have died out; while only those in which,
as intelligence became more powerful, these sanctions became more
formidable have in the long-run survived and reached any considerable
level of civilisation. There has been, we may say, a never-ceasing race
between the development of individual intelligence and the increasing
power of these social sanctions; and wherever the former has got ahead
of the latter, there social disaster and destruction have ensued.
At the present time many savage tribes and barbarous communities
are illustrating these principles; they are rapidly dying out, owing to the
failure of the social sanctions to give sufficient support to the parental
instinct against developing intelligence. It is largely for this reason that
contact with civilisation proves so fatal to so many savage peoples; for
such contact stimulates their intelligence, while it breaks the power of
their customs and social sanctions generally and fails to replace them by
any equally efficient.114 A weakening of the social sanctions of the pa-
rental and reproductive instincts by developing intelligence has played a
great part also in the destruction of some of the most brilliant and pow-
erful societies of the past, notably those of ancient Greece and Rome.115
Among peoples of the lower cultures the failure of the social sanc-
tions to maintain the predominance of the reproductive and parental
instincts over the egoistic tendencies supported by intelligence, shows
itself mainly in the form of infanticide; in the highly civilised nations it
takes the forms of pre-natal infanticide, of great irregularity of the rela-188/William McDougall
tions between the sexes, of failure of respect for marriage, of aberra-
tions of the reproductive instinct (which so readily arise wherever the
social sanctions become weakened), and, lastly, of voluntary celibacy
and restriction of the family.116
Mr. Benjamin Kidd117 has argued that the prime social function of
any system of supernatural or religious sanctions is the regulation and
the support of the parental instinct against the effects of developing
intelligence. This statement contains a large element of truth, though it
is perhaps an overstatement of the case. However that may be, it is clear
that one of the most momentous problems facing the most highly civilised
peoples of the present time is whether they will be able to maintain their
places against their rivals in the international struggle, in spite of the
secularisation of social sanctions and of the institution of marriage, and
in spite of the rapid spread of the habit of independent thought and
action among the people. For all these are influences that weaken those
social supports of the parental instinct which seem to have been neces-
sary for the continued welfare of the societies of every age.
Up to this point of our discussion we have assumed that the strength
of these two instincts remains unchanged from generation to generation,
and that any changes of their operation in societies are due to changes of
customs and social sanctions. But this assumption may be questioned.
It may be that the instincts themselves are growing weaker. And this is
the assumption commonly made by writers in the newspapers who call
attention from time to time to the fall of the birth-rate, which has contin-
ued at an increasing rate in nearly all civilised countries during the last
thirty or forty years. They commonly attribute it to a decay or progres-
sive weakening of the maternal instinct, under some mysterious influ-
ence of civilisation. But there is no good evidence that any such decay is
occurring; while, on the other hand, a number of considerations justify
us in asserting with some confidence that the fall of the birth-rate, which
seems inevitably to accompany the attainment of a high level of
civilisation, is not due to any such decay of the parental instinct, but
rather is to be attributed to social changes of the kinds noted above. In
the first place, this instinct, like all other human and animal qualities, is
subject to individual variations which, in our present state of ignorance,
we call spontaneous; and it is probable that in every society there have
been persons in whom it was decidedly less strong than in the average
human being. Now, in respect to this instinct, as well as the instinct of
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fashion; for there can be no doubt that persons in whom either, or both,
of these instincts are weak will on the average have fewer children than
those in whom the instincts are strong. This particular variation is thus
constantly eliminated, and the strength of the instinct is thereby main-
tained from generation to generation. This deduction is strongly sup-
ported by the fact that in our own country one-quarter of the people of
each generation become the parents of about one-half of the population
of the succeeding generation.118  There can be no doubt that, among this
quarter of the population, the parental, and probably also the reproduc-
tive, instinct is on the average stronger than in the remaining three-
quarters who produce the other half of the next generation.119
This view receives further strong support from the fact that it is
among the most cultured and leisured classes of any community that the
falling birth-rate first and most strongly manifests itself. This seems to
have been the case in Greece and Rome, and it has been statistically
established for this country as well as for several others;120 while in the
United States of America the difference in this respect between the cul-
tured descendants of the earlier colonists in the Eastern States and the
less civilised hordes of later immigrants, seems to be generally admitted
and to be recognised as a matter for serious regret. And it is of course
among the cultured classes that the supernatural and social sanctions
are most weakened by the habit of independent thought and action. Again,
it is in Australia where the supernatural and other sanctions are rela-
tively weak and the average level of education and intelligence is high,
that the fall of the birth-rate is exhibited very markedly by all classes of
the community. On the other hand, the Jews are a people that has been at
a fairly high level of civilisation more continuously and for a longer
total period than any other outside Asia; yet they remain prolific, for the
supernatural and social sanctions that maintain the family have retained
an undiminished strength; a fact which may be ascribed to the peculiar
position of Jewish communities: they live mingled with others, yet dis-
tinct from them, a position which results in the constant shedding or loss
from the community of those members who find its religious teachings
or social institutions unsuited to their temperament and disposition.
We may find similar evidence in the history of other peoples of
long-continued civilisation, evidence, that is, that where religious and
other sanctions give adequate support to the family instincts no serious
diminution of fertility occurs. It is for this reason that ancestor-worship
is so eminently favourable to national stability. The cult of the ancestor190/William McDougall
and of the family, with the patria potestas, the immense authority given
by law and custom to the head of the family, counted for much in the
strength and stability of ancient Rome. In fact, the high civilisations of
ancient Greece and Rome rested on a firm basis of this kind until their
decline began.121
The cult of the ancestor has played a similar part in Japan. For
there, as in the early days of Greece and of Rome, the welfare of the
dead man is dependent on the daily ministrations of his living descen-
dants, and they in turn, according to the still-prevailing belief, owe their
successes and prosperity to the active benevolence of the spirits of their
ancestors.122 Hence the interests of each generation are intimately bound
up with those of the generations that have gone before and of those that
shall come after. Hence, in order to secure his own happiness as well as
that of his ancestors and descendants, a man’s first care and duty is to
bring up a family that will carry on the ancestral cult. It is probable that
China also owes her immense stability and latent power in large mea-
sure to similar causes.
Hitherto we have considered the social importance of the parental
instinct only in its relation to the family. But, if our account of this
instinct in Chapter III was correct, it is the source, not only of parental
tenderness, but of all tender emotions and truly benevolent impulses, is
the great spring of moral indignation, and enters in some degree into
every sentiment that can properly be called love. We shall then attribute
to it in these derived or secondary applications a wider or narrower field
of influence in shaping social actions and institutions, according as we
incline to see much or little of true benevolence at work in the world.
That the impulse of this instinct is one of the great social forces seems to
me an indisputable fact. Especially is this true in many of the countries
in which the Christian and the Buddhist religions prevail. Some writers
would seem to regard the charity and benevolence displayed in such
societies as wholly due to the mild teaching of these religions. But no
teaching and no system of social or religious sanctions could induce
benevolence in any people if their minds were wholly lacking in this
instinct. Such influences can only favour or repress in some degree the
habitual and customary manifestations of the innate tendencies; and the
fact that these religions have gained so wide acceptance shows that they
appeal to some universal element of the human mind; while the spe-
cially strong appeal of Christianity to the feminine mind,123 the Catholic
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whole system as compared with Mohammedan and other religions, shows
that we are right in identifying this element with the parental, the prima-
rily maternal, instinct.
This instinct, save in its primary application in the form of the
mother’s protection of her child, is not, like the reproductive instinct,
one of overwhelming force; hence the extent of its secondary manifesta-
tions is profoundly influenced by custom and training. To this fact must
be ascribed in the main the very great differences between communities
of different times and races in respect to the force with which the in-
stinct operates outside the family. The savage who is a tender father
may behave in an utterly brutal manner to all human beings other than
the members of his tribe. But such brutal behaviour is sanctioned by the
public opinion of the tribe, prescribed by custom and example, and pro-
voked by tribal feuds. That races differ in respect to the strength of this
instinct is probable; but that any are entirely devoid of it, it is difficult to
believe—if only because such a race would fail to rear its progeny, and
therefore could not survive. Everywhere one may see traces of its influ-
ence. In the ancient classical societies it seems to have played a very
restricted part; but, even in the worst days of Rome’s brutal degrada-
tion, many a man was kindly to his slaves, and the practice of manumis-
sion was at times so prevalent as to excite some uneasiness. On the
other hand, it is not necessary to suppose that the great extension of
benevolent action, which is undoubtedly one of the most notable fea-
tures of the present age of our civilisation, denotes any increase in the
innate strength of this instinct. How this great extension has been brought
about in modern times is a most interesting problem, the discussion of
which does not fall within the scope of this book. But we may note some
of its most important social effects.
Among the most obvious of these effects are the humanitarian regu-
lations of civilised warfare, and the devotion of vast amounts of human
energy, of money and material resources of all kinds, by our modern
civilised communities to the relief of the poor and suffering, to the hos-
pitals, and to the many organisations for the distribution of charity and
the prevention of cruelty. A social change of more importance from the
point of view of world-history is the abolition of slavery and serfdom
throughout the regions of Western Civilisation. This great change, which
marks an epoch in the history of civilisation, is undoubtedly attributable
to the increased influence of this instinct in modern times. It is no doubt
true that the main question at issue in the American war of North and192/William McDougall
South was the maintenance of the federal union of the States. And there
is some truth in the cynical dictum that the abolition of slavery comes
when slavery ceases to be economically advantageous—the specially
advantageous conditions being an unlimited area of highly fertile soil
creating a demand for an abundance of unskilled labour. But in the
liberation of the slaves of the British West Indies, which cost the En-
glish people twenty millions of hard cash, disinterested benevolence cer-
tainly played a great and essential part; and the same is true of the
liberation of the serfs of Russia in 1861.124
But of still more wide-reaching importance is the admission to po-
litical power of the masses of the people, which in this and several other
countries has been carried very nearly as far as legislation can carry it.
This no doubt has been due to the rise of a demand for such admission
on the part of the masses; but, as Mr. B. Kidd 125 has forcibly argued,
this demand was itself largely created by the teachings of leaders moved
by the benevolent impulse, and it would have failed to obtain satisfac-
tion if the power-holding classes had been devoid of this impulse, and if
very many of their members had not been moved by it to accede to this
demand and to aid in the accomplishment of this great political change.
Chapter XI
The Instinct of Pugnacity
The instinct of pugnacity has played a part second to none in the evolu-
tion of social organisation, and in the present age it operates more pow-
erfully than any other in producing demonstrations of collective emo-
tion and action on a great scale. The races of men certainly differ greatly
in respect to the innate strength of this instinct; but there is no reason to
think that it has grown weaker among ourselves under centuries of
civilisation; rather, it is probable, as we shall see presently, that it is
stronger in the European peoples than it was in primitive man. But its
modes of expression have changed with the growth of civilisation; as
the development of law and custom discourages and renders unneces-
sary the bodily combat of individuals, this gives place to the collective
combat of communities and to the more refined forms of combat within
communities. It is observable that, when a pugnacious people is forc-
ibly brought under a system of civilised legality, its members are apt to
display an extreme and, to our minds, absurd degree of litigiousness.
The replacement of individual by collective pugnacity is most clearly
illustrated by barbarous peoples living in small, strongly organised com-An Introduction to Social Psychology/193
munities. Within such communities individual combat and even expres-
sions of personal anger may be almost completely suppressed, while the
pugnacious instinct finds its vent in perpetual warfare between commu-
nities, whose relations remain subject to no law. As a rule no material
benefit is gained, and often none is sought, in these tribal wars, which
often result in the weakening and even the extermination of whole vil-
lages or tribes. Central Borneo is one of the few regions in which this
state of things still persists. The people are very intelligent and sociable
and kindly to one another within each village community; but, except in
those regions in which European influence has asserted itself, the
neighbouring villages and tribes live in a state of chronic warfare; all
are kept in constant fear of attack, whole villages are often extermi-
nated, and the population is in this way kept down very far below the
limit at which any pressure on the means of subsistence could arise.
This perpetual warfare, like the squabbles of a roomful of quarrelsome
children, seems to be almost wholly and directly due to the uncompli-
cated operation of the instinct of pugnacity. No material benefits are
sought; a few heads, and sometimes a slave or two, are the only trophies
gained; and, if one asks of an intelligent chief why he keeps up this
senseless practice of going on the warpath, the best reason he can give is
that unless he does so his neighbours will not respect him and his people,
and will fall upon them and exterminate them. How shall we begin to
understand the prevalence of such a state of affairs, if we regard man as
a rational creature guided only by intelligent self-interest, and if we
neglect to take account of his instincts? And it is not among barbarous
or savage peoples only that the instinct of pugnacity works in this way.
The history of Christendom is largely the history of devastating wars
from which few individuals or societies have reaped any immediate ben-
efit, and in the causation of which the instinct of pugnacity of the rulers,
or of the masses of the peoples, has played a leading part. In our own
age the same instinct makes of Europe an armed camp occupied by
twelve million soldiers, the support of which is a heavy burden on all the
peoples; and we see how, more instantly than ever before, a whole na-
tion may be moved by the combative instinct—a slight to the British
flag, or an insulting remark in some foreign newspaper, sends a wave of
angry emotion sweeping across the country, accompanied by all the char-
acteristics of crude collective mentation, and two nations are ready to
rush into a war that cannot fail to be disastrous to both of them. The
most serious task of modern statesmanship is, perhaps, to discount and194/William McDougall
to control these outbursts of collective pugnacity. At the present time
custom is only just beginning to exert some control over this interna-
tional pugnacity, and we are still very far from the time when interna-
tional law, following in the wake of custom, will render the pugnacity of
nations as needless as that of the individuals of highly civilised states,
and physical combats between them as relatively infrequent.
It might seem at first sight that this instinct, which leads men and
societies so often to enter blindly upon deadly contests that in many
cases are destructive to both parties, could only be a survival from man’s
brutal ancestry, and that an early and a principal feature of social evolu-
tion would have been the eradication of this instinct from the human
mind. But a little reflection will show us that its operation, far from
being wholly injurious, has been one of the essential factors in the evo-
lution of the higher forms of social organisation, and, in fact, of those
specifically social qualities of man, the high development of which is an
essential condition of the higher social life.
It was said above that the earliest form of human society was in all
probability the family, and, indeed, it is probable that in this respect
primitive man did but continue the social life of his prehuman ancestors.
But what form the primitive family had, and in what way more complex
forms of society were developed from it, are obscure and much- dis-
puted questions. Hence any attempt to show how the human instincts
played their parts in the process must be purely speculative. Neverthe-
less it is a legitimate and fascinating subject for speculation, and we
may attempt to form some notion of the socialising influence of the
instinct of pugnacity among primitive men by adopting provisionally
one of the most ingenious of the speculative accounts of the process.
Such is the account offered by Messrs. Atkinson and Andrew Lang,126
which may be briefly sketched as follows. The primitive society was a
polygamous family consisting of a patriarch, his wives and children.
The young males, as they became full-grown, were driven out of the
community by the patriarch, who was jealous of all possible rivals to
his marital privileges. They formed semi-independent bands hanging,
perhaps, on the skirts of the family circle, from which they were jeal-
ously excluded. From time to time the young males would be brought by
their sex-impulse into deadly strife with the patriarch, and, when one of
them succeeded in overcoming him, this one would take his place and
rule in his stead. A social system of this sort obtains among some of the
animals, and it seems to be just such a system as the fierce sexual jeal-An Introduction to Social Psychology/195
ousy of man and his polygamous capacities and tendencies would pro-
duce in the absence of any modifying law or moral tradition. This pro-
hibition enforced by the jealousy of the patriarch is the primal law, the
first example of a general prohibition laid upon the natural impulse of a
class of human beings and upheld by superior force for the regulation of
social relations.
We have seen in Chapter V that jealousy is an emotion dependent
upon the existence of a sentiment. Whether we have to recognise among
the constituent dispositions of the sentiment an instinct of acquisition or
possession, is a difficult question to which we found it impossible to
give a decided answer. But, however that may be, it is clear that the
principal constituent of the emotion of male jealousy, especially of the
crude kind excited within the crude sentiment of attachment or owner-
ship which the primitive patriarch entertained for his family, is anger; in
the human, as well as many other species, the anger excited in connec-
tion with the sexual instinct is of the most furious and destructive inten-
sity. If, then, we accept this hypothesis of the “primal law,” we must
believe that the observance of this law was enforced by the instinct of
pugnacity.
Now an instinct that led to furious and mortal Combat between the
males of any group might well determine the evolution of great strength
and ferocity and of various weapons and defensive modifications of
structure, as sexual characters, in the way that Darwin supposed it to
have done in many animal species.127 But it is not at first sight obvious
how it should operate as a great socialising force. If we would under-
stand how it may have done so, we must bear in mind the fact, so strongly
insisted on by Walter Bagehot in his brilliant essay, “Physics and Poli-
tics,”128 that the first and most momentous step of primitive men to-
wards civilisation must have been the evolution of rigid customs, the
enforced observance of which disciplined men to the habit of control of
the immediate impulses. Bagehot rightly maintained that the achieve-
ment of this first step of the moral ladder must have been a most diffi-
cult one; he wrote—“Law, rigid, definite, concise law was the primary
want of early mankind; that which they needed above anything else, that
which was requisite before they could gain anything else,” i.e., before
they could gain the advantages of social co-operation. Again, he wrote:
“In early times the quantity of government is much more important than
its quality. What is wanted is a comprehensive rule binding men to-
gether, making them do the same things, telling them what to expect of196/William McDougall
each other, fashioning them alike, and keeping them so. What the rule is
does not matter so much. A good rule is better than a bad one, but a bad
one is better than none.” When Bagehot goes on to tell us how law
established law- abidingness, or the capacity of self-control, in human
nature, his account ceases to be satisfactory; for he wrote when biolo-
gists still believed with Lamarck and Darwin and Spencer in the inher-
itance of acquired characters. That such inheritance is possible we may
no longer assume, though very many writers on social topics still make
the assumption, as Bagehot did, and still use it as the easy key to all
problems of social evolution. For Bagehot simply assumed that the habit
of self-control and of obedience to law and custom, forcibly induced in
the members of succeeding generations, became an innate quality by
transmission and accumulation from generation to generation. While,
then, we may accept Bagehot’s dictum that it is difficult to exaggerate
the difference between civilised and primitive men (i.e., really primitive
men, not the savages of the present time) in respect to their innate law-
abidingness, and while we may accept also his view that the strict en-
forcement of law played a great part in producing this evolution, we
cannot accept his view of the mode of operation of law in producing this
all-important change.
But the hypothesis of the “primal law “ enables us to conceive the
first step of the process in a manner consistent with modern biological
principles. For offence against the “primal law” meant death to the of-
fender, unless he proved himself more than a match for the patriarch.
Hence the ruthless pugnacity of the patriarch must have constantly
weeded out the more reckless of his male progeny, those least capable of
restraining their sexual impulse under the threat of his anger. Fear, the
great inhibitor, must have played a great part in inducing observance of
the “primal law”; and it might be suggested that the principal effect of
the enforcement of this law must have been to increase by selection the
power of this restraining instinct But those males who failed to engage
in combat would never succeed in transmitting their too timorous na-
tures to a later generation; for by combat alone could the headship of a
family be obtained. Hence this ruthless selection among the young males
must have led to the development of prudence, rather than to the mere
strengthening of the instinct of fear.
Now prudent control of an impulse implies a much higher type of
mental organisation, a much greater degree of mental integration, than
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the instinct of fear plays a part in such prudent control, but it implies
also a considerable degree of development of self-consciousness and of
the self-regarding sentiment and a capacity for deliberation and the weigh-
ing of motives in the light of self-consciousness. If an individual has
such capacities, a moderate strength of the fear-impulse will suffice to
restrain the sex-impulse more effectively than a very strong fear-im-
pulse operating in a less-developed mind. The operation of the “primal
law” will, therefore, have tended to secure that the successful rival of
the patriarch should have strong instincts of sex and of pugnacity and a
but moderately strong fear-instinct, combined with the more developed
mental organisation that permits of deliberation and of control of the
stronger impulses through the organised co-operation of the weaker
impulses. That is to say, it was a condition which secured for the family
community a succession of patriarchs, each of whom was superior to
his rivals, not merely in power of combat, but also and chiefly in power
of far-sighted control of his impulses. Each such patriarch, becoming
the father of the succeeding generation, will then have transmitted to it
in some degree his exceptional power of self-control. In this way the
“primal law,” enforced by the fiercest passions of primitive man, may
have prepared human nature for the observance of laws less brutally
and ruthlessly enforced, may, in short, have played a great part in devel-
oping in humanity that power of self-control and law-abidingness which
was the essential condition of the progress of social organisation.
If we consider human societies at a later stage of their development,
we shall see that the pugnacious instinct has played a similar part there
also. And in this case we are not compelled to rely only on speculative
hypotheses, but can find inductive support for our inference in a com-
parative study of existing savage peoples.
When in any region social organisation had progressed so far that
the mortal combat of individuals was replaced by the mortal combat of
tribes, villages, or groups of any kind, success in combat and survival
and propagation must have been favoured by, and have depended upon,
not only the vigour and ferocity of individual fighters, but also, and to
an even greater degree, upon the capacity of individuals for united ac-
tion, upon good comradeship, upon personal trustworthiness, and upon
the capacity of individuals to subordinate their impulsive tendencies
and egoistic promptings to the ends of the group and to the commands
of the accepted leader. Hence, wherever such mortal conflict of groups
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groups just those social and moral qualities of individuals which are the
essential conditions of all effective co-operation and of the higher forms
of social organisation. For success in war implies definite organisation,
the recognition of a leader, and faithful observance of his commands;
and the obedience given to the war-chief implies a far higher level of
morality than is implied by the mere observance of the “primal law” or
of any other personal prohibition under the threat of punishment. A
leader whose followers were bound to him by fear of punishment only
would have no chance of success against a band of which the members
were bound together and to their chief by a true conscientiousness aris-
ing from a more developed self-consciousness, from the identification
of the self with the society, and from a sensitive regard on the part of
each member for the opinion of his fellows.
Such conflict of groups could not fail to operate effectively in de-
veloping the moral nature of man; those communities in which this higher
morality was developed would triumph over and exterminate those which
had not attained it in equal degree. And the more the pugnacious instinct
impelled primitive societies to warfare, the more rapidly and effectively
must the fundamental social attributes of men have been developed in
the societies which survived the ordeal.
It is not easy to analyse these moral qualities and to say exactly
what elements of the mental constitution were involved in this evolu-
tion. In part the advance must have consisted in a further improvement
of the kind we have supposed to be effected by the operation of the
“primal law,” namely, a richer self-consciousness, and increased capac-
ity for control of the stronger primary impulses by the co-operation of
impulses springing from dispositions organised about the idea of the
self. It may also have involved a relative increase of strength of the more
specifically social tendencies, namely, the gregarious instinct, the in-
stincts of self-assertion and subjection, and the primitive sympathetic
tendency; the increase of strength of these tendencies in the members of
any social group would render them capable of being more strongly
swayed by regard for the opinions and feelings of their fellows, and so
would strengthen the influence of the public opinion of the group upon
each member of it.
These results of group-selection produced by the mortal conflicts of
small societies, and ultimately due to the strength of the pugnacious
instinct, are very clearly illustrated by the tribes of Borneo. As one
travels up any one of the large rivers, one meets with tribes that areAn Introduction to Social Psychology/199
successively more warlike. In the coast regions are peaceful communi-
ties which never fight, save in self-defence, and then with but poor suc-
cess; while in the central regions, where the rivers take their rise, are a
number of extremely warlike tribes, whose raids have been a constant
source of terror to the communities settled in the lower reaches of the
rivers. And between these tribes at the centre and those in the coast
regions are others that serve as a buffer between them, being decidedly
more bellicose than the latter but less so than the former. It might be
supposed that the peaceful coastwise people would be found to be supe-
rior in moral qualities to their more warlike neighbours; but the con-
trary is the case. In almost all respects the advantage lies with the war-
like tribes. Their houses are better built, larger, and cleaner; their do-
mestic morality is superior; they are physically stronger, are braver, and
physically and mentally more active, and in general are more trustwor-
thy. But, above all, their social organisation is firmer and more efficient,
because their respect for and obedience to their chiefs, and their loyalty
to their community, are much greater; each man identifies himself with
the whole community and accepts and loyally performs the social duties
laid upon him. And the moderately warlike tribes occupying the inter-
mediate regions stand midway between them and the people of the coast
as regards these moral qualities.129  Yet all these tribes are of closely
allied racial stocks, and the superior moral qualities of the central tribes
would seem to be the direct result of the very severe group- selection to
which their innate pugnacity has subjected them for many generations.
And the greater strength of their pugnacious instinct, which displays
itself unmistakably in their more martial bearing and more fiery temper,
is probably due ultimately to the more bracing climate of the central
regions, which, by favouring a greater bodily activity, has led to more
frequent conflicts and a stricter weeding out of the more inoffensive and
less energetic individuals and groups.
Such tribal conflict, which in this remote region has continued up to
the present time, has probably played in past ages a great part in prepar-
ing the civilised peoples of Europe for the complex social life that they
have developed. Mr. Kidd has insisted forcibly upon this view, pointing
out that the tribes of the central and northern regions of Europe, which
have played so great a part in the later history of civilisation, were sub-
jected for long ages to a process of military groupselection which was
probably of extreme severity, and which rendered them, at the time they
first appear in history, the most pugnacious and terrible warriors that200/William McDougall
the world has ever seen.130 This process must have developed not only
the individual fighting qualities, but also the qualities that make for
conscientious conduct and stable and efficient social organisation. These
effects were clearly marked in the barbarians who overran the Roman
Empire. The Germanic tribes were perhaps more pugnacious and pos-
sessed of the military virtues in a higher degree than any other people
that has existed before or since. They were the most terrible enemies, as
Julius Caesar found; they could never be subdued because they fought,
not merely to gain any specific ends, but because they loved fighting,
i.e., because they were innately pugnacious. Their religion and the char-
acter of their gods reflected their devotion to war; centuries of Chris-
tianity have failed to eradicate this quality, and the smallest differences
of Opinion and belief continue to furnish the pretexts for fresh combats.
Mr. Kidd argues strongly that it is the social qualities developed by this
process of military group-selection which, more than anything else, have
enabled these peoples to build up a new civilisation on the ruins of the
Roman Empire, and to carry on the progress of social organisation and
of civilisation to the point it has now reached.
These important social effects of the pugnacious instinct seem to be
forcibly illustrated by a comparison of the peoples of Europe with those
of India and of China, two areas comparable with it in extent, in density
of settled population, and in age of civilisation. In neither of these areas
has there been a similar perennial conflict of societies. In both of them,
the mass of the people has been subjected for long ages to the rule of
dominant castes which have established themselves in successive inva-
sions from the central plateau of Asia, that great breeding-ground of
warlike nomadic hordes. The result in both cases is the same. The bulk
of the people are deficient in the pugnacious instinct; they are patient
and long suffering, have no taste for war, and, in China especially, they
despise the military virtues. At the same time they seem to be deficient
in those social qualities which may be summed up under the one word
“conscientiousness,” and which are the cement of societies and essential
factors of their progressive integration. Accordingly, in the societies
formed by these peoples, the parts hang but loosely together—they are
but partially integrated and loosely organised. Among these peoples
Buddhism, the religion of peace, found a congenial home, and its pre-
cepts have governed the practice of great masses of men in a very real
manner, which contrasts strongly with the formal acceptance and prac-
tical neglect of the peaceful precepts of their religion that has alwaysAn Introduction to Social Psychology/201
characterised the Christian peoples of Western Europe.
In this connection it is interesting to compare the Japanese with the
Chinese people. Whether the strain of Malayan blood in the Japanese
has endowed them from the first with a stronger instinct of pugnacity
than their cousins the Chinese, it is impossible to say. But it is certain
that the people, in spite of the fact that they have long recognised in their
Emperor a common spiritual head of the empire, have been until very
recently divided into numerous clans that have been almost constantly
at war with one another, society being organised on a military system
not unlike that of feudal Europe. Hence the profession of the soldier has
continued to be held in the highest honour, and the fighting qualities, as
well as the specifically social qualities of the people, have been brought
to a very high level.
In Japan also Buddhism has long been firmly established; but, as
with Christianity in Europe, its preaching of peace has never been prac-
tically accepted by the mass of the people; the old ancestor-worship has
continued to flourish side by side with it, and now, on the accentuation
of the warlike spirit induced by contact with the outside world, seems to
be pushing the religion of peace into the background.
In addition to this important role in the evolution of the moral quali-
ties, the pugnacious instinct has exerted a more direct and hardly less
important influence in the life of societies.
We have seen how this instinct is operative in the emotion of re-
venge and in moral indignation. These two emotions have played lead-
ing parts in the growth and maintenance of every system of criminal law
and every code of punishment; for, however widely authors may differ
as to the spirit in which punishment should be administered, there can
be no doubt that it was originally retributive, and that it still retains
something of this character even in the most highly civilised societies.
The administration of criminal law is then the organised and regulated
expression of the anger of society, modified and softened in various
degrees by the desire that punishment may reform the wrong-doer and
deter others from similar actions.
Though with the progress of civilisation the public administration
of justice has encroached more and more on the sphere of operation of
the anger of individuals as a power restraining offences of all kinds, yet,
in the matter of offences against the person, individual anger remains as
a latent threat whose influence is by no means negligible in the regula-
tion of manners, as we see most clearly in those countries in which the202/William McDougall
practice of duelling is not yet obsolete. And in the nursery and the school
righteous anger will always have a great and proper part to play in the
training of the individual for his life in society.
It was suggested in Chapter IV that emulation is rooted in an in-
stinct which was evolved in the human mind by a process of differentia-
tion from the instinct of pugnacity. However that may be, it seems clear
that this impulse is distinct from both the combative and the self-asser-
tive impulses; and just as, according to our supposition, the emulative
impulse has acquired in the course of the evolution of the human mind
an increasing importance, so in the life of societies it tends gradually to
take the place of the instinct of pugnacity, as a force making for the
development of social life and organisation.
It is among the peoples of Western Europe, who, as we have seen,
have been moulded by a prolonged and severe process of military selec-
tion, that the emulative impulse is most active. With us it supplies the
zest and determines the forms of almost all our games and recreations;
and Professor James is guilty of picturesque exaggeration only, when he
says “nine-tenths of the work of our world is done by it.” Our educa-
tional system is founded upon it; it is the social force underlying an
immense amount of strenuous exertion; to it we owe in a great measure
even our science, our literature, and our art; for it is a strong, perhaps
an essential, element of ambition, that last infirmity of noble minds, in
which it operates through, and under the direction of, a highly devel-
oped social self- consciousness.
The emulative impulse tends to assert itself in an ever-widening
sphere of social life, encroaching more and more upon the sphere of the
combative impulse, and supplanting it more and more as a prime mover
of both individuals and societies. This tendency brings with it a very
important change in the conditions of social evolution. While the com-
bative impulse leads to the destruction of the individuals and societies
that are least capable of self-defence, the emulative impulse does not
directly lead to the extermination of individuals or societies. It is, rather,
compatible with a tender solicitude for their continued existence; the
millionaire, who, prompted by this impulse, has succeeded in appropri-
ating a proportion of the wealth of the community vastly in excess of his
deserts, may spend a part of it on free libraries, hospitals, or soup-
kitchens. In fact, the natural tendency of the emulative impulse is to
preserve, rather than to destroy, defeated competitors; for their regards
bring a fuller satisfaction to the impulse, and the exploitation of theirAn Introduction to Social Psychology/203
labour by the successful rival is the natural issue of competition. There-
fore, as emulation replaces pugnacity within any society, it tends to put
a stop to natural selection of individuals within that society; so that the
evolution of human nature becomes increasingly dependent on group-
selection. And, if international emulation should completely supplant
international pugnacity, group-selection also will be rendered very much
less effective. To this stage the most highly civilised communities are
tending, in accordance with the law that the collective mind follows in
the steps of evolution of the individual mind at a great interval of time.
There are unmistakeable signs that the pugnacity of nations is being
supplanted by emulation, that warfare is being replaced by industrial
and intellectual rivalry; that wars between civilised nations, which are
replacing the mortal conflicts between individuals and between societ-
ies dominated by the spirit of pugnacity, are tending to become mere
incidents of their commercial and industrial rivalry, being undertaken to
secure markets or sources of supply of raw material which shall bring
industrial or commercial advantage to their possessor.
The tendency of emulation to replace pugnacity is, then, a tendency
to bring to an end what has been an important, probably the most im-
portant, factor of progressive evolution of human nature, namely, the
selection of the fit and the extermination of the less fit (among both




It was pointed out in Chapter III that the gregarious instinct plays a
great part in determining the forms of our recreations; and in Chapter
VI it was shown how, in co-operation with the primitive sympathetic
tendency, it leads men to seek to share their emotions with the largest
possible number of their fellows. Besides determining the forms of rec-
reations, this instinct plays a much more serious part in the life of civilised
societies. It is sometimes assumed that the monstrous and disastrous
growth of London and of other large towns is the result of some obscure
economic necessity. But, as a matter of fact, London and many other
large towns have for a long time past far exceeded the proportions that
conduce to economic efficiency and healthy social life, just as the vast
herds of bison, or other animals, referred to in Chapter III, greatly ex-
ceed the size necessary for mutual defence. We are often told that the204/William McDougall
dulness of the country drives the people to the towns. But that statement
inverts the truth. It is the crowd in the towns, the vast human herd, that
exerts a baneful attraction on those outside it People have lived in the
country for hundreds of generations without finding it dull. It is only the
existence of the crowded towns that creates by contrast the dulness
of the country. As in the case of the animals, the larger the aggregation
the greater is its power of attraction; hence, in spite of high rents, high
rates, dirt, disease, congestion of traffic, ugliness, squalor, and sooty
air, the large towns continue to grow at an increasing rate, while the
small towns diminish and the country villages are threatened with ex-
tinction.
That this herding in the towns is not due to any economic necessi-
ties of our industrial organisation, is shown by the fact that it takes
place to an equally great and regrettable extent in countries where the
industrial conditions are very different. In Australia, where everything
favours an agricultural or pastoral mode of life, half the population of a
continent is crowded into a few towns on the coast. In China, where
industry persists almost entirely in the form of handicrafts and where
economic conditions are extremely different from our own, we find towns
like Canton containing three million inhabitants crowded together even
more densely than in London and under conditions no less repulsive.
In England we must attribute this tendency chiefly to the fact that
the spread of elementary education and the freer intercourse between
the people of the different parts of the country have broken down the
bonds of custom which formerly kept each man to the place and calling
of his forefathers; for custom, the great conservative force of society,
the great controller of the individual impulses, being weakened, the deep-
seated instincts, especially the gregarious instinct, have found their op-
portunity to determine the choices of men. Other causes have, of course,
co-operated and have facilitated the aggregations of population; but
without the instinctive basis they would probably have produced only
slight effects of this kind.
The administrative authorities have shown of late years a disposi-
tion to encourage in every possible way this gregarious tendency. On the
slightest occasion they organise some show which shall draw huge crowds
to gape, until now a new street cannot be opened without the expendi-
ture of thousands of pounds in tawdry decorations, and a foreign prince
cannot drive to a railway station without drawing many thousands of
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confirming their already overdeveloped gregarious instincts. There can
be no doubt that the excessive indulgence of this impulse is one of the
greatest demoralising factors of the present time in this country, just as
it was in Rome in the days of her declining power and glory.
In this connection we may briefly consider the views of Professor
Giddings132 on “the consciousness of kind,” which he would have us
regard as the basic principle of social organisation. He writes, “In its
widest extension the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from
the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animals it marks off species
and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the
more definite ethnical and political groupings, it is the basis of class
distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance, of rules of intercourse,
and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct towards those whom we feel
to be most like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from
our conduct towards others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves.
Again, it is the consciousness of kind, and nothing else, which distin-
guishes social conduct, as such, from purely economic, purely political,
or purely religious conduct; for in actual life it constantly interferes
with the theoretically perfect operation of the economic, political, or
religious motive. The working man joins a strike of which he does not
approve rather than cut himself off from his fellows. For a similar rea-
son the manufacturer who questions the value of protection to his own
industry yet pays his contribution to the protectionist campaign fund.
The Southern gentleman, who believed in the cause of the Union, none
the less threw in his fortunes with the Confederacy, if he felt himself to
be one of the Southern people and a stranger to the people of the North.
The liberalising of creeds is accomplished by the efforts of men who are
no longer able to accept the traditional dogma, but who desire to main-
tain associations which it would be painful to sever. In a word, it is
about the consciousness of kind that all other motives organise them-
selves in the evolution of social choice, social volition, or social policy.”
All that attraction of like to like, which Giddings here attributes to
the “consciousness of kind” is, I think, to be regarded as the work of the
gregarious impulse, operating at a high level of mental life in conjunc-
tion with other impulses. That “consciousness of kind,” the recognition
of degrees of likeness of others to one’s self, underlies all such cases as
Professor Giddings mentions, and is presupposed by all social life, is
true only if we use the words in a very loose sense. If we would state
more accurately the facts vaguely implied by this phrase, we must say206/William McDougall
that the gregarious impulse of any animal receives satisfaction only
through the presence of animals similar to itself, and the closer the simi-
larity the greater is the satisfaction. The impulse of this instinct will
bring and keep together in one herd animals of different species, as when
we see horses and bullocks grazing together, or birds of several species
in one flock; but it brings and keeps together much more powerfully
animals of one species. Just so, in any human being the instinct operates
most powerfully in relation to, and receives the highest degree of satis-
faction from the presence of, the human beings who most closely re-
semble that individual, those who behave in like manner and respond to
the same situations with similar emotions. An explicit “consciousness
of kind” in any literal sense of the words implies a relatively high level
of mental development and a developed self-consciousness, and this is
by no means necessary to the operation of the gregarious instinct. And
such “consciousness of kind” can of itself do nothing, it is not a social
force, is not a motive, can of itself generate no impulse or desire. It is
merely one of the most highly developed of the cognitive processes
through which the gregarious instinct may be brought into play. If this
instinct were lacking to men, the most accurate recognition of personal
likenesses and differences would fail to produce the effects attributed to
“consciousness of kind.”
It is because we are not equally attracted by all social aggregations,
but find the greatest satisfaction of the gregarious impulse in the society
of those most like ourselves, that a segregation of like elements occurs
in all communities. Among uncivilised people we usually find commu-
nities of the same tribe, and tribes closely allied by blood, occupying
contiguous areas; and the effects of this tendency persist in the civilised
countries of the present day in the form of local differences of physical
and mental characters of the populations of the various counties or other
large areas.
The same tendency is illustrated by the formation in the United States
of America of large, locally circumscribed communities of various Eu-
ropean extractions; and in our large towns it manifests itself in the seg-
regation of people of similar race and occupation and social status, a
process which results in striking differences between the various dis-
tricts or quarters of the town, and striking uniformities within the limits
of any one such quarter. In this tendency we may find also an explana-
tion of the curious fact that the traders dealing in each kind of object are
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streets—the coach-builders in Long Acre, the news-vendors in Fleet
Street, the doctors in Harley Street, the shipping offices in Leadenhall
Street, and so on. This segregation of like trades, which might seem to
be a curious economic anomaly under our competitive system, is not
peculiar to European towns. It forced itself upon my attention in the
streets of Canton, where it obtains in a striking degree, and also in sev-
eral Indian towns.
We may briefly sum up the social operation of the gregarious in-
stinct by saying that, in early times when population was scanty, it must
have played an important part in social evolution by keeping men to-
gether and thereby occasioning the need for social laws and institutions;
as well as by providing the conditions of aggregation in which alone the
higher evolution of the social attributes was possible; but that in highly
civilised societies its functions are less important, because the density of
population ensures a sufficient aggregation of the people; and that, fa-
cilities for aggregation being so greatly increased among modern na-
tions, its direct operation is apt to produce anomalous and even injuri-
ous social results.
Chapter XIII
The Instincts through which Religious
Conceptions Affect Social Life
Many authors have written of the religious instinct or instincts, though
few have made any serious attempt to make clear the meaning they
attach to these phrases.133 Those who use these phrases usually seem to
imply that this assumed religious instinct of man is one that is his pecu-
liar endowment and has no relation to the instincts of the animals. But I
do not know that this is now seriously maintained by any psychologist.
The emotions that play a principal part in religious life are admiration,
awe, and reverence. In Chapter V we have analysed these emotions and
found that admiration is a fusion of wonder and negative self-feeling;
that awe is a fusion of admiration with fear; and that reverence is awe
blended with tender emotion.
Religion has powerfully influenced social development in so many
ways, and the primary emotions and impulses through which the reli-
gious conceptions have exerted this influence have co-operated so inti-
mately, that they must be considered together when we attempt to illus-
trate their role in social life.208/William McDougall
Something has already been said of the role of fear in the chapter
treating of pugnacity. Whether or no the hypothesis of the “primal law”
be well founded, fear must have played in primitive societies some such
part as was assigned to it in discussing that doctrine. That is to say, fear
of physical punishment inflicted by the anger of his fellows must have
been the great agent of discipline of primitive man; through such fear he
must first have learnt to control and regulate his impulses in conformity
with the needs of social life.
But, at an early stage of social development, awe must have supple-
mented and in part supplanted simple fear in this role. For, as with the
development of language man became capable of a fuller life of ideas,
the instinct of curiosity, which in the animals merely serves to rivet their
attention upon unfamiliar objects, must have been frequently excited by
the display of forces that in creatures of a lower level of development
excite fear only. This instinct must then have kept his thoughts at work
upon these objects of his wonder, and especially upon those which ex-
cited not only wonder but fear. These must have become the objects of
man’s awful contemplation, and he began to evolve theories to account
for them, theories of which, no doubt, he felt the need as guides to action
in the presence of these forces.
We may assume that primitive man lacked almost completely the
conception of mechanical causation. For the modern savage mechanical
causation is the explanation of but a small part of the natural processes
which interest him through affecting his welfare for good or ill. For
those of us who have grown up familiar with the modern doctrine of the
prevalence of mechanical causation throughout the material world, it is
difficult to realise how enormous is the distortion of the facts of imme-
diate experience wrought by that doctrine, by how great an effort of
abstraction it has been reached. The savage is familiar with the sequence
of movement upon impact, but such sequences are far from invariable
in his experience, and constitute but a very small proportion of the events
which interest him. The fall of bodies to the ground, the flowing of
water, the blowing of the wind, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the
growth and movements of animals and plants, thunder, lightning, rain,
fire, and the emission and reflection of light and heat—these are promi-
nent among the things that interest him, and in none of them is there any
obvious indication of mechanical operation. The one kind of causation
with which the uncultured man is thoroughly familiar is his own voli-
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rally and inevitably becomes for him the type on which he models his
theories of the causation of terrible events. Here we touch the fringe of
an immense subject, the evolution of religious conceptions, which we
cannot pursue. It must suffice to say that Professor Tylor’s doctrine of
animism, as set forth in his great work on “Primitive Culture,” is prob-
ably the best account we yet have of the early steps of this evolution. Let
us note merely that in all probability primitive man, like ourselves, was
apt to accept without wonder, without pondering and reasoning upon
them, the beneficent processes of nature, the gentle rain, the light and
warmth of the sun, the flowing of the river, the healthy growth of animal
and vegetable life; but that his wonder was especially aroused by those
things and events which excited also his fear, by disease and death,
pestilence and famine, storm and flood, lightning and thunder, and the
powerful beasts of prey. For, while the beneficent processes are regular,
gentle, and familiar, these others are apt to come suddenly, irregularly,
and apparently capriciously, and are therefore unfamiliar and startling,
as well as hurtful and irresistible. On such objects and events, then,
man’s wondering thoughts were concentrated, about them his imagina-
tion chiefly played. Hence it followed that the powers which his imagi-
nation created for the explanation of these events were conceived by
him more or less vaguely as terrible powers ready at every moment to
bring disaster upon him and his community. Therefore he walked in fear
and trembling, and was deeply concerned to learn how to avoid giving
offence to these mysterious and fearful powers. And, as soon as these
powers began to be conceived by man as personal powers, they must
have evoked in him the attitude and impulse of subjection and the emo-
tion of negative self-feeling, which are rooted in the instinct of subjec-
tion. Or perhaps it would be truer to say that, as man began to form
conceptions of these forces of nature, they evoked in him the impulse
and emotion of this instinct, threw him into the submissive attitude char-
acteristic of this instinct, which is essentially a personal attitude, one
implying a personal relation; and that primitive man, finding himself in
this attitude before these powers, was thus led to personify them, to
attribute to them the personal attributes of strength and anger, which are
the normal and primitive excitants of this instinct. Hence his emotion
took the complex form of awe (a tertiary compound of fear, wonder, and
negative self-feeling134); that is, he not only feared, and wondered at,
these powers, but humbled himself before them, and sought to gain and
to obey the slightest indications of their wills.135210/William McDougall
It is obvious that conceptions of this sort, once achieved and ac-
cepted by all members of a community with unquestioning belief, must
have been very powerful agencies of social discipline. The cause of
every calamity, befalling either the individual or the community, would
be sought in some offence given to the beings thus vaguely conceived;
and primitive man would be apt to regard as the source of offence any
action at all unusual, at all out of the ordinary, whether of individuals or
of the community. Hence the conceptions of these awe-inspiring beings
would lead to increased severity of social discipline in two ways: firstly,
by causing society to enforce its customary laws more rigidly than was
the rule so long as breaches of the law were regarded as merely natural
offences against members of the community; for the breaking of custom
by any individual was now believed to bring grave risks to the whole
community, which therefore was collectively concerned to prevent and
to punish any such breach: secondly, by producing a very great increase
in the number and kinds of customary prohibitions and enforced obser-
vances; for post hoc ergo propter hoc is the logic of uncultured man,
and every unusual act followed by success or disaster must have tended
to become a customary observance or the subject of a social prohibi-
tion.
Thus these conceptions of supernal powers, the products of man’s
creative imagination working through, and under the driving power of,
the instincts of fear, curiosity, and subjection, became the great genera-
tors and supporters of custom. The importance of the social operation
of these instincts was, then, very great; for the first requisite of society,
the prime condition of the social life of man, was, in the words of Bagehot,
a hard crust or cake of custom. In the struggle for existence only those
societies survived which were able to evolve such a hard crust of cus-
tom, binding men together, assimilating their actions to the accepted
standards, compelling control of the purely egoistic impulses, and ex-
terminating the individuals incapable of such control.
We see the same result among all savage communities still existing
on the earth, and among all the peoples of whom we have any record at
the dawn of civilisation. Their actions, whether individual or collective,
are hampered, controlled, or enforced at every step by custom. In Borneo,
for example, an expedition prepared by months of labour will turn home-
ward and give up its objects if bad omens are observed—if a particular
bird calls on one side or the other, or flies across the river in some
particular fashion; or a newly- married and devoted couple will separateAn Introduction to Social Psychology/211
if on the wedding day the cry of a deer is heard near the house.
There is no end to the curious and absurd customs, generally sup-
ported by supernatural sanctions, by which the actions of savages and
barbarians are commonly surrounded and hemmed in. We have to re-
member that, in the case of existing savage communities, the growth
and multiplication of customs may have been proceeding through all the
ages during which the few progressive peoples have been evolving their
civilisation. But enough is now known of the primitive age of ancient
Greece and Rome to show that the great civilisations of these states took
their rise among peoples bound hand and foot by religious custom and
law as rigidly as any savages,136 and to show also that the dominant
religious emotion was fear.137
We may assume with confidence that the formation of a mass of
customary observance and prohibition was a principal feature of the
evolution of all human societies that have risen above the lowest level
and have survived through any considerable period of time; not only
because the existence of such a crust of custom is observable in all
savage and barbarous communities, but also because in its earlier stage
the process must have so strengthened the societies in which it took
place that rival societies in which it failed could not have stood up against
them in the struggle for existence. And this essential step of social evo-
lution was, as we have seen, in the main produced by the co-operation
of the instincts of fear, curiosity, and subjection.
The difficult thing to understand is how any societies ever managed
to break their cake of custom, to become progressive and yet to survive.
As a matter of fact, very few have become progressive, and fewer still
have long survived the taking of this step. The great majority have re-
mained in the bonds of custom. And these customs have grown ever
more rigid and more remote in form from primitive customs, and often
more unreasonable and absurd; in many cases they have assumed forms
so grotesque that it is difficult to suggest their psychological origin and
history; and in many cases their multiplicity and rigidity have increased,
until they have far exceeded the socially advantageous limits.
In many regions the fearful element in religion predominated more
and more, the gods increasingly assumed a cruel and bloodthirsty char-
acter, until, as in the case of the Aztecs of ancient Mexico, the religious
ritual by which they were appeased involved the sacrifice of herds of
victims, and their altars were constantly wet with human blood.
These elements and forces of primitive religion have lived on, con-212/William McDougall
tinuing to play their parts, while religion rose to a higher plane on which
tender emotion, in the form of gratitude, mingled more and more with
awe, blended with it, and converted it to reverence.
This change in the nature of religious emotion among those peoples
that have survived and progressed was a natural consequence of their
success in the struggle of groups for survival. For the surviving com-
munities are those whose gods have in the main, not only spared them,
not only abstained from bringing plague and famine and military disas-
ter upon them in too severe measure, but have actively supported them
and enabled them to overcome their enemies. Communities that are con-
tinuously successful in battle naturally tend to conceive the divine power
as a god of battles who smites the enemy hip and thigh and delivers them
into the hands of his chosen people to be their slaves and to add to their
wealth and power. Thus the early Romans, as they emerged triumphant
from successive wars with the neighbouring cities and grew in power
and wealth, naturally and inevitably acquired some confidence in the
beneficence of their gods; they began to fear them less and to feel some
gratitude towards them.
The utterly cruel gods could continue to survive only among com-
munities not subjected to any severe struggle with other groups, as, for
example, among the comparatively isolated Aztecs of Mexico.
Nevertheless, in almost all religions, fear of divine punishment has
continued to play its all- important part in securing observance of social
custom and law, and in leading communities to enforce their customs
with severe penalties. The divine power remains for long ages a very
jealous god (or gods), whose anger against a whole people may be stirred
by the offences of individuals. This feature, namely, communal respon-
sibility before the gods, to which in primitive societies the supernatural
sanctions owe their tremendous power as agents of social discipline,
was clearly present even in the religion of Athens at the time of its
highest culture; and even in our own age and country the belief still
survives and finds occasional expression (or did so very recently) in the
observance of days of national humiliation.
But, as societies became larger and more complex, this principle
necessarily weakened. Man’s sense of justice rebelled against the as-
cription of so much injustice to the gods, whom he was learning to re-
gard with gratitude and reverence as well as awe. Man is never long
content to worship gods of moral character greatly inferior to his own.
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to be shifted back to the offending individual. And then, since it was
obvious in every age that the wicked man often flourishes during this
life, it became necessary to assume that the vengeance of the supernatu-
ral powers falls upon him in the life beyond the grave. Hence we find
that, while societies are small and compact, communal responsibility
for individual wrong-doing is the rule, and the idea of punishment after
death is hardly entertained; but that, with the growth in size and com-
plexity of a society and with the improvement of its moral ideas, belief
in communal responsibility declines, and belief in punishment of wrong-
doing after death arises to take its place as the effective sanction of
custom and law. The most notable example of this process is, of course,
afforded by the hell-fire which has played so great a part in the sterner
forms of Christianity. And the long persistence of fear and awe in reli-
gion is well illustrated by the phrase widely current among the genera-
tion recently passed away, “an upright, god-fearing man,” a phrase which
expresses the tendency to identify uprightness with god-fearingness, or,
rather, to recognise fear as the source and regulator of social conduct. It
is a nice question: To what extent is the lapse from orthodox obser-
vances, so remarkable and widespread among the more highly civilised
peoples at the present time, due to the general softening of religious
teaching, to the lapse of the doctrine of divine retribution to a very sec-
ondary position, and to the discredit into which the flames of hell have
fallen?138
It has been contended by some authors that religion and morality
were primitively distinct, and that the intimate connection commonly
obtaining between them in civilised societies arose comparatively late in
the course of social development. This contention, which is opposed to
the view of religious development sketched in the foregoing pages, is
true only if we attach an unduly narrow meaning to the words “religion”
and “morality.” Although many of the modes of conduct prescribed by
primitive and savage custom and enforced by supernatural sanctions
are not such as we regard as moral, and are in many cases even detri-
mental to the simple societies in which such customs obtain, and so
cannot be justified by any utilitarian principle, yet we must class the
observance of such custom as moral conduct. For the essence of moral
conduct is the performance of social duty, the duty prescribed by soci-
ety, as opposed to the mere following of the promptings of egoistic im-
pulses. If we define moral conduct in this broad sense, and this is the
only satisfactory definition of it139—then, no matter how grotesque and,214/William McDougall
from our point of view, how immoral the prescribed codes of conduct of
other societies may appear to -be, we must admit conformity to the code
to be moral conduct; and we must admit that religion from its first crude
beginnings was bound up with morality in some such way as we have
briefly sketched; that the two things, religion and morality, were not at
first separate and later fused together; but that they were always inti-
mately related, and have reciprocally acted and reacted upon one an-
other throughout the course of their evolution. We must recognise also
that a firm and harmonious relation between them has been in every age
a main condition of the stability of societies.
The hypothetical sketch of the early development of morality, the
most essential condition of all development of social life, contained in
the foregoing pages may be summarised as follows: Moral conduct con-
sists in the regulation and control of the immediate promptings of im-
pulse in conformity with some prescribed code of conduct. The first
stage was the control of impulse through fear of individual retribution.
Advance from this level took place through three principal changes: (1)
the general recognition and customary observance of individual rights
which before had been claimed only by individuals and enforced only by
their superior strength; (2) an increase in the number of kinds of action
regulated by customary law; (3) an increase of the effectiveness of the
sanctions of these laws; the principal change in this connection being
the introduction of supernatural powers (i.e., powers which we regard
as supernatural) as the guardians or patrons of custom, resulting (a) in
the stern enforcement of customs by the whole community, which feels
itself collectively responsible to these powers, and (b) in the supple-
menting of the fear of human retribution by the fear of divine retribu-
tion; (4) a change in the innate dispositions of men, consisting in a de-
velopment of those features of the mind which render possible a prudent
and more complete control of the primary impulses, a change effected in
the earlier stages chiefly by individual selection, in later stages chiefly
by military group- selection.
In the production of this evolution of morality the instincts of pug-
nacity (probably largely under the form of male jealousy) and of fear
were the all-important factors as regards the first stages; while in later
stages these great socialising forces were supplemented by the impulses
of curiosity or wonder, of subjection, and, at a still later stage, by the
tender protective impulse evoked principally in the form of gratitude
towards the protecting deities.An Introduction to Social Psychology/215
A few more words must be said about the role of curiosity as a force
in the life of societies. For, although it has no doubt played, largely
under the forms of wonder and admiration, a leading part in the evolu-
tion of religion, and in so far has been one of the conservative forces of
society, it has played also a no less important part of a very different
tendency. The instinct of curiosity is at the base of many of man’s most
splendid achievements, for rooted in it are his speculative and scientific
tendencies. It has been justly maintained by J. S. Mill, by T. H. Buckle,
and others, that the free and effective operation of these tendencies in
any society is not only the gauge of that society’s position in the scale of
civilisation, but also the principal condition of the progress of a people
in all that constitutes civilisation. No attempt can be made here to sup-
port this view. But it may be pointed out that its truth is brought home to
the mind by cursorily reviewing the periods of the greatest achieve-
ments of speculative reason. Such a review will show that these periods
coincide approximately with the periods of the most rapid progress of
social evolution; each such period of the life of a people being com-
monly followed by one of social stagnation, during which the leading
minds remain content to brood over the wisdom of the ancient sages,
Confucius, Aristotle, or Galen, regarding their achievements as unap-
proachable, authoritative, and supreme.
It is the insatiable curiosity of the modern European and American
mind that, more than anything else, distinguishes it from all others and
is the source of the immensely increased power over nature and over
man that we now possess. Contrast our sceptical, insatiable, North-
Pole- hunting disposition with that of most Eastern peoples.140
If we attempt briefly to characterise the achievements that we owe
to the speculative tendencies rooted in the instinct of curiosity, we find
that they may for the most part be summed up under the head of im-
provements in our conception of causation. Mr. Stuart Glennie has for-
mulated, as the fundamental law of intellectual development, the law of
the advance from a quantitatively undetermined to a quantitatively de-
termined conception of the reciprocal action or interaction of all things;
that is to say, he maintains that the main cause of human progress is the
advance from very imperfect and misleading views of causation to more
accurate views; and in place of Comte’s three stages of thought—the
theological, the metaphysical, and the positive—he would distinguish
the magical, the supernatural, and the scientific stages of this advance
in man’s notion of causation.216/William McDougall
There is truth in this formulation; but we must recognise that the
stages do not succeed one another in clearly distinguishable periods of
time, but rather that the three modes of thought coexist among every
people that has progressed beyond savagery, and will probably always
coexist: we must recognise that progress consists in, and results from,
the increasing dominance of the second, and especially of the third, over
the first, rather than in any complete substitution of one for another.
The magical mode of thought and practice is the immediate expres-
sion of man’s need and desire to control the forces of his environment,
while yet he knows nothing of their nature. At this stage man conceives
all things to be capable of reciprocal action, but as to the modes of their
interaction he has but the vaguest and most inaccurate notions. Hence,
in attempting to control these forces, he adopts whatever procedure sug-
gests itself in virtue of the natural associative conjunctions of his ideas;
as when he attempts to cause rain by sprinkling water on the ground
with certain traditional formalities, to raise wind by whistling or by
imitating the sound of it with the bull-roarer, to bring disease or death
by maltreating an effigy of his enemy, to cure pain and disease by draw-
ing it out of the body in the form of a material object or imaginary entity.
Though belief in the efficacy of such practices has maintained itself
with wonderful persistency through long ages, yet the lack of success
that so often attends them forbids man to remain for ever satisfied with
them, or to feel that he has a power of control over nature adequate to
his needs. Hence his imaginative faculty, operating under the impulse of
curiosity or wonder, evolves great supernatural powers which he re-
gards with awe and submission. Society recognises these powers, and a
traditional cult of them grows up, and the system of supernatural expla-
nation of natural events enters upon its long period of dominance. All
the unprogressive societies of the earth remain in this stage in which
theories of causation are predominantly supernatural and personal.
But in most societies there have been, throughout the period of domi-
nance of supernatural explanations, a certain number of men whose
curiosity was not satisfied by the current systems. They have main-
tained the magical attitude, and, impelled by curiosity, have sought to
increase their direct influence upon natural forces by achieving a better
understanding of them. These are the wizards, the medicine-men, the
alchemists and astrologers, the independent thinkers, who at almost all
times and places have been reprobated and persecuted by the official
representatives of the supernatural cults. In most of the societies thatAn Introduction to Social Psychology/217
have survived in the struggle for existence, the impulse of curiosity has
not been strong enough to make head against these repressive measures.
For the strength of the social sanctions, derived from the belief in the
supernatural powers and from the awe and reverence excited by the
ideas of these powers, was a main condition of the strength and stability
of society; and no society has been able to survive in any severe and
prolonged conflict of societies, without some effective system of such
sanctions. Hence we find a survival of the primitive predominance of
the magical conception of causation only among peoples such as the
natives of Australia, which, owing to their peculiar geographical condi-
tions, have never been subjected to any severe process of group-selec-
tion. While all societies that have made any considerable progress in
civilisation have been enabled to do so only in virtue of the stability they
derived from their system of supernatural sanctions.
Hence the age-long, inevitable, and radical antagonism between the
conservative spirit of religion and the progressive spirit of inquiry. The
progress of mankind has only been rendered possible by their coexist-
ence and conjoint operation. In the main, those societies which, in virtue
of the strength and social efficiency of their system of supernatural be-
liefs and sanctions, have been most stable and capable of enduring have
been least tolerant of the spirit of inquiry, and therefore least progres-
sive; on the other hand, the flourishing of scepticism has been too often
the forerunner of social decay, as in ancient Greece and Rome. Contin-
ued progress has been rendered possible only by the fact that the gains
achieved by the spirit of inquiry have survived the dissolution of the
societies in which they have been achieved (and to which that spirit has
proved fatal) through becoming imitatively taken up into the culture of
societies in which the conservative spirit continued to predominate.
At the present time it may seem that in one small quarter of the
world, namely, Western Europe, society has achieved an organisation
so intrinsically stable that it may with impunity tolerate the flourishing
of the spirit of inquiry and give free rein to the impulse of curiosity. But
to assume that this is the case would be rash. The issue remains doubt-
ful. The spirit of inquiry has broken ail its bonds and soared gloriously,
until now the conception of natural causation predominates in every
field; and, if the notion of supernatural powers still persists in the minds
of men, it is in the form of the conception of a Divine Creator who
maintains the laws that He has made, but does not constantly interfere
with their operation. This change of belief, this withdrawal of super-218/William McDougall
natural power from immediate intervention in the life of mankind, inevi-
tably and greatly diminishes the social efficiency of the supernatural
sanctions. Whether our societies will prove capable of long surviving
this process is the most momentous of the problems confronting West-
ern Civilisation. The answer to it is a secret hidden in the bosom of the
future. If they shall survive the change, it can only be because the im-
pulse of curiosity, carrying forward the work that it has so splendidly
begun, will rapidly increase man’s understanding of, and control over,
his own nature and the conditions of healthy and vigorous social life.141
Of the instinct of self- display little need be said in this section. Not
because it is not of the first importance for social life, but because what
was said of it in Section I. suffices to show the view I take of its impor-
tance and how it becomes incorporated in the self-regarding sentiment
and plays a part in all true volition. Here I would only add that in my
view it plays a similarly essential part in all true collective volition,
being incorporated in the sentiment for the family tribe, or nation, or
other social aggregate that exerts such volition. But the discussion and
illustration of the nature of collective mental processes falls outside the
plan of this volume.
Of the social functions of the instinct of submission something has
been said in Section I. and in the foregoing pages of this Section. But
one of its most important social operations is the determination of the
imitative, suggestible attitude of men and of societies towards one an-
other; and of this something will be said in the last chapter.142
Chapter XIV
The Instincts of Acquisition and Construction
The two instincts last mentioned in Chapter III, namely, those of ac-
quisitiveness or cupidity and of construction, are not directly social in
their operation, but indirectly they exert important effects in the life of
societies, of which a few words may be said.
The importance of the instinct of acquisition, from our present point
of view, is due to the fact that it must have greatly favoured, if it was not
an essential condition of, that accumulation of material wealth which
was necessary for the progress of civilisation beyond its earliest stages.
There are still in existence people who support themselves only by
hunting and the collection of wild fruits, having no houses or fixed places
of abode, nor any possessions beyond what they carry in their hands
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cient; or perhaps it is, that it never is able to determine the formation of
a corresponding habit owing to their wandering mode of life. Among
pastoral nomads the working of the instinct is manifested in the vast
herds sometimes accumulated by a single patriarchal family144 But it
was only when agriculture began to be extensively practised that the
instinct could produce its greatest social effects. For grain of all sorts
lends itself especially well to hoarding as a form of wealth. It is compact
and valuable in proportion to its bulk, can be kept for long periods
without serious deterioration, and is easily stored, divided, and trans-
ported. Most of the civilisations that have achieved any considerable
development have been based on the accumulation of stores of grain.
Besides being a very important form of capital, it was one of the earliest
and most important objects of trade, and trade must always have ex-
erted a socialising influence.
Although in highly civilised societies the motives that lead to the
accumulation of capital become very complex, yet acquisitiveness, the
desire for mere possession of goods, remains probably the most funda-
mental of them, blending and co-operating with all other motives; this
impulse, more than all others, is capable of obtaining continuous or
continually renewed gratifications; for while, in the course of satisfac-
tion of most other desires, the point of satiety is soon reached, the de-
mands of this one grow greater without limit, so that it knows no satiety.
How few men are content with the possession of what they need for the
satisfaction of all other desires than this desire for possession for its
own sake! It is this excess of activity beyond that required for the satis-
faction of all other material needs, that results in the accumulation of
the capital which is a necessary condition of the development of
civilisation. It might be plausibly maintained that the phenomena with
which economic science is concerned are in the main the outcome of the
operation of this instinct, rather than of the enlightened self-interest of
the classical economists.
The possession and acquisition of land affords satisfaction to this
desire in a very full degree, land being a so permanent and indestructible
form of property. And this instinct has played its part, not only in the
building up of large private estates—the tendency to the indefinite growth
of which everywhere manifests itself— but also in the causation of the
many wars that have been waged for the possession of territories. Wars
of this type are characteristic of autocracies; for the desire to possess is
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become the possession of a single individual, than if it is to be shared by
all the members of a democratic community. Accordingly, one of the
most striking effects of the democratisation of States is the passing away
of wars of this worst type.
The principal social effects of the instinct of construction are pro-
duced by the necessity for co- operation in works of construction that
surpass the powers of individuals, especially architectural works. Among
all peoples, this tendency to co-operation in large architectural construc-
tions, huge totem poles, monoliths, temples, or massive tombs like the
pyramids of Egypt, shows itself as soon as they attain a settled mode of
life; and these works tend to confirm them in the settled mode of life,
and to strengthen the social bonds.
Chapter XV
Imitation, Play, and Habit.
In Chapter IV we discussed the three fundamental forms of mental in-
teraction—suggestion, sympathy, and imitation. In each case, we said,
the process of interaction results in the assimilation of the mental state
of the recipient or patient to that of the agent. In each case we need a
pair of words to denote the parts of the agent and of the patient respec-
tively. “Suggest” denotes the part of the agent in assimilating the cogni-
tive state of the patient to his own; but we have no word for the part
played by the patient in the process, unless we adopt the ugly expres-
sion—“to be suggestioned.” “Imitate” and “sympathise” denote the part
of the patient in the process of assimilation of his actions and of his
affective state to those of the agent; but we have no words denoting the
part of the agent in these processes. Since these three processes co-
operate intimately in social life, we may avoid the difficulty arising from
this lack of terms by following M. Tarde,145 who extends the meaning of
the word “imitation” to cover all three processes as viewed from the side
of the patient If we do that, we still need a correlative word to denote all
three processes viewed from the side of the agent. I propose to use the
words “impress” and “impression” in this sense.146 We may also follow
M. Tarde in using “contra- imitation” to denote the process of centra-
suggestion viewed from the side of the patient.
Impression and imitation are, then, processes of fundamental im-
portance for social life. M. Tarde writes:—“Nous dirons donc... qu’une
société est un groupe de gens qui présentent entre eux beaucoup de si-
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making imitation the very essence of social life he hardly exaggerates its
importance. In Section I. we have considered some of the ways in which
imitation moulds the growing individual and assimilates him to the type
of the society into which he is born. In this Section we must consider the
results of imitation from the point of view of the society as a whole
rather than from that of the development of the individual.
Imitation is the prime condition of all collective mental life. I pro-
pose to reserve for another volume the detailed study of collective men-
tal processes. Here I would dismiss the subject by merely pointing out
that when men think, feel, and act as members of a group of any kind—
whether a mere mob, a committee, a political or religious association, a
city, a nation, or any other social aggregate—their collective actions
show that the mental processes of each man have been profoundly modi-
fied in virtue of the fact that he thought, felt, and acted as one of a group
and in reciprocal mental action with the other members of the group and
with the group as a whole. In the simpler forms of social grouping,
imitation (taken in the wide sense defined above) is the principal condi-
tion of this profound alteration of the individual’s mental processes.
And, even in the most developed forms of social aggregation, it plays a
fundamental part (although greatly complicated by other factors) in ren-
dering possible the existence and operation of the collective mind, its
collective deliberation, emotion, character, and volition.
Without entering further into the discussion of the conditions, na-
ture, and operations of the collective mind, we may note some of the
principal points of interest presented by imitation as a social factor.
In the development of individual human beings, imitation, as we
have seen, is the great agency through which the child is led on from the
life of mere animal impulse to the life of self-control, deliberation, and
true volition. And it has played a similar part in the development of the
human race and of human society.
The mental constitution of man differs from that of the highest ani-
mals chiefly in that man has an indefinitely greater power of learning, of
profiting by experience, of acquiring new modes of reaction and adjust-
ment to an immense variety of situations. This superiority of man would
seem to be due in the main to his possession of a very large brain, con-
taining a mass of plastic nervous tissue which exceeds in bulk the sum
of the innately organised parts and makes up the principal part of the
substance of the cerebral hemispheres. This great brain, and the im-
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have been evolved hand in band with the development of man’s social
life and with that of language, the great agent and promoter of social
life. For to an individual living apart from any human society the greater
part of this brain and of this capacity for acquisition would be useless
and would lie dormant for lack of any store of knowledge, belief, and
custom to be acquired or assimilated. Whereas animal species have ad-
vanced from lower to higher levels of mental life by the improvement of
the innate mental constitution of the species, man, since he became man,
has progressed in the main by means of the increase in volume and
improvement in quality of the sum of knowledge, belief, and custom,
which constitutes the tradition of any society. And it is to the superiority
of the moral and intellectual tradition of his society that the superiority
of civilised man over existing savages and over his savage forefathers is
chiefly, if not wholly, due. This increase and improvement of tradition
has been effected by countless steps, each relatively small and unimpor-
tant, initiated by the few original minds of the successive generations
and incorporated in the social tradition through the acceptance or imita-
tion of them by the mass of men. All that constitutes culture and
civilisation, all, or nearly all, that distinguishes the highly cultured Eu-
ropean intellectually and morally from the men of the stone age of Eu-
rope, is then summed up in the word “tradition,” and all tradition exists
only in virtue of imitation; for it is only by imitation that each genera-
tion takes up and makes its own the tradition of the preceding genera-
tion; and it is only by imitation that any improvement, conceived by any
mind endowed with that rarest of all things, a spark of originality, can
become embodied within the tradition of his society. Imitation is, then
not only the great conservative force of society, it is also essential to all
social progress. We may briefly glance at its social operations, under
these two heads.148
Imitation as a Conservative Agency
The similarities obtaining between the individuals of any one country,
any one county, social class, school, university, profession, or commu-
nity of any kind, and distinguishing them from the members of any other
similar community, are in the main due to the more intimate intercourse
with one another of the members of the one community, to their conse-
quent imitation of one another, and to their acceptance by imitation of
the same tradition. Under this head fall similarities of language, of reli-
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ing, and of recreation, all those routine activities which make up by far
the greater part of the lives of men.149
There is widely current a vague belief that the national characteris-
tics of the people of any country are in the main innate characters. But
there can be no serious question that this popular assumption is errone-
ous and that national characteristics, at any rate all those that distin-
guish the peoples of the European countries, are in the main the expres-
sions of different traditions. There are innate differences of mental con-
stitution between the races and sub-races of men and between the peoples
of the European countries; and these innate peculiarities are very impor-
tant, because they exert through long periods of time a constant bias or
moulding influence upon the growth of national cultures and traditions.
But, relatively to the national peculiarities acquired by each individual
in virtue of his participation in the traditions of his country, the innate
peculiarities are slight and are almost completely obscured in each indi-
vidual by these superimposed acquired characters. If the reader is in-
clined to doubt the truth of these statements, let him make an effort of
imagination and suppose that throughout a period of half a century ev-
ery child born to English parents was at once exchanged (by the power
of a magician’s wand) for an infant of the French, or other European,
nation. Soon after the close of this period the English nation would be
composed of individuals of French extraction, and the French nation of
individuals of English extraction. It is, I think, clear that, in spite of this
complete exchange of innate characters between the two nations, there
would be but little immediate change of national characteristics. The
French people would still speak French, and the English would speak
English, with all the local diversities to which we are accustomed and
without perceptible change of pronunciation. The religion of the French
would still be predominantly Roman Catholic, and the English people
would still present the same diversity of Protestant creeds The course of
political institutions would have suffered no profound change, the cus-
toms and habits of the two peoples would exhibit only such changes as
might be attributed to the lapse of time, though an acute observer might
notice an appreciable approximation of the two peoples towards one
another in all these respects. The inhabitant of France would still be a
Frenchman and the inhabitant of England an Englishman to all outward
seeming, save that the physical appearance of the two peoples would be
transposed. And we may go even further and assert that the same would
hold good if a similar exchange of infants were effected between the224/William McDougall
English and any other less closely allied nation, say the Turks or the
Japanese.
The dominance of the traditional characters, acquired by each gen-
eration through imitation, over innate characters holds good not only in
respect to the characters mentioned above, but also, though perhaps in a
smaller degree, in respect to those modes of activity which are regarded
as essentially the expressions of individuality, namely, the various forms
of art-production, of science, of literature, of conversation. The im-
mensely increased intercourse of peoples characteristic of the present
age has already done much to obscure these national differences and
peculiarities, but we have only to go back to earlier ages to see that the
force of imitation is in these fields of human activity, as well as in all
others, immensely greater than the force of individuality or of innate
peculiarities. For, the further back we go in time and in cultural level,
the more strictly and locally peculiar does each kind of cultural element
appear. So persistent are such traditional peculiarities that archaeolo-
gists and anthropologists confidently trace the distribution and affinities
of extinct peoples and races throughout great periods of time and large
areas by noting peculiarities of modes of sepulture, of carving, of build-
ing, of the shape, size, or ornamentation of pottery, of weapons, or of
any other durable manufactured article, or even slight peculiarities in
the mode of laying stones together to form a building of any kind.
It is a general law of imitation that modes of doing persist more
obstinately than modes of thinking and feeling. Hence the many remark-
able instances of survival of former stages of culture generally take the
form of practices whose meanings and original purposes have been long
forgotten or completely transformed. One of the most interesting ex-
amples of such vestigial remnants of an earlier culture is the survival of
the forms of marriage by capture among the peasantry of various Euro-
pean countries up to, or nearly up to, the present time; and, in fact, the
practice of throwing rice and old shoes after the departing bridegroom,
which is still observed among us, is probably the last surviving remnant
of the forms of marriage by capture. In some parts of Europe there
survives a vestige of another form of marriage, namely, marriage by
purchase—the bridegroom gives to the parents of his bride a few grains
of corn; and it is the more striking that the old practice persists in the
shape of this formal act, where the actual spirit of the transaction has
been transformed into its opposite, and the bride is expected to bring to
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nearly all our old-fashioned village festivals are survivals of the prac-
tices, the pagan rites and ceremonies, by means of which our ancestors
propitiated and honoured the various powers or divinities whom they
conceived to preside over the processes of nature that most nearly af-
fected their welfare. The May-day festival, for example, is probably a
survival from the rites by means of which some god or goddess of veg-
etation was worshipped and propitiated; and many other instances might
be cited.150 At the present time the transformation of such religious rites
into mere holiday festivals may be observed in actual and rapid progress
in various odd corners of the world.151
This tendency of practices to survive by continued imitation, long
after their original significance has been forgotten, has had far more
important effects than that of preserving vestiges as curiosities for the
anthropologists. There can be no doubt that practices so surviving the
memory of their significance have in many cases been interpreted and
been given a new meaning by the generations that found themselves
performing them in blind obedience to tradition; although, from the na-
ture of the case, it can seldom be possible to attain more than a specula-
tive probability in regard to such transformations and developments. As
an example of processes of this kind, we may note Robertson Smith’s
speculation to the effect that the ever- burning altar fire, which became
among so many peoples a symbol and a condition of the life and pros-
perity of a people or a city, was a re-interpreted survival of the fire
which originally was used to consume the parts of the sacrificial victim
too holy to be otherwise disposed of.152 And of many of the symbolical
rites of the higher religions it has been shown that they may with some
plausibility be regarded as re- interpreted survivals of older rituals.
Dr. A. Beck153 goes further, and argues forcibly that all, or most,
myths and dogmas, and, in fact, all religious conceptions of the lower
cultures, were arrived at by this process of re-interpretation of survivals
of practices once of practical utility.
Among some peoples the conservative power of imitation is, of
course, displayed much more strongly than among others. The force of
custom is generally supreme among peoples at a low level of culture.
Among them the sufficient justification and supreme sanction of all ac-
tion is custom. And, even after a people has made considerable progress
in the scale of civilisation, it is always liable to become fixed and sta-
tionary once more under the supremacy of tradition; then no innovation,
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can obtain a foothold or find general acceptance within it, because no
individual and no other people has in the eyes of that people a prestige
that can rival the prestige of its own past and of the great men of its own
past history. A society, arrived at a fair level of civilisation and suffi-
ciently strongly organised to resist violent attacks from without, may
persist through long ages almost unchanged, as we see in the case of the
Chinese people. Then, with every generation that passes away, the pres-
tige of the past becomes greater, because it becomes more deeply shrouded
in the mists and the mystery of age; and so the cake of custom becomes
ever harder and more unbreakable.
Imitation as an Agent of Progress
If imitation, maintaining customs and traditions of every kind, is the
great conservative agency in the life of societies, it plays also a great
and essential part in bringing about the progress of civilisation. Its op-
eration as a factor in progress is of two principal kinds: (1) the spread
by imitation throughout a people of ideas and practices generated within
it from time to time by its exceptionally gifted members; (2) the spread
by Imitation of ideas and practices from one people to another. There
are certain features or laws of the spreading by imitation that are com-
mon to these two forms of the process.
The spread of any culture element, a belief, an art, a convention, a
sentiment, a habit or attitude of mind of any kind, tends to proceed in
geometrical progression, because each individual or body of individuals
that imitates the new idea and embodies it in practice becomes an addi-
tional centre of radiation of that idea to all individuals and groups that
come in contact with it; and also because, with each step of the spread
of the idea over a wider area and to larger numbers of persons, the
power of mass-suggestion grows in virtue of mere numbers.
The rapidity of the spreading of a culture-element by imitation among
any people depends in great measure upon two conditions: first, the
density of population; secondly, the degree of development of means of
communication and the degree of use made of these means. These propo-
sitions are so obviously true that we need not dwell upon them. We have
only to look around us to see how, in our own country at the present
time, the rapid development of the means of communication during the
latter part of the nineteenth century has so facilitated spread by imita-
tion among our dense population as to bring about a very high degree of
uniformity in many respects. Local dialects are rapidly passing away,An Introduction to Social Psychology/227
and local peculiarities of dress and social convention have already been
almost obliterated, while local sports, such as golf, have spread in a few
years throughout the country. The rate of spreading of trivial passing
fashions is marvellous—a new way of shaking hands, the fashion of
dropping the “g” and saying “Good mornin’,” the shape and size of
ladies’ hats or a style of wearing the hair, such games as ping- pong and
diabolo—all these and a hundred other fashions suddenly and mysteri-
ously appear and, having in a few months ravaged the whole country
like deadly pestilences, disappear as suddenly as they came. In almost
all such cases imitation and contra-imitation work strongly together;
each victim is moved not only by the prestige of those whom he imitates,
but also by the desire to be different from the mass who have not yet
adopted the fashion. And it is owing to this strong element of contra-
imitation that these trivial fashions are usually so fleeting; for, as soon
as the fashion has spread to a certain proportion of the total population,
the operation of contra- imitation is reversed and begins to make for the
abolition of the fashion and its supplanting by some other—the mistress
cannot possibly continue to wear the new shape of hat, however becom-
ing to her, because her maids and her humbler neighbours have begun to
imitate it.
These trivial fashions generally pass away completely. But all new
ideas that spread by imitation must first become fashions, before they
can become embodied in tradition as customs; and the easy catching-on
and rapid spread of new fashions are sure indications that the culture of
a people is mobile and plastic, that it is ready and likely to embody new
features in its customs, beliefs, and institutions, and so to undergo change;
though such change is not necessarily or always progress towards a
better state of civilisation or of social organisation.
Imitation modifies a people’s civilisation in one of two ways—by
substitution or by accumulation; that is to say, the new culture-element,
spreading by imitation among a people, either conflicts with, drives out,
and supplants some older traditional element, or constitutes an exten-
sion, complication, and enrichment of the existing tradition. Thus a lan-
guage or a religious system may be imitated by one people from an-
other, and may completely supplant the indigenous language or religion.
But more commonly it becomes worked up with the indigenous lan-
guage, or religion, enriching it and rendering it more complex and more
adequate to the needs of the people; as when, for example, the Norman-
French language was largely imitated by the English people, and so228/William McDougall
became in large part incorporated in the English language; or as when
the religion of Buddha was adopted by the Japanese people, partially
fusing with, rather than supplanting, their national Shinto religion of
ancestor-worship.
An idea or practice that has once begun to be imitated by a people
tends to spread to the maximum extent possible under the given condi-
tions of society; and then the custom or institution in which it has be-
come embodied tends to persist indefinitely with this maximum degree
of intensity and diffusion; and it only recedes or disappears under the
influence of some newly introduced antagonistic rival. In illustration of
this law we may cite tea-drinking, tobacco- smoking, or lawn tennis. It
is when imitation of any idea has reached this saturation point or degree
of maximum diffusion, that the statistician shows numerically the con-
stancy of the occurrence of its external manifestations, and cites his
figures to prove that the actions of man are as completely determined
and as predictable as the motions of the heavenly bodies.
The imitation of peoples follows the fundamental law of all imita-
tion—the law, namely, that the source from which the impression comes
is one enjoying prestige, is an individual or collective personality that is
stronger, more complex, or more highly developed, and therefore to some
extent mysterious, not completely effective, to the imitators. Whether
the ideas of an individual shall be accepted by his fellow-countrymen
depends not so much upon the nature of those ideas as upon the degree
of prestige which that individual has or can secure. The founders of new
religions have always secured prestige, partly by their personal force
and character, partly by acquiring a reputation for supernatural powers
by means of falling occasionally into trance or ecstasy, or by the work-
ing of miracles, or in virtue of a reputed miraculous origin, or by all of
these together. A great general, having secured prestige by his military
exploits, may then, like the first Napoleon, impress his ideas of social
organisation upon a whole people. A statesman, having secured prestige
by his eloquence and parliamentary skill, can then set the tone of politi-
cal life, and, under the two-party system, can make approximately one
half of the people of his country accept his ideas almost without ques-
tion. Of this, two very striking illustrations have recently been afforded
by English political changes—the acceptance of Gladstone’s “Home
Rule” idea and of Mr. Chamberlain’s idea of Protection. If the latter
idea should become generally accepted, it will be a most striking in-
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Free Trade was universally accepted in this country, save by a few scep-
tics, who for lack of prestige could get no hearing; yet now half, or
nearly half, the country clamours for Protection. And this great change
is almost entirely due to the influence of one self- reliant man of estab-
lished prestige.
But originality is a very rare quality, and still more rarely is it com-
bined with the moral and physical and social advantages necessary for
the acquisition of high prestige; hence, if the progress of each nation
took place only by the acceptance of the ideas of its own great men,
progress would have been very much slower than it actually has been.
The imitation of one people by another has been a principal condi-
tion of the progress of civilisation in all its stages, but more especially in
its later stages. The people that is imitated by another is always one of
more highly evolved civilisation or of greater skill and power in the use
of the particular idea or institution that is imitated. The most striking
example of this process afforded by history is the imitation of the Ro-
mans by the peoples of Western Europe whom they conquered, and, at a
later period, by the peoples by whom they were conquered. The im-
mense prestige of the Romans enabled them to continue to impress their
language, their religion, their laws, their architecture, and all the princi-
pal features of their material civilisation upon these peoples, even when
their military power had declined. On the other hand, although the Ro-
mans conquered the Grecian world, they were not imitated by it; but
rather themselves became the imitators in respect to most of the higher
elements of culture; for the prestige of Greece in respect to all forms of
art and literature was greater than that of Rome.
The imitation of Western Europe by Japan is, of course, the most
striking instance of modern times. And this case is unique in that the
imitation is in the main self-conscious and deliberate, whereas in all
former ages national imitation has been largely of lower forms. For in
national as in individual imitation we have to recognise very different
modes of imitation, ranging from the immediate unreflecting acceptance
of a mode of thought or action to its adoption by an organised national
effort of collective volition after careful deliberation.
Perhaps the great influence of national imitation on the progress of
civilisation is illustrated most clearly by the study of national arts, espe-
cially of architecture. The distinctive forms of art of each nation can,
almost without exception, be traced back to two or more ancestral
sources, from the blending and adaptation of which the new national art230/William McDougall
has resulted. The work of archaeologists largely consists in tracing these
streams of influence and the results of their blendings.
The further back we go towards periods of simpler civilisation, the
more striking becomes the evidence of diffusion of ideas by imitation.
For, in the simpler civilisations of past ages, ideas were fewer and, there-
fore, of greater individual importance. We find, for example, evidence
of the almost world-wide diffusion of certain myths—of which a no-
table example has been worked out in detail by Mr. Hartland in his
“Legend of Perseus.” And this wide diffusion of myths constitutes, per-
haps, the most striking illustration of imitation on a great scale, because
in this case the operation of imitation is not complicated by any mate-
rial, or other definite social, advantages or disadvantages resulting from
or accompanying it on the part of the imitated or of the imitating people.
The same is, perhaps, less strictly true of such customs as peculiar
modes of sepulture, e.g., burning or mound-burial. But the process of
imitation has achieved its most important results in the case of the great
discoveries that have increased man’s power over nature and consti-
tuted essential steps in the evolution of civilisation—agriculture, the
domestication of animals, the use of the arch and dome in building, of
the bow and of gunpowder in warfare, of the wheel in locomotion, the
art of printing, of glass-making, the application of steam as a substitute
for other forms of power; each of these has been discovered in some one
or two places only, has been first applied among some one or two peoples
only, and has been diffused by imitation throughout the world.
Our present civilisation—so rich and complex in language, in laws,
in science and art, in literature, in institutions and material resources—
is, then, the outcome, not of the original discoveries and ideas of men of
our own race, or of any one people, but of the peoples of the whole
world. No one of the leading European nations has created its own
civilisation, but each one has rather appropriated the various elements
of its culture from all the peoples of the earth, adapting them and com-
bining them to meet its special needs, and itself contributing a small
though important part to the whole.
There is one rule or law which, as M. Tarde has pointed out, holds
good of international collective imitation, but not of individual imita-
tion. It is that, as Tarde expresses it, such imitation proceeds from within
outwards; that is to say, the ideas and sentiments of a people are first
imitated by another, and, not until they have become widely spread and
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and embodied, imitated also. Thus, in the greater instances of national
imitation, for example, the imitation of British parliamentary institu-
tions by other nations, there occurs first a period during which the ideas
and sentiments underlying them are imitated; and it is not until this as-
similation of ideas has passed beyond the stage of fashion and they have
become a part of the national tradition, that effective imitation of the
institutions themselves is possible. If such institutions are imposed upon
a people by authority before this stage of assimilation has been reached,
the institutions will be liable to break down hopelessly. Hence the fail-
ure of parliamentary government in various South American republics,
and in Russia, and its inevitable failure in the Philippine Islands if intro-
duced there by the authority of the American people. It is in accordance
with this law that among civilised peoples the study of foreign litera-
ture, in which the ideas of other peoples are conveyed most clearly and
in the most diffusible form, usually prepares the way for imitation of
institutions, arts, laws, and customs. Thus the Renaissance of Western
Europe was prepared for by the study of Hellenic literature, and the
spread of British political institutions was preceded by the study of the
writings of our political philosophers, from Hobbes and Locke to Adam
Smith, Bentham, and Mill.
Within any nation imitation tends always to spread from upper to
lower classes, rather than in the reverse direction. This is due to the
fundamental law of imitation, namely, that prestige is the principal con-
dition that enables one person or group to impress others. And in inter-
national imitation this spreading from above downwards through the
social strata is especially clearly manifested; for it is usually by the
upper classes, or by sections of them, that imitations of foreign ideas
and customs are originally made, the further spread of the foreign ele-
ments then proceeding by class-imitation. In this way aristocracies of
many nations have performed valuable services for which they have not
usually been given due credit In all earlier ages royal courts have served
as centres for the reception and diffusion of foreign ideas. Owing to the
greater freedom of communication between courts than between other
parts of nations, foreign ideas were more readily introduced and assimi-
lated by the members of a court, and from them were transmitted to the
rest of the nation; whereby its life was enriched and its civilisation ad-
vanced. In this way, for example, the court of Frederick the Great intro-
duced French culture to a relatively backward Prussia.
In recent times royal courts and hereditary aristocracies have been232/William McDougall
to a great extent superseded in these functions by the great capitals,
which are in a sense their offspring. Thus Paris has succeeded to the
French court as the centre of assimilation and diffusion of foreign ideas,
and its immense prestige enables it to impress its ideas upon the whole
of France. The aristocracy of intellect, which in former ages was usu-
ally an appanage of the courts and now is generally gathered in the
capitals, plays an important part both in introducing foreign ideas and
in securing to court or capital the prestige which renders possible the
diffusion of those ideas.
Besides thus serving as the means of introducing and diffusing for-
eign ideas, hereditary aristocracies and courts are enabled, in virtue of
their prestige and quite independently of any merits of their members, to
secure another important advantage to nations, namely, by setting a com-
mon standard, which is accepted for imitation by all classes of the people,
they make for homogeneity of the ideas and sentiments of the people;
and this is a great condition of national strength. It is, then, perhaps, no
mere coincidence that the progressive nations have been the nations whose
social organisation comprises an hereditary aristocracy and a hierarchy
of classes; whereas the unprogressive nations, those which though
strongly organised have ceased to progress, are those which have had
no native aristocracy, or have been organised on the caste system—a
system which precludes class-imitation. This impossibility of class-imi-
tation under a strict caste system is, no doubt, one of the principal con-
ditions of the stagnation of the Brahmanic civilisation of India. And the
backwardness of Russia may be ascribed in large measure to the same
condition; for there the conquering northmen, the Varegs, established a
military and bureaucratic aristocracy which has remained relatively in-
effective in civilising the masses of Slav peasantry, owing to the lack of
any middle classes by whom the aristocrats might have been imitated.
The stationary state of the civilisation of China, and the great difference
as regards the rapidity of permeation by European ideas between the
Chinese and the Japanese (who are closely allied by blood) must be
ascribed in great measure to the absence of an hereditary native aristoc-
racy among the Chinese. For in Japan a native aristocracy of great pres-
tige has in recent years imitated the ideas of Western civilisation and, by
impressing these foreign-gathered ideas and institutions upon the mass
of the people, has produced and is still producing a very rapid advance
of Japanese civilisation in many important respects. Whereas in China
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as barbarian usurpers and have not the prestige, even if they had the
will, to play the same role as the aristocratic class of Japan; and the
governing class, which consists of men of letters chosen by examination
from among all classes of the people, has no hereditary class-prestige,
and therefore has but little power of impressing upon the people the
ideas which it has acquired from Western civilisation.
In England the influence of the hereditary aristocracy in securing
homogeneity of national thought, sentiment, and custom, has been very
great. An Englishman notoriously loves a lord and imitates him; and,
though this national snobbishness lends itself to ridicule and has its bad
aspects, especially perhaps in that it has done much to abolish the pic-
turesque local and class differences of speech and manners and dress, it
has yet aided greatly in making the English people the most mentally
homogeneous nation in the world, and so in bringing it further than any
other along the path of evolution of a national self-consciousness and a
truly national will.
Contra-imitation demands a few words of separate notice. It plays a
considerable part, as Tarde has pointed out, in rendering societies ho-
mogeneous. Some small societies or associations of cranks and faddists
owe their existence chiefly to its operation. In national societies also it is
operative, especially strongly perhaps in the English nation. Most En-
glishmen would scorn to kiss and embrace one another or to gesticulate
freely, if only because Frenchmen do these things; they would not wear
their hair either long or very closely cropped, because Germans do so;
they would not have a conscript army or universal military training,
because nearly every other European nation has them. The Chinese people
shows how contra-imitation may operate as a considerable conservative
power in a people among whom it is strongly developed. It prevents or
greatly retards their assimilation by imitation of foreign ideas, and at
the same time it confirms them in the maintenance of those practices,
such as the wearing of the queue, by means of which they make them-
selves visibly distinguished from all other peoples.
Play
It is hardly necessary to say anything of the socialising influence of the
play tendency. It is obvious that even its cruder manifestations, athletic
contests and games of all sorts, not only exert among us an important
influence in moulding individuals, preparing them for social life, for co-
operation, for submission, and for leadership, for the postponement of234/William McDougall
individual to collective ends, but also are playing no inconsiderable part
in shaping the destinies of the British Empire, by encouraging a friendly
intercourse and rivalry between its widely scattered parts, and by keep-
ing the various parts present to the consciousness of each other part
Wherever games have been customary, they must have exerted similar
socialising influences in some degree. The modern Olympic games (in
this respect resembling those of ancient Greece), and the many interna-
tional sporting contests of the present time, are doing something to bring
nations into more sympathetic relations, and may yet do much more in
this direction.
The play impulse is usually regarded as one of the principal roots of
artistic production. In so far as this is the case, it has its share in the
socialising influences of art, which are so great and so obvious that it is
hardly necessary to mention them. The works of art produced within a
nation direct the attention of individuals towards certain aspects of life
and nature, and teach them all to experience the same emotions in face
of these aspects. In this way they tend to the increase of mutual under-
standing and sympathy, and they further that homogeneity of mind which
is an essential condition of the development of the collective mental life
of a people.
In a similar way art tends to soften and socialise the relations be-
tween nations. When of two nations each has learnt to appreciate and
admire the art-products of the other, the gulf between them is bridged
over and a firm foundation for mutual sympathy and regard is laid. As
a prominent instance, consider how greatly the art of the Japanese has
facilitated their entrance into the exclusive circle of civilised and pro-
gressive peoples. Or again, consider how great an influence towards
European solidarity is exerted by the common admiration of the nations
of Europe for the sculpture of ancient Greece, for the music of modern
Germany, the Gothic architecture of France and England, the paintings
of Italy.
Habit
Of the great general tendencies common to the minds of all men of all
ages, the last of our list in Section I. was the tendency for all mental
processes to become facilitated by repetition, the tendency to the forma-
tion of habits of thought and action which became more and more fixed
in the individual as he grows older; and the consequent preference, in-
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and the dislike of all that is novel in more than a very moderate degree.
It was said above that imitation is the great conservative tendency
of society, because it leads each generation to adopt with but little change
the mass of customs and traditions of the preceding generation. But
imitation is conservative in virtue only of the cooperation of the ten-
dency we are now considering. For this tendency sets narrow limits to
that other tendency of imitation—the tendency to produce social changes
by the introduction into any class or people of the ways of thought and
action of other classes, or people? It is this tendency which secures that
each generation imitates chiefly its predecessor rather than any foreign
models; for the native, and local, and class ways of thought, feeling, and
action are the models first presented to the child; under their influence
the earliest habits are formed, and a strong bias is determined; so that,
by the time the individual comes under the influence of foreign models,
he is already moulded to the pattern of his nation, his class, his locality,
and is but little capable of radical change; that is to say, in virtue of
habits formed on the pattern of his class and nation, he is already refrac-
tory to the influence of foreign models, save in a small degree. In short,
the formation of habits by the individuals of each generation is an essen-
tial condition of the perpetuation of custom, and custom is the principal
condition of all social organisation.
One point is worthy of special notice in this connection. The preva-
lence of certain conditions of life, of certain types of culture and modes
of occupation, within a society are favourable to the influence of the
elder members of the society, while other conditions are unfavourable to
their influence. Thus, the mode of life of pastoral peoples, especially of
pastoral nomads, is eminently favourable to the influence and authority
of the elder men; their long experience renders their judgments highly
valuable in all that concerns the welfare of the herds, and their bodily
infirmity does not diminish this value. On the other hand, among tribes
of people much given to warfare the physical vigour and the bold initia-
tive of youth are high qualifications for leadership; hence the influence
of the elders is relatively less. Accordingly, we find that societies of the
former kind are in general extremely stable and conservative. They de-
velop a patriarchal system, and under the conservative influence of their
patriarchs they remain unchanged for long ages. There are pastoral no-
mads still existing under a social organisation which has remained un-
changed since the dawn of history and, not improbably, from a much
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more liable to change. We have already seen that they have been the
most progressive peoples; and their progress has been due in part, no
doubt, to the effects of military group-selection and to the moralising
influences of war, but in part also to their less conservative character
which they owe to the diminished influence of the older, and therefore
more conservative, individuals.
The tendency to the formation of habits, which pervades every func-
tion of the mind, exerts in yet another way an immense influence on
private life, and, perhaps, an even greater influence on the collective life
of societies; I refer to the tendency to convert means into ends. It is
hardly too much to say that in very many persons, not given to reflection
on and analysis of motives, the ends of their actions seldom come clearly
and explicitly to consciousness. Their actions are largely determined by
the blind instinctive impulses on the one hand, and on the other, by
simple acquiescence in, and imitation of, the kinds of activity they see
going on about them. Of many women especially is this true. Many a
woman who spends half her energies in making things clean and tidy
and setting her house in order either never explicitly recognises the end
of this activity, namely, domestic comfort, convenience, and happiness,
or else, losing sight of this end and transforming the means into an end,
sacrifices in a considerable degree the true end to the perfection of the
means. With men nothing is commoner than that the earning of money,
at first undertaken purely as means to an end, becomes an end in itself.
So with all of us, the perfection of powers, whether of the body or of the
mind, the acquisition of learning, of a good literary style, or of any other
accomplishment, is very apt to become an end in itself, to which the true
end may be in large measure sacrificed; and some moralists even ex-
pressly commend the transformation of such means into ends.
In the collective thought and action of societies this tendency ap-
pears even more strongly than in private conduct, and for this reason—
while a man may question the usefulness of any particular mode of
activity that is practiced by a few of his fellows only, he is less likely to
raise any such question in regard to any practice that he finds faithfully
observed by all his fellows. The fact that all his fellows observe the
practice is sufficient to put it beyond criticism and to lead him to regard
it as an end in itself. And this is one of the principal bases of custom.
The ends or purposes of many customs are lost in the mists of antiquity.
In some cases, perhaps, the end has never been clearly defined in any
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sion between diverse customs, or through some purely instinctive mode
of reaction, or through perverted imitation of some foreign model. But,
however and for whatever purpose instituted, a custom once established,
the practice of it always becomes in some degree an end in itself, and
men are prepared to maintain it, often at great cost of effort or discom-
fort, long after it serves any useful end. Hence the fact that meaningless
formalities and rites continue to surround almost all ancient institutions.
Besides thus playing its part as one of the conservative forces, this
tendency leads also to many mistaken social efforts and institutions, or
to the undue emphasis of social truths. Thus, such things as liberty and
equality are seen by a Rousseau to be means to human happiness; he
preaches liberty and equality; his ideas are accepted by the masses, and
liberty and equality become for them ends in themselves, and all social
well-being is for a time sacrificed to them. In a similar way Free Trade
was preached by Cobden as a means to an end. The idea was widely
accepted, and for great numbers of men the means has become an end.
So also by setting up as ends liberty and equality, which are but means
to human welfare and happiness, the people of the United States of
America have brought upon themselves the insoluble negro problem;
and the British people, in virtue of the same tendency, is in danger of
creating a similar problem in South Africa.
Our brief review of the social operations of the primary tendencies
of the human mind is finished. Enough perhaps has been said to con-
vince the reader that the life of societies is not merely the sum of the
activities of individuals moved by enlightened self-interest, or by intelli-
gent desire for pleasure and aversion from pain; and to show him that
the springs of all the complex activities that make up the life of societies
must be sought in the instincts and in the other primary tendencies that




My principal aim in writing this volume was to improve the psychologi-
cal foundations of the social sciences by deepening our understanding
of the principles of human conduct. In the three and a half years which
have elapsed since the appearance of its first edition, I have discerned
here and there in subsequent publications what seem to be traces of its
influence. But none of the writers who have criticized or otherwise re-238/William McDougall
ferred to the book seems to have noticed that it propounds a theory of
action which is applicable to every form of animal and human effort,
from the animalcule’s pursuit of food or prey to the highest forms of
moral volition. I therefore add this appendix to the present edition with
a threefold purpose. First I desire to draw attention to this theory of
action by throwing it into stronger relief; secondly, I desire to present it
in the form of a distinct challenge both to my colleagues the psycholo-
gists, and especially to writers on moral philosophy, to whose hands the
positive theory of conduct has been too largely confided by the psy-
chologists, thirdly, I desire to help young students of psychology and
ethics to understand the relation of the theory of action expounded in
this book to other theories of action widely current at the present time.
The execution of this threefold design involves a somewhat technical
and controversial discussion hardly suited for the general reader; I have
therefore preferred to present it in the form of an appendix, rather than
to insert it in the body of the text.
I will first state dogmatically and explicitly the theory of action
which is implied throughout this volume, and will then justify it by show-
ing the inadequacy of the other theories of action that have been most
widely accepted.
Human conduct, which in its various spheres is the topic with which
all the social sciences are concerned, is a species of a wider genus,
namely, behaviour. Conduct is the behaviour of self- conscious and ra-
tional beings; it is the highest type of behaviour; and, if we desire to
understand conduct, we must first achieve some adequate conception of
behaviour in general and must then discover in what ways conduct, the
highest type, differs from all the lower types of behaviour.
We sometimes speak of the behaviour of inert or inorganic things,
such things as tools, or weapons, or even the weather. But in such cases
we usually recognize more or less clearly that we are using the word
playfully—we playfully regard the object as alive —and the ground of
our doing so is generally that it seems to set itself in opposition to our
will, and to strive to frustrate or hinder the accomplishment of our pur-
pose. It is generally recognized that the word “behaviour” implies cer-
tain peculiarities which are only found in the movements of living things.
These peculiarities are the marks of life; wherever we observe them, we
confidently infer life. We form our notion of behaviour by the observa-
tion of the movements of living things; and, in order to explicate this
notion, we must discover by what marks behaviour is distinguished fromAn Introduction to Social Psychology/239
all merely physical or mechanical movements. If in imagination we con-
struct a scale of types of behaviour ranging from the simplest to the
most complex,154 we find that at all levels of complexity behaviour pre-
sents four peculiar marks.
1. The creature does not merely move in a certain direction, like an
inert mass impelled by external force; its movements are quite incapable
of being described in the language with which we describe mechanical
movements; we can only describe them by saying that the creature strives
persistently towards an end. For its movements do not cease when it
meets with obstacles, or when it is subjected to forces which tend to
deflect it: such obstacles and such opposition rather provoke still more
forcible striving, and this striving only terminates upon the attainment
of its natural end; which end is generally some change in its relation to
surrounding objects, a change that subserves the life of the individual
creature or of its species.
2. The striving of the creature is not merely a persistent pushing in
a given direction; though the striving persists when obstacles are en-
countered, the kind and direction of movement are varied again and
again so long as the obstacle is not overcome. Behaviour is a persistent
trial or striving towards an end, with, if necessary, variation of the means
employed for its attainment.
3. In behaviour the whole organism is involved. Every action that
we recognize as an instance of behaviour is not merely a partial reac-
tion, such as the reflex movement of a limb, which seems to be of a
mechanical or quasi-mechanical character; rather, in every case of
behaviour, the energy of the whole organism seems to be concentrated
upon the task of achieving the end: all its parts and organs are subordi-
nated to and co-ordinated with the organs primarily involved in the ac-
tivity.
4. The fourth mark of behaviour is equally characteristic and prob-
ably equally universal with the other three, though it is less easily ob-
served; it is, namely, that, although, on the recurrence of a situation
which has previously evoked behaviour, the creature may behave again
in a very similar manner, yet the activity is not repeated in just the same
fashion as on the previous occasion (as is the case with mechanical
processes, except in so far as the machine has been in some degree worn
out on the former occasion); there is as a rule some evidence of in-
creased efficiency of action, of better adaptation of the means adopted
to the end sought— the process of gaining the end is shortened, or in240/William McDougall
some other way exhibits increased efficiency in subserving the life of
the individual or of the species.
When we survey the whole world of material things accessible to
our perception, these seem, as a matter of immediate observation and
apart from all theories of the relation of mind to matter, to fall into two
great classes, namely, (1) a class consisting of those things whose changes
seem to be purely physical happenings, explicable by mechanical prin-
ciples; (2) a class of things whose changes exhibit the marks of behaviour
and seem to be incapable of mechanical explanation, but rather to be
always directed, however vaguely, towards an end—that is to say, are
ideological or purposive; and this class constitutes the realm of life.
The four peculiarities which, as we have seen, characterize behaviour
are purely objective or outward marks presented to the observation of
the onlooker. But to say that behaviour is purposive is to imply that it
has also an inner side or aspect which is analogous to, and of the same
order as, our immediate experience of our own purposive activities. We
are accustomed to accept as the type of purposive action our own most
decidedly volitional efforts, in which we deliberately choose, and self-
consciously strive, to bring about some state of affairs that we clearly
foresee and desire. And it has been the practice of many writers, accept-
ing such volitional effort as the type of purposive activity, to refuse to
admit to the same category any actions that do not seem to be prompted
and guided by clear foresight of the end desired and willed. When pur-
posive activity is conceived in this very restricted way, and is set over
against mechanical processes, as process of a radically different type,
there remains the difficulty of assigning the place and affinities of the
lower forms of behaviour.
One way of solving the difficulty thus created is that adopted by
Descartes, namely, to assign all the lower forms of behaviour to the
mechanical category. But this is profoundly unsatisfactory for two rea-
sons: (1) As we have seen, behaviour everywhere presents the outward
marks which are common to the lower forms of behaviour and to human
conduct, and which set it so widely apart from mechanical processes;
(2) this way of dealing with the difficulty creates a still greater diffi-
culty, namely, it sets up an absolute breach between men and animals,
ignoring all the unmistakable indications of community of nature and
evolutional continuity between the higher and the lower forms of life.
The creation of this second difficulty has naturally resulted in the
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mechanical category; that is, by regarding as wholly illusory the con-
sciousness of striving towards an end which every man has when he acts
with deliberate purpose; by assuming that we are deceived when we
believe ourselves to be real agents striving more or less effectively to
determine the course of events and to shape them to our will and pur-
pose. The demonstration that this view is untenable requires a very long
and intricate argument, which cannot be presented here even in briefest
outline.155 It must suffice to say that the acceptance of this view would
be subversive of all moral philosophy, would deprive ethical principles
and ethical discussion of all meaning and value; for if our consciousness
of striving to achieve ends, to realize ideals, to live up to standards of
conduct, if all this is illusory, then, to seek to determine what we ought
to do and to be, or to set up standards or norms or ideals, is wholly
futile; such endeavours can at best only serve to make us more acutely
aware of our impotence in face of such ideals,
We can only avoid this difficulty and this impasse by recognizing
that the commonly entertained notion of purposive activity is too nar-
row, and that it must be widened to include the lower forms of behaviour
as well as the higher forms which constitute human conduct.
The only serious objection that can be raised to this widening of the
notion of purposive activity is the contention that the word “purpose”
essentially implies on the part of the agent consciousness of the goal
that he seeks to attain, of the end he pursues; it may be said that it is only
in so far as the agent may reasonably be regarded as clearly conscious
of the goal he seeks that we can claim to understand in any sense or
degree how the end determines the course of the activity, how, in short,
the action is teleologically determined. And it may be said, with truth,
that we are not warranted in believing that the lower animals are ca-
pable of conceiving, or of being in any way clearly conscious of, the
ends of their actions; and therefore, it may be said, it is illegitimate to
regard the lower forms of behaviour as purposive or to claim that our
immediate experience of purposive activity in any way enables us to
understand them.
This objection may be removed by the following considerations.
Mental process seems to be always a process of striving or conation
initiated and guided by a process or act of knowing, of apprehension;
and this knowing or cognition is always a becoming aware of some-
thing, or of some state of affairs, as given or present, together with an
anticipation of some change. That is to say, mental life does not consist242/William McDougall
in a succession of different states of the subject, called states of con-
sciousness or ideas or what not; but it consists always in an activity of
a subject in respect of an object apprehended, an activity which con-
stantly changes or modifies the relation between subject and object. Now
this change which is to be effected, and which is the goal or end of
action, is anticipated with very different degrees of clearness and ad-
equacy at different levels of mental life. In many of our own voluntary
actions the end is anticipated or foreseen in the most general manner
only; to take a trivial but instructive instance: you cough in order to
clear your throat; or, experiencing a slight irritation in your throat, you
put out your hand, take up a glass of water, and drink, in order to allay
it. How very sketchy and ill-defined may be your thought of the end of
your action! And even in the execution of our most carefully thought-
out, our most purposeful, actions, our anticipatory thought or represen-
tation of the end to be achieved falls far short of its actual fulness of
concrete detail. The anticipation of the end of action is, then, always
more or less incomplete; its adequacy is a matter of degree. Therefore
we ought not to assume that a clear and full anticipation or idea of the
end is an essential condition of purposive action; and we have no war-
rant for setting up the instances in which anticipation is least incomplete
as alone conforming to the purposive type, and for setting apart all in-
stances in which anticipation is less full and definite as of a radically
different nature.
It is important also to note that the representation or idea of the end
is not truly the cause or determining condition of the purposive activity.
The merely cognitive process of representing or conceiving the end or
the course of action does not of itself suffice to evoke the action; we can
imagine many possible actions or ends of actions, without carrying them
out or feeling any inclination to pursue them; in fact it often happens
that the more clearly we envisage the end and course of a possible ac-
tion, the more strongly averse to it do we become. The truth is that the
anticipatory representation of the end of action merely serves to guide
the course of action in detail; the essential condition of action is that a
conative tendency, a latent disposition to action, shall be evoked. Where
the anticipatory representation of the end is vague and sketchy and gen-
eral, there the action will be general, vague, imperfectly directed in de-
tail; where it is more detailed and full, there action is more specialized,
more nicely adjusted to the achievement of its end.
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anticipation of the end varies from that of the most clear and detailed
nature through all degrees of incompleteness down to the most vague
and shadowy, a mere anticipation of change of some undefined kind. We
are therefore able to form some notion of the inner or subjective side of
the action of animals, even of those lowest in the scale of organization.
Putting aside a limited number of animal actions which owe their defi-
niteness and precision to guidance at every point by new impressions
falling from moment to moment upon the sense-organs (as in the most
striking instances of purely instinctive action), we see that, as we go
down the scale of life, actions become less precisely guided in detail,
and present more and more the character of random or but vaguely
directed efforts; in this corresponding to what we may legitimately sup-
pose to be the increasing vagueness of the anticipatory representations
by which they are guided. The theoretical lower limit of this series would
be what has been well called (by Dr. Stout) anoetic sentience; a mere
feeling or sentience involving no objective reference and giving rise only
to movement or effort that is completely undirected. This lower limit is
approached in our own experience when we stir uneasily or writhe or
throw ourselves wildly about, under the stimulus of some vaguely local-
ized internal pain. But we do not ourselves experience the limiting case,
and it is questionable whether we can properly suppose it to be realized
in the simplest instances of animal behaviour; it seems probable that the
actions of even the lowliest animals imply a vague awareness of some-
thing, together with some vague forward reference, some vague antici-
pation of a change in this something.
Knowing, then, is always for the sake of action; the function of
cognition is to initiate action and to guide it in detail. But the activity
implies the evoking, the coming into play, of a latent tendency to action,
a conative disposition; every such tendency or conative disposition is
either of a very general or of a more specialized or specific character;
and each such conative tendency) when awakened or brought into play,
maintains itself until its proper or specific end is attained, and sustains
also the course of bodily and mental activity required for the attainment
of that end. When, then, any creature strives towards an end or goal, it
is because it possesses as an ultimate feature of its constitution what we
can only call a disposition or latent tendency to strive towards that end,
a conative disposition which is actualized or brought into operation by
the perception (or other mode of cognition) of some object. Each organ-
ism is endowed, according to its species, with a certain number and244/William McDougall
variety of such conative dispositions as a part of its hereditary equip-
ment for the battle of life; and in the course of its life these may undergo
certain modifications and differentiations.
To attempt to give any further account of the nature of these con-
ative dispositions would be to enter upon a province of metaphysical
speculation, and is a task not demanded of psychology. I will only say in
this connection that we may perhaps describe all living things as expres-
sions or embodiments of what we may vaguely name, with Schopenhauer,
Will, or, with Bergson, the vital impulsion (l’élan vital), or, more sim-
ply, life; and each specifically directed conative tendency we may re-
gard as a differentiation of this fundamental will-to-live, conditioned by
a conative disposition. At the standpoint of empirical science, we must
accept these conative dispositions as ultimate facts, not capable of be-
ing analyzed or of being explained by being shown to be instances of
any wider more fundamental notion. To adopt this view is to assert that
the facts of behaviour, the empirical data of psychology, must be ex-
plained in terms of fundamental conceptions proper to it as an indepen-
dent science. The physicist works, and explains his facts, in terms of the
conception of mechanical process, not necessarily concerning himself
with the metaphysical problem that underlies this conception; for ex-
ample, he accepts as an ultimate fact the tendency of a moving mass to
continue to move in a straight line without change of velocity. In a simi-
lar manner the psychologist may work, and explain his facts, in terms of
the conception of purposive or appetitive process. The physicist studies
mechanical processes of all kinds in order to arrive at the most general
laws of mechanical process; and his explanation of any one fact of ob-
servation consists in exhibiting it as an instance of the operation of such
general laws; that is, in showing that it conforms to the type, that it may
be analytically regarded as a conjunction of simple mechanical pro-
cesses obeying the most general laws of mechanism. Just in the same
way the psychologist has to study appetitive processes of all kinds and
of all degrees of complexity, in order to ascertain the most general laws
of appetitive process. And his explanation of any process of the kind
with which he is concerned must consist in exhibiting it as an instance
of the operation of such general laws of appetition, in showing how it
may be analytically regarded as a conjunction of appetitions according
to the general laws of appetition that he has established. According to
this view, then, the acts of human beings, all our volitions, our efforts,
our resolutions, choices! and decisions, have to be explained in terms ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/245
the laws of appetition. When, and not until, we can exhibit any particu-
lar instance of conduct or of behaviour as the expression of conative
tendencies which are ultimate constituents of the organism, we can claim
to have explained it
Owing to the great development of physical science in modern times
and to the immense success that has attended its attempts to explain
physical facts in terms of the laws of mechanism, there obtains very
widely at the present time the opinion that we understand mechanical
process in some more intimate sense than, we can understand appetitive
process; and that, therefore, it is the business of all science to explain its
facts in terms of the laws of mechanism, and that appetitive processes
can only be rendered intelligible if they can be reduced to the mechani-
cal type. But this is a delusion. Of the two types of process, we certainly
understand the appetitive more intimately than the mechanical; for we
directly experience appetition, we have an inside acquaintance with it,
as well as acquaintance of the purely external kind which is the only
kind of acquaintance that we have with mechanical process. And when
metaphysicians attempt to go behind the distinction of mechanical and
appetitive processes (which for science is fundamental) and attempt to
show that processes of the two types are really of like nature, the most
plausible view seems to be that which regards mechanical process as
reducible to the appetitive type or regards it as, perhaps, representing a
degradation of process of the appetitive type. This, at least, is the view
which has been and is maintained by some of the most distinguished
metaphysicians and which seems to involve less serious difficulties than
the acceptance of the converse view.156
I have now stated explicitly the theory of action which is implied by
the doctrines of instinct, of sentiment, and of volition, expounded in this
volume; and it remains to justify it by showing the inadequacy of other
theories of action.
The theory of action most widely accepted by psychologists at the
present time is, perhaps, the theory which regards all organisms as merely
machines and all behaviour as mechanically determined. I put this aside
for the reasons already stated.
Of other theories, the one which has exercised the greatest influence
in modern speculation is the theory of psychological hedonism; this is
the theory of action which was unfortunately adopted by the founders of
Utilitarianism as the psychological foundation of all their social and
ethical doctrines.157 It asserts that the motive of all action is the desire to246/William McDougall
obtain increase of pleasure or diminution of pain. It claims to be an
empirical induction from the undeniable fact that men do seek pleasure
and do try to avoid pain. But its strange power to hold the allegiance of
those who have once accepted it is to be explained by the fact that it
seems to afford a rational explanation of all conduct, to show a suffi-
cient cause for all action. Whenever an action can be regarded as an
effort in pursuit of pleasure or in avoidance of pain, we seem to have an
explanation which is ultimate and intelligible. We feel no need to in-
quire—Why should anyone prefer pleasure to pain, or seek to gain plea-
sure and to avoid pain? No other theory of the ground of action seems at
first sight so self-evident and satisfying.
It is, no doubt, possible to show the fallacious nature of the doctrine
by careful examination of our own motives and unbiassed consideration
of the conduct of other men. For such consideration shows that, when
we desire any object or end, as, for example, food, what we normally
desire is the object or end itself, not the pleasure that may attend the
attainment of the end. But the complexity of the human mind is so great,
its springs of action so obscure, that, in almost every instance of human
behaviour, it is possible for the psychological hedonist to make out a
plausible interpretation in terms of his theory. Two facts play into his
hands: first, the fact that the attainment of any desired object or goal
brings satisfaction or pleasure; for the desired object or goal can then be
ambiguously described as a pleasure, and the agent can be said to have
been moved by desire for this pleasure: secondly, the fact that, even
though a man be really moved by the desire of pleasure, he may choose
to sacrifice the pleasure of the immediate future (or even to suffer pain)
in order to secure a greater pleasure at a later time. And the hedonist,
when he cannot plausibly interpret an action—such as one involving the
sacrifice of life in the cause of duty—in terms of his theory in any other
way, can always assert that the agent was moved by his aversion to the
pain of remorse which he foresees to be the consequence of neglect of
duty.
For these reasons the easiest and surest refutation of the hedonist
theory of action is provided by the consideration of animal behaviour.
For we may observe numberless instances of action, of persistent striv-
ing towards ends, on the part of lowly animals which cannot be credited
with the power of anticipating or desiring the pleasure that may accrue
from success.
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ascribes all conation, all mental and bodily striving, not to desire of
future pleasure or aversion from future pain, but to the influence of
present pleasure or pain; that is to say, feeling (in the sense of pleasure
or pain) is regarded as an essential link between cognition and conation;
it is maintained that cognition only moves us to action in so far as it
evokes in us pleasurable or painful feeling. This may conveniently be
designated the pleasure-pain theory of action. It is widely accepted at
the present time; it is more subtle and less easily refuted than the theory
of psychological hedonism, which is no longer seriously to be reckoned
with. The difficulty of refuting this doctrine arises from the fact that
mental process has almost invariably some feeling-tone, is coloured,
however faintly, with pleasure or with pain; so that it is possible to
attribute with some plausibility almost every instance of activity to the
feeling which accompanies and qualifies it. This theory rightly recog-
nizes that what we normally desire and strive after is some object or end
which is not pleasure itself, though its attainment may be accompanied
by pleasurable feeling; that, for example, when we are hungry we nor-
mally desire food rather than the pleasure of eating. But it asserts that
the moving power of the desire, that which prompts us to action, is the
feeling, the pleasure or pain, which we experience at the moment of
desire and of action; that, when we desire food, that which prompts us
to strive after it is neither the pleasure which we anticipate from eating
nor the pain which we anticipate from fasting, but the pleasure which
arises from the thought of eating or the pain which immediately quali-
fies the sensation of hunger.
The last sentence indicates the line of criticism by which this theory
may be shown to be untenable. We must ask—Is the hungry man
prompted to seek food by the pleasure of the thought of eating or by the
pain of hunger? Some of the pleasure-pain theorists incline to the one
view, some to the other, and some158 boldly solve the difficulty by ac-
cepting both, asserting that desire always involves both pain and plea-
sure. These last assert, for example, that the desire of food is pleasant in
so far as it is or involves the thought of eating, and that it is at the same
time painful in so far it is a state of unsatisfied appetite or craving. The
assumption that consciousness may be at any one moment both pleasur-
ably and painfully toned is one of very doubtful validity; but it is a
further and perhaps more serious objection to this view, that the plea-
sure and the pain which are assumed to coexist should be assumed also
to prompt to the same kind of action. And if the pleasure and the pain248/William McDougall
are assumed to alternate in consciousness, rather than to coexist, the
same difficulty remains. As a matter of fact, every kind of desire or
striving may be pleasurable or painful—pleasurable in so far as it
progresses towards its goal, painful in so far as it is thwarted; and yet
the desire and the striving may persist while the feeling tone alternates
from the extreme of pleasure to extreme of pain. Thus the desire of the
lover persists, whether he be raised to the height of bliss by the expecta-
tion of success, or cast down to depths of torment by a rebuff.
If we consider the animals, we shall again be led to the true view. It
is now generally admitted that we cannot attribute to the lower animals
“ideas,” or any power of clearly representing, or thinking of, things not
present to the senses; therefore we cannot attribute their actions to the
pleasure of the idea of attaining the end pursued; yet such animals strive
under the spur of hunger, as we say, and of other appetites. Therefore, in
the lower realms of life all action must be attributed by the pleasure-
pain theory to present pain. But the pain of hunger seems to be in our
own case the pain of unsatisfied craving; that is, the pain is conditioned
by the craving, and presupposes it—if there were no craving, there would
be no pain. But the craving is essentially a conation, a tendency to ac-
tion, however vaguely directed. Hunger, then, is not a pain which ex-
cites to action; but it is fundamentally a tendency to action, which, when
it cannot achieve its proper end, is painful; it is, in short, an appetition
arising from a specific conative disposition. And it seems in the highest
degree probable that this is true of the hunger of animals and of all the
pains to which the pleasure-pain theory finds itself compelled to at-
tribute their activities.
The assumption, necessarily made by the pleasure-pain theory,
namely, that all the actions of animals (save possibly some of those of
the highest animals) are prompted by pain, is, then, unsatisfactory, and
seems to invert the true relation of feeling to conation. That human
desires and actions are not exclusively or in any large measure due to
present pain is obvious; the pleasure-pain theory, therefore, attributes
them in the main to the pleasure which accompanies the thought of the
desired end or goal. The necessity of assuming that the actions of ani-
mals and those of men are predominantly prompted by the opposite
principles (pain and pleasure respectively) should give pause to the plea-
sure-pain theory. But, if we waive this objection and inquire after the
source or condition of the pleasure which is supposed to accompany the
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here too the theory inverts the true relation of feeling to conation. De-
sire, or the thought of the desired end, is pleasant in so far as an appetite
or conation obtains some degree of ideal satisfaction through the belief
in the possibility of presently achieving the act, or in so far as the activi-
ties prompted by the desire successfully achieve the steps which are the
means to the end. Thus hunger, even acute hunger, is pleasant if we
know that the bell will presently summon us to a well-spread table, or if
we are in the act of obtaining the food we desire; yet, if the hungry man
knows that it is impossible for him to obtain food, if, for example, he is
a castaway in an empty boat, the thought of food is a torment to him,
though he cannot cease to desire it, or prevent himself from dwelling
upon the thought of it.
Both the pleasure and the pain of hunger seem, then, to be condi-
tioned by the craving, the conative tendency, the specifically directed
impulse or appetition. And this seems to be true not only of the desire
for food, but of many other desires. When, for example, we desire the
applause of our fellows, when we are consumed with what is called
disinterested curiosity, when we desire to avenge ourselves or vent our
wrath on one who has insulted us, when we desire to relieve distress,
when we are impelled by sexual desire; in all these cases the state of
desiring is painful in so far as efforts are unavailing or attainment ap-
pears impossible, and pleasurable in so far as we are able to anticipate
success or take effective steps towards the desired end. And in each case
the strength of desire, of the conative tendency, seems to be quite, or
almost quite, independent of the quality and of the intensity of its he-
donic tone; while on the other hand the hedonic tone seems to be mani-
festly conditioned by the conative tendency, its quality by the success or
failure of the striving, Its intensity by the strength of the tendency. When,
then, the pleasure-pain theorist tells us that feeling determines conation,
we must ask what determines the feeling; and, if he replies that cogni-
tion of some object is the immediate condition of feeling, we point to
these numerous instances in which the feeling-tone of the thought of the
object varies from pleasure to plain, its quality and strength being obvi-
ously determined, not directly by cognition, but by the conation it evokes.
But if, for the purpose of the argument, we accept the thesis that the
pleasure of the idea of the end, the pleasure that we experience in con-
templating the end of action, is the spur that prompts and sustains ac-
tion, and inquire why is the thought of the desired end pleasant, we find
that two different answers are returned. Some of the pleasure-pain theo-250/William McDougall
rists tell us that the thought of the desired end or of the achievement of
the end is pleasant because this end is in congruity with our nature.159
Now this can only mean that the end of action which on being contem-
plated appears pleasant is one to which we naturally tend, that is, is one
towards which we feel impelled in virtue of a conative disposition di-
rected to such an end. To give this answer is then implicitly to give up
the pleasure-pain theory and to admit the truth of the view maintained in
these pages.
The other answer to this question as to the source or ground of the
pleasure we feel in contemplating the end of action, is to assert that all
feelings are primarily the pleasures and pains of sense, that certain sen-
sations are intrinsically pleasant and others intrinsically unpleasant, and
that all other pleasures and pains are derived from these by association.
According to this doctrine, which has been most fully elaborated by G.
H. Schneider,160  the sight of food is pleasant, because the pleasure of its
taste has become associated with the visual impression according to the
principle of contiguity; and the pleasure thus associated with the visual
perception or representation of food is the condition of the desire for
food, and prompts and sustains our efforts to obtain it. This answer may
seem plausible when applied to explain desires whose satisfaction nor-
mally involves sense-pleasures; though even in their case it is open to
several very serious objections. First, the notion of the association of
pleasure with ideas of objects according to the principle of contiguity is
of very questionable validity. Secondly, the fact that the feeling-tone of
desire for an object may vary, as we have seen, from the extreme of pain
to the extreme of pleasure is irreconcilable with this view; for it shows
that there is no fixed association of pleasure with the idea of the desired
object, but that the feeling-tone of the thought of the object is a function
of the way we think about it, being pleasant when we think of it as
attainable, unpleasant when we think of it as unattainable. Further, this
answer has no plausibility when applied to the many desires the satis-
faction of which involves no sense- pleasure, such as the desires for
applause, for revenge, for knowledge.
And we may attack the doctrine at the root by questioning its funda-
mental assumption, namely, that certain sensations are intrinsically plea-
surable and others intrinsically painful. This assumption seems most
plausible in the case of what are called physical pains, but even in this
connexion its validity may be seriously questioned. It may be main-
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pression which evokes aversion, a conative tendency to escape or with-
draw from the situation, a tendency which usually manifests itself clearly
enough, as when the hand is snatched away from a hot surface or a
pricking point; and that painful feeling only arises in so far as this cona-
tion fails to attain its end. It seems to be just for this reason that such
sensations as toothache and other strong sensations from inflamed or-
gans are so intensely painful. The various organs are endowed with
their capacities for evoking these strong sensations, in order that they
may be withdrawn from the influence of the excessive stimuli—the sen-
sitivity of the teeth, for example, serves primarily to prevent our biting
strongly on hard substances on which they might be broken. But when,
as in toothache, tendencies which such strong sense-impressions excite
fail to terminate the impression, and we vainly throw ourselves about,
rock to and fro, or writhe in a thousand ways, the situation is intensely
painful. Our power of voluntarily supporting sense- impressions that
normally are painful points in the same direction. When for any reason
we voluntarily submit to strong sense-impressions (as when we have a
tooth filled by the dentist, making up our minds to submit to the neces-
sary pain), we suppress by a strong effort of will partially or wholly the
tendency to escape the strong sense- impression; and, in so far as we are
successful in this, it loses its painful character. In this way also, I think,
we must understand such extreme examples of fortitude as the calm
behaviour of the Indian brave or the Christian martyr under torture; the
training and beliefs of such persons render them capable of voluntarily
submitting to the torture and of suppressing by strong volition the ten-
dency to struggle to escape evoked by the strong sense-impressions;
and, in so far as they succeed in this, the experience ceases to be pain-
ful—the stake and the rack are robbed of their terrors. For the same
reason hunger, voluntarily submitted to (as when we fast for the sake of
our health) is but a matter of small discomfort, though we are told that
it is very painful when suffered involuntarily.
It may be maintained with equal plausibility that the pleasures of
sense also are conditioned by conation. If we consider the case of the
pleasures of the palate, we see that the pleasant tastes are those which
stimulate us to maintain the processes of mastication and deglutition.
According to the pleasure-pain theory, these activities are induced and
maintained by the pleasure which the taste excites. But how can this
view be maintained in face of the fact that the same taste qualities cease
to be pleasing so soon as they cease to evoke these activities? Thus, one252/William McDougall
who likes sweet things finds the taste of sugar pleasant so long as it
subserves its normal function of exciting the processes of ingestion; but
as soon as repletion ensues, the tendency to mastication and deglutition
can no longer be excited by the sweet taste (for this requires the co-
operation of certain visceral conditions which are abolished by reple-
tion), and the mastication of the sugar then ceases to be pleasant, and
may even become decidedly unpleasant, if for any reason we persist in
it.
It appears, then, that even in those instances most favourable to the
pleasure-pain theory, the facts are difficult to reconcile with it, and are
more consistently in harmony with the opposite view, namely, that plea-
sure and pain are always conditioned by the success and failure of cona-
tion, respectively. And the superiority of the latter view will be estab-
lished if we can point to instances in which activity is unmistakably
independent of pleasure and pain; for by such instances, the pleasure-
pain theorist would be compelled to admit that his theory of action holds
good of some activities only, and that others require a different theory
for their explanation, namely, the theory which makes feeling dependent
on conation and which seems quite adequate to the explanation of the
types of activity most favourable to the pleasure-pain theory. Such in-
stances we may find at the two extremes of human behaviour; namely,
in the actions implying the highest moral effort and in merely habitual
actions. Whether or no we accept as true the story of the voluntary
return of Regulus to captivity and death, we all recognize that it repre-
sents a possible type of conduct. Now while psychological hedonism
has to explain such conduct by supposing that Regulus was more averse
to the pains of remorse than to those of bodily torture and death, the
pleasure-pain theory is driven to suppose that the contemplation of the
heroic line of action yielded Regulus a high degree of pleasure, and that
this pleasure impelled him to pursue this line of action even though he
anticipated from it a painful death; or the alternative explanation might
be suggested, that he found his absence from Carthage so painful that
he was impelled by this pain to return thither. Surely, whether from the
ethical or the psychological standpoint, this form of the hedonic theory
when applied to such instances of hard choice, appears hardly less fan-
tastic than psychological hedonism ! Surely it is obvious that men do
often carry through a line of action which is to them painful in every
phase, in the contemplation of it, in deciding upon it, and in its execu-
tion and achievement! Consider the more familiar instance of the fatherAn Introduction to Social Psychology/253
who feels himself impelled to inflict severe punishment upon a beloved
child, such as the withholding from it the enjoyment of something to
which they had both looked forward, hoping to enjoy it together. At
every stage the father hates the necessity laid upon him, and knows that
he himself is sacrificing a keen pleasure and undertaking a painful task.
It would be absurd to say that the father’s conduct is sustained by the
pleasure of the thought of the improved conduct or character of his son
which the punishment may bring about. Even if at times he may find
consolation in this thought, it can be but momentarily; and such plea-
sure will be in the main wholly submerged and neutralized by his sym-
pathetic pain and by the violence he does to the immediate promptings
of parental love.
Instances of purely habitual and quasi-mechanical actions are not
less decisive. We sometimes find ourselves performing some trivial fa-
miliar action, without having intended or resolved to do it, but merely
because we happen to be in a situation in which this action is habitually
performed; as when one winds up one’s watch on changing one’s waist-
coat. Such “absent- minded” actions involve a minimum of attention,
but are nevertheless conations; they are the expressions of habits, and
seem to be independent of pleasure and pain, whether anticipated or
experienced at the moment. Such an action is immediately induced by
the sense-impressions of the moment; they bring into play the special-
ized conative disposition which is the habit Such actions, better perhaps
than any others, enable us to understand in some degree the way in
which many of the actions of the animals are performed.
We may pass on to consider other theories of action; and we may
notice first the only remaining theory which makes any claim to be ap-
plicable to human behaviour of all types and levels. This is the intellec-
tualist theory of action which attributes action immediately to “ideas,”
ignoring the obvious fact that the development and organization of char-
acter, or of the conative side of the mind, is largely distinct from and
independent of the development and organization of knowledge, the cog-
nitive side of the mind. Prominent among older exponents of this theory
was Herbart, and, among contemporaries, Professor Bosanquet and (if
I have not wholly failed to understand his writings) Mr. F. H. Bradley.
According to this theory, the mind consists of a more or less highly
organized system of ideas; and every idea is both an intellectual entity
and a tendency to action. The type of all the higher forms of action is the
so-called ideo-motor action, the action which is supposed to result di-254/William McDougall
rectly from the presence in consciousness of the idea of that action.
Volition is merely a somewhat complicated instance of such ideo-motor
action.
Now, it may be seriously questioned whether any action really con-
forms to the alleged ideo- motor type. Actions proceeding from so-called
fixed ideas have usually been regarded as examples par excellence of
ideo-motor action. But the modern developments of psycho- pathology
are making it clear that in all such cases the fixed idea is fixed, and is
capable of determining action, just because it is functionally associated
with some strong conative tendency. But, putting aside this objection
and accepting for the purpose of the discussion the notion of ideo-motor
action, I urge that it would be manifestly absurd to say that action which
is carried out with painful effort against inner and outer difficulties of
all sorts, is simple ideo- motor action. We have to ask—What gives the
one idea of action the power to prevail over other ideas of action equally
vividly conceived? Bradley’s answer to this question is that the self iden-
tifies itself with the end the idea of which prevails.161 Bosanquet an-
swers that it is attention to the one idea. Both answers are true if the
“self” and “attention” are understood in the true sense; that is, if the self
is understood as the vast organization of conative dispositions which is
the character, and if attention is understood as conation revealing itself
in cognition. But for Bosanquet attention is merely apperception in the
Herbartian sense, the fusion of an idea with a mass of congruous ideas;
and since conation is not recognized, the congruity implied is logical
congruity, Whatever idea of action, then, is congruous with other ideas
of action is apperceived or attended to, and therefore predominates over
other ideas; and this is volition. Bosanquet adds that “in cases of delib-
erative action at a high level of consciousness, the self or personality
participates, i.e., one of the ideas which are striving for predominance
reinforces itself by the whole mass of our positive personality.”162 But
he explains that the whole self or personality is merely a mass of ideas
with their accompaniments of feeling, a fabric of ideas accompanied
with their affections of pleasure and pain, and having a tendency to
assert themselves in so far as they become partly discrepant from real-
ity.”163 And in Bradley’s view also the self seems to be merely a “fabric
of ideas.” In this intellectualist theory of action, then, conation, or will,
which, as has been maintained throughout this volume, is the very foun-
dation of all life and mind, is simply ignored; and my criticism of it must
consist in pointing to all that has been said of instinct, sentiment, andAn Introduction to Social Psychology/255
volition in this book. Unless all this is the purely fanciful construction
of a diseased brain, this intellectualist doctrine is radically false. I will
only point out in addition that, when we turn to the lower forms of life,
the impotence of this theory is at once clear; for, since at that level we
cannot postulate “ideas,” all action has to be interpreted as purely me-
chanical reflex action; and we are then faced with the problem of evolv-
ing intellect and will from unconscious mechanism, a task to which, as
is generally recognized, the ingenuity of Herbert Spencer himself proved
inadequate.
All other theories of human conduct may be classed together in
virtue of the fact that they place moral conduct in a separate category,
apart from all other forms of behaviour, and attribute it to some special
faculty peculiar to human beings, which they call “conscience,” or “the
moral sense,” or “reason,” or the “rational will,” or “the sense of duty”;
a faculty which seems to be conceived as having been implanted in the
human mind by a special act of the Creator, rather than as being the
product of the slow processes of evolution. Most of those who attribute
moral conduct to any such special faculty recognize that human nature
comprises also certain lower principles of action, which they call ani-
mal propensities, instincts, or passions; and these are regarded as re-
grettable survivals of our animal ancestry, unworthy of the attention of
a moral philosopher.
All these doctrines are open to two very serious objections: (1) that
they are incompatible with the principle of the continuity of evolution;
(2) that they are forms of the “faculty doctrine” whose fallacies have so
often been exposed. But a few words must be said about the more im-
portant of them. When authors tell us that “reason” is the principle of
moral action, it is necessary to point out that the function of reason is
merely to deduce new propositions from propositions already accepted.
Suppose a hungry man to be in the presence of a substance which he
does not recognize as food; by the aid of reason he may discover that it
is edible and nutritious, and he will then eat it or desire to eat it; but, if
he is not hungry, reason will not create the desire or impel him to eat.
And in the moral sphere the function of reason is the same. Reason aids
us in determining what is good, and in deducing from our knowledge of
the good conclusions as to what actions are right. But, unless a man
already hungers for righteousness, already desires to do whatever is
right, to be whatever is virtuous, unless, that is, he possesses the moral
sentiments and moral character, reason cannot impel him to do right or256/William McDougall
to desire it. To create desire is a task beyond its competence; it can only
direct pre-existing tendencies towards their appropriate objects. It is
therefore a grave error on the part of some authors164 to say that reason
may create a desire for a moral quality; or to say (as Sidgwick said) that
in rational beings as such the cognition or judgment that this is right or
ought to be done “gives an impulse or motive to action.” For this is not
true of rational beings as such —in Satan, we may suppose, no such
impulse would be awakened by this issue of the reasoning process. It is
true only of moral or moralized beings as such, beings who already
desire to be virtuous and to do the right. It is only by arbitrarily and
implicitly defining the “rational being” as one who desires to do right,
that the doctrine is made to seem plausible. Nor is this doctrine, that
moral conduct proceeds from the reason, appreciably improved when
“the rational will” is put in the place of “reason.” This may seem to
avoid the intellectualist fallacy of assigning intellectual processes as the
springs of action. But, unless some further account of the will is given,
this doctrine is in no way superior to the doctrine of “conscience;” for
the “rational will” remains a mere word, by which we denote the fact
that we do make deliberate moral choices and decisions, and that such
choice is not merely the issue of a brute conflict of opposed desires.
Though the intuitionist doctrines which attribute moral judgment,
moral choice and effort, to a special faculty, have been variously stated,
and though the supposed faculty has received a variety of names, they
are essentially similar and need not be separately considered. We may
consider that form which derives from Kant and attributes our moral
judgments and conduct to “the sense of duty.” It is no longer seriously
contended that all the actions of any moral being spring from the “moral
faculty.” It is admitted that upon most of the ordinary occasions of life
our actions spring from other principles or sources. But it is maintained
that, in deliberation which issues in moral decision, this issue is deter-
mined by the co-operation of “the sense of duty.” The “sense of duty” is
in fact the last refuge of intuitionism, of those moralists who insist upon
making of man’s moral nature a mystery, separate from the larger mys-
tery of mind, and implying laws of an order radically different from
those which govern behaviour in general. Canon Rashdall writes: “In
claiming for the idea of duty not merely existence but authority, we have
implied that the recognition that something is our duty supplies us with
what we recognize upon reflection as a sufficient motive for doing it....
The recognition of the thing as right is capable of producing an impulseAn Introduction to Social Psychology/257
to the doing of it.”165 And he speaks of the “sense of duty” as being “the
one all-sufficient motive present to the consciousness” at moments of
moral crisis.166
This doctrine, if true, obviates the need for all psychological inves-
tigation or reflection on the part of the moral philosopher; except in so
far as he desires to expose the errors of his predecessors, by showing
how they proceed from a false and unnecessarily complicated psychol-
ogy, such as that of Kant or that of the founders of Utilitarianism. For
the whole of the positive psychology required by him is contained in a
nutshell, in the sentence: “Reason proclaims my duty, and my sense of
duty impels me to do it” But some of the modern exponents of intuition-
ism, unfortunately for the consistency of their doctrine, are not content
to leave their “sense of duty” an utterly mysterious faculty of which
nothing more can be said. Sidgwick asserted that the notion of “ought”
or duty is too elementary to admit of formal definition; and in the same
spirit Dr. Rashdall tells us that the idea that something ought to be done
“is an unanalysable idea which is involved in all ethical judgments.”
But he ventures further and tells us that “Duty means precisely devotion
to the various kinds of good in proportion to their relative value and
importance”;167 and again: “At bottom the sense of duty is the due ap-
preciation of the proportionate objective value of ends.”168 From this it
appears that, by the admission of a prominent exponent of the intuition-
ist doctrine, “the sense of duty” is not an ultimate element of the moral
consciousness, is not an unanalysable idea and at the same time an im-
pulse to action; rather it appears as the highly abstract name for all that
immensely complex part of the mental organization which is the moral
character, and which comprises the system of the moral sentiments and
the developed self-regarding sentiment. For it is the possession of devel-
oped moral character, and this alone, that enables us to judge rightly of
the relative values of moral goods and impels us to pursue the best; and,
as I have tried to show in this book, and as indeed is now generally
admitted, this complex organization which is moral character is only
acquired by any individual by a slow process of growth continued through
many years under the constant pressure of the social environment and of
the moral tradition. Our “sense of duty” is, in short, at the lower moral
level our sense of what is demanded of us by our fellows; and, at the
higher moral level, it is our sense of what we demand of ourselves in
virtue of the ideal of character that we have formed. How and why we
respond to these demands made upon us by our fellows and by our-258/William McDougall
selves, and how we come to make these demands, I have tried to show
by means of a general theory of action, a theory of the moral sentiments
and a theory of volition. Before dismissing the theory of “a moral fac-
ulty,” I must add that in one respect the intuitionist doctrine is true;
namely, it is true that when we have acquired moral sentiments we do
frequently both pass moral judgments and make moral efforts without
any weighing of the consequences of action. But to admit or to establish
this is neither to justify the doctrine of “a moral faculty,” nor to deny
that our moral judgments frequently need correction by reference to the
consequences of action upon human welfare, the only true and ultimate
criterion of moral value.
We may admit also the possibility that, though the moral sentiments
are in the main built up anew in each individual in the way roughly
sketched in the pages of this volume, some predisposition to their for-
mation may be inherited, and that, in so far as this is the case, the capac-
ity of moral judgment, which is rooted in them, may be said to be innate
and, in that sense, a priori.
It only remains to show that the theory of action here set forth is
implied in the doctrines of some eminent philosophers (although it has
not been explicitly stated by them), and most clearly perhaps by T. H.
Green and Prof. Stout. These authors recognize the actions of animals
as true conations or expressions of will, in the wider sense of the word
“will.” They recognize that human nature is capable of, or liable to,
similar modes of primitive conation; and that desire is a comparatively
complex mode of conation of which, perhaps, in the proper sense men
only are capable. But they do not claim that volition or moral conduct is
nothing more than the issue of a conflict of desires. They rightly tell us
that these simpler modes of conation, blind impulses, cravings, and de-
sires, are something that each man experiences as, in a sense, forces
acting upon him, impelling him towards this or that line of action; and
that he knows that his true self can either oppose such tendencies, or can
accept them; and that only when the self thus intervenes to accept or
resist desire or impulse do we perform a volitional act And by the self
they do not mean an abstract entity of which no account can be given.
Green tells us that by the true self he means the character of the man; he
uses also the term “conscience” to convey the same notion; and by con-
science he means something which has a history in the life of the indi-
vidual, something that is slowly built up in the course of moral training
and under the influence of the social environment; conscience or moralAn Introduction to Social Psychology/259
character is, in short, in Green’s view an organized system of habits of
will.
Stout also tells us that volition is distinguished from mere conflict
of desires by the decisive intervention of self-consciousness; and that
this self, which in moral conflict self-consciously throws itself upon the
side of one desire and against others, is a unified system of interests.
Now an interest is, for Stout, a conative tendency with the accompany-
ing potentialities of feeling; and the self, therefore, is a unified system of
conative tendencies.
These authors, then, have put forward in very general terms the
theory of action which I am defending. They recognize will as a funda-
mental faculty co-ordinate with cognition; they recognize that in all or-
ganisms (animals and men alike), this faculty of striving is directed
either vaguely or with more or less of precision towards certain kinds of
action which tend to secure specific ends; that when these conative ten-
dencies are brought into play in relative isolation, sporadic impulse,
desire, or action is the result; and they recognize that moral volition and
moral conduct depend upon the systematic organization of such tenden-
cies; that in short, moral volition expresses character or is character in
action. Their doctrines, then, imply the thesis here maintained; namely,
that in order to explain or understand any action we have to exhibit it as
the expression of some single conative disposition, or of a conflict of, or
of some conjunction of, such tendencies, according to the plan of orga-
nization of the character; and that, when we thus show it to be an in-
stance of conation or appetition conforming to the most general laws of
appetition, we do all that as men of science we can be called upon to do.
Supplementary Chapter II
The Sex Instinct
In previous editions of this book the sex instinct was dismissed with a
few words only,169 partly because of the difficulty of treating of it satis-
factorily in a book designed to appeal to the general reader, partly be-
cause it had been discussed at great length by several able writers, and
because it seemed that in respect to this one department of human con-
duct the main thesis of my book was already generally accepted; the
thesis, namely, that human activities, both mental and bodily, are only
to be explained or understood by tracing them back to a number of
innate dispositions, tendencies to feel and act in certain more or less
specific ways, in certain situations; tendencies which manifest them-260/William McDougall
selves in each normal individual of the species independently of previ-
ous experience of such situations and which, like the similar innate ten-
dencies of the animals, may properly be called instinctive.
But I have found that to obtain general acceptance of this theory of
human action is not so easy a task as I had supposed it to be. And, since
the consideration of sexual experience and conduct affords the clearest
illustrations and the most obvious support of the theory, I feel that it
would be foolish to neglect to make good this serious omission.
The addition of this supplementary chapter seems to be called for
also by the widespread interest in and lively controversies over ques-
tions of mental pathology which have sprung up in recent years and in
which the question of the role of sex has figured very prominently.
Throughout the greater part, and more especially throughout the
higher part, of the animal kingdom, the members of each species are of
two kinds, male and female, and reproduction is sexual—that is to say,
reproduction depends upon the fusion of a living cell formed in the body
of a male (the sperm cell) with one formed in the body of a female (the
egg) to form the germ which evolves into the new individual. This fu-
sion, together with the processes by which the two cells are brought
together, is the process of fertilization. In plants, among many species
of which sexual reproduction is also the rule, fertilization is left as it
were to chance; the plant does nothing more than produce a quantity of
male or female germ cells, or both (pollen and ovules), and set these in
such positions that external forces of nature (generally insects or the
wind) bring together cells of the two kinds. But in the animal kingdom it
is the rule that a great economy of germ cells is effected by the operation
of the sex instinct, an instinct which impels individuals of opposite sex
to approach one another at the time when their germ cells are ready to
take part in the process of fertilization. In many species of fish we see
the operation of the sex instinct at its simplest; the male merely swims
close to a female and ejects a cloud of sperm cells into the water, at the
same time as the female extrudes into the water a number of eggs; and
the final approximation and fusion of the egg and sperm cells is effected
by the active approach of the latter to the former and by a process of
penetration of the egg by the sperm, when contact has been effected.
This active approach of the sperm cell to the egg and its penetration of
it remain very obscure. We are not concerned with it here, further than
to note that it strikes the keynote of male and of female sexuality through-
out the animal scale—namely, the active seeking of the female by theAn Introduction to Social Psychology/261
male and the relatively passive or merely attractive role of the female.
Apart from this final act of the germ cells, the process of fertilization
consists essentially in the two stages of the operation of the sex instinct:
first, the near approach of two individuals of opposite sex; secondly, the
discharge of the reproductive cells in such a way that they come into
near neighbourhood of one another.
The sex instinct is Nature’s provision for the effecting of these first
two stages of the process of fertilization, the process which initiates the
development of each new individual. Like other instincts it is a complex,
innately organized, psycho-physical disposition, consisting of three parts,
each subserving one of the three phases that we distinguish in every
complete mental or psycho-physical process, namely the cognitive, the
affective, and the conative; three parts which, from the point of view of
nervous function and structure we may call the afferent or sensory, the
central, and the efferent or motor.170
It is important to note that, even at the simple level of sex activity
displayed by the fishes, the operation of the instinct implies or presup-
poses a differentiation of the two sexes in respect of external or percep-
tible characters which serve as recognition marks of sex. For, in the
absence of such perceptible differences between the sexes (commonly
called secondary sex characters), it would be impossible for the male to
distinguish the female of his species from his fellow males, and hence
impossible to achieve that first stage of the process of fertilization, the
approach of the male to the female. Accordingly we find that in all
bisexual animal species the two sexes are differentiated by the posses-
sion of such recognition marks of sex; marks which may be perceptible
by any one of the senses, but which in the higher animals most com-
monly appeal to the eye, though not infrequently to the other great or-
gans of perception at a distance, namely, the ear and the nose.
It is still more important to note that this first stage of the fertiliza-
tion process, the approach of the male to the female, presupposes (on
the part of the male at least) an innate capacity to recognize the female,
i.e. to distinguish the female from the male, to perceive her as different
by reason of her recognition marks of sex. For, though it may seem
plausible to suppose that, in the more intelligent and social species, the
male learns through experience to distinguish the female, this cannot be
maintained of the less intelligent species, and is clearly inadmissible of
the many species in which the male, on first encountering the adult fe-
male, is attracted by her in a way in which he is not attracted by males.262/William McDougall
The innate capacity or disposition to recognize the other sex by aid of
the recognition marks of sex is, then, an essential feature or part of the
complex innate disposition which is the sex instinct. Without this per-
ceptual side the instinct would be well-nigh useless to the animals; it
would achieve the first essential step of the process of fertilization but
very wastefully and uncertainly. The sex instinct, then, illustrates very
clearly a much-neglected fact of instinct on which I have insisted in the
earlier chapters of this volume, the fact, namely, that an instinct is not
only an innate disposition to act and to feel in a more or less specific
manner, but is also an innate disposition to perceive or perceptually
discriminate those things towards which such reactions are demanded
by the welfare of the species.
In many species it is not sufficient that the cognitive side of the
instinct should enable the perceptual discrimination of one sex from the
other. A further differentiation of it is required. For the second stage of
the process of fertilization, the extrusion of the germ cells at the re-
quired place and time, is also accomplished instinctively. In the simplest
cases the mere proximity of two individuals of opposite sex seems to
suffice to produce or excite this further reaction; as when the male fish
or frog merely pours out his germ cells into the water in which the
female is laying her eggs. But in many species the second stage of the
process involves a more complex action or train of actions, that is to
say, as in so many other cases, the motor issue of the excitement of the
instinct is not a single reaction or a single or repeated movement of one
kind, but a chain or series of reactions, each step of which brings about
a new situation that evokes the next step.
In mammals the second stage of the process of fertilization is com-
plicated by the necessity of bringing the sperm cells into the near
neighbourhood of the egg, while the egg still remains within the womb
of the female; this being the only place in which the fertilized egg finds
the conditions necessary to the earlier stages of its development. In or-
der that the sperm cells may be brought into such a position that they
may of their own feeble powers of locomotion reach the egg in the womb,
the male is provided with the organ of intromission, the penis, and the
female with the vagina or sheath, the antechamber to the womb. And to
the same end the sex instinct is modified and complicated in such a way
that the second stage of the process of fertilization, the emission of the
sperm cells by the male, is no longer excited by the mere proximity to,
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male shall enter the antechamber of the womb, and that emission of the
sperm cells shall not take place until this is accomplished. In order that
the second stage of fertilization shall be completed in this manner, the
sex instinct of the male requires to be complicated on its perceptive as
well as on its executive side. The male accordingly is endowed, not only
with the capacity of recognizing the female, but also with the capacity
of singling out the entrance to the womb. And on its executive side the
male’s instinct is complicated in such a way that he is impelled to em-
brace the female and to introduce his organ to the vagina, and thereupon
to execute movements which, by stimulating the highly sensitive skin of
the organ, excite the emission of the sperm cells. The sex instinct of the
mammalian female requires less modification than that of the male; for,
her role being passive and receptive rather than active and aggressive
she does not need to be innately endowed with the capacity of singling
out the male organ and of actively seeking to effect its introduction to
her body (a point of some importance for the understanding of the dif-
ference between male and female sexuality). Nevertheless, in some spe-
cies the instinct seems to impel her to respond to the movements of the
male with appropriate corresponding behaviour. The activities of the
male reach their natural end with the emission of the sperm cells; and in
the female the embrace culminates in a peculiar activity of the internal
sex organs which facilitates the approach of the sperm cells to the egg in
the womb, and which, like the act of emission in the male, constitutes
the climax and termination of the sexual act (the orgasm). In both sexes
the activity of the sex instinct is supported by a powerful impulse and
accompanied by an emotional excitement, which, when the process of
fertilization runs its normal course, waxes throughout, attains its cli-
max at the moment of orgasm, and then suddenly subsides. And the
whole activity seems normally to be highly pleasurable, in accordance
with the general law that the natural and unimpeded progress of any
instinctive activity towards its natural end is pleasurably toned.
This brief and general description of the nature and operation of the
sex instinct in mammals holds good for the human species; and, al-
though the operation of the instinct is often (especially among persons
of culture and refinement) very much complicated and obscured by the
influence of the will, and of personal sentiments and ideals, it neverthe-
less is often displayed in relatively uncomplicated and direct fashion.
Indeed, a principal source of the difficulties and dramas of civilized life
is to be found in the fact that, owing to the great strength of the impulse264/William McDougall
of this instinct, men, and even women, who have attained a high level of
character and culture are liable to be swept away by a flood of sexual
passion, and, the restraints normally maintained by their higher senti-
ments being temporarily broken through, to be impelled to yield to the
prompting of the instinct in a manner almost as simple and direct as the
mating of the animals.
As in most species of the higher animals, the sex instinct in man
does not attain its full development until the period of youth, the period
of growth and acquisition, is well-nigh completed. The questions of the
age at which the instinct normally comes into operation in man, and of
the course of its development, are still in dispute; and in respect to them
opinions still differ very widely. These very important topics will be
discussed in a final section of this chapter. At present we may confine
our attention to some special features and problems of the fully devel-
oped instinct in man.
It is maintained by some high authorities on the psychology of sex171
that the activities which I have described in the foregoing paragraphs as
constituting the first and second stages of the process of fertilization are
respectively the expressions of two impulses which they denote by the
terms impulses of “contrectation” and of “detumescence.” But it would
be a mistake to attribute these two stages of the sexual act to separate
instincts. In the animal world we may observe numerous instances of
“chain instincts,” instincts, that is to say, each of which manifests itself
in a chain of activities; each step of such a chain prepares the way for a
further step, the new situation created by each step modifying in detail
the direction and operation of the impulse, while yet the impulse to-
wards the one biological end seems to dominate and to supply the con-
ative energy of the whole process. As examples of such chain instincts
we may cite those which impel most of the constructive efforts of ani-
mals (the nest-building of birds, the web- weaving of spiders), and such
actions as those by which a squirrel buries a nut in the ground, or a bird
first lays eggs in some chosen spot and then broods over them. Just as in
these instances the first step of the instinctive process creates a situation
which excites the second step, so the first stage in the process of fertili-
zation in man prepares in a double manner the situation which excites
the activities of the second stage. The perception of a suitable individual
of the opposite sex evokes the impulse of approach, and at the same
time tends to bring about that state of tumescence or turgescence of the
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second stage of the process. But, though the bodily activities of the two
stages are different, the quality of the emotional conative excitement
that accompanies the activities is recognizably the same throughout both
stages.
This emotional conative excitement, when it occurs uncomplicated
by other emotions and tendencies, is properly called “lust.” It is unfor-
tunate that this word has lost its respectability owing to the opprobrium
heaped upon lust by Christian moralists. But, for the purposes of psy-
chology, it is a necessary and useful word. We must frankly recognize
that, in spite of all the hard things that have been said about lust, it is an
essential element in the emotional conative attitude of human lovers
towards one another; and that, no matter how much the attitude and the
feeling of refined lovers may be modified and complicated by other ten-
dencies, lust nevertheless strikes the ground tone and supplies the chief
part of the mental and bodily energy which is put forth so recklessly and
copiously in the service of sex love.
But, while it is necessary to recognize that lust enters into and colours
the emotions evoked in the lover by the presence or the thought of the
beloved one, we must avoid the mistake (not infrequently made) of as-
suming that the mere direction of the sex impulse towards a particular
person in itself constitutes sexual love. Such habitual direction of the
sex impulse towards one person is certainly an essential condition or
feature of sex love; but an habitual lusting for a particular person would
be a crude sentiment not worthy of the name of love. Sex love is a
complex sentiment, and in its constitution the protective impulse and
tender emotion of the parental instinct are normally combined with the
emotional conative disposition of the sex instinct, restraining, softening,
and ennobling the purely egoistic and somewhat brutal tendency of lust.
The presence of the maternal element in the attitude of a woman
towards her lover has been recognized by countless writers of romance.
And that the tender protective element commonly enters into the senti-
ment of the man for the beloved woman is equally obvious. That sex
love should thus combine the most purely altruistic with the most ruth-
lessly egoistic tendency of human nature, seems sufficiently accounted
for in the case of the woman by the great strength of the maternal im-
pulse and the ease with which it is aroused in her in all personal rela-
tions; and in the man it is perhaps sufficiently accounted for by the fact
that woman, especially at the age at which she is most strongly attrac-
tive to man, resembles in many respects, both mental and physical, the266/William McDougall
child, the normal object of the parental or protective impulse.
It is, then, a mistake to attribute to the sex instinct all the manifesta-
tions of sex love; for this sentiment is commonly highly complex, and
involves not only the emotional-conative dispositions of the sexual and
parental instincts, but those of other instincts also, notably those of the
instincts of self-display and self-abasement The importance of distin-
guishing between the sex instinct and the sentiment of sex love, and of
recognizing the complex constitution of the latter, is well illustrated by
the controversies raised among the mental pathologists by the doctrines
of Professor Sigmund Freud. Freud proposes to extend very greatly the
sphere commonly attributed to sexuality in human life, assigning a sexual
root to mental and nervous disorders of almost every kind, as well as to
all dreams and to other processes of normal mental life that have no
obvious connexion with sex. It seems to me that this immense extension
of the sphere of sexuality (which has excited acute opposition to Freud’s
doctrines and obscures for many the important and valuable truths con-
tained in them) is in large part an error due to the neglect of the distinc-
tion insisted upon in the foregoing paragraph. For Freud and his dis-
ciples, taking the sentiment of sex love as the type of all love, regard as
manifestations of sexuality all modes of behaviour and of feeling that
are of the same kind as those that occur as phases in the life-history of
this sentiment. They are thus led to regard as sexual, or as containing a
sexual element, the love of parents for their children and of children for
their parents, as well as every other variety of love and every manifesta-
tion of tender emotion. Expressions of other emotional and conative
tendencies that commonly enter into the composition of the sentiment of
sex love have been in a similar way and for the same reason regarded by
writers of this school as indicative of the presence of the sexual tone in
relations in which they are displayed, or spoken of as components of the
normal sexuality of man and woman.172 If we carefully observe this
distinction, we shall find no reason to regard the sex instinct as compris-
ing any tendencies other than those which are directly concerned in ef-
fecting the first and second stages of the process of fertilization.
If we adopt this relatively restricted view of the scope of the sex
instinct in man, it still appears as one of considerable complexity on its
executive side; and on its perceptual side it is certainly more complex
than has commonly been assumed. In earlier chapters of this book I
have urged, in opposition to a widely held view, that the structure of an
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render the possessor of the instinct capable of attentively singling out
and discriminatively perceiving objects or situations of the kind that
demand the instinctive reaction. The sex instinct is no exception to this
rule. We have seen that in the animals the presence of the recognition
marks of sex implies that the sex instinct renders them capable of distin-
guishing the members of the opposite sex from those of their own, and
that this truth is especially obvious in the case of those animals which
react sexually on the first occasion of encountering a member of the
other sex. In man, since the sexual instinct does not normally ripen or
become excitable until the individual has greatly developed both his
perceptual capacities and his power of self-direction, no such direct
evidence of the innate perceptual organization of the instinct can be
cited; but there is no reason to believe that in this respect the sex instinct
of the human species has undergone any considerable degree of degen-
eration or involution. And we have indirect evidence supporting the view
here maintained. In the first place, the great emotional effect and aes-
thetic value of the human form, especially of the female form for man,
can hardly be accounted for without this assumption. But of greater
evidential value is the fact that the boy or youth who knows nothing of
the facts of sex may, and often does, experience the strong and for him
altogether mysterious attraction and emotional influence of the female
form, and may find that his imagination is strongly occupied by ideas of
it, even against his will. If we reject the view I am urging, we are com-
pelled to regard the direction of the sex impulse towards the opposite
sex as determined by experience of sexual pleasure obtained through
contact with the other sex; or as resulting from the acquired knowledge
that the other sex is the natural object of the impulse and that only
through a member of that sex can the sexual impulse, craving, or desire,
obtain full satisfaction. Attempts have been made to explain the fact in
both these ways. The former way is a special application of the plea-
sure-pain theory of action, the fallacy of which has been exposed in the
foregoing chapter. Both kinds of attempt break down in face of the fact
that the sex attraction is sometimes felt and displayed prior to all expe-
rience of sexual pleasure and to all knowledge of the facts of sex.173
It is true that perverted example, or early acquaintance with per-
verse modes of obtaining sex pleasure, may and too often does pervert
the direction of the sex impulse, in the ways denoted by the terms “sexual
inversion” and “sexual fetishism”; but the fact that the normal direction
of the sex impulse so often asserts itself in spite of early acquired expe-268/William McDougall
rience and knowledge of these unfortunate kinds is strong evidence that
the impulse is innately directed to the opposite sex.174  And such innate
direction necessarily implies that the instinct is innately organized on its
afferent side for the perceptual discrimination of the opposite sex by aid
of its secondary sex characters.
Consideration of the sex instinct thus affords very strong support to
the view of the nature of instinct adopted and maintained throughout
this volume, the view, namely, that an instinct is an innately organized
capacity, not only to act and feel in a certain manner, but also to per-
ceive the object upon which the action and the feeling are directed. Psy-
chologists are very slow to accept this view, although much of the
behaviour of animals, especially of the higher insects, implies it in the
most obvious and unmistakable fashion. Their reluctance seems to be
due to the fact that “innate ideas” are out of fashion and that to admit
innate dispositions to perceive objects of special kinds is perilously near
to admitting “innate ideas”; for it is but a small step from an innate
perceptual disposition to an innate disposition to represent, or think of,
an object apart from its presentation to the senses. In my view there are
good grounds for believing that dispositions of both kinds are inherit-
able and innate; and in any case we ought to be guided in this question
by impartial consideration of the facts, rather than by the prevailing
philosophical fashions.175
The principal thesis of this book is that each instinct is a great source
or spring of the psycho- physical energy176 that supports our bodily and
mental activities. This principle is illustrated very vividly by the sex
instinct.
It is generally recognized that in men and animals alike the sex
impulse is apt to manifest itself in very vigorous and sustained efforts
towards its natural end; and that in ourselves it may determine very
strong desire, in the control of which all the organized forces of the
developed personality, all our moral sentiments and ideals, and all the
restraining influences of religion, law, custom, and convention too often
are confronted with a task beyond their strength.
It is generally recognized also how the energy of this impulse may
quicken and animate the whole organism, and how it sustains and in-
vigorates all activities which are entered upon as steps or means to-
wards the attainment of the end of the instinct. In this connexion the sex
instinct is especially interesting in two respects. First, it illustrates bet-
ter than any other the fact that the instinct may work strongly within us,An Introduction to Social Psychology/269
impelling us to actions that bring us nearer to the end of the instinct,
while yet that end remains undefined in consciousness. Thus a youth,
though totally inexperienced in and ignorant of sexual relations, never-
theless may feel very strongly attracted to a member of the other sex,
impelled to seek her neighbourhood, to follow her, and to find enormous
emotional value and significance in the slightest contact. In such a per-
son the sex impulse may be nothing more than a vague restlessness, a
blind craving for some object or impression or experience that he cannot
define to himself; yet under favouring conditions the impulse may carry
him on irresistibly to the accomplishment of the actions which consti-
tute both the first and second stages of the process of fertilization.
Secondly, the social consequences of the sexual act are so serious
that great hindrances are opposed to its completion, both by the consti-
tution of human nature (especially female nature) and by the customs
and conventions, the traditions and ideals which a moralized society
imposes upon its developing members. Yet the conditions that tend to
excite the instinct are very frequently realized in normal social inter-
course. Hence it follows that in most members of a civilized society
(especially in the younger celibate members) the instinct is frequently
excited in some degree, but only comparatively rarely (in some cases
never) permitted to accomplish its end. The impulse of this instinct there-
fore, in addition to subserving the primary function of reproduction of
the species, plays a large part (in co-operation with other tendencies) in
determining the forms and maintaining the activities of social intercourse.
In the games of children and young people, in their dances and social
gatherings, the mingling of the sexes gives a zest to the enjoyment and
adds to the vigour of both bodily and mental activity, through the appeal
to the sex instinct; even though the gathering be of the most decorous
and no single participant be capable of defining the end of the instinct or
be aware of the source of his special animation. And in such games as
kiss-in-the- ring, in the sophisticated dances of modern society, in flirta-
tions of all degrees, and in the more or less self-conscious efforts of
deliberate courtship, the operation of the sex impulse is obvious enough.
Dance and song and the writing of love letters, which figure so
largely in the arts of courtship, connect the large fields of social activity
in which the influence of the sex impulse is very obvious, with an equally
extensive and perhaps even more important province of human activity
in which the influence of the sex instinct is more obscure but undoubt-
edly present, namely, the production and enjoyment of works of art.270/William McDougall
The dance and song and literary composition which are used more
or less deliberately in courtship may clearly be brought under the gen-
eral principle that the conative energy of the instinct maintains all ac-
tivities that appear to be means towards the attainment of the instinctive
end. In this respect they are comparable to the efforts of the young man
to secure an economic position which will enable him to marry the girl
of his choice; efforts which, as we know, are often very energetic and
long sustained.
But this principle will hardly explain the part of the sex impulse in
those aesthetic activities whose clearly envisaged and sufficient end seems
to be the completed work of art. Perhaps we may partially explain the
influence of the sex instinct in such works by invoking the principle that
the means to an end tend, when that end is long pursued, to become
desired as ends in themselves; and where the end of an instinct is not
explicitly defined in consciousness, as is so frequently the case with the
sex instinct, this conversion of means into ends is no doubt especially
apt to occur.
But the connexion between the sex instinct and artistic production
is probably more direct in many instances. The stirring of the sex im-
pulse may suffuse the body with energy and the mind with a vague
emotion and a longing for something indefinable; and this surplus en-
ergy, not being consciously directed to any end, and being denied the
opportunity and the conditions which would lead on the impulse to de-
fine itself in action and in thought, vents itself in spontaneous and self-
sufficing, i.e., purely lyrical, activities, such as mere gambollings, dance,
or song. If this be admitted, it remains a very difficult problem to ex-
plain how and why these modes of expending the sex energy assume the
forms which we regard as specifically artistic. This is perhaps the most
fundamental problem of aesthetics. No doubt much is due to example
and tradition; but I do not think that the full answer can be given, unless
we recognize far more fully than is usual with psychologists the innate
organization of the perceptual side of the sex instinct. If we consider the
facts on the comparatively simple plane of animal life, we find, I think,
the key to the understanding of the relation of sex to art. Who can doubt
that the female nightingale is thrilled by the music of the male as by no
other sound; that the evolutions of the male pigeon are pleasing to the
hen bird; and that in both cases this is true because the sex instinct is so
organized as to be excited by these impressions? That the stimulation of
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when there is no anticipation of further indulgence of it, is sufficiently
shown by the extent to which the lower forms of art, literature, and
public entertainment rely upon a titillation of the sex impulse in making
their appeal to the public. When the plastic and pictorial arts represent
beautiful human forms, they make appeal to the same element; but in
their higher expressions they present these objects in such a way as to
evoke also wonder and admiration, a respectful or even reverential atti-
tude which prevents the dominance of the sex impulse over the train of
thought, and, arresting its bodily manifestations, diverts its energy to
other channels. This diverted energy then serves to reinforce the intel-
lectual activity required for the apprehension of the various subtle har-
monies of line and light and colour; that is to say, the energy liberated by
the appeal to the sex instinct is utilized in enhancing the activity of
purely aesthetic apprehension.
But, even though this account be in the main correct, it seems prob-
able that we still have not exhausted the indirect influences of the sex
instinct. It is widely held, and though it is difficult to adduce any con-
vincing or crucial evidence, the view appears well founded, that the
energy of the sex impulse, if it is not expended wholly in its own chan-
nels of expression, may function as a re- enforcer of purely intellectual
activities in situations that make no appeal to the instinct. If this be true,
we can hardly hope to find any psychological explanation of the facts,
though physiology may render them in some degree intelligible.
Such indirect utilization of the sex instinct as a great fund of energy
available for other than purely sexual activities is the process which
Freud has proposed to call “sublimation”; and we may conveniently
adopt this term and recognize the general truth of the notion, without
committing ourselves to the acceptance of all, or indeed of any other, of
the Freudian doctrines.
The regulation of the sex instinct always has been and must ever
continue to be a difficult problem for the human race. And the difficulty
of the problem increases, rather than diminishes, with every forward
step of civilization and every increase of the control of far-sighted intel-
ligence over the more immediate promptings of human nature. For the
intellect of man, being superimposed upon this strong animal tendency,
whose exercise, because of its great strength, is attended by such intense
pleasure or gratification, leads him to seek to obtain the greatest pos-
sible amount of this pleasure, and at the same time to seek, with ever
more success as intellect and knowledge increase, to frustrate the end272/William McDougall
for the sake of which this strong instinct was evolved. This is a funda-
mental disharmony of human nature which not only endangers the hap-
piness of individuals of all times and places, but also threatens every
advancing civilization with stagnation and decay. Nature cannot solve
the problem for us by altering the innate constitution of the human race;
for to weaken either factor of this discord would be fatal to humanity;
the weakening of the instinct would mean the extinction of the race; the
weakening of the intellect would mean the loss of human attributes and
of all that renders human life of more value than the animals’.
The system of sexual morality represents the cumulative effort of
society to control and counteract this inevitable result of Nature’s su-
preme achievement, the superposition of man’s higher moral and intel-
lectual capacities upon a basis of animal instincts; it is the attempt to
solve this problem which Nature has left unsolved, to harmonize the life
of intellect and the development of self-conscious moral personality with
the needs of the race and the promptings of the instinct which at lower
levels of evolution effectively serves life’s most fundamental law, namely
propagation and increase. And so we find that in societies of all levels of
culture the operation of this most powerful instinct is more or less suc-
cessfully regulated by an array of laws and conventions, supported by
the strongest sanctions of custom and public opinion, of religion and of
superstition. And, apart from its primary operations, the great strength
of the sex impulse gives it, as we have seen, a wide range of secondary
functions of great importance for the higher life of mankind. The prob-
lem before every civilization that aspires to attain and maintain a high
level of culture is, therefore, not merely so to regulate the sex instinct as
to prevent its exerting an influence injurious to the interests of the higher
culture, while it performs its all-important primary function; but also to
direct it in such a fashion that its immense energy shall be brought as
freely as possible into the service of the higher culture. Hence the im-
portance of a knowledge of the nature and working of the instinct and of
its normal course of development.
Among those who have recognized the existence of the sex instinct
in man, it has been usual to regard it as lying latent in the child up to the
age of puberty, and as then rapidly maturing, and attaining its full strength
in the course of a year or two.
But in recent years a very different view of the course of sexual
development has been vigorously propagated by the school of medical
psychologists of which Professor Freud is the leader and inspirer. It isAn Introduction to Social Psychology/273
not yet possible to form a decided opinion upon the doctrines of this
school. I incline strongly to the view that they have extended to normal
individuals generalizations which are true only of a certain number of
persons of somewhat abnormal constitution, from among whom their
patients have been drawn. But, since it is possible that their views are in
the main true of the normal constitution, and since, even if as I suggest
they are true only of a minority, this minority may be numerous, it seems
necessary to give here some brief outline of them.
Freud’s doctrine177 differs from generally received views in main-
taining that the sexual life of the individual begins its development at or
even before birth. Freud asserts that the child’s sexuality, although awake
from earliest infancy, is not at first an impulse definitely directed to-
wards any object, but consists rather in a capacity for finding pleasure
in a variety of modes of sensory stimulation and bodily movement. With-
out going so far as to maintain (with some authors) that all pleasure is
sexual, he regards the pleasure found in these stimulations and move-
ments as essentially sexual.178 The thumb-sucking of infants is regarded
as the type of such infantile sexual processes. Freud sees in this habit a
blind seeking of sexual gratification; he regards it as the source of a
number of peculiar hysterical troubles of later life and believes that it
always involves the risk of the development of such troubles. He de-
scribes the mucous membrane of the lips, therefore, as an “erogenous
zone,” i.e. a sensory area stimulation of which may give rise to sexual
excitement. And he believes that every infant possesses, in addition to
the primary erogenous zone (which consists of the external sex organs
themselves), a number of such zones, any one of which may become
unduly prominent, if in any way it is unduly stimulated, thus bringing
about a perversion of the sex impulse; for normal development can only
take place if all these zones become duly subordinated to the primary
one. Accordingly, he describes the normal infant as “polymorphous per-
verse,” and believes that accidents of development leading to perversion
very frequently occur.
This initial stage of objectless sexual excitement or “auto-erotism”
is said normally to persist throughout the period of infancy proper; un-
til, about the age of seven years, there begin to operate certain tenden-
cies which repress or keep in check the crude sex impulses, namely,
shame, loathing, and disgust. Under favourable conditions of environ-
ment and training, the sex tendencies remain more or less completely
repressed throughout the period of childhood proper. At puberty they274/William McDougall
increase in strength; but, if the repressing forces are now re-enforced by
moral training and aesthetic ideals, they manifest themselves only in
sublimated forms; that is to say, the energy of the sex impulse is di-
verted from the channels of direct sexual expression and is “long-cir-
cuited” into channels in which it supports and intensifies intellectual-
ized and refined modes of concern with the natural object of the im-
pulse, namely, persons of the opposite sex. The processes of repression
and sublimation are regarded as somewhat precarious, and as liable at
every stage to suffer interferences which will lead to crude and direct
manifestations of a normal or perverted kind. It is said, for example,
that the sex impulse of the boy normally and properly becomes directed
towards the opposite sex by the pleasure that he obtains from the tender
ministrations of his mother; but that there is great danger in encourag-
ing the boy’s affection towards his mother and in her lavishing caresses
upon him, because such treatment is apt to result in his sex impulse
becoming too strongly fixed upon this its first object, a result which
may afterwards lead to troubles of various kinds. The impulse thus di-
rected, becomes, it is said, repressed, driven into subconsciousness, where
it works in a subterraneous fashion, and expresses itself in indirect and
symbolical ways in the youth’s thoughts, feelings, and conduct. It is
said, for example, that the youth grows jealous of his father; but that
this jealousy, being repressed, may show itself only in an exaggerated
deference towards him. If this state of affairs continues, no great harm
is done, save that the youth is rendered incapable of falling in love in a
normal manner with a girl of his own age. But in some cases, it is said,
this state of things issues in the most awful domestic tragedies of which
“Hamlet” and “Œdipus Rex” are the type. This school of psycho-pa-
thology describes such a repressed but subconsciously operating ten-
dency as a “complex”; it speaks of a repressed sexual attraction to the
mother with a consequent repressed jealousy of the father, as of the type
of the “Œdipus complex”; and it claims to have traced the influence of
complexes of this type in the forms of many myths, legends, and works
of literature.
In attempting to form an opinion on this Freudian doctrine of infan-
tile sexuality, it is important to remember that, even if we find ourselves
compelled to reject it for the normal majority, it may be at least partially
true of a minority. For, in regard to the most fundamental point at issue,
namely, the age at which sexuality is to be attributed to the child, gen-
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widely in this respect. It may well be that in an unknown proportion of
human beings the sex instinct begins to be excitable at a very early age,
while in others, probably the great majority, this occurs at a much later
stage of development; and it is not improbable that the neurotic patients,
on the study of whom the Freudian doctrine is chiefly based, belong to
the minority, and that it is just this peculiarity of constitution that ren-
ders them liable to their disorders. In considering the question of infan-
tile sexuality, we must therefore attach but little weight to the evidence
of it drawn from the study of psycho-neurotic patients, and must rather
weigh the positive indications for and against it provided by healthy
persons.
I have already indicated the fallacy of one piece of reasoning ad-
vanced in support of the Freudian view, namely, the acceptance of all
manifestations of persona love or affection as evidence of sexuality; for
this, as was said, is due to the confusion of the sexual instinct with the
sentiment of love. Only one other piece of evidence on this side seems
deserving of serious consideration; the fact, namely, that a considerable
number of infants acquire the habit of playing with their sex organs in a
manner which implies that such stimulation is pleasurable. If this were
the rule with the majority of infants the argument would be very weighty.
But that is by no means true. And we must remember that the infants
who acquire this habit may belong to the minority of abnormal innate
constitution whose existence we have admitted to be probable. It is very
possible also that, by undue stimulation of the sex organs of a normal
infant (an act of which unscrupulous persons are sometimes guilty), the
sex instinct may be forced to a precocious and partial development, In
these two ways we may account for the auto-erotism which seems to be
manifested by some infants, without regarding it as a normal stage in
the development of the sex instinct. It may be added that most of the
other arguments adduced by Freud in support of his doctrine of infantile
sexuality (such as, e.g. the prevalence of thumb- sucking) may be dis-
missed on the ground that the doctrine of erogenous zones, with which
they are bound up, is in itself very obscure, seems incapable of being
rendered clear and self- consistent, and betrays a conception of the na-
ture of the sex instinct which is vague, chaotic, and elusive, uncon-
trolled by consideration of the facts of animal instinct and inconsistent
with these facts. In support of this last point of this indictment, it may
suffice to point out that the Freudian conception of the nature and devel-
opment of sexuality is radically incompatible with the view that the sex276/William McDougall
impulse is directed towards the opposite sex by the innate organization
of the instinct—a view which is certainly true of many of the animals
and which in its application to the human species is, as we have seen,
very strongly based.
On the other side, two strong arguments may be adduced. First, a
large number of auto- biographical accounts of sexual development have
been published.179 Examination of these “reveals the fact that, in a very
large proportion of cases, the first stirrings and promptings of sex feel-
ing that can be remembered by the subject were experienced in or about
the eighth year of life. Freud maintains that infantile sex experiences are
not remembered by the adult because the memory of them is actively
repressed. But he entirely fails to explain why those which he supposes
to occur before the eighth year should be forgotten, while those which
occur between that age and puberty are remembered. It is also very
important to note in this connexion that a certain number of these auto-
biographers can distinctly remember having been made in infancy (i.e.
before the eighth year) the victims of unscrupulous persons who have
deliberately attempted, but without success, to excite them sexually;
while their accounts show that similar attempts made a few years later
have been or, if repeated, would undoubtedly have been successful.
Secondly, the observation of the behaviour of children gives strong
support to this view. It is at about the age of eight years that the behaviour
of children commonly begins to exhibit indications of their attraction
towards and a new interest and feeling towards members of the other
sex. Before this age some children display warm personal affection; but
such displays commonly involve nothing that implies the operation of
the sex instinct. And one feature of them constitutes indirect but weighty
evidence of the absence of the sex element, namely, the complete ab-
sence of any reserve or bashfulness in their relations with the objects of
their affection, although in other circumstances bashfulness may be
strongly displayed. On the other hand, as soon as the sex instinct begins
to be operative (i.e. from about the eighth year onwards) bashfulness is
apt to dominate the attitude of the child in his relations to persons of the
other sex (especially, perhaps, in relations of the boy to girls whose
attraction for him is strong). This change of attitude and expression180
takes place, then, at about the age to which adult reminiscence agrees in
attributing the first promptings of the sex impulse; and it can, I submit,
only be explained by the assumption that a new and powerful factor
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assigned to no other source than the sex instinct, and which, if we iden-
tify it with the sex impulse, affords adequate explanation of the facts.
The manifestations of the sex instinct are intimately related with
and modified by modes of behaviour which are popularly attributed to a
vaguely conceived function or faculty termed modesty. But the attribu-
tion of them to “modesty” is by no means an explanation of them. “Mod-
esty” and “modest” are terms properly used to denote the quality of
character or of conduct characterized by such behaviour. Some authors
assume that the tendency to such behaviour is a component of the sex
instinct; but, since this quality is displayed in a variety of situations that
make no appeal to the sex instinct, that way of accounting for it is hardly
justifiable.
It seems clear that modesty is closely allied to bashfulness. We may
confine our attention to the modesty displayed in sex relations, and it is
convenient to denote this form of modesty by the special term “pudor.”
We may, I think, regard pudor, together with all other forms of modesty
and of humility, and the element of shrinking in bashfulness, as all alike
expressions under different circumstances and at different levels of in-
tellectualization, of one fundamental tendency, namely, the shrinking
impulse of the instinct of self-abasement.
The behaviour of the females of many animal species, as well as the
human, in the presence of the male is apt to be coy; this coyness of the
female is essentially a refusal and avoidance of the sexual approaches
of the male in spite of the excitement of her sex instinct. If, as Darwin
and Wallace and other biologists have maintained, sexual selection has
been an important factor of evolution, female coyness has had a great
biological role to play. For, by necessitating the active pursuit and the
courtship of the female by the male, female coyness gives scope for the
operation of sexual selection; the male better endowed with strength or
skill to overcome his rivals, or with beauty of voice or form or colour to
excite more strongly the attention of the female, is given scope for the
exercise or display of these advantages and opportunities to profit by
them which he would hardly enjoy to the same extent, if the females of
his species yielded at once to the advances of every male. The probabil-
ity that female coyness plays this important role in evolution affords
some ground for the view that it is the expression of a special instinct
whose function it is to give scope for sexual selection. But the principle
of economy of hypothesis forbids us to make this assumption, if the
facts can be otherwise explained. And it is, I think, possible to regard278/William McDougall
coyness as but the manifestation of pudor under the special circum-
stances of the approach and pursuit of the ardent male. In fact, it would,
perhaps, be more correct to describe coyness as essentially bashfulness
displayed by the female under these circumstances. For bashfulness, as
we have seen (Chapter V), seems to be essentially the expression of a
conflict between the opposed instincts of self-display and self-abase-
ment. And, in the coy behaviour of the female pursued by the male, her
movements of retreat and avoidance, which are attributable to the latter
instinct, are commonly varied at moments by movements of self-dis-
play; the dominance of one or other tendency being determined from
moment to moment by the increase or diminution of the male’s aggres-
siveness.
That the impulses of self-display and self-abasement should habitu-
ally complicate the operation of the sex impulse is an inevitable conse-
quence of the nature of the three instincts from which they respectively
spring. For the sex impulse necessarily intensifies self-consciousness,
at the same time that it impels the individual to seek the presence of his
or her fellows and to become attentive to their regards; that is to say, it
brings members of the two sexes into just such relations to one another
as are best fitted to lead to the excitement of the instincts of self-display
and self-abasement. And, in order to account for the greater prominence
of pudor and of coyness in the female than in the male, we have only to
assume that the impulse of the instinct of self-abasement is in general
stronger in woman than in man, an assumption which is borne out by
many other peculiarities of feminine behaviour and feeling. In both the
pudor and the coyness of the adult woman, the direct operation of this
impulse is commonly complicated by other more intellectualized ten-
dencies, notably by the desire to avoid transgressing the conventions of
her society and the shrinking from the possibility of inducing disgust in
the male. For we must recognize that disgust is primarily and specially
excited by the secreta and excrementa of the body. And Nature, with an
utter disregard for the dignity and high potentialities of the sexual func-
tions, has placed our organs of reproduction in the closest anatomical
and even physiological association with the body’s principal channels
of excretion.
The intimate connexion of the operation of these two impulses with
that of the sex instinct is clearly illustrated by the fashions of dress of
almost every country and every age, and especially clearly perhaps by
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clothing was primarily used for the concealment or for the display of the
body. The former view has been commonly accepted; but of late several
authors have argued that the primitive function of clothing was to adorn
and to draw attention to the sex characters of the body. But there is, I
think, little room for doubt that clothing has from the first served both
purposes; as it certainly does at the present time. In many subtle ways
woman’s dress manages, without transgressing the limits set by conven-
tion, to draw attention to and to accentuate her secondary sex charac-
ters; and that it serves at the same time to conceal the body is also
obvious. And many masculine fashions of dress serve the same two
opposed purposes.
The foregoing remarks on pudor, coyness, and bashfulness in sex
relations bear out the view that their almost sudden onset or increase at
about the eighth or ninth year is due to the awakening of the sex instinct.
These considerations justify us in accepting as well founded the view
that in the normal child the sex instinct first begins to make itself felt
about the eighth year, though it is possible that even in normally consti-
tuted children it may be precociously awakened in some degree by im-
proper influences. The most positive evidence that the instinct is com-
monly functional in the period of childhood proper is afforded by the
frequency of cases in which children, through lack of control, bad ex-
ample, and only too frequently the malpractices of older persons upon
them, are led to exercise or to attempt to exercise the bodily activities of
sex, not only under the form of self-abuse, but also as more or less
successful efforts at connexion with one another.
During this period (from the eighth year to puberty) the sex impulse
is commonly weak and but very vaguely directed; though it is, I think,
an overstatement to say (with Dessoir and Moll) that the instinct is at
this age quite undifferentiated or not at all directed to the opposite rather
than towards the same sex. During this period the maturation and extru-
sion of the germ cells does not normally occur in either sex, even if
sexual connexion takes place. This is only one of many facts which
indicate that the excitation of the bodily manifestations of sex is highly
undesirable at this age. During this period the inexperience, the igno-
rance, the curiosity, the natural suggestibility and plasticity of the child,
and the weak differentiation or direction of its sex impulse towards the
opposite sex, while stimulation of it is nevertheless capable of yielding a
pleasurable excitement; all these combine to render the child peculiarly
susceptible to perversion of the instinct. It follows that initiation into280/William McDougall
perverted practices of any kind is peculiarly dangerous at this age; and
there can be little doubt that many cases of homosexuality or inversion,
and of “fetishism” (the fixation of the sex impulse upon unnatural ob-
jects) are determined by unfortunate experiences at this age. That the
sex instinct so frequently turns towards its proper object and undergoes
a normal development at puberty, in spite of influences which tend to its
perversion during childhood, is strong evidence that its direction to-
wards the opposite sex is determined by its innate constitution.
Reflection upon these special conditions and dangers of the child in
respect of its sexual development must force us to the conclusion that
the strong condemnation of pederasty which is common to most of the
higher civilizations is entirely justifiable. There is among us a consider-
able number of persons who would defend the practice of sexual love
between persons of the same sex; asserting that this is purely a private
concern of individual taste and feeling; and that the present state of the
law and of public opinion in this country inflicts grievous hardship upon
a number of persons whose sex impulse is innately directed to their own
sex. The answer to all such pleas must be that, while we may pity the
misfortune of such persons, they must, like others born with mental and
bodily malformations still harder to bear, learn to adapt themselves as
best they may to the social institutions formed for the regulation of the
lives of normally constituted men and women, and must, if necessary,
suffer in silence. If sexual inversion were always and only a purely
innate peculiarity, there would be much to be said on the side of those
who plead for individual freedom in this matter. But, so far from this
being the case, it seems to be clearly proved that the example and influ-
ence of sexual perverts may and actually does determine the perversion
of many individuals who, if shielded from such influences, would de-
velop in a normal manner. This being so, it follows that the social ap-
proval of homosexuality or of pederasty (even in its milder and less
ignoble forms) tends to set up a vicious circle, the operation of which
misdirects the sex impulse of increasing numbers of the successive gen-
erations, and therefore (as in ancient Greece) tends to the decay of the
normal relations between the sexes and to the destruction of the society
which has taken this false step.
The peculiar condition of the sex instinct in the child, with its liabil-
ity to perversion, provides a weighty argument against the too strict
segregation of the sexes at this age. For there can be little doubt that,
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expressions is very undesirable at this age, the awakening of the instinct
in such a way that its impulse remains subdued and severely restricted
in expression, while directed towards the opposite sex, is a safeguard
against perversion; and it is probable that even at this age the energy of
its impulse may be “sublimated” in the service of intellectual, moral,
and aesthetic development
The foregoing paragraph may not be interpreted without reserve as
a justification of “co-education of the sexes”; but it does support the
view that the normal family, containing several boys and girls and main-
taining friendly relations with other similar families, provides the best
environment for the child. The repression and sublimation of the sex
impulse during childhood and youth is an essential condition for the
development and maintenance in any society of a high level of culture.
And of such repression and sublimation, respect of the boy for woman
is the principal condition. It is here that the influence of good mothers
and pure sisters is of so much importance. If woman were by nature
nothing more for man than an object capable of stimulating his “erog-
enous zones” more effectively than objects of any other class, she would
be merely the chief of many “fetish objects,” and an unrestrained and
excessive indulgence of the sexual appetite would be the inevitable rule
for both sexes from childhood to old age.181 Hence it is supremely im-
portant that women should be presented to the boy and youth only in
fair and noble and dignified forms; that he should learn, before his sex
impulse attains its full strength, to regard women with respect as per-
sonalities.
We may enforce this point by imagining a normal boy subjected to
influences of either of two extreme types. On the one hand, he may at an
early age be led to regard woman as an animal endowed with a strong
sex impulse, always seeking its gratification, and ever ready to co-oper-
ate with him in obtaining sensual pleasures. There could be no “long-
circuiting” or sublimation of the sex energy in such a case. On the other
hand, the boy who knows women, and who knows of them, only as
beings superior to himself that deserve his profoundest respect and ad-
miration, and who, when he learns the facts of sex and feels the power-
ful and mysterious attraction of a woman’s body, believes that he can-
not approach any one woman with the least hope of intimacy, unless he
preserves an attitude of the utmost delicacy and respect, and then only
by way of a long course of devoted service by which he may show his
worth and his superiority to rival suitors; in such a boy the repression of282/William McDougall
the immediate promptings of the sex instinct is as inevitable as their free
indulgence in the former case; and the energy of its impulse will lend
itself to re-enforce all those activities which appear to him as the indis-
pensable means towards the attainment of the natural end of this, the
strongest tendency of his nature.
The alternatives may be stated still more crudely and forcibly. If a
boy grew up in a society in which he might obtain possession of any
female by knocking her down with a club, or by making a lewd gesture
before her, his sex energy would inevitably expend itself in the main in
crude sexual acts. On the other hand, in a society in which all women
were noble and beautiful and chaste, there would be no sexual problem
and disorder; for the development of the sex impulse of men would be
compelled to follow the higher course. But the truth about women lies
somewhere between the extremes we have imagined, and women, like
men, differ widely in these respects.
Here we may see a warning against the extreme policy of sex en-
lightenment in youth. There is coming into fashion a strong tendency to
carry this policy too far. It is too often assumed that mere knowledge of
the facts of sex and of what is most desirable and admirable in the
conduct of the sex life is all-important and all-sufficient. But knowledge
may be more dangerous than ignorance; ignorance of some of the facts
is a great and necessary safeguard of youth; a second- hand familiarity
with the facts of sexual vice cannot fail to be injurious to youth, and
even a full insight into the psychology of sex is highly dangerous.182
Surely the boy should know only part of the facts! Surely it is per-
missible to lead him to believe that all women are more or less as we
would have them be in an ideal world, and to allow men to appear to
him as rather better in these respects than they actually are! The tree of
knowledge cannot be robbed of its dangers, though it be draped in the
driest of scientific jargon.
At puberty the child becomes the adolescent, and the transforma-
tion involves many profound changes of mind and body. In regard to
puberty the great question of theoretical interest is—Are all or most of
the characteristic mental changes to be regarded as direct and indirect
effects of the maturing of the sex instinct and its organs, and of the
increase of strength of its impulse? Or must we infer that a number of
other innate tendencies that have been latent throughout infancy and
childhood become active at this time? The second alternative has been
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the simpler hypothesis, and we ought to explain the facts as far as pos-
sible by means of it, before we go on to make the other assumption. And
it will go a long way towards explaining the facts. But first, something
may be said against the other view.
We know that extirpation of the sex glands in infancy prevents the
development of all the characteristic bodily changes of puberty, and it
seems, though here the facts cannot be so easily observed, that it pre-
vents also the characteristic mental changes. We should hardly expect
these effects, if these changes depend upon the maturing at puberty of a
number of more or less independent innate tendencies.
Again, those who take this second view have never succeeded in
defining the nature of these tendencies whose existence and operation
they assume. There is no theoretical objection to be made against the
assumption; but as a principle of psychological method we must set our
faces against the easy ad hoc postulation of innate tendencies, whenever
we are confronted with a problem of conduct or of mental development
The mental change most generally recognized as characteristic of
puberty is, of course, an increased interest in the opposite sex and in
one’s own sex stirrings and sex characters. All this we may confidently
attribute to the increase of strength and excitability of the sex impulse.
We have to recognize that, in respect of mental changes at puberty that
go beyond these most constant and direct effects, individuals differ widely.
These differences seem to be determined largely by differences of the
degree to which the repressive or inhibitory influences are brought into
effective play.
If we tried to imagine a case in which these influences were not
effectively applied, we should, I think, expect, as the principal and per-
haps the sole secondary result of the increase of strength of the sex
impulse, an intensification of self-consciousness, which, as we have seen
(Chapter VII), is always at the same time a consciousness of the social
setting and relations of the self. This intensification of self-conscious-
ness may obviously be determined in two ways: (1) as a consequence of
new and exciting bodily functions, and of more intense feelings and
cravings than any before experienced; (2) through an increase of inter-
est in other persons, which results in part from the direct attraction
exerted by persons of the opposite sex, and in part from the enrichment
of one’s conception of other personalities achieved by reading into them
one’s own new experiences.
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to-others naturally increases the frequency and strength of excitation of
the two great self-regarding impulses, those of self- display and self-
abasement, and of those conflicts between them which we call states of
bashfulness. That is to say, the adolescent becomes more sensitive to the
regards of other persons, he is more elated or depressed by them, ac-
cording as they are favourable or unfavourable; and his mind is more
frequently and more intensely occupied with the process of self-display.
This is evinced in the crudest way by his increased interest in his per-
sonal appearance, and, in girls more especially, perhaps, by attention to
dress. In boys the self-display takes more varied forms, display of bodily
strength and skill and achievement being, no doubt, the primary and
fundamental form.
I see no reason to think that, in the absence of the repressive influ-
ences that are brought to bear in some degree on almost all adolescents,
puberty would produce any further mental changes of importance. I see
no evidence that any further changes occur in those communities and in
those individuals (e.g. the savages of our great cities) in which the re-
pressive influences are not brought to bear.
Among true savages, measures, prescribed by custom and rigidly
enforced (often in the form of initiation ceremonies), impress upon the
adolescent, in the strongest manner, the code of sexual prohibitions and
penalties, and serve as repressive influences. Among ourselves the code
is impressed in many ways (generally less direct than those of savage
peoples) which greatly re- enforce the repressive influence of modesty
and that exerted by the respect previously acquired for members of the
opposite sex (especially the mother) and, perhaps, for the sex in general.
The result of the repression of the sex impulse effected by these
influences may be described in the most general terms as an increase of
seriousness and intensity in almost all fields of thought, feeling, and
action, especially in all that concerns personal and social relations and
the conduct of life, and therefore in all questions of morality and reli-
gion. This may be regarded as an effect of a generalized “sublimation”
of the sex energy.
But, beside this, there often occur “sublimations” of the more spe-
cialized kinds to which the term is more usually applied. The intensifi-
cation of thought and feeling may affect principally the religious inter-
ests, and then becomes a main condition of the conversion which is so
characteristic of adolescence. In this, no doubt, the sex instinct plays its
part in another way also, namely, by giving rise to a “consciousness ofAn Introduction to Social Psychology/285
sin,” or an awareness of a powerful temptation to wrongdoing, of a
force within one that one cannot control unaided. Or the sublimation
may result, most frequently and naturally perhaps, in a quickening of
interest in romance or poetry or other form of art.
Supplementary Chapter III
The Derived Emotions
In the first part of this book I distinguished certain emotions as primary
emotions, namely, fear, anger, tender-emotion, disgust, positive self-feel-
ing, negative self-feeling, and wonder. The peculiarity of these emotions
which gives them their position of primary importance is, I maintained,
the fact that each one is the immediate inevitable result and subjective
expression of the excitement of an instinct, an innate disposition specifi-
cally directed to some particular mode of action. It was not my intention
to assert that no other than these seven emotions belong to this class. I
recognised the fact that the innate constitution of man comprises other
instinctive dispositions, and that the excitement of any one of these is
accompanied by some subjective excitement or feeling which is of the
same nature as the primary emotions; but, I said, the qualities of these
states of feeling are obscure, are but little differentiated and therefore
not easily recognisable introspectively.
Besides these primary emotions I described a number of well-
recognised emotions as being essentially compounds or blends of the
primary emotions, that is to say emotional qualities which are experi-
enced when two or more of the great instinctive tendencies are simulta-
neously excited. Examples of this class are awe, reverence, gratitude,
admiration, scorn, envy; and some of these blended emotions, I said, are
only aroused in virtue of the previous acquisition of sentiments, perma-
nent or habitual emotional-conative attitudes towards particular objects
or classes of things. As examples of this class, reproach, jealousy, venge-
ful emotion, and shame were briefly discussed.
I then discussed joy and sorrow, arguing that neither of these is to
be classed with the primary emotions; because each of them is a state of
feeling or emotion which is not the immediate effect and expression of
the excitement of any one instinct or disposition, but rather arises when
any of the conative tendencies operate under certain conditions. They
may therefore be distinguished as derived or secondary emotions. Joy
and sorrow are not the only emotions of this class; there is a large num-
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by well- established names, which belong to the same class; for they
arise only when the various active tendencies of our nature operate un-
der special mental conditions. They seem to be connected with no spe-
cial conative dispositions; but each of them rises to colour our whole
consciousness when any one of these operates under the appropriate
conditions.
I have felt that not only are these emotions of great interest and
importance in themselves, but that a discussion of them and of the con-
ditions under which they arise and of their relations to the primary emo-
tions and tendencies will make clearer to the mind of my readers the
distinctive position assigned to the primary emotions in the foregoing
chapters of this book. I therefore add this chapter, and I propose to
discuss these derived emotions in the light of, and largely in the form of
a criticism of, Mr. Shand’s treatment of them in his work on “The Foun-
dations of Character.”184 For Mr. Shand has given us a more elaborate
and careful study of these emotions than any other that has been pub-
lished; and the contrasting of my own view of them with his will, I think,
aid in bringing clearly to mind some of the many interesting problems
presented by them.
Mr. Shand has pointed out that the emotions of this class, of which
the types are confidence, hope, disappointment, anxiety, despondency,
and despair, always arise in the course of the operation of some contin-
ued desire, and he therefore treats of them under the head of the pro-
spective emotions of desire. With this I am in entire agreement, save that
I would enlarge the class by including in it the retrospective as well as
the prospective emotions of desire; thus we should add regret, remorse,
and sorrow. Joy, I submit, occupies a peculiar position, in that it be-
longs to both groups; there are retrospective as well as prospective joys.
These emotions occur in all degrees of intensity; but we may with
advantage fix our attention upon their more intense manifestations, to
the neglect of their fainter forms in which one or other of them is present
to consciousness at almost all moments of our waking life, faithfully
attending every movement of our conative tendencies.
The operation of some strong continued desire is, then, the essential
condition of the rise to consciousness of the emotions of this class; and,
since such desire commonly arises from some strongly organised senti-
ment, these emotions arise most frequently in connection with the op-
eration of such sentiments; but this is not necessarily or always the case.
For example, a desire for food may spring from the simple primaryAn Introduction to Social Psychology/287
hunger tendency; and, if such a simple primary instinctive desire or
appetite is sufficiently strong, it may generate most, though perhaps not
all, of these prospective and retrospective emotions of desire.
Shand regards desire itself as an emotional system, and these emo-
tions of desire as comparable with those I have distinguished as the
primary emotions; that is to say he regards each of these qualities of
emotion as being rooted in or dependent upon the activity of a disposi-
tion which has its own conative tendency and proper end; and the sys-
tem of desire is for him a complex disposition given in the innate consti-
tution and composed of the postulated dispositions of all these emotions
of desire.185 He is committed to this treatment of these emotions by his
view that each emotion is not, as in my view, merely a specific affective
tone or colouring of consciousness qualifying our mental activities, but
is essentially a disposition having its own specific conative tendency;
the instincts being merely dispositions to special modes of bodily move-
ment, subordinated to and more or less organised within the emotional
dispositions.
In opposition to this, I submit, that, while the primary emotions
may loosely be said to have the specific tendencies of the instinctive
dispositions in which they are rooted, these derived emotions have no
such specific tendencies, for they are not attached to or rooted in any
special dispositions; they are, therefore, not forces of character, and
cannot be said in any true and significant meaning of the words to be
organised within the sentiments or in the great hierarchy of sentiments
which is the character of the individual.
Desire is the general name for that peculiar experience which arises
in every mind (sufficiently developed intellectually to hold before itself
the idea of an end) whenever any strong impulse or conative tendency
cannot immediately attain or actively progress towards its natural end.
If this be true, and I believe that some such statement of the nature of
desire is generally acceptable to almost all psychologists, it is quite un-
necessary to postulate some special disposition as the root of desire. If,
following Shand, we did so, we should find ourselves involved in in-
soluble difficulties when we attempted to conceive the relation of this
special disposition to the other conative dispositions, whether the pri-
mary instincts or the sentiments; and if, like Shand, we further assumed
that it is a highly complex disposition, comprising the special disposi-
tions of all the emotions of desire, our difficulties would be very greatly
and gratuitously increased. Shand seems to have reached this view288/William McDougall
through allowing himself to be unduly influenced by the literary tradi-
tion, to which he attaches great importance; for in poetry and the “belles-
lettres” these emotions are commonly spoken of as forces or agents, and
are frequently personified.
This influence may be illustrated by citing Shand’s treatment of
hope. He regards hope as one of the greatest forces that operate in the
mind, as something that enters into the structure of character; and he
attributes to it a variety of effects upon conduct. He points out that the
poets have generally attributed to it “a tendency of supreme importance
to desire and love.” Thus Shelley wrote: “Hope still creates from its
own wreck the thing it contemplates.” Milton exclaimed: “What rein-
forcement we may gain from hope!”: and Tennyson wrote of “the mighty
hope that makes us men.” Campbell, addressing “Hope,” said:—
“Thine is the charm of life’s bewildered way,
That calls each slumbering passion into play”;
and Amiel wrote: “At bottom everything depends on the presence or
absence of one single element in the soul—hope. All the activities of
man... presuppose a hope in him of attaining an end. Once kill this hope,
and his movements become senseless, spasmodic, and convulsive.”
Shand, who cites these and other similar remarks of the poets upon
hope, adds: “No other emotion has had such general tribute paid to it”;
and he regards these poetic sayings as strong evidence of the truth of his
view of this emotion. He proceeds to translate these poetic expressions
into sober scientific language, defining the tendencies of hope as fol-
lows: “Hope increases the activity of desire, aids it in resisting misfor-
tune and the influence of its depressing emotions, and in both ways
furthers the attainment of its end”; and “hope tends always to make the
future appear better then the present,” and thus also strengthens desire.
We are told also that hope tends to give us courage, that it tends to
conserve the direction of thought and effort, and that hope has this in-
dispensable use and function for desire. He treats of the other emotions
of this group in similar fashion, adducing the sayings of the poets in
support of his view that they all are actual mental forces having their
distinctive tendencies towards specific ends. Now we cannot put aside
this literary evidence as of no account; but Shand, I venture to think,
attaches too much importance to it. The poets speak with poetic licence
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analysis, and do not attempt to use a scientific terminology; and, when
they speak of hope or despondency or despair as forces which compel to
this or that form of behaviour, we do them no wrong and make no re-
flection upon their knowledge of human nature, if we abstain from tak-
ing their words in the most literal sense.
The principal objection to accepting these emotions as forces com-
parable to the great primary emotional conative tendencies, such as an-
ger and fear, is that they always arise as incidents or phases of feeling in
the course of the operation of some activity prompted by some other
motive. Thus, hope is never an independent motive; we hope always for
the attainment of some end which we desire or aim at from some other
motive than hope; and the driving power which Shand attributes to hope
itself may without improbability or any distortion of the facts be attrib-
uted to this primary motive or desire. Secondly, the ends assigned to
these emotions are highly general and abstract; it is difficult to suppose
that any innate disposition can be directed to any specific end so highly
abstract as making the future appear better than the present.” Thirdly,
as we have already seen, desire itself is by Shand’s own admission an
abstraction, and these emotions of desire are equally abstractions; they
are so many distinguishable ways in which the desire and emotion spring-
ing from any primary conative disposition, or from any sentiment, are
modified by our intellectual apprehension of the degree of success or
failure attending our efforts towards the end of our desire. Fourthly,
though these emotional states are sufficiently distinct to be generally
and intelligibly denoted by distinct names, they do not differ one from
another in the fundamental way in which anger differs from fear or
disgust or tender emotion; rather they pass into one another by insen-
sible gradations, and the names we give them mark merely points or
regions in a continuous scale of feeling. If, then, we can account for
them by a simpler hypothesis than Shand’s, and in so doing avoid the
very great difficulties that arise on the acceptance of his view of them,
we are compelled by the principles of scientific method to adopt the
simpler hypothesis.
Let us see how the simpler view works when applied to some one
strong desire; and, for simplicity’s sake, let us take a desire rooted in a
strong and primitive tendency, the tendency to seek food when hungry.
Let us imagine ourselves to be a party of polar explorers making for a
deposit of food a few days’ march away, as they return from their dash
for the pole. We have exhausted the supplies which we carried with us;290/William McDougall
but the conditions of travelling are good, we are all in vigorous health,
and we know exactly where to find the hidden store of food. Then, though
we all desire strongly to find this food, and though our minds may be
much occupied by the thought of it, even tormented by ideas of succu-
lent beefsteaks, we go forward in confidence. We do not hope for the
food; we confidently look forward to reaching it; our line of action lies
clear before us; nothing raises a doubt of our success; we are simply
impelled to vigorous sustained effort by our strong desire. Confidence is
thus a negative condition; it is simply desire working towards its end
unobstructedly. Shand tells us that “confidence tends to relax the higher
intellectual and voluntary processes and to leave the accomplishment of
desire to external events or to processes that are automatic.” It is easy to
see in the light of our illustration how he arrives at this view. Our party
of polar explorers needs to form no further plans; it has only to persist
in the one line of vigorous activity, and its end will be reached. But,
though it needs no further deliberation, its efforts will hardly be relaxed
by confidence. The true statement seems to be that, when our purpose
and plan of action are in no way obstructed by foreseen difficulties,
when pur desire is untroubled by any imagined possibility of failure, we
work on simply without further planning along the line of action that
lies plain before us; our impulse or desire carries us on with full force
and concentration of energy, because it is untroubled and unobstructed.
But suppose that the sky becomes overcast, threatening a blizzard;
or that the snow underfoot becomes so soft as greatly to impede our
progress; or let any other difficulty arise that renders us a little doubtful
of attaining our end. At once we begin to hope: we hope the weather will
hold good; we hope the snow will harden; we trudge on, no longer con-
fident, but full of hope, contemplating the desired end, enjoying in an-
ticipation the food we desire and seek. But the threat, however faint, of
some cause of failure leads us to concentrate our efforts a little more,
keeps our minds more constantly occupied with the one all-important
end, restrains us from all unnecessary dispersion of our energies. That
is a fundamental law of all impulse, all conation; obstruction leads to
more explicit definition of the end and of the means to it, brings the
conative process more vividly into consciousness. Hope, then, is not a
new force added to our desire; it is merely a new way in which the desire
operates when confidence is no longer complete. So long as the threat is
slight or distant, our desire continues to carry with it a pleasurable an-
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But let the difficulties loom larger; the snow begins to fall and the
wind rises against us. Then hope gives place to anxiety, or alternates
with it; and there is no sharp line of transition between the two states. In
our anxiety our attention becomes still further concentrated upon the
task in hand, but especially upon the means, rather than upon the end.
We think of every possibility; we try to think out new means to meet the
hitherto unforeseen difficulty. We consider whether it might not be wiser
to leave the less vigorous members of the party in some sheltered spot,
while the stronger push on with all possible speed to find the much.
desired store of food. The pleasurable anticipation of success, which
coloured our state of hope, gives place to the painful thought of failure
and its consequences; we begin to think, not so much of the meal we
shall enjoy, but rather of our state if we should fail to attain the end of
our desire; we picture ourselves camping once more without food; we
think of the night of troubled dreams and continued anxiety and of our-
selves setting out once more in a weakened condition. This is not the
effect of a new force; it is the same force, the desire for food, working
under changed intellectual conditions. Shand says: “Anxiety is a con-
stant stimulus, sustaining attention and thought and the bodily processes
subservient to desire.... Anxiety counteracts the extravagant anticipa-
tions of hope—it counteracts by watchfulness and forethought the care-
less attitude into which we are apt to fall through the influence of hope.”186
I submit that anxiety is the name by which we denote our state when the
means we are taking towards the desired end begin to seem inadequate,
when we cast about for possible alternatives and begin to anticipate the
pains of failure. I suggest that, if in such case any new conative force
enters into the process, it is the impulse of fear awakened by the thought
of the consequences of failure, or that of anger roused, according to the
general law of anger, by obstruction to the course of conation. I main-
tain that anxiety in itself is not a conative force distinct from, and ca-
pable of being added to, the original desire.
As confidence passes into hope when difficulties arise, and as hope
passes into anxiety when the difficulties grow more serious and threat-
ening, so anxiety passes into despondency as we begin to feel that our
difficulties are too great to be overcome by any effort. When hope fades
away and becomes faint, we begin to despond; or in poetical language
we might say that despondency drives out hope; and in similar language
we might describe anxiety as a conflict between hope and despondency,
each of the antagonists gaining in turn the upper hand. But this would292/William McDougall
be metaphorical language. When in an earlier chapter I wrote of conflict
between the impulses of fear and curiosity, or of fear and anger, or of
positive and negative self-feeling, that was not the language of meta-
phor. For in each of those cases there are at work two impulses of op-
posed tendency which really conflict; as we see in the hesitating alter-
nating behaviour of the animal or the child that is at once fearful and
curious, or angry and yet afraid—“Willing to wound, and yet afraid to
strike.” But in hope and despondency, and when they alternate in anxi-
ety, the motive or conative tendency and the end are the same through-
out. The states differ only in that in hope the desire of the end is quali-
fied and supported by pleasant anticipation of attainment; while in de-
spondency our desire is coloured and checked by the painful anticipa-
tion of failure. In despondency we trudge on, but with lowered heads
and drooping shoulders; we have to re- enforce our desire by volition,
by calling up all our resolution; that is to say, by holding up our ideal of
self, evoking our self-assertive tendency. We say: “No matter how hope-
less our effort, we will not give in; if we must die, we will die gamely,
struggling to the end as Englishmen should.” In so far as in despon-
dency our efforts are less vigorous than in hope, the difference is suffi-
ciently accounted for by the most general law of feeling, namely, that
pleasure re-enforces and sustains the activities it qualifies, while pain
tends to weaken and suppress them. And in anxiety we have no true
conflict of opposed impulses of hope and despondency; we have merely
the one desire or conative tendency, working under such conditions that
pleasurable anticipation of success and painful anticipation of failure
are about equally balanced; the probabilities seem to be about equal,
and we alternate between the two states. Shand, attempting to define the
tendency of despondency and its biological function, says: “Despon-
dency weakens desire, just as hope strengthens it”; and then he is hard
put to it to find a use, a biological justification and raison d’être, for
such an impulse. It serves, he suggests, to turn us from the particular
line of action we are pursuing as means to the desired end, and to make
us look about for other means. But this is just the function of pain as we
see it at work all down the scale of life from the protozoon to man.
Now imagine our polar party overwhelmed by a blizzard, or arriv-
ing at the place where the food was stored and finding that the store has
been broken open and everything eaten by bears. No possibility of suc-
cess remains; our strength is exhausted; the most hopeful has to face the
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despair; we resign all hope, our efforts relax and we lie down to die. Or,
if we are resolute men, we do first whatever seems worth doing; we
write a letter of farewell to our friends or bring the log-book faithfully
up to date, in the one hope that is still possible, the hope that our re-
mains will be found by other explorers. If we are weak, we give way to
the impulse of distress and cry aloud for help, until we realise the utter
futility of that impulse also, and complete despair overwhelms us.
Shand finds great difficulty in attempting to define the tendency and
end of despair. In literature he finds many statements to the effect that
despair imparts a new and desperate energy to our efforts, and he for-
mulates four laws of despair: (1) “Despair tends to evoke an energy in
desire and a resolution capable of attempting the most dangerous and
uncertain actions”; (2) “Despair excludes all hope from desire, and only
arises after all hope is excluded”;187 (3) Despair tends to weaken and
discourage desire. But the first law states that despair evokes an energy
in desire, and therefore a fourth law is needed to reconcile these contra-
dictory statements, and we read: (4) “Despair tends to weaken the desire
which submits to its influence, and to strengthen the desire which tri-
umphs over it.” This goes a long way in the personification of desires
and the emotions of desire. We are asked to regard despair as a new
force with which the primary desire (of whose system it is said to be a
part) enters into a conflict like that of two persons; the primary desire
struggles against this new force, and either absorbs it and adds it to
itself, or succumbs to it in despair; and we are left to imagine the emo-
tion of despair triumphant and exulting over the prostrate desire.
The true explanation of those forms of conduct which justify such
phrases as “the courage of despair” is, I think, as follows: So long as
there appears any possibility of attaining our desired end, we carefully
follow out our adopted plan, adapting our actions in detail at each stage
by taking anxious thought. But, when we see that all our carefully thought
out plans are of no avail, we may lose our self-control, relax our intel-
lectual efforts, and abandon ourselves to the crude instinctive impulse
which underlay all our deliberate efforts; and then we strive blindly,
wildly, purely instinctively, like an animal. Our polar party, arrived at
the crisis we have imagined, might throw aside all its equipment, all its
cohesion and organisations and plans, and break up into its units; each
man might rush blindly on with, as we say, the blind courage of despair.
But if this is courage, it is courage only in the sense in which we speak
of the courage of an animal impelled to struggle to the end by purely294/William McDougall
instinctive fear or anger.
Hume formulated a fundamental law of desire, which explains the
attitude of despair, when he wrote: “We are no sooner acquainted with
the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes.”
This statement goes perhaps too far; it is an exaggeration of the truth.
The truth seems to be that the intellectual apprehension of the impossi-
bility of attaining the desired end terminates all our efforts after it; we
cease to look forward to the end or to strive towards it. Our attitude
becomes wholly retrospective; but the desire lives on in the peculiar
form of regret. Suppose that you have desired to help a friend in diffi-
culties, but have delayed too long or have taken insufficiently active
steps to prevent his dying, overwhelmed by his misfortune. Your desire
is not entirely extinguished. In a sense it may become more acute than
ever before. You say: “Oh, how I wish that I had done more or acted
more promptly!” expressing clearly the persistence of your desire; and,
though nothing can be done, you think of all the things you might have
done, if only you had understood the urgency of his need; and every
such thought in which your desire now expresses itself is coloured with
the pain of a baffled and thwarted desire that cannot achieve its end.
That is regret; and, if self- reproach enters into the state, it is one of
remorse.
Despair, then, is the turning point at which we cease to look for-
ward, and, instead, look back only with the finally thwarted desire which
is regret. Our polar explorers, sitting in their tent awaiting death, will, if
they are not utterly prostrated, be filled with regret—regret that they did
not take this or that step, that they did not start out earlier on their return
journey, regret that they did not make their stores of food at shorter
intervals, regret for all the many things that might have made the differ-
ence between success and failure. But regret is no more a new force
added to the primary desire than is confidence or hope, anxiety, despon-
dency, or despair.
We have hitherto considered the derived emotions as they attend the
operation of a desire of great intensity; but it must be recognised that in
fainter forms the same states of feeling accompany and qualify our most
trivial efforts. For example, you set out in good time, as you believe, to
catch your morning train to town. Having plenty of time, you walk on in
confidence, never doubting your catching it. Then you remember that
your watch has been irregular of late, and you notice other persons
hurrying towards the railway station; hope replaces confidence. Or shallAn Introduction to Social Psychology/295
we say, in poetical language, that hope drives out confidence? You ask
the time of a passer- by, and, according to his statement, your watch is
slow; hope passes into anxiety, and you begin to look for a cab or bus or
other means of accelerating your passage. The church clock confirms
the opinion of the passer-by, and anxiety passes into despondency; it
seems hardly worth while to hurry on, your chance of catching the train
is so small. You see from a distance the train arrive, and despondency
becomes despair; and, as it steams away, despair passes into regret. Just
in proportion to the intensity of your desire to catch the train will be the
intensity of these emotions.
In the light of the foregoing discussion I would add a few words to
what was said in Chapter V, of joy and sorrow; for these two emotions
are closely allied to the emotions of desire.
Shand regards sorrow as one of the primary emotions and as one of
the great forces of character. I maintain that it is rather a derived emo-
tion, one of the retrospective emotions of desire; that, in short, it is a
special form of regret, essentially a regret that springs from the senti-
ment of love, and therefore a tender regret. The most frequent and typi-
cal occasion of sorrow is the death of one we love. Consider the se-
quence of emotions we experience during the fatal sickness of a much-
loved child. While the child is in perfect health, love’s desire to cherish
and protect its object attains an ever renewed and progressive satisfac-
tion in loving services rendered and in marks of love returned. The ac-
tions prompted by the desire of the sentiment of love are accomplished
in confidence. That is, I submit, a variety of confidence properly called
joy. It is a joyful activity attended by a joyful tender emotion. Its pecu-
liarity is that desire is progressively satisfied while it continues unabated.
Let the child show some slight indisposition, and we hope he will soon
be well ; our tender care is redoubled. He grows worse rather than bet-
ter, and we become anxious, hope alternating with despondency, and
yielding place to it more and more as the little patient’s strength ebbs
away and the symptoms grow more serious. It becomes clear that he
cannot live, and we despair. He dies, and despair gives place to sorrow:
for our attitude is no longer prospective, but wholly retrospective. De-
sire no longer prompts to action; the conative tendencies of the senti-
ment, especially the protective impulse, still prompt us to occupy our
minds with its object we cannot dismiss it, and would not if we could;
we hug our sorrow; for the sentiment is alive, and its impulses working
constantly within us are baffled and painful just because they can attain296/William McDougall
no satisfaction; we regret that we did not do this or that, take this or that
precaution, act earlier or more energetically. Sorrow is, then, a tender
regret. It seems to me clear that we never experience an emotion that can
properly be called sorrow, save in connection with a sentiment of love
and the complete thwarting of its impulses, which can hardly be brought
about in any other way than by the destruction of its object.
If this be true, then clearly sorrow is not a primary but a derived
emotion; and, like those other emotions of desire, prospective and retro-
spective, it springs from no specific conative disposition, has no im-
pulse or tendency of its own, is not a force in itself; and, having no
disposition, it cannot be organised within the sentiment of love nor yet
within that of hate (as Shand maintains). Shand describes sorrow as
having three distinct tendencies or impulses: (1) To cry out for aid and
comfort (2) to cling to its object and to resist consolation; (3) to restore
its object. Of these alleged tendencies the first and second are contradic-
tory or incompatibles; the tendency to cling to the object and to restore
it is the tendency of the tender emotion organized in the sentiment of
love. The tendency to cry out for aid and comfort when our powers are
completely baffled, no doubt does often enter into sorrow; but I submit
that it does not essentially belong to it. It seems to be the expression of
a primary instinctive disposition which I have neglected to distinguish
in the earlier chapters. This tendency seems to manifest itself whenever
our strength proves wholly insufficient to achieve the end that we keenly
strive after, no matter what may be the nature of the conation at work in
us. The working of this impulse to cry out for aid and comfort seems to
be accompanied by a true primary emotion which, perhaps, is best called
“distress.” This is the emotion displayed so freely and frequently by the
infant when he wails aloud. We learn to suppress its outward marks;
but, though we can suppress our cries and sobs or transmute them to a
mere sigh, we cannot so easily prevent the watering of the eyes, which is
a part of this instinctive expression; and even the strong man, when he
has reached the utmost limit of his strength in the pursuit of any strongly
desired end, may break down completely, sobbing, freely shedding tears,
or crying aloud to God for help.
Shand speaks of the sorrow of a child when we forcibly take away
from him his toy. But this emotion, where it is not predominantly anger,
is, I submit, the emotion of distress; and the common sequence upon
such an occasion is an outburst of anger, followed by the tears and cries
of distress, when the child finds that his angry efforts are unavailing.An Introduction to Social Psychology/297
Shand maintains that hate, equally with love, may generate sorrow,
when its object is seen to be healthy and prosperous. This seems to me
to be a misuse of, or at least a laxity in the use of, the term, which we
should strive to avoid; for only by the strictest care in our terminology
can we hope to attain to further understanding and general agreement in
this difficult province of psychology; And it is the business of scientific
writers to specialise the terms by which in popular speech our emotional
states are denoted with little discrimination of their finer differences,
rather than to ignore the finer shades of difference in well-nigh synony-
mous words.
I submit, then, that our state of feeling on witnessing the success
and prosperity of a hated person should not be called sorrow, but rather
chagrin. This feeling is also one of the retrospective emotions of desire,
but of the desire of hate, the desire to destroy, to bring down, or in any
way to thwart the hated object. It also is a form of regret, a regret having
no element of tender emotion, but only the bitterness of thwarted anger
and increased fear. And, if we have been striving against the hated ob-
ject with all our powers and find our utmost efforts brought to nought,
this feeling will include an element of distress, manifested perhaps by
tears and sobs or even wild cries for help.
I turn now to consider an objection that may be raised against this
simplified view of these emotions of desire. In an earlier chapter it was
said that we properly speak of a man as having a timid or fearful, an
irascible, an inquisitive, a humble, or a self-assertive disposition. The
word disposition is here used in the larger sense, namely, to denote the
sum total of the person’s natural dispositions; and the qualifying adjec-
tive denotes the predominance in the total disposition of some one of the
primary affective-conative dispositions. Surely, it may be said, we may
with equal propriety speak of a hopeful, an anxious, or a despondent
disposition. And, it may be asked, if that is a proper use of language,
does it not justify Shand’s assumption that each of these emotions springs
from its own innate disposition, and is a primary emotion in the same
sense as fear, anger, disgust, tenderness, curiosity, or positive and nega-
tive self-feeling? If a man of timid or of irascible disposition owes this
peculiarity to the great strength or easy excitability of the disposition of
fear or of anger, must we not assume that a man of hopeful or of de-
spondent disposition owes this peculiarity in the same way to the native
strength or excitability of a disposition of hope or despondency?
It must be admitted that the common use of language does seem to298/William McDougall
justify this assumption of parallelism of the emotions of desire with the
primary emotions. But, again, we must not allow ourselves to attach
undue importance to the common forms of speech. If the facts can be
more simply explained, we may disregard this evidence of common speech
and accept the simpler explanation. First, I submit, that the individual
peculiarities which we are now considering may be more properly spo-
ken of as peculiarities of temper rather than of disposition. I suggest
that we should speak of a man as having an irascible or timid disposi-
tion, but a confident or hopeful or despondent temper. Now, if these
emotions and peculiarities of temper were rooted each in its own innate
disposition, as are the primary emotions, we should expect to find that
they are independent variables. The primary emotions are independently
variable; that is to say the native intensity and excitability of each of
them varies from man to man, independently of the intensity and excit-
ability of the rest of them; but obviously the derived emotions are not.
The hopeful temper is a lesser degree of the confident temper; the de-
spondent temper is closely allied to the despairing temper, and related to
it as a lesser degree of the same tendency; while the anxious temper lies
between the hopeful and the despondent; and every gradation occurs
between the extremes of the confident and the despairing tempers.
But there are other forms of temper: there is the steadfast temper,
and the fickle or variable temper; and there seems to be a range of native
varieties of temper of which the extremes are denoted by the terms vio-
lent and equable or placid temper. It seems clear that these peculiarities
of temper, which in the main are native endowments, are very important
as determinants of character, exerting considerable influence upon the
course of development of each man’s character throughout his life, but
especially in youth. How then are we to account for them? I presume
that even Mr. Shand would not attribute fickleness of temper to a spe-
cial innate disposition of fickleness, nor steadfastness nor violence nor
placidity to corresponding special dispositions. Consider a number of
men all of well-balanced innate disposition, that is to say, endowed with
dispositions in which no one of the primary affective-conative disposi-
tions is disproportionately strong. These men may nevertheless differ
widely in respect of temper.
The principal factors of temper seem to be of three kinds. First, the
conative tendencies, though well balanced, may all be strong or all weak;
or any or all of them may stand in some intermediate position in a weak-
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either extremely persistent or but little persistent. That is to say, each
man is natively endowed with conative tendencies (a will, if one uses
that word in the widest sense as denoting the general power of striving,
as distinct from the will in the more special sense in which it is identical
with or is the expression of the developed character) which have two
independently variable attributes, mainly intensity and persistence; they
may be low or high in either scale independently of their position in the
other. Thirdly, a great factor of temper, also independently variable, is
the native susceptibility of conation to the influences of pleasure and of
pain. There are some men whose desires and strivings seem to be very
easily and strongly influenced by pleasure and by pain. Pleasure has a
great effect in strengthening, supporting, and confirming their conative
tendencies; and pain has a great effect in the way of checking, depress-
ing, and diverting their strivings and desires. These are the people of
whom we say that they have very sensitive feelings. Some men, on the
other hand, are comparatively indifferent to pleasure and to pain. They
are not easily turned aside by pain, nor strongly led on by pleasure.
Their feelings are not very sensitive, we say. It is impossible to know
whether this difference is more properly described by saying that the
strivings of the former class are more strongly affected by a given de-
gree of pleasure or of pain, or by the statement that the pleasure and the
pain they experience are more acute, and therefore exert greater influ-
ence upon conation. But that men do differ widely by native constitution
in this way seems clear; and the differences are no doubt most obvious
in respect of the influence of bodily pleasures and pains.
If it is true, as I suggest, that the conative endowment of individuals
varies in these three ways, in respect of these three attributes, intensity,
persistence, and affectability, we can, I think, explain all the varieties of
temper as being conjunctions of different degrees of these three attributes.
There will be eight well-marked types, corresponding to the eight pos-
sible combinations: (1) The most steadfast find confident temper is that
which results from the conjunction of high intensity and persistency
with low affectability. (2) The most fickle and shallow temper results
from the opposite conjunction, namely, high affectability with low in-
tensity and persistence. (3) The conjunction of high affectability and
high intensity with low persistence gives a violent unstable temper; the
sort of man who alternates between confidence or hope and despon-
dency or despair. (4) The despondent temper is that which combines low
affectability and persistency with high intensity. (5) Great affectability300/William McDougall
combined with great persistency and low intensity gives the anxious
temper. (6) The hopeful temper results from the conjunction of all three
attributes in high degree. (7) The placid temper combines high persis-
tency with low intensity and affectability; and (8) the conjunction of all
three attributes in low degree gives the sluggish temper. It is possible
that we ought to recognise two further native peculiarities, the one con-
sisting in greater liability to the influence of pleasure than of pain, and
the other the converse of this: these would account more adequately
perhaps for the hopeful and the despondent tempers, and are perhaps
required for their explanation.
If the foregoing account of the peculiarities of temper is approxi-
mately correct, the argument from the usage of common speech, when it
refers to hopeful, anxious, or despondent dispositions, need carry no
serious weight against the view of the nature of the derived emotions
which is suggested in this chapter.
An objection of a different kind may be raised to this view. It may
be asked—If hope and despair and despondency and the other derived
emotions are not conative forces sustaining thought and controlling ac-
tion, what function have they to discharge? Of what use are they to us?
This is a form of a wider question which may be asked of all the emo-
tions, considered as modes of experience. And, of course, the question
has been asked, in a still more general form, of experience or conscious-
ness in general. Leaving that widest form of the question, I will attempt
only to suggest an answer to the question which is applicable both to the
primary emotions and to the derived emotions. I suggest that those quali-
tatively distinct modes of feeling which we call the primary emotions
have the specific function of enabling the creature that experiences them
to recognise its own state and tendency at the moment of experience,
and also the state and tendency of other creatures of its own species. We
may see the value for the control of behaviour of such qualitatively
distinct modes of feeling, if we imagine a man or an animal whose in-
stinctive reactions were evolved without any such accompaniment, one
in which the various instinctive modes of behaviour were excited with-
out any change of feeling, or in which all the instinctive reactions were
accompanied by the same quality of feeling, a perfectly general feeling
of emotional excitement without specific varieties of quality. Is it not
obvious that such a creature would be greatly handicapped in compari-
son with one in which the excitement of each instinctive mode of
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For the latter learns to recognise each of these qualities of feeling, and
through them becomes aware of the tendency of its action; and this is
the necessary first step towards intelligent control of action. The other
creature would find itself carrying out each step of the train of instinc-
tive behaviour without having any power of foreseeing the coming phase,
and therefore without any possibility of preventing, controlling, or modi-
fying its actions. The qualities of the primary emotions serve, I suggest,
to enable mind or intelligence to get a grip upon instinct, and so begin to
establish the control which in the well-developed character becomes well-
nigh complete. It seems obvious that the emotion-qualities subserve this
function, and are indispensable to it in ourselves. One feels the awaken-
ing of, say, anger or fear within one as the behaviour of another man
becomes insulting or threatening, and says to oneself—Now I must keep
a tight hold on myself. And because the quality of the emotion implies
the kind of actions which we shall be liable instinctively to display, we
are enabled in some measure to counteract and control the tendencies to
such actions. And, though it is more difficult to describe or to imagine
the working of a similar process in the animal mind, we may fairly
presume that on its lower plane and in simpler fashion the emotional
experience of the animal subserves this same function. And, if we con-
sider how widespread and important among men and all the gregarious
animals are the reactions due to the primitive sympathetic tendency, we
shall see that the emotional qualities play an essential part in enabling
each of us to understand the state of mind of our fellows, and therefore
to some extent to foresee and adapt ourselves to the actions they are
about to display. It is difficult to see how we could ever achieve any
sympathetic insight into the minds and hearts of our fellow men, if we
were not equipped with these capacities for the specific qualities of
emotion and the primitive tendency to experience them when we witness
their outward manifestations in our fellows.
The derived emotions may be supposed to subserve a similar func-
tion in human life, although in the animal world they seem to occur only
in the most rudimentary forms.
Notes
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8 In many cases an instinct is excitable only during the prevalence of
some special organic condition (e.g., the nest-building and mating
instincts of birds, the sitting instinct of the broody hen); and some
writers have given such organic conditions an undue prominence,
while neglecting the essential part played by sense-impressions.
9 Most definitions of instincts and instinctive actions take account only
of their conative aspect, of the motor tendencies by which the in-
stincts of animals are most clearly manifested to us; and it is a com-
mon mistake to ignore the cognitive and the affective aspects of the
instinctive mental process. Some authors make the worse mistake of
assuming that instinctive actions are performed unconsciously. Herbert
Spencer’s definition of instinctive action as compound reflex action
was mentioned above. Addison wrote of instinct that it is “an imme-
diate impression from the first Mover and the Divine Energy acting
in the creatures,” Fifty years ago the entomologists, Kirby and Spence,
wrote: “We may call the instincts of animals those faculties implanted
in them by the Creator, by which, independent of instruction, obser-
vation, or experience, they are all alike impelled to the performance
of certain actions tending to the well-being of the individual and the
preservation of the species.” More recently Dr. and Mrs. Peckham,
who have observed the behaviour of wasps so carefully, have writ-
ten: “Under the term ‘instinct’ we place all complex acts which are
performed previous to experience, and in a similar manner by all
members of the same sex and race.” One modern authority, Professor
Karl Groos, goes so far as to say that “the idea of consciousness
must be rigidly excluded from any definition of instinct which is to be
of practical utility.” In view of this persistent tendency to ignore the
inner or psychical side of instinctive processes, it seems to me impor-
tant to insist upon it, and especially to recognise in our definition its
cognitive and affective aspects as well as its conative aspect. I would
reverse Professor Groos’s dictum and would say that any definition
of instinctive action that does not insist upon its psychical aspect is
useless for practical purposes, and worse than useless because mis-
leading. For, if we neglect the psychical aspect of instinctive pro-An Introduction to Social Psychology/303
cesses, it is impossible to understand the part played by instincts in
the development of the human mind and in the determination of the
conduct of individuals and societies; and it is the fundamental and
all- pervading character of their influence upon the social life of man-
kind which alone gives the consideration of instincts its great practi-
cal importance.
The definition of instinct proposed above does not insist, as do
many definitions, that the instinctive action is one performed without
previous experience of the object; for it is only when an instinct is
exercised for the first time by any creature that the action is prior to
experience, and instinctive actions may continue to be instinctive even
after much experience of their objects. The nest-building or the mi-
gratory flight of birds does not cease to be instinctive when these
actions are repeated year after year, even though the later perfor-
mances show improvement through experience, as the instinctive ac-
tions of the higher animals commonly do. Nor does our definition
insist, as some do, that the instinctive action is performed without
awareness of the end towards which it tends, for this too is not essen-
tial; it may be, and in the case of the lower animals, no doubt, often
is, so performed, as also by the very young child; but in the case of
the higher animals some prevision of the immediate end, however
vague, probably accompanies an instinctive action that has often been
repeated; e.g., in the case of the dog that has followed the trail of
game many times, we may properly regard the action as instinctive,
although we can hardly doubt that, after many kills, the creature has
some anticipation of the end of his activity.
10 It is probable that these central affective parts of the instinctive
dispositions have their seat in the basal ganglia of the brain. The
evidence in favour of this view has been greatly strengthened by the
recent work of Pagano (“Archives Italiennes de Biologie,” 1906).
11 As in the case of wild creatures that we may see from the windows
of a railway train browsing undisturbed by the familiar noise.
12 It is, e.g., the interpretation proposed by G. H. Schneider in his
work “Der thierische Wille”; it mars this otherwise excellent book.
13 In this way some particular odour, some melody or sound, some
phrase or trick of speech or manner, some peculiar combination of
colour or effect of light upon the landscape, may become capable of
directly exciting some affective disposition, and we find ourselves
suddenly swept by a wave of strong emotion for which we can assign304/William McDougall
no adequate cause.
14 It would, of course, be more correct to say that the creature strives
to achieve its end under the driving power of the instinctive impulse
awakened within it, but, if this is recognised, it is permissible to avoid
the repeated use of this cumbrous phraseology!
15 None of the doctrines of the associationist psychology was more
profoundly misleading and led to greater absurdities than the attempt
to exhibit pleasure and pain as the source of all activities. What could
be more absurd than Professor Bain’s doctrine that the joy of a mother
in her child, her tender care and self-sacrificing efforts in its behalf,
are due to the pleasure she derives from bodily contact with it in the
maternal embrace? Or what could be more strained and opposed to
hundreds of familiar facts than Herbert Spencer’s doctrine that the
emotion of fear provoked by any object consists in faint revivals, in
some strange cluster, of ideas of all the pains suffered in the past
upon contact with, or in the presence of, that object? (cf. Bain’s “Emo-
tions and the Will,” chap. vi.; and H. Spencer’s “Principles of Psy-
chology,” vol. i. part iv. chap. viii. 3rd Ed.)
16 For a further discussion of the nature of instinct the reader may be
referred to The British Journal of Psychology, vol. iii., which con-
tains papers contributed to a symposium on Instinct and Intelligence
by Messrs. C. S. Myers, Lloyd Morgan, Wildon Carr, G. F. Stout,
and the author.
17 It has often been remarked that the emotions are fluid and indefin-
able, that they are in perpetual flux and are experienced in an infinite
number of subtle varieties. This truth may be used as an argument
against the propriety of attempting to exhibit all the many varieties of
our emotional experience as reducible by analysis to a small number
of distinct primary emotions. But such an objection would be ill-
taken. We may see an instructive parallel in the case of our colour-
sensations. The colour-sensations present, like the emotions, an in-
definitely great variety of qualities shading into one another by im-
perceptible gradations; but this fact does not prevent us regarding all
these many delicate varieties as reducible by analysis to a few simple
primary qualities from which they are formed by fusion, or blending,
in all proportions. Rather it is the indefinitely great variety of colour
qualities, their subtle gradations, and the peculiar affinities between
them, that justify us in seeking to exhibit them as fusions in many
different proportions of a few primary qualities. And the same is trueAn Introduction to Social Psychology/305
of the emotions.
Of course, if the James-Lange theory of the emotions is true,
then each of the primary emotions is in principle not an elementary
affection of consciousness or mode of experience, but a complex of
organic sensations and feeling tone. But in that case the conception
of a primary emotion, and the propriety of regarding each complex
emotion as a fusion of two or more primary emotions, are not invali-
dated. For the primary emotion must be regarded (according to that
theory) as a complex of organic sensation and feeling tone which is
constant and specific in character, its nature having been determined
and fixed by the evolutionary process at a very remote pre-human
period.
18 “A Primer of Physiological Psychology,” 1905. That the principle is
not generally recognised is shown by the fact that in Baldwin’s Dic-
tionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1901) no mention is made of
any intimate relation between emotion and instinct; we are there told
that no adequate psychological definition of instinct is possible, since
the psychological state involved is exhausted by the terms “sensa-
tion” (and also “perception”), “instinct,” “feeling,” and “impulse”;
and instinct is defined as “an inherited reaction of the sensori-motor
type, relatively complex and markedly adaptive in character, and
common to a group of individuals.” Professor James, who treats of
the instincts and the emotions in successive chapters, comes very
near to the recognition of the principle laid down above, without,
however, explicitly stating it. Others who have recognised—more or
less explicitly—this relation between instinct and emotion are
Schneider (“Der thierische Wille”), Ribot (“Psychologie des Senti-
ments”), and Rutgers Marshal (“Pain, Pleasure, and Æsthetics,” and
“Instinct and Reason”)
Mr. Shand (Chapter xvi., Stout’s “Groundwork of Psychology”)
has rightly insisted upon the impossibility of analysing the complex
emotions by unaided introspection, and has laid down the principle
that we must rely largely on the observation of their motor tenden-
cies. But he has not combined this sound methodological suggestion
with the recognition of the above-mentioned guiding principle. It is
on this combination that I rely in the present chapter.
19 That the emotion as a fact of consciousness may properly be distin-
guished from the cognitive process which it accompanies and quali-
fies is, I think, obvious and indisputable. The propriety of distin-306/William McDougall
guishing between the conative element in consciousness, the impulse,
appetite, desire, or aversion, and the accompanying emotion is not so
obvious. For these features are most intimately and constantly asso-
ciated, and introspective discrimination of them is usually difficult.
Nevertheless they show a certain degree of independence of one an-
other; e.g., with frequent repetition of a particular emotional situa-
tion and reaction, the affective aspect of the process tends to become
less prominent, while the impulse grows stronger.
20 It may be noted in passing that this is one of a class of facts which
offers very great difficulty to any attempt to account for instinctive
action on purely mechanical principles.
21 Lest any reader should infer, from what is said above of the immedi-
ate and often irrational character of our emotional responses upon
the reception of certain sense-impressions, that I accept the James-
Lange theory of emotion in the extreme form in which it is stated by
Professor James, I would point out that the acceptance of the theory
is by no means implied by my treatment of emotion. In the course of
the discussion of instinct in the preceding chapter, it was expressly
stated that the instinctive process is not to be regarded as merely a
compound reflex, initiated by crude sensation, but that its first stage
always involves distinct cognition, which, in the case of purely in-
stinctive action, is always a sense-perception. That is to say, the sense-
impressions must undergo the psychical elaboration and synthesis
implied by the word “perception”; but such perceptual elaboration is
in every case only rendered possible by the activities of a preformed
psycho-physical disposition, which in the case of the purely instinc-
tive action is innately organised. Professor Ward has effectively
criticised the James-Lange theory (Art. “Psychology” in supplemen-
tary volumes of “Encyclopaedia Britannica,” 9th edition), and I would
in the main endorse that criticism, though I think Professor Ward
does not sufficiently recognise that our emotional responses are bound
up with, and in many cases are immediately determined by, simple
perceptions. He writes: “Let Professor James be confronted first by a
chained bear and next by a bear at large: to the one object he presents
a bun, and to the other a clean pair of heels.” This passage seems by
implication to ignore the truth I wish especially to insist upon, namely
the immediacy with which the emotional response follows upon per-
ception, if the perceptual disposition involved is a part of the instinc-
tive disposition, or if it has become connected with its central part asAn Introduction to Social Psychology/307
an acquired afferent inlet in the way discussed in Chapter II. There is
a world of difference between, on the one hand, the instinctive re-
sponse to the object that excites fear, and, on the other hand, running
away because one judges that discretion is the better part of valour. I
well remember standing in the zoological garden at Calcutta before a
very strong cage in which was a huge Bengal tiger fresh from the
jungle. A low-caste Hindu sweeper had amused himself by teasing
the monster, and every time he came near the cage the tiger bounded
forward with an awful roar. At each of many repetitions of this per-
formance a cold shudder of fear passed over me, and only by an
effort could I restrain the impulse to beat a hasty retreat. Though I
knew the bars confined the brute more securely than any chain, it
was not because the emotion of fear and the corresponding impulse
were lacking that I did not show a “clean pair of heels.”
22 It is worth noting that, if the emotional accompaniment of these two
very different sets of bodily symptoms seems to have essentially the
same quality in the two cases and to be unmistakably fear, this fact is
very difficult to reconcile with the James-Lange theory of emotion
interpreted in a literal fashion.
23 A form of admiration in which curiosity (or wonder in the sense in
which the word is here used) predominates (see chap. v.).
24 It may be objected that, if a man strikes me a sudden and unpro-
voked blow, my anger is effectually and instantaneously aroused,
even when I am at the moment not actively engaged in any way; for it
may be said that in this case the blow does not obstruct or oppose any
impulse working within me at the moment. To raise this objection
would be to ignore my consciousness of the personal relation and my
personal attitude towards the striker. The impulse, the thwarting of
which in this case provokes my anger, is the impulse of self-asser-
tion, which is habitually in play during personal intercourse. That
this is the case we may see on reflecting that anger would not be
aroused if the blow came from a purely impersonal source—if, for
example, it came from a falling branch, or if the blow received from
a person were clearly quite accidental and unavoidable under the cir-
cumstances. Anger at the stupidity of others might also be quoted as
an instance not conformable to the law; but it is only when such
stupidity hinders the execution of some plan that the normal man is
angered by it.-
25 “Psychology of the Emotions,” p. 340.308/William McDougall
26 One of my boys, who learnt to walk when eighteen months old,
delighted in the applause that greeted his first steps, and, every time
that one of his many excursions across the room failed to evoke it, he
threw himself prone upon the floor with loud cries of anger and dis-
pleasure.
27 See his chapter on the emotions in Professor Stout’s “Groundwork
of Psychology.”
28 “Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.”
29 Op. cit,
30 Cf. Chap. XVII of E. Westermarck’s “Origin and Development of
the Moral Ideas.” London, 1906.
31 “Emotions and the Will,” p. 82.
32 Op. cit., p. 80.
33 There are women, happily few, whose attitude towards their chil-
dren shows them to be devoid of the maternal instinct. Reflection
upon the conduct of such a woman will discover that her conduct in
all relations proceeds from purely selfish motives.
34 It is, I think, not improbable that the impulse to kiss the child, which
is certainly strong and seems to be innate, is a modification of the
maternal impulse to lick the young which is a feature of the maternal
instinct of so many animal species.
35 It is a fair question whether, among those nations who pride them-
selves upon having attained so high a state of civilisation that they
can no longer inflict capital punishment, the greater clemency of the
law should not be attributed to a relative deficiency in the strength of
the parental instinct in the mass of the people, and to a consequent
relative incapacity for moral indignation. At the present moment the
moral indignation of a large section of the French people is clamouring
for the death of a wretch who has been convicted of cruelly maltreat-
ing a child and to whom, it is thought, the presidential clemency may
be extended.
36 Op. cit., p. 83.
37 Op. cit., p. 291.
38 For fuller discussion of sympathy see Chapters IV and VI.
39 Professor Stout’s “Groundwork of Psychology,” chap. xvi.
40 See Chapter IV.
41 In so far, of course, as the impulse is not completely thwarted.
42 See Supplementary Chapter II at the end of this volume, which con-
tains a fuller discussion of the sex instinct.An Introduction to Social Psychology/309
43 “Inquiries into Human Faculty,” p. 72.
44 “Principles of Psychology.”
45 Cf. p. 302.
46 “Les Lois de l’Imitation.” Paris, 1904.
47 “Mental Development,” and “Social and Ethical Interpretations.”
48 Op. cit., ii., p. 410.
49 This truth has been clearly expressed by Herbert Spencer (“Prin-
ciples of Psychology,” vol. ii., p. 563), and Bain recognised it, al-
though, as we have seen, he failed to hold it consistently.
50 Shortly after writing these lines I was holding a child in my arms,
looking out of window on a dark night. There came a blinding flash
of lightning and, after some seconds, a crash of thunder. The child
was pleased by the lightning, but at the first crack of thunder she
screamed in terror; immediately upon hearing the scream, I experi-
enced, during a fraction of a second, a pang of fear that could not
have been more horrible had I been threatened with all the terrors of
hell. I am not at all disturbed by thunder when alone. This incident
illustrates very well two points—first the sympathetic induction of
emotion by immediate instinctive reaction to the expression of emo-
tion by another; secondly, the specific character of loud noises as
excitants of fear. Regarded as merely a sensory stimulus, the flash of
lighting was far more violent than the thunder; yet it provoked no
fear in the child.
51 This is very noticeable in the case of vomiting. A tender mother will
sometimes turn away from a vomiting child with an irresistible im-
pulse of repulsion.
52 “Principles of Psychology,” vol. ii., p. 408.
53 “Mental Development, Methods and Processes,” 3rd ed p. 281. New
York, 1906.
54 An excellent account of this peculiar affliction may be found in Mr.
Hugh Clifford’s “Studies in Brown Humanity,” as also in Sir F. A.
Swettenham’s “Malay Sketches.”
55 “Die Seele des Kindes,” 5te Auflage, Leipzig, 1900, S. 180.
56 “The Play of Animals” and “The Play of Man.”
57 “Mind,” N.S., vol. xv, p. 468.
58 While living among the hybrid Papuan-Melanesian people of a small
group of islands in the Torres Straits, I was much struck by the marked
weakness of the impulse of rivalry among them. Though adults and
children spent a large proportion of their time in playing, the spirit of310/William McDougall
rivalry was displayed but feebly in a few of the games and hardly at
all in most of their playing. I failed completely to get the boys to take
up various English games, and the failure seemed due to the lack of
the impulse of rivalry. The same defect or peculiarity seemed to be
responsible for the fact that the people were so content with their
equality in poverty that, although opportunities for earning high wages
in adjacent islands were abundant, few could be induced to avail
themselves of them, or to work for more than a few months, if they
did so. These people are unwarlike, and the men and boys never fight
with one another—a striking fact, which certainly is not to be ex-
plained by excellence of the social system or refinement of manners;
for but a generation ago these people were notorious for having de-
voured the crews of several vessels wrecked upon the islands.
59 “Character and the Emotions,” Mind, N.S., vol. v., and “M. Ribot’s
Theory of the Passions,” Mind, N.S., vol. xvi.
60 I would remind the reader that “wonder” is here used in a sense a
little different from the usual one.
61 One is tempted to ask, Was it because the external aspect of the
Gothic cathedral is apt to fall short of exciting the fear which is es-
sential to reverence, that in so many cases the artists of the Middle
Ages covered the exterior with grotesque and horrible figures, like
those of Notre Dame of Paris?
62 This we may perhaps identify with the instinct of acquisition men-
tioned in Chapter III.
63 Tolstoy’s “Kreutzer Sonata” is a study of jealousy of this type aris-
ing within a sentiment which was certainly not love, but was a strange
blend of hate with an extended self-regarding sentiment. It is, I think,
obvious that jealousy could not arise within a sentiment of hate, pure
and simple.
64 “Die Entwickelung der Strafe.”
65 An excellent account is given by Mr. Hugh Clifford in a story called
“The Amok of Dâta Kâya.”
66 “Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,” Chapter II.
67 Ibid., p. 22.
68 “Criminal Responsibility,” Oxford, 1905.
69 In a recent treatise on ethics, which makes a considerable show of
psychological precision, they are described on one page successively
as emotions, sentiments, feelings, and judgments.
70 “Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,” chap,An Introduction to Social Psychology/311
vi., London, 1902.
71 Even in so recent and excellent a treatise as Dr. Rashdall’s “Theory
of Good and Evil” this identification of pleasure with happiness is
frequently repeated, verbally at least.
72 Cp. p. 151.
73 In a recent article criticising M. Ribot’s book “Les Passions” (“Mind,”
vol. xvi., p. 502) Mr. Shand has suggested that the sentiment of love
is innately organised. I cannot see any sufficient grounds for accept-
ing this suggestion, and I believe that any such assumption will raise
more difficulties than it solves. In previous chapters I have suggested
that certain of the instincts may have peculiarly intimate innate rela-
tions, that, e.g., the instinct of pugnacity is thus specially intimately
connected with the maternal instinct and with the sex instinct of the
male. But even this seems to me very questionable.
74 I shall be told that in restricting in this way the meaning of the term
“self-love” I am setting aside a usage consecrated by age and the
writings of innumerable moralists. I would anticipate this objection
by asking—Why should the psychologist feel any obligation to clog
and hamper the development of his science by a regard for the termi-
nology of the pre-scientific ages, while the workers in other scientific
fields are permitted to develop their terminology with a single eye to
its precision and to the accurate discrimination and classification of
the like and the unlike? The chemist is not held to be under any obli-
gation to class earth, air, fire, and water with his elements, nor does
the physicist persist in classing heat and electricity with the fluid
substances.
75 For the same reason other sentiments of this type, resulting from
fusion of the self-regarding sentiment with the love of an object other
than the self (of which patriotism is the most striking example), ac-
quire their power of supplying dominant or extremely powerful mo-
tives.
76 E.g., the relation of mother and son in Mr. Wells’s “Days of the
Comet.”
77 Cp. Chapter IV.
78 Cf. Kipling’s story, “Baa-baa, Black Sheep.”
79 In “Progressive Morality.”
80 Professor Baldwin has well described this process, although he does
not seem to have recognised the two instincts which, according to the
view here taken, are the all-important factors. See “Social and Ethi-312/William McDougall
cal Interpretations in Mental Development,” part I, chap. i.
81 I leave out of account here religious conceptions, which for many,
perhaps most, persons play this all-important part in developing the
self-regarding sentiment; not because they are not of great social im-
portance, but because the principles involved are essentially similar
to those dealt with in this passage.
82 It may seem anomalous that fear should enter into the self-regarding
sentiment; but we have to remember that the object of this sentiment
is not merely the self, but rather the self in relation to other persons.
83 Cf. Chapter IV.
84 Like the fully developed parental sentiment, the patriotism of many
men is a fusion of this quasi- altruistic extension of the self-regarding
sentiment with the truly altruistic sentiment of love.
85 I would ask the reader to refrain from taking this remark as appli-
cable to all the peoples of Borneo. Most of these much maligned
savages are quite incapable of such conduct, which is peculiar to the
Sea Dayaks or Ibans.
86 “Progressive Morality.”
87 “The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,” p. 4.
88 That is, a process as purely intellectual as any mental process can
be; the motive power of the process is not the impulse of some emo-
tion directly evoked by the action judged.
89 For example, some young children pass the original moral judgment
“You are naughty” upon any person who interferes with their play or
work, who obstructs in any way the operation of any impulse and so
evokes their anger.
90 “Prolegomena to Ethics,” p. 351.
91 The effective operation of this sentiment on a great scale has re-
cently been illustrated in several cases in which the most disinter-
ested efforts of private individuals have corrected the effects of mis-
carriages of legal procedure—e.g., the cases of Mr. Beck and Mr.
Edalji. Some years ago the unjust condemnation of Major Dreyfus
produced in France a still more striking and famous display of disin-
terested effort on behalf of the principle of justice.
92 This hypothesis is still maintained by some modern writers of re-
pute. Dr. Rashdall (“Theory of Good and Evil”) uses the phrase “the
moral consciousness” and makes it the key of his ethical and theo-
logical position. By it he means to denote the faculty of judging of
ethical value or of judging anything to be good. He regards this fac-An Introduction to Social Psychology/313
ulty in the same way as Kantians regard our faculties of perceiving
spatial and temporal relations, namely, as one which, though it may
be developed and refined by use, is given a priori as a primary fac-
ulty of intuition, one not evolved from more elementary forms of
judgment. But he makes no attempt to justify this assumption, on
which he hangs so great a weight of consequences. Curiously enough,
while the Kantian view of our faculties of spatial and temporal judg-
ment is held to imply that such judgments have no objective value,
space and time being purely subjective, Dr. Rashdall finds in the
assured a priori character of moral judgment and the moral con-
sciousness his one source of confidence in the objectivity of such
judgments
93 “Principles of Psychology,” vol. ii., p. 549.
94 This we may see most clearly in the case of the problem of the
evolution of the moral tradition. If, as we have said, the moral tradi-
tion has been slowly evolved by the influence of the precept and ex-
ample of the great moral leaders, and if, as the libertarians maintain,
all the moral victories of such leaders, in virtue of which they attain
their ascendancy over their fellow-men and their power of moulding
the moral tradition, have this mysterious and utterly incomprehen-
sible source, then the growth of the moral tradition may be described
but cannot be explained, and we have no—or but very little—ground
to suppose that what we can learn of its growth in the past will justify
any assumptions or forecasts as to its growth in the future. And this
must remain true no matter how small be the quantity of “will-en-
ergy” postulated by the libertarians to account for the turning of the
scale in the conflict of motives.
95 I purposely avoid touching upon the more difficult moral problem.
How far is punishment of one man justified by its deterrent or re-
forming effects upon others.
96 In so far as punishment will produce these effects upon madmen
they have a moral right to be punished. The medical profession gen-
erally ignores this truth in its perennial conflict with the lawyers. It is
for them to determine which of the mental diseases render the patient’s
conduct incapable of being controlled by punishment or by the threat
of it, and which leave him still susceptible to the deterrent and re-
forming influence of punishment.
97 The only possible answer of the libertarians to this argument seems
to be: Yes, but if this outside influence is “a very little one,” we may,314/William McDougall
by means of punishment, give the good influences a better chance of
determining a favourable issue of our moral conflicts. This seems to
be the line recent defenders of freewill are inclined to take. They are,
nevertheless, bound to admit that, since the magnitude of these out-
side influences is unknown, the recognition of them must weaken the
case for punishment, and must diminish to an unknown and quite
incalculable extent our moral responsibility.
98 The most successful defence of indeterminism yet made is that of
Dr. Schiler (“Studies in Humanism”). His position is not quite the
same as Professor James’s. He suggests that there may arise con-
junctions of conditions whose issue is indeterminate in the sense that
opposing forces are exactly balanced in an unstable equilibrium, which
we might compare to that of a billiard ball balanced on a knife-edge.
A strictly minimal force might then determine the issue in either di-
rection, and so produce very important consequences; e.g., if the knife-
edge were on the water-parting of the Rocky Mountains, the ball
might reach the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, according to the direc-
tion of this minimal force. Dr. Schiller points out truly enough that,
for anything we know, such situations may occur in both the physical
and moral spheres; for, if their issue is thus determined by some such
minimal force that is not determined by antecedent conditions, the
calculation of the strength of the opposing forces, with sufficient ac-
curacy to enable us to discover the presence of this unconditioned
factor, is beyond our power, and we shall probably never be able to
make this calculation for the physical, and certainly never for the
moral, world. If this unconditioned factor is assumed to be in every
case of strictly minimal strength, the admission of its reality will not
seriously undermine the principles of moral responsibility; but it will,
as pointed out above, introduce an incalculable element among the
factors which the student of society has to try to take into account,
and therefore will make difficult if not impossible the attempt to con-
struct a science of history and of society. Whether it would lighten in
any degree the moral difficulty of determinism discussed above is a
more difficult and subtle problem; I cannot at present see that it can
have any such result, save in the following way: it would allow us to
believe in “a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness,”
and such a belief might encourage and stimulate us to make efforts
towards the realisation of the purpose of that power. Since, then, a
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remains open to us to postulate indeterminism; and if such postula-
tion makes for the predominance of right conduct, it is difficult to
find any good reason for refusing to follow James and Schiller when
they ask us to commit ourselves to it.
99 This view seems to be maintained still by Professor Höffding in a
recent article in the Revue Philosophique (1907), “Sur la Nature de
la Volonté.”
100 “Mind,” New Series, vol. v.
101 Ibid., vol. iv.
102 “Analytic Psychology” vol. i., p. 243.
103 Experiments that seem to establish this point were described by the
author in the fourth of the series of papers entitled “Physiological
Factors of the Attention-Process,” “Mind,” N.S., vol. xv. Some of
these experiments have since been repeated and confirmed by MM.
Et. Maigre and H. Piéron (Revue de Psychiatrie et de Psychologie
Expérimental, Avril, 1907).
104 For a fuller discussion of this question and a theory of the inhibi-
tory process see a paper by the author, “The Nature of Inhibitory
Processes within the Nervous System” in “Brain,” vol. xxvi, and his
review of Professor Sherrington’s “Integrative Action of the Nervous
System” in “Brain,” vol. xxx.
105 “The Groundwork of Psychology.”
106 Some authors wax scornful when they examine the statement that
the self is the all-important factor in volition. But the view they scorn-
fully reject is that which makes the abstract ego, the logical subject
of all our experiences, or the transcendental self, the source of the
power of the will. If self is meant to be taken in either of these two
senses in this connection, the scorn of these writers is perhaps justifi-
able when they stigmatise it as a mere metaphysical abstraction. It is
for this reason better to say always the idea of self (rather than sim-
ply the self) is an essential factor in volition.
107 Ideas of this latter kind have not the irresistible force often attrib-
uted to them. Dr. Bramwell has argued very strongly that if they are
opposed to the organised tendencies of the subject they will in no case
realise themselves in action (“Hypnotism, its History, Theory, and
Practice”). In my opinion his view is in the main correct, though, no
doubt, he has a little overdriven it.
108 See Buckle’s “History of Civilisation in Europe.”
109 Professor Pollard attributes it in part to voluntary control induced316/William McDougall
by the system of land tenure, as in modern France. “Factors in Mod-
ern History,” p. 135.
110 For an excellent discussion of the importance of the family see
Mrs. Bosanquet’s “The Family,” and the works of the school of Le
Play, especially “La Constitution Essentielle de l’Humanité.”
111 Professor Keane asserts this to be the issue of the lively discussion
that has been waged on this topic. See his “Ethnology.”
112 It is, I think, true without exception that the family is found in
every animal species, of which the males, as well as the females, are
endowed with the parental instinct and co-operate in the care of the
young; that is to say, the co-existence of the reproductive and paren-
tal instincts in the members of both sexes suffices to determine the
family, the parental impulse being commonly directed to the adult
partner, as well as to the offspring.
113 It has been asserted by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen (“The Northern
Tribes of Central Australia”) that some of the Australian tribes are
utterly ignorant of the relation of the reproductive act to child-birth,
but doubt has been thrown on this statement.
114 The well-meant efforts of missionaries may sometimes play a con-
siderable part in this process; e.g., it has been observed that the abo-
lition of polygamy, in communities in which females are more nu-
merous than the males, has led to such gross irregularities in the
sexual relations as to diminish greatly the rate of reproduction.
115 See the frequent references to the prevalence of voluntary child-
lessness in Professor Dill’s two volumes, “Roman Society in the Last
Century of the Empire,” and “Roman Society from Nero to Marcus
Aurelius,” also M. de Lapouge’s “Les Selections Sociales,” in which
the share of these influences in the destruction of Ancient Greece is
discussed in some detail. Dr. W. Schallmayer argues to similar effect
of the decline of both Greece and Rome (“Vererbung u. Auslese im
Lebenslauf d. Völker”).
116 One of the most remarkable illustrations of the tendencies discussed
in this paragraph was afforded by the flourishing among the natives
of the Sandwich Islands of an association, the members of which
bound themselves on frankly hedonistic grounds to avoid parenthood.
117 “Social Evolution.”
118 See Professor Karl Pearson’s “Chances of Death.”
119 There are certainly among the celibates of our population a certain
number of persons who know of sexual desire only by hearsay andAn Introduction to Social Psychology/317
who regard it as a strange madness from which they are fortunately
free. Cf. Professor Forel’s “Sexuelle Frage.”
120 See especially David Heron (Drapers’ Company Research Mem-
oir), “On the Relation of Fertility to Social Status,” 1906.
121 See especially “La Cité Antique,” by Fustel de Coulanges.
122 See the books of the late Lafcadio Hearn, especially “Japan: an
Interpretation.” His account was borne out by the recent newspaper
accounts of the solemn national thanksgiving to ancestors after the
successes of the late war.
123 According to Mr. Fielding Hall, the same is true of Buddhism; see
“The Soul of a People,” and “A People at School.”
124 See Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace’s “Russia,” Chapter xxix.
125 “Principles of Western Civilisation.”
126 “The Primal Law.”
127 “The Descent of Man.”
128 International Scientific Series.
129 These statements are based not merely on my own observations
during a sojourn of six months among these tribes, but also on the
authority of my friend Dr. Charles Hose, who for more than twenty
years has exercised a very remarkable influence over many of the
tribes of Sarawak, and has done very much to establish the benefi-
cent rule of the Rajah, H.H. Sir Charles Brooke, over the wilder
tribes of the outlying districts.
130 “Principles of Western Civilisation,” p. 156: “The ruling fact which
stands clearly out in regarding this movement of peoples as a whole,
is that it must have represented a process of military selection, prob-
ably the most sustained, prolonged, and culminating in character that
the race has ever undergone.”
131 The attempt now being made to found a science and an art of
Eugenics owes its importance largely to this tendency.
132 “Principles of Sociology,” p. 18 (my quotation is abridged).
133 Thus Professor M. Jastrow writes: “The certainty that the reli-
gious instinct is, so far as the evidence goes, innate in man, suffices
as a starting-point for a satisfactory classification.” The same author
tells us that “the definite assumption of a religious instinct in man
forms part of almost every definition of religion proposed since the
appearance of Schleiermacher’s discourses” (“The Study of Reli-
gion,” pp. 101 and 153).
134 Cf. p. 131.318/William McDougall
135 Certain of these forces of nature were less terrible than others, e.g.,
rain, and the growth of plants and animals, and man made the bold
experiment of attempting to control them, proceeding by a purely
empirical method and guided by the slightest indications to belief in
the success of his experiments; such seemingly successful procedures
then became conventional and recognised modes of influencing these
powers. In so far as man seemed to find himself able to control and
coerce any of these forces, his attitude and emotion in presence of
them would b« those of the instinct of self-assertion, even though he
might continue to be filled with fear and wonder. This complex emo-
tional state seems to be the characteristically superstitious one, and
the attitude and practices are those of magic. I suggest that the funda-
mental distinction between religious and magical practices is not, as
is sometimes said, that religion conceives the powers it envisages as
personal powers, while magic conceives them as impersonal; but rather
that the religious attitude is always that of submission, the magical
attitude that of self-assertion; and that the forces which both magical
and religious practices are concerned to influence may be conceived
in either case as personal or impersonal powers. Hence the savage,
who at one time bows down before his fetish in supplication, and at
another seeks to compel its assistance by threats or spells, adopts
toward the one object alternately the religious and the magical atti-
tude. The same fundamental difference of attitude and emotion dis-
tinguishes religion from science, into which magic becomes trans-
formed as civilisation progresses.
136 The system of omens of the Romans was not only similar in gen-
eral outline to that of some existing communities, but closely resembled
in many of its details that observed at the present day by tribes of
Central Borneo—a remarkable illustration of the uniformity of the
human mind. (See paper by the author, in conjunction with Dr. C.
Hose, on “The Relations of Men and Animals in Sarawak,” Journal
of the Anthropological Institute, 1901.)
137 Fustel de Coulanges has drawn a vivid picture of the dominance of
this religion of fear in ancient Greece and Rome; he writes: “Ainsi, en
temps de paix et en temps de guerre, la religion intervenait dans tous
les actes. Elle était partout présente, elle enveloppait l’homme. L’âme,
le corps, la vie privée, la vie publique, les repas, les fêtes, les
assemblées, les tribunaux, les combats, tout etait sous l’empire de
cette religion de la cité. Elle réglait toutes les actions de l’homme,An Introduction to Social Psychology/319
disposait de tous les instants de sa vie, fixait toutes ses habitudes.
Elle gouvernait l’être humain avec une autorité si absolue qu’il ne
restait rien qui fût en dehor d’elle.... Cette religion etait un ensemble
mal lié de petites croyances, de petites pratiques, de rites minutieux.
Il n’en fallait pas chercher le sens; il n’y avait pas à réfléchir, à se
rendre compte.... La religion était un lien matériel, une chaine qui
tenait l’homme esclave. L’homme se l’était faite, et il était gouverné
par elle. Il en avait peur et n’osait ni raisonner, ni discuter, ni regarder
en face.... Ni les dieux n’aimaient l’homme, ni l’homme n’aimait ses
dieux. Il croyait a leur existence, mais il aurait parfois voulu qu’ils
n’existassent pas. Même ses dieux domestiques ou nationaux, il les
redoutait, il craignait d’être trahi par eux. Encourir la haine de ces
êtres invisibles était sa grande inquiétude. Il etait occupé toute sa vie
à les apaiser.... En effet, cette religion si com- pliquée était une source
de terreurs pour les anciens; comme la foi et la pureté des intentions
étaient peu de chose, et que toute la religion consistait dans la pra-
tique minutieuse d’innombrables prescriptions, on devait toujours
craindre d’avoir commis quelque négligence, quelque omission ou
quelque erreur, et l’on n’était jamais sûr de n’être pas sous le coup de
la colère ou de la rancune de quelque dieu.” As to the rites: “L’altération
la plus légère troublait et bouleversait la religion de la patrie, et
transformait les dieux protecteurs en autant d’ennemis cruels” (“La
Cité antique,” pp. 186–196).
138 On the great role of fear in the more primitive forms of religion,
and the decline of its influence in recent times, see an article by Pro-
fessor J. H. Leuba, “Fear, Awe, and the Sublime in Religion,” in the
American Journal of Religious Psychology vol. ii.
139 There is, of course, the higher kind of morality of the man who,
while accepting in the main the prescribed social code, attempts by
his example and precept to improve it in certain respects.
140 This contrast cannot be better illustrated than by quoting a part of
a letter from a Turkish official to an English seeker after statistical
information: “The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless.
Although I have passed all my days in this place, I have neither counted
the houses, nor inquired into the number of the inhabitants; and as to
what one person loads on his mules and the other stows away in the
bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But, above all, as to
the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt
and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of320/William McDougall
the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it. O my
soul! O my lamb! seek not after the things which concern thee not
Thou earnest with us and we welcomed thee—go in peace.... Listen,
O my son! There is no wisdom equal unto the belief in God! He
created the world, and shall we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking
to penetrate into the mysteries of His creation? Shall we say, Behold
this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth
and cometh in so many years! Let it go! He from whose hand it came
will guide and direct it.” The letter is quoted in full by Professor
James (from whom I copy) from Sir A. Layard’s “Nineveh and
Babylon.”
141 See the conclusion of Mr. A. J. Balfour’s lecture on “Decadence,”
Cambridge, 1908.
142 For a fuller discussion of the religious tendencies of primitive man,
the reader may be referred to Mr. R. R. Marett’s “Threshold of Reli-
gion” (London, 1909). In that work Mr. Marett traces back the evo-
lution of religion to a pre-animistic stage, which he proposes to de-
note by the word “animalism.” It will be seen that my own brief
sketch is in substantial agreement with his view.
143 One of the most interesting of such peoples are the Punans of Borneo,
a remarkably pleasing, gentle-mannered, handsome, and fair-skinned
race of forest-dwellers.
144 See “Comment la Route crée le Type social,” by M. Ed, Demolins.
145 “Les Lois de l’Imitation,” Paris, 1904, and “Les Lois Sociales,”
Paris, 1902.
146 Following in this respect Professor Giddings.
147 “Los Lois de l’Imitation,” p. xii.
148 The following summary account of the social operations of imita-
tion is in large part extracted from M. Tarde’s well-known treatise,
“Les Lois de l’Imitation.”
149 The last century has seen a great change in respect to the force with
which his immediate social environment bears upon the individual;
but, that the form of each man’s religious belief is determined for him
by the tradition of his society, was strictly true almost without excep-
tion in all earlier ages, and still remains true as regards the mass of
men. There has been a similar weakening as regards the influence of
political tradition, but still it is roughly true that “every little boy and
girl that’s born into this world alive is either a little liberal or else a
little conservative,” and for the most part continues so throughoutAn Introduction to Social Psychology/321
life.
150 Cf. especially Professor J. G. Frazer’s “Golden Bough.”
151 The process was going on rapidly in the islands of the Torres Straits
at the time I spent some months there ten years ago. The natives had
been converted to Christianity (nominally, at least) some twenty years
before the date of my visit.
152 “Religion of the Semites.”
153 “Die Nachahmung,” Leipzig, 1903.
154 For such a scale of instances of behaviour I would refer the reader
to my volume in the Home University Library, “Psychology, the Study
of Behaviour.”
155 To the presentation of this argument I have devoted a separate
volume (“Body and Mind, a History and Defence of Animism,” Lon-
don, 1911), to which I would refer any reader who desires to form an
opinion on this difficult question.
156 The most thorough and convincing defence of this view is to be
found in Professor James Ward’s recently published volume of Gifford
Lectures, “The Realm of Ends,” London, 1911.
157 The critics of Utilitarianism have concentrated their attack upon
this false psychological doctrine; but the student of Ethics should not
be misled into supposing that the Utilitarian principle, as the crite-
rion of the good or the right, stands or falls with psychological hedo-
nism.
158 Prof. J. H. Muirhead, for example, in his “Elements of Ethics.”
159 E.g., Prof. Muirhead, op. cit.
160 “Der Menschliche Wiles,” Berlin, 1883.
161  Series of papers in Mind. N.S. vols. ix–xiii.
162 “Psychology of the Moral Self,” p. 77.
163 Op, cit. p. 91.
164 E.g., Dr. Rashdall who writes: “It is true that the action cannot be
done unless there is an impulse to do what is right or reasonable on
our part, but such a desire may be created by the Reason which rec-
ognizes the Tightness.” (“Theory of Good and Evil,” vol. i. p. 106).—
165 “Theory of Good and Evil,” vol. i. p. 104.
166 Op. cit., vol. i. p. 121.
167 Op. cit., vol. i. p. 125.
168 Op. cit., vol. i. p. 128.
169 Under the name “Instinct of Reproduction,” which, as I now see, is
apt to mislead.322/William McDougall
170 I adhere to the description of the structure of an instinct offered in
Chapter II; but I recognize that this summary statement of the rela-
tion of the affective and conative parts of the disposition is very inad-
equate. The relation between them it more obscure and in some sense
more intimate than that between them and the cognitive part. For
purposes of exposition it would usually suffice to treat of the affec-
tive and conative parts of the disposition as forming a functional
unit.
171 Especially A. Moll (“Untersuchungen ü. d. Libido Sexualis,” Ber-
lin, 1897) and Havelock Ellis (“The Psychology of Sex,” Philadel-
phia, 1911).
172 For example, the cruelty sometimes displayed or invited in the
course of sexual relations (the extremer forms of which are known as
“Sadism” and “Masochism”) has been regarded as a component of
normal sexuality. But, as I have argued elsewhere (Proc. of Royal
Soc. of Med., Sect, of Psychiatry, 1914) these manifestations seem
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